Which has been the bane of the modern relativisitic paradigm, as opposed to......dare I say.......Enlightenment moral subjectivism, the judgements of which arises from entirely different conditions. If there is no favored disposition, in effect there is no morality at all. But we know this is false because there are harmonious communities, which presupposes a common favored morality. One must conclude some elucidations of modern relativism are incoherent, or, the tenets grounding pre-modern relativism are correct.

That's fine, but then you have to explain the supposed logical relevance. It doesn't pose a problem internally for any moral relativist, and if you are trying to criticise moral relativism externally, then you must support your external premises, whatever they might be. — S

Whether it poses any problem for moral relativists doesn't matter to me, it's irrelavnat to what I am arguing. Their criterion for a particular moral standpoint should only be what they prefer and nothing more. The point is that since that is also equally, and equally validly (within the assumptions and context of moral relativism) the sole criterion for any morally relativist argument; there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, and therefore they are all in the same boat, that is they are all equal.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no "apart from" any subjective standard that makes any sense of morality. But there are evidently subjective standards of better and worse which can be appealed to in order to make sense of moralit — S

Sure there are subjective standards, but as such they are all equal. If an individual moral relativist's subjective standards of better and worse are merely based on personal preference, then all individual moral relativist's moral opinions are arbitrary beyond the fact that they are preferred. This means that there is no need to appeal to standards of better and worse in order to make sense, on the presumption of moral relativism, of morality. And standards of better and worse cannot consistently be appealed to in order to judge morally relativistic arguments or standpoints

There is no meta-ethics; there is only ethics. — Janus

Oh come on. You can't be serious.

Ethics talking about itself is part of ethics, just as philosophy talking about itself is part of philosophy. Try not to be hoodwinked by the fashionable notions of 'meta" disciplines and your thinking should improve. — Janus

Interestingly, despite appearances, that says nothing at all. You implicitly acknowledge meta-ethics, you just don't want to call it that because amusingly you think of calling it that as some sort of fad.

Relative to a subjective standard. I don't appeal outside of myself to make value judgements about whose moral judgement is better or worse. That makes zero sense. It is in fact absurd. — S

You can make judgements, but your judgements can carry no normative weight at all, and hence they are merely arbitrary, just as the judgements of all the other moral relativists are.

as you wish, will just add it to all the other questions you dodge and deflect with ad hominem. Man up, make an argument of your own for once. Give up your default comfort level of throwing stones at others views.

Here is my view once again.

Slavery is morally wrong without regard to situation, time period, or any individual evaluation.

If you wish to man up and take the challenge and present your argument that I am wrong I'll be here.

No, it's all just talk about ethics, which is part of the domain of ethics; there is no coherent separation. In any case it doesn't matter what you call it, the point is that within the context of moral relativism there can be no normatively compelling reason to think that morally relativistic arguments and opinions are anything other than merely arbitrary. If this were actually true of moral thought then this whole argument is irrelevant and pointless.

The simplest way to introduce a normative significance to moral arguments is to acknowledge that the purpose of mores is to bring about social harmony. It is then easy to see that moral positions that support actions that are engendered by fear, hatred, envy, and so on are not up to the task which is the foundational purpose of moral thought.

Whether it poses any problem for moral relativists doesn't matter to me, it's irrelavnat to what I am arguing. Their criterion for a particular moral standpoint should only be what they prefer and nothing more. — Janus

Firstly, if it's not a problem for me, as a moral relativist, then why should I care?

Secondly, it all boils down to "preference", or rather, moral feelings. Reason is but the slave of the passions, remember? That is one of the most important lessons to learn in moral philosophy, if not the most important.

The point is that since that is also equally, and equally validly (within the assumptions and context of moral relativism) the sole criterion for any morally relativist argument; there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, and therefore they are all in the same boat, that is they are all equal. — Janus

That every single individual moral agent, irrespective of their meta-ethical or normative stance, fundamentally appeals to their moral feelings or subjective evaluation in reaching moral judgements or conclusions about what's better or worse does not imply that all of these judgements and evaluations are all treated as equal in any sense which poses any problem for moral relativism. That "we're all in the same boat" and that "we're all equal" in the sense that we're all confined to subjectivity is precisely my point. I don't know why you'd be preaching to the choir or suggesting that that's somehow a big problem. It is not problem at all. It is the way things are, and morality is no less functional. It is functional so long as we are moral agents capable of moral judgement. Morality isn't functional based on misguided romantic notions about a "harmonious society".

Sure there are subjective standards, but as such they are all equal. — Janus

If all you're saying is that they're all equal in kind, like how we're all equally human, then that is obvious and trivial.

If an individual moral relativist's subjective standards of better and worse are merely based on personal preference, then all individual moral relativist's moral opinions are arbitrary beyond the fact that they are preferred. — Janus

Merely? Arbitrary? I'm not suggesting that reason has no role, I'm suggesting that it is subservient. I am a Humean.

"'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger".

This means that there is no need to appeal to standards of better and worse in order to make sense, on the presumption of moral relativism, of morality. — Janus

Of course there is. It is necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. That truth relies on relativism and subjectivity. It is made sense of as an evaluation.

And standards of better and worse cannot consistently be appealed to in order to judge morally relativistic arguments or standpoints. — Janus

I can and do make consistent judgements. That's all that matters. Any opinion from outside which overlooks things like that are missing something important as far as I'm concerned. I don't care about your assumptions about a dispassionate observer. Morality is of the passions.

You can make judgements, but your judgements can carry no normative weight at all, and hence they are merely arbitrary, just as the judgements of all the other moral relativists are. — Janus

But they can and do. Just look around. That's how morality works. That's what it is. It is just people making judgements, approving and disapproving, expressing emotions and sometimes using reason to explain themselves, but often that isn't even part of it. The average person isn't much like a philosopher when it comes to ethics, and especially not a rationalist philosopher. And especially not like Kant! It is laughable to think of the average person reasoning in accordance with the categorical imperative!

Typically, you could probably get enough just from body language alone on things like cruelty to animals or child abuse. The foundation in moral feelings is very evident.

Firstly, if it's not a problem for me, as a moral relativist, then why should I care? — S

You obviously care enough to argue with others about it.

Secondly, it all boils down to "preference", or rather, moral feelings. Reason is but the slave of the passions, remember. — S

I agree that moral feelings are the foundation of moral stances; or at least that feelings are. If someone cares about others and about living harmoniously with them, then they will not promote moral thoughts such as that murder, or rape, or theft, or deception is good. If someone cares nothing for others; they probably still will not promote such moral thoughts since to do so could jeopardize their security.

So, if one wants to have genuine loving relationships with others, then one would be better served by moral thoughts that are based on that love. That is an objective observation.

It is the way things are, and morality is no less functional. — S

It is functional because people by and large are not moral relativists; most people I know think that it is not merely a matter of opinion as to whether some acts are right or wrong. You are treating individuals as if they are isolated islands of feeling; this is wrongheaded; people are not like that at all. Most people are heavily influenced by the mores around them, and almost no one is immune to normativity. So the romantic isolated individual model that underlies moral relativism is not true to the actual conditions under which people make moral judgements.

If all you're saying is that they're all equal in kind, like how we're all equally human, then that is obvious and trivial. — S

You can try to dismiss this point, which is so uncomfortable for what you want to believe, by calling it "trivial", but it remains a salient point.

Merely? I'm not suggesting that reason has no role, I'm suggesting that it is subservient. I am a Humean. — S

If reason is not normatively motivated then it really is a mere slave to the passions, and as such, irrelevant. Rationality suggests 'ratio' which is basically referring to weighing or measurement, and in moral relativism there is nothing to weigh or measure reasons against.

Of course there is. It is necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. That truth relies on relativism and subjectivity. It is made sense of as an evaluation. — S

No it isn't; not if you are merely arguing that it is better because you prefer it. And under the presumption of moral relativism you are not justified in arguing from any other criteria.

I can make consist judgements. That's all that matters. Any opinion from outside which overlooks things like that are missing something important as far as I'm concerned. I don't care about your assumptions about a dispassionate observer. Morality is of the passions. — S

All this asserts is what your preferences and beliefs are; why should I care?

No, the reality is that people don't see themselves as isolated subjects preferring moral positions like they might prefer different foods. People don't see themselves that way and nor are they that way. Your view is misleadingly simplistic.

No, it's all just talk about ethics, which is part of the domain of ethics; there is no coherent separation. In any case it doesn't matter what you call it, the point is that within the context of moral relativism there can be no normatively compelling reason to think that morally relativistic arguments and opinions are anything other than merely arbitrary. If this were actually true of moral thought then this whole argument is irrelevant and pointless. — Janus

What is or isn't normatively compelling is completely irrelevant in meta-ethics.

The simplest way to introduce a normative significance to moral arguments is to acknowledge that the purpose of mores is to bring about social harmony. It is then easy to see that moral positions that support actions that are engendered by fear, hatred, envy, and so on are not up to the task which is the foundational purpose of moral thought. — Janus

Lol. The normative is of significance in normative ethics, not meta-ethics.

You are making a very good example of why the distinction matters.

What is or isn't normatively compelling is completely irrelevant in meta-ethics. — S

This is nonsense, since ethics is essentially a normative discipline, and so-called meta-ethics is nothing if it not a part of that. Don't be relying on your incoherent distinction to avoid trying to argue cogently for a position which cannot be argued cogently (since all arguments are normatively motivated and assessed according to normative principles).

You obviously care enough to argue with others about it. — Janus

Boy, this is very "meta" now. Yes, I care enough to at least analyse whether or not what you're raising is genuinely a problem and respond with the results of my analysis, and then argue in support of my conclusion and so on.

I mean, we can take this to a meta-meta-meta-meta... level if you really want to. You keep ironically reinforcing the distinction you've explicitly denied.

I agree that moral feelings are the foundation of moral stances; or at least that feelings are. If someone cares about others and about living harmoniously with them, then they will not promote moral thoughts such as that murder, or rape, or theft, or deception is good. If someone cares nothing for others; they probably still will not promote such moral thoughts since to do so could jeopardize their security. — Janus

Okay. On that we agree at least.

So, if one wants to have genuine loving relationships with others, then one would be better served by moral thoughts that are based on that love. That is an objective observation. — Janus

And if one has other priorities, then it will be different. But either way, this doesn't get to the heart of the issue. This is not the objectivity that I am rejecting. I do not see that as meta-ethically relevant, though it is relevant in some other context.

It is functional because people by and large are not moral relativists; most people I know think that it is not merely a matter of opinion as to whether some acts are right or wrong. — Janus

But this is where meta-ethical beliefs are irrelevant. The distinction between what is the case meta-ethically, what people meta-ethically believe, and what people normatively believe in ethics, is very important and very useful. The key point is that morality functions in spite of the meta-ethics.

And besides, as has been pointed out before multiple times, it is not correct to associate moral relativism with amoralism, moral nihilism, or anarchy in the sense of chaos and disorder, indifference, everything being equal, and so on. Again, this is a common misperception. It is just as functional as simplistic notions of morality per moral absolutism. Moral judgement doesn't lose any force, it doesn't mean that there's no right or wrong or better or worse. It actually interprets those terms in a way that makes them meaningful and true, unlike the nonsense and falsehood of moral absolutism and moral objectivism.

You are treating individuals as if they are isolated islands of feeling; this is wrongheaded; people are not like that at all. Most people are heavily influenced by the mores around them, and almost no one is immune to normativity. So the romantic isolated individual model that underlies moral relativism is not true to the actual conditions under which people make moral judgements. — Janus

No, you misunderstand and are not representing my position well. It is more about independence than isolation. I rectified these errors in understanding earlier on in my exchange with T Clark. I acknowledge external influential factors. They are not primary. Demonstrably so in many cases. T Clark weakly appealed to factors like the government and religion. He couldn't have been any more wrong if he tried in my case! I am strongly anti- the current government, and anti- much of the prevalent religion in my society, namely Christianity. These are not the primary determining factors in my morality. I know that better than you. You are on the outside trying to glimpse inside. That is pretty naive.

If all you're saying is that they're all equal in kind, like how we're all equally human, then that is obvious and trivial.
— S

You can try to dismiss this point, which is so uncomfortable for what you want to believe, by calling it "trivial", but it remains a salient point. — Janus

Then go ahead and explain it. It is salient, but it is trivial in the sense that you're preaching to the choir with no clear point beyond that.

If reason is not normatively motivated then it really is a mere slave to the passions, and as such, irrelevant. Rationality suggests 'ratio' which is basically referring to weighing or measurement, and in moral relativism there is nothing to weigh or measure reasons against. — Janus

But of course there is. There are our feelings and values and suchlike. That is what we're weighing up moral considerations against. It is our compass. Reason is just a handy tool to connect things and to rationalise. But it's all fundamentally about feelings.

No it isn't; not if you are merely arguing that it is better because you prefer it. And under the presumption of moral relativism you are not justified in arguing from any other criteria. — Janus

Isn't what? I'm not sure what you're referring to there.

Anyway, when I say that it is better, obviously I mean that it is better in accordance with my standard. That's what everyone effectively means, whether they realise it or not.

And what is my standard upon analysis? It is subjective. It is feelings.

Moral objectivism doesn't have a leg to stand on.

All this asserts is what your preferences and beliefs are; why should I care? — Janus

You don't have to, but that's simply what morality is. We express our thoughts and feelings about the stuff of ethics, stuff we tend to care about a lot. Your error is to treat it as though it is like mathematics or science or something. It isn't. It is more like psychology. Rationalist interpretations of morality are categorically mistaken, and have been dead in the water since Hume.

Yes, I care enough to at least analyse whether or not what you're raising is genuinely a problem — S

But if your morality were based only on your personal preferences, and you were satisfied with that then nothing anyone raises could be a problem for you, then no argument could be against your position and hence would not be worth arguing against. It would be like arguing that your preference for beef over lamb was somehow mistaken.

To discuss anything is to seek normative agreement, For anything to be worth arguing over is for it to be potentially subject to normative agreement, but that is impossible in the case of moral relativism.

So to answer what might be considered to be the meta-ethical question "What do moral judgements consist in?" with something like "They are nothing more than personal preferences", is to ignore the reality of cultural and normative influences on the individual.

And further to that if they were nothing more than personal preferences based on feeling (and I am not denying that they are that, only that they are not nothing more than that) then they are not properly moral at all, since they would then have no moral significance. In other words you would just be acting, not morally, but as your feelings dictate, just as animals do. (This is not to deny that the instinctive behavior of animals towards their own kind is not normative and cannot be seen as a kind of quasi-morality).

And if one has other priorities, then it will be different. But either way, this doesn't get to the heart of the issue. This is not the objectivity that I am rejecting. I do not see that as meta-ethically relevant, though it is relevant in some other context. — S

What "other (moral) priorities" could one who wishes to live in society have? The whole idea of morality consists in thinking of others. So if you had. for example, an "other priority" that consisted in exploiting others without consideration for their feelings or welfare, then that would amount to thinking only about yourself and your own feelings, and hence would not count as moral at all, but rather amoral. If someone acts against their own moral principles, then they are acting immorally. If someone has no moral principles, which would be the case if someone were to kill people without remorse, then they would be acting amorally.

And besides, as has been pointed out before multiple times, it is not correct to associate moral relativism with amoralism, moral nihilism, or anarchy in the sense of chaos and disorder, indifference, everything being equal, and so on. — S

I may have been pointed out, but it is not compelling; it just doesn't stand up to scrutiny. If moral relativism consists in saying that it is OK to believe whatever is in accordance with your feelings about how to act towards others, then that just is an amoral, morally nihilistic, anarchic view. In that sense the very idea of moral relativism is a contradiction in terms.

It is more about independence than isolation. — S

I don't believe that individuals are morally independent in any significant sense. I made this point before to Terrapin; an artist is not isolated from influence, but they may be creatively independent in the sense that they can produce an original synthesis. This is not the case with moral stances; there are no original stances when it comes to questions about the rightness of murder, rape, theft, deception and so on. There is really very little variation on those generic question other than for or against, and actually there is even less variation than that since almost everyone is against murder, rape, theft and deception.

Then go ahead and explain it. It is salient, but it us trivial in the sense that you're preaching to the choir with no clear point beyond that. — S

It is not merely that they are "equal in kind", but that they are equal insofar as on the presumption of moral relativism there is no rational reason to prefer one over the other. The fact that moral relativists do prefer one over the other does not indicate that there are any rational justifications for any of those preferences, because they are preferences based only on self-interest or feeling.

But if course there is. There are our feelings and values and suchlike. That is the measurement. Reason is just a handy tool to connect things and to rationalise. But it's all fundamentally about feelings. — S

There is no need for rational justification if you are a moral relativist, because you are simply following your feelings. If those feelings happen to be kind, then good, but that does not make them moral. Animals have kind feelings towards their own; does that make them moral beings? Something more is needed, and that something more consists in thinking that it is important to care about your fellows, even if you don't naturally feel that way.

Isn't what? I'm not sure what you're referring to there.

Anyway, when I say that it is better, obviously I mean that it is better in accordance with my standard. That's what everyone effectively means, whether they realise it or not.

And what is my standard upon analysis? It is subjective. It is feelings. — S

Isn't what? Isn't

necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. — S

because if you are a consistent moral relativist you won't expect anyone to be interested in your reasons for your moral judgements since they are merely based on your feelings and not on any normative considerations. In fact it isn't possible for you, as a consistent moral relativist, to 'explain the truth in (your) claim that (your) moral judgement is better than someone else's" because any such explanation will necessarily appeal to normative values that you have no business appealing to. All you could consistently say is "I feel my moral judgement is better than yours, so there!" to which the other will likely retort "So what?".

Your error is to treat it as though it is like mathematics or science or something. — S

No, I don't treat it like that at all. As I said a few times moral philosophy is more an art than a science, and similarly as with aesthetics there are qualities which determine the value of works that are more than merely a matter of personal preference, even though, since art has no strict utility, it is even harder than it is with ethics to say precisely what those qualities are.

This sounds interesting. I am not familiar with pre-modern moral subjectivism, so I'll have to research a bit before responding. :smile:

This is nonsense, since ethics is essentially a normative discipline, and so-called meta-ethics is nothing if it not a part of that. Don't be relying on your incoherent distinction to avoid trying to argue cogently for a position which cannot be argued cogently (since all arguments are normatively motivated and assessed according to normative principles). — Janus

No, that's nonsense, and is the cause of much of your confusion. It is about ethics. It has a different aim to normative ethics. It aims to explain what morality is, not what it is good for, which is that same mistake someone else made earlier. Saying that a particular meta-ethical framework is better or valuable or does more good than another because it leads to more beneficial consequences, given your personal value about a harmonious society, will continue to be fallacious, given the context, which is not what is good, or most good, but rather what is the case.

I appreciate that you've put a lot of work into a lengthy response and somehow the few paragraphs I'm going to offer back does not seem to do it justice, but I think we've reached a point where we are just repeating ourselves, and mainly with paradigmatic statements, not arguments.

I get what you're saying, but I disagree. I think that, in the fields where moral decisions are made, the 'way the world is' is sufficiently complex that no single model stands out as being objectively best with the clarity you believe. Of course, there are models which are so bad they can be discarded from consideration, but that still leaves most options that normal adult humans consider, in play.

My reasons for this are;

Moral positions relate to the effect actions have on people. Fields covering the effects on people are mainly psychology, sociology and human biology. None of these fields has the rigour of basic physics (or even chemistry) and to treat them as such is a mistake. Models can, and frequently do, come completely undone as new information emerges, and multiple models exist simultaneously.

Models are devised and popularised by human beings and human beings are not perfect rational creatures, they are subject to bias, ignorance and error. Multiplying the number of people involved may limit error, but there is no good reason to believe it will limit bias because in many cases all those involved will share the same bias. All medical researchers, for example, have invested in a career in medicine. Every single one of them has a bias in favour of the value of a medical solution to a problem because they have dedicated their lives to that very thing.

Most models are complex. This means they rapidly become quite unpredictable over long periods of time. Even your sacred cow of the success of vaccination has only been measured over a few decades. What about 100 years, 1000 years? Do you think anyone has any hope of reliably predicting the effects on societies over those timescales?

Most models are multivariate and, given their complexity, this makes them extremely vulnerable to minor variations in starting conditions, especially over the long term. We can quite accurately predict the weather tomorrow. We can have a good guess at the weather next week. We haven't a clue what the weather will be this time next month. You keep referring to similar starting values, without taking proper account of the plural. If our only goal were dental health, then maybe brushing our teeth is objectively the way to go about it, but that is never our only goal. You use this nebulous concept of 'utility' but how do you define that, and what of the others who will inevitably disagree with your definition? What we want of a 'perfect' society, is actually a very broad collection of states.

Basically my feeling is that, in the face of such uncertainty, feeling good about one's decisions is more important than the extremely fragile result of some utilitarian calculus. That's not to say that these models are useless, far from it. I think it vitally important that when one's approach is overwhelmingly contradicted by the evidence, one is well advised to change it, but the key word here is 'overwhelmingly'. Not only is a preponderance of evidence not enough, but most of importantly, I personally must be overwhelmed by it, not others telling me I should be.

Morality isn't anything other than what's it's good for. You seem to be confusing yourself by looking for a substantive nature of morality, instead of realizing it's nature is pragmatic.

Morality isn't anything other than what's it's good for. You seem to be confusing yourself by looking for a substantive nature of morality, instead of realizing it's nature is pragmatic. — Janus

I conclude from that that you don't know what morality is, or you deliberately conflate two different things, which is illogical. The error is clear to see with an analogy. What you're doing is like answering the question of what a drill is by saying that a drill is good for making holes. That's absurd, as it clearly doesn't answer the question, it treats it as though it was a different question. A drill is not a "good for making holes": that's its purpose or design or a benefit of it. It is an object made of materials like plastic and metal.

You're a fragment of the sociocultural awkwardly expressed through the mostly compliant body of an ape. Your perceived individualism and autonomy is largely formed of retroactive confabulations designed to make the marriage between the fragment and the ape less acrimonious. There's plenty you can't do but manage to convince yourself you don't want to. — Baden

:smile:

moral truth. It has nothing to do with what makes you feel good. It has everything to do with living in a community and not causing harm where possible. One should not harm community members when we depend on the community for survival, wants, and needs. — Noah Te Stroete

Well put. I'm not convinced that the strictures societies place upon their members are moral laws, though. I think they're just pragmatic strictures, put in place because they were found (by society) to be necessary for social and co-operative living. I suppose we can call them what the hell we like, but I see more pragmatism than morality. YMMV, of course. :wink:

If we want to rule out the possibility that there is someone who has no moral preferences we do — Janus

You seem to be conflating the idea of empirical evidence and "proof." You want certainty of the claim, not just evidence of it. But (a) we can't actually prove empirical claims, (2) surveying every single person wouldn't provide empirical proof even if it were possible (to prove empirical claims), because, for example (i) someone could be dishonest in their survey responses, and (ii) their view can change over time, so even if people couldn't be dishonest, we'd need to survey everyone all the time.

In any case moral relativism (at least int the way you frame it) carried to its logical conclusion means that no moral stance is inherently any more valid than any other, which entails that they are all equal from that perspective. — Janus

??? I did address that, I just didn't quote your text when I addressed it. Here's a copy/paste of my response to that:

"Both inherent properties and validity are category errors here, so that's hardly a criticism of moral relativism.

"But yeah, from a perspective that's completely irrelevant to morality, and completely irrelevant to any person's view, all moral stances are equal."

If that's what you're referring to re it seeming like gibberish to you, just clarify that.

Firstly, it should be obvious to you that I wasn't using the term 'validity' in the sense that pertains to formal logic. — Janus

That's the only sense in which I use that term. Hence, especially if folks are using a sense not related to truth (if the sense is related to truth it's a category error), my asking for clarification from others above re just what sense they're using.

And secondly if a moral stance promotes harmonious human community (which is the whole reason behind morals) then it is a more valid, that is a more appropriate and effective, response than a moral stance that promotes disharmony. — Janus

This simply ignores my comments about harmoniousness (if normative), re preferring harmoniousness, and the same thing would go for appropriateness and whatever non-truth sense of validity you might be using. You're talking about preferences that people have.

You're arguing with your own reference. — tim wood

What is (at least an example of) my disagreement with it a la a quote that I'm disagreeing with?

The last post of mine addressed to you prior to this was simply a service, a more complete/detailed explanation of the ideas.

Validity is a function of form, period. — tim wood

Again, I said nothing suggesting otherwise.

If you want to do some of the heavy lifting, feel free to make an argument against my position that:

Slavery is morally wrong in all circumstances, in every time, and no matter the individual that is evaluating it.

I would be interested in hearing your argument. If you feel no compulsion to change my mind, I am fine with that as well. — Rank Amateur

It would simply amount to arguing over whether there is any evidence of the world, independently of persons, making a judgment (or whatever word you'd want to substitute that doesn't imply persons doing something) to the effect of "slavery is wrong."

Because aside from evidence of that, all we have is evidence of people telling us whether they feel that slavery is wrong or not, and some of them tell us that slavery isn't wrong. So their perspective is a circumstance in which slavery isn't wrong.

But if there's evidence that the world outside of persons makes such judgments (or whatever we want to call them), then we could at least say that the person who said "slavery isn't wrong" got what the world is like incorrect, assuming that's what they were trying to do, assuming they were trying to match what the world is like independently of them.

Once we've agreed upon starting values, there are no more meaningful relativist implications on moral debate/morality in practice. — VagabondSpectre

That's really only going to work if the "starting values" are pretty specific. It wouldn't work if the starting value was something like "it's is morally wrong to harm people," because people are going to disagree on what amounts to harm with a normative connotation, they're going to say things like, "Where there are competing interests, someone is going to be harmed no matter what we do, so we need to invoke a caluculus" and then they'll disagree on the relative weights of things, and so on.

Not at all; it says that the essence of moral relativism as Terrapin frames it (and I'm not saying that is the only possible framing) is that all moral arguments are equal apart from individual preferences; — Janus

I'd agree that all moral arguments are equal from any objective perspective, but I'd add that an objective perspective is a category error when we're talking about morality.

It's no different than saying something like "All flavors of ice cream are identical to the pavement." That's true in a sense, but only because pavement is the sort of thing that can't taste anything at all, so there are going to be no flavors to the pavement. Focusing on pavement when we're talking about flavors is a category error. When we're talking about flavors, we need to talk about the sort(s) of thing that are capable of taste.

The very purpose of mores is to engender social harmony — Janus

The purpose according to whom? Or are you going to make a category error there, too? People are the only sorts of things that have purposes.

It would simply amount to arguing over whether there is any evidence of the world, independently of persons, making a judgment... to the effect of "slavery is wrong."

Because aside from evidence of that, all we have is evidence of people telling us whether they feel that slavery is wrong or not, and some of them tell us that slavery isn't wrong. So their perspective is a circumstance in which slavery isn't wrong. — Terrapin Station

It's called reason. We know some folks here repeat the Humean claim "reason is the slave of passion," but that a quote from a text that does not here apply, by someone who has not troubled to understand it (or they do, and are here just being wicked).

Reason is not feeling. If all it were, were feeling, then you'd have a case, but on there being a difference between reason and feeling, your case evaporates.

If you depend on "perspectives" - what does that mean btw? - then you will find circles that look like squares, and similar impossible oddities that are only resolved by recognizing the limitations and deceptive possibilities of "perspectives."

I asked you earlier if you accepted reason and if it "had a place at this table." You can answer any time.

Ethics talking about itself is part of ethics, — Janus

"Talk about what ethics is ontologically," "talk about how we can know ethical stances," etc. is conventionally named "metaethics." If you don't like calling it that, that's fine, but conventionally that's what it's called.

It's called reason. — tim wood

And would you claim that reason is something that occurs independently of persons?

(I don't want to ignore the rest of your post, but I don't want to overlook the question I just asked you above, either)

a society in which murder was considered virtuous could never be a harmonious one and would not even survive for long. — Janus

First, this is pure speculation, and it's dubious at that. But we can ignore that, and ignore the problems with a term like "harmonious" and just say as a given that it's a fact that a society in which murder was considered virtuous could not survive for long.

The question then is, "Well, so what?" How does that fact have any implication for anything?

under the assumption of moral relativism, no normative criteria by which one can be assessed to be better than another. — Janus

I have no idea where you'd be getting that idea from. Has any moral relativist ever said anything like that? Under moral relativism, normative criteria are relative (and subjective on the subjectivist brand of moral relativism).

I think that if a disinterested person observed a whole bunch of moral relativists expressing their different moral opinions and arguments, she would not, in fact could not, find that there is, within the very criteria with which the moral relativists justify their own positions (which is just that they happen to prefer them) any reason to prefer one over the other. And the obvious conclusion would be that they are all equal. — Janus

A hypothetical person with no preferences would indeed not be able to find a reason to prefer one moral stance over the other, no matter what the person were to look at. The very idea of that doesn't make any sense. We'd be wondering if a person who has no preferences in domain D might gain preferences in domain D as an implication or upshot of examining some set of facts (such as the fact that J prefers m, K prefers n, etc.), or the fact that A causes B. They wouldn't, because no set of facts implies any preference. That's just the point. So it's an argument in favor of the relativist position, not an argument against it.

The person might develop preferences based on simple exposure to something they weren't previously familiar with (if John never heard jazz before and then starts listening to a lot of jazz, he might develop (or learn he had) preferences for some of it), but that's a factor of how their brain works, and then it would turn out that it's not true that the person has no preferences after all.

there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, — Janus

As if anyone prefers anything for a reason other than preferences.