That's fine, but then you have to explain the supposed logical relevance. It doesn't pose a problem internally for any moral relativist, and if you are trying to criticise moral relativism externally, then you must support your external premises, whatever they might be. — S
To the best of my knowledge, there is no "apart from" any subjective standard that makes any sense of morality. But there are evidently subjective standards of better and worse which can be appealed to in order to make sense of moralit — S
There is no meta-ethics; there is only ethics. — Janus
Ethics talking about itself is part of ethics, just as philosophy talking about itself is part of philosophy. Try not to be hoodwinked by the fashionable notions of 'meta" disciplines and your thinking should improve. — Janus
Relative to a subjective standard. I don't appeal outside of myself to make value judgements about whose moral judgement is better or worse. That makes zero sense. It is in fact absurd. — S
Whether it poses any problem for moral relativists doesn't matter to me, it's irrelavnat to what I am arguing. Their criterion for a particular moral standpoint should only be what they prefer and nothing more. — Janus
The point is that since that is also equally, and equally validly (within the assumptions and context of moral relativism) the sole criterion for any morally relativist argument; there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, and therefore they are all in the same boat, that is they are all equal. — Janus
Sure there are subjective standards, but as such they are all equal. — Janus
If an individual moral relativist's subjective standards of better and worse are merely based on personal preference, then all individual moral relativist's moral opinions are arbitrary beyond the fact that they are preferred. — Janus
This means that there is no need to appeal to standards of better and worse in order to make sense, on the presumption of moral relativism, of morality. — Janus
And standards of better and worse cannot consistently be appealed to in order to judge morally relativistic arguments or standpoints. — Janus
You can make judgements, but your judgements can carry no normative weight at all, and hence they are merely arbitrary, just as the judgements of all the other moral relativists are. — Janus
Firstly, if it's not a problem for me, as a moral relativist, then why should I care? — S
Secondly, it all boils down to "preference", or rather, moral feelings. Reason is but the slave of the passions, remember. — S
It is the way things are, and morality is no less functional. — S
If all you're saying is that they're all equal in kind, like how we're all equally human, then that is obvious and trivial. — S
Merely? I'm not suggesting that reason has no role, I'm suggesting that it is subservient. I am a Humean. — S
Of course there is. It is necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. That truth relies on relativism and subjectivity. It is made sense of as an evaluation. — S
I can make consist judgements. That's all that matters. Any opinion from outside which overlooks things like that are missing something important as far as I'm concerned. I don't care about your assumptions about a dispassionate observer. Morality is of the passions. — S
No, it's all just talk about ethics, which is part of the domain of ethics; there is no coherent separation. In any case it doesn't matter what you call it, the point is that within the context of moral relativism there can be no normatively compelling reason to think that morally relativistic arguments and opinions are anything other than merely arbitrary. If this were actually true of moral thought then this whole argument is irrelevant and pointless. — Janus
The simplest way to introduce a normative significance to moral arguments is to acknowledge that the purpose of mores is to bring about social harmony. It is then easy to see that moral positions that support actions that are engendered by fear, hatred, envy, and so on are not up to the task which is the foundational purpose of moral thought. — Janus
What is or isn't normatively compelling is completely irrelevant in meta-ethics. — S
You obviously care enough to argue with others about it. — Janus
I agree that moral feelings are the foundation of moral stances; or at least that feelings are. If someone cares about others and about living harmoniously with them, then they will not promote moral thoughts such as that murder, or rape, or theft, or deception is good. If someone cares nothing for others; they probably still will not promote such moral thoughts since to do so could jeopardize their security. — Janus
So, if one wants to have genuine loving relationships with others, then one would be better served by moral thoughts that are based on that love. That is an objective observation. — Janus
It is functional because people by and large are not moral relativists; most people I know think that it is not merely a matter of opinion as to whether some acts are right or wrong. — Janus
You are treating individuals as if they are isolated islands of feeling; this is wrongheaded; people are not like that at all. Most people are heavily influenced by the mores around them, and almost no one is immune to normativity. So the romantic isolated individual model that underlies moral relativism is not true to the actual conditions under which people make moral judgements. — Janus
If all you're saying is that they're all equal in kind, like how we're all equally human, then that is obvious and trivial.
— S
You can try to dismiss this point, which is so uncomfortable for what you want to believe, by calling it "trivial", but it remains a salient point. — Janus
If reason is not normatively motivated then it really is a mere slave to the passions, and as such, irrelevant. Rationality suggests 'ratio' which is basically referring to weighing or measurement, and in moral relativism there is nothing to weigh or measure reasons against. — Janus
No it isn't; not if you are merely arguing that it is better because you prefer it. And under the presumption of moral relativism you are not justified in arguing from any other criteria. — Janus
All this asserts is what your preferences and beliefs are; why should I care? — Janus
Yes, I care enough to at least analyse whether or not what you're raising is genuinely a problem — S
And if one has other priorities, then it will be different. But either way, this doesn't get to the heart of the issue. This is not the objectivity that I am rejecting. I do not see that as meta-ethically relevant, though it is relevant in some other context. — S
And besides, as has been pointed out before multiple times, it is not correct to associate moral relativism with amoralism, moral nihilism, or anarchy in the sense of chaos and disorder, indifference, everything being equal, and so on. — S
It is more about independence than isolation. — S
Then go ahead and explain it. It is salient, but it us trivial in the sense that you're preaching to the choir with no clear point beyond that. — S
But if course there is. There are our feelings and values and suchlike. That is the measurement. Reason is just a handy tool to connect things and to rationalise. But it's all fundamentally about feelings. — S
Isn't what? I'm not sure what you're referring to there.
Anyway, when I say that it is better, obviously I mean that it is better in accordance with my standard. That's what everyone effectively means, whether they realise it or not.
And what is my standard upon analysis? It is subjective. It is feelings. — S
necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. — S
Your error is to treat it as though it is like mathematics or science or something. — S
This is nonsense, since ethics is essentially a normative discipline, and so-called meta-ethics is nothing if it not a part of that. Don't be relying on your incoherent distinction to avoid trying to argue cogently for a position which cannot be argued cogently (since all arguments are normatively motivated and assessed according to normative principles). — Janus
Morality isn't anything other than what's it's good for. You seem to be confusing yourself by looking for a substantive nature of morality, instead of realizing it's nature is pragmatic. — Janus
You're a fragment of the sociocultural awkwardly expressed through the mostly compliant body of an ape. Your perceived individualism and autonomy is largely formed of retroactive confabulations designed to make the marriage between the fragment and the ape less acrimonious. There's plenty you can't do but manage to convince yourself you don't want to. — Baden
moral truth. It has nothing to do with what makes you feel good. It has everything to do with living in a community and not causing harm where possible. One should not harm community members when we depend on the community for survival, wants, and needs. — Noah Te Stroete
If we want to rule out the possibility that there is someone who has no moral preferences we do — Janus
In any case moral relativism (at least int the way you frame it) carried to its logical conclusion means that no moral stance is inherently any more valid than any other, which entails that they are all equal from that perspective. — Janus
Firstly, it should be obvious to you that I wasn't using the term 'validity' in the sense that pertains to formal logic. — Janus
And secondly if a moral stance promotes harmonious human community (which is the whole reason behind morals) then it is a more valid, that is a more appropriate and effective, response than a moral stance that promotes disharmony. — Janus
You're arguing with your own reference. — tim wood
Validity is a function of form, period. — tim wood
If you want to do some of the heavy lifting, feel free to make an argument against my position that:
Slavery is morally wrong in all circumstances, in every time, and no matter the individual that is evaluating it.
I would be interested in hearing your argument. If you feel no compulsion to change my mind, I am fine with that as well. — Rank Amateur
Once we've agreed upon starting values, there are no more meaningful relativist implications on moral debate/morality in practice. — VagabondSpectre
Not at all; it says that the essence of moral relativism as Terrapin frames it (and I'm not saying that is the only possible framing) is that all moral arguments are equal apart from individual preferences; — Janus
The very purpose of mores is to engender social harmony — Janus
It would simply amount to arguing over whether there is any evidence of the world, independently of persons, making a judgment... to the effect of "slavery is wrong."
Because aside from evidence of that, all we have is evidence of people telling us whether they feel that slavery is wrong or not, and some of them tell us that slavery isn't wrong. So their perspective is a circumstance in which slavery isn't wrong. — Terrapin Station
Ethics talking about itself is part of ethics, — Janus
It's called reason. — tim wood
a society in which murder was considered virtuous could never be a harmonious one and would not even survive for long. — Janus
under the assumption of moral relativism, no normative criteria by which one can be assessed to be better than another. — Janus
I think that if a disinterested person observed a whole bunch of moral relativists expressing their different moral opinions and arguments, she would not, in fact could not, find that there is, within the very criteria with which the moral relativists justify their own positions (which is just that they happen to prefer them) any reason to prefer one over the other. And the obvious conclusion would be that they are all equal. — Janus
there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, — Janus
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