The burger, when not being perceived, is like a burger, only one that is not being perceived. — S

What properties must a thing have to be "like" a burger?

The idealist will likely say that these properties are experiential in nature, i.e. to have a particular look, a particular smell, a particular taste, etc., and that it doesn't make sense to say that something can have a look, a smell, and a taste when not being perceived.

Presumably you disagree with the idealist's position that a burger's properties are experiential in nature? What properties, then, must a thing have to be "like" a burger (or more simply, to be a burger)?

Matter is always either thought about or perceived when people speak about it. — Noah Te Stroete

This is correct, from both a rational and epistemological point of view. It is true a human can never speak of that which is not present in thought, or present to perception. There simply is no other way for humans to speak of anything.
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In this sense, it is impossible to speak of something extra-mental. — Noah Te Stroete

Perhaps “....impossible to speak of something not first mental”, would be a more favorable thesis. Impossible to speak of something extra-mental carries the burden of implying the extra-mental is unavailable to us, which we both understand as not being the case. THAT the extra-mental is available to us is always given; WHAT the extra-mental is, that is available, may be susceptible to discussion, hence not given necessarily.

Perhaps “....impossible to speak of something not first mental”, would be a more favorable thesis — Mww

I agree.

What properties must a thing have to be "like" a burger?

The idealist will likely say that these properties are experiential in nature, i.e. to have a particular look, a particular smell, a particular taste, etc., and that it doesn't make sense to say that something can have a look, a smell, and a taste when not being perceived.

Presumably you disagree with the idealist's position that a burger's properties are experiential in nature? What properties, then, must a thing have to be "like" a burger (or more simply, to be a burger)? — Michael

Well, yes, to be clear, I certainly didn't mean qualia just because I used the word "like". I don't mean what it looks like, or tastes like, and so on. If that's what I had meant, I would have made that clear.

When I said that the burger is like a burger when it is being perceived, only the burger wouldn't be being perceived, I meant that they have some things in common. Both consist in a bread bun with a cooked meat patty made of a meat such as beef in between them. That's what a burger is. It is an object with properties. It is composed of particles.

Nothing I've just described about the burger would magically change from when it is being perceived to when it isn't being perceived. That's not how the world works. That is a fundamental misunderstanding which involves confusing our perception of the burger with the burger. That's like confusing the mashing of the potato with the potato. Both involve the same logical error of conflating two different things.

Predictably, you do not pick up on or address the error. You just ignore it, because it is me that is pointing it out, and you seem to think that anything I say is obviously wrong and not worth engaging with.

The error is confusing what we're doing with what would be going on in the hypothetical scenario. We are talking. We are thinking. We are perceiving and conceiving and so on.

That wouldn't be happening in the hypothetical scenario though, would it? There is a subtle connection that you and Noah are making or suggesting which isn't actually logical or warranted. You are both under the idealist illusion. You think that you're saying something logically relevant, but you're actually not.

None of your speaking about speaking actually addresses the point. The point was not about speaking. I spoke of a burger, I didn't speak about speak. That's another finger/moon failure right there. Another de re / de dicto failure.

That's what a burger is. It is an object with properties. It is composed of particles.

Nothing I've just described about the burger would magically change from when it is being perceived to when it isn't being perceived. That's not how the world works. — S

That's certainly the materialist's position. But the idealist disagrees with this. They are probably going to be instrumentalists rather than scientific realists when it comes to talk of particles.

That's certainly the materialist's position. But the idealist disagrees with this. They are probably going to be instrumentalists rather than scientific realists when it comes to talk of particles. — Michael

I don't doubt that they'd disagree, but they don't have good sense on their side. What is a burger? It is as I described it. It is a bread bun with a cooked meat patty made of a meat such as beef in between the bun. And that is made of particles, as the wealth of scientific evidence strongly suggests.

Note that I haven't said anything about what the burger looks like, or tastes like, and so on. I've just described what it is.

It wouldn't cease to exist. It wouldn't cease to be a burger. It wouldn't cease to have any of those properties.

And I don't buy for a second that scientific research amounts to some sort of fairytale. That particles are just a fiction, like magic beans.

I'm not suggesting that idealism can't come up with an answer. I'm saying that it's bollocks. And I'm saying that because it is. Its only value is as a quirky way of getting someone to think critically about things they might not otherwise have thought about. It is not valuable as a serious philosophy.

I think that Berkeley was one of the worst philosophers of all time. Locke was better. Kant was better, but still wrong. If you take away the veil of perception, there's still a burger.

And that is made of particles, as the wealth of scientific evidence strongly suggests. — S

I don't think it right to saying that there's empirical evidence for scientific realism. Realism and instrumentalism are two different ways to interpret scientific evidence.

I don't think it's right to say that there's empirical evidence for scientific realism. Realism and instrumentalism are two different ways to interpret scientific evidence. — Michael

Okay. And there's a plausible way and an implausible way to interpret scientific evidence. It's implausible to interpret all of the scientific evidence for particles as just a fairytale about magic beans.

Okay. And there's a plausible way and an implausible way to interpret scientific evidence. — S

History would suggest that instrumentalism would be the more reasonable approach. Or are you saying that we have good reasons to believe that we've finally figured things out for real? But then which theory has it correct? Are particles excitations of a quantum field, as quantum field theory says, or are they one-dimensional strings, as string theory says? Is gravity the curvature of space-time, as general relativity says, or is it a force mediated by gravitons, as quantum gravity says?

History would suggest that instrumentalism would be the more reasonable approach. Or are you saying that we have good reasons to believe that we've finally figured things out for real? But then which theory has it correct? Are particles excitations of a quantum field, as quantum field theory says, or are they one-dimensional strings, as string theory says? Is gravity the curvature of space-time, as general relativity says, or is it a force mediated by gravitons, as quantum gravity says? — Michael

No, history would suggest the very opposite, in spite of the fact that we haven't worked everything out. Whatever problems you raise, I can match with problems that have been solved. Entire encyclopaedias can be filled with what we've learnt about reality through science. Do you doubt that we evolved from apes? That we are apes? Even when you look a chimpanzee in the eyes?