Most of the things you say are too simpleminded to bother responding to, because I know you will just come back with some more simpleminded shit, and it will never stop it seems. So what could be in it for me?

Of course, but so what? Those people exist and share attitudes, don't they? Shared attitudes which will be more or less suitable to the flourishing of communities, no?

What does that mean? "Imbued in us"? — creativesoul

An undeveloped albeit intrinsic quality present at birth.

Are you claiming that you, as a human, do not have any emotional content within your reasoning? — creativesoul

No. I’m saying I can Reason with respect to emotion when it’s called for. Feelings are not cognitions, which is why they have no object of their own. The body supplies the object, re: tears, butterflies, sheer delight or sheer adrenaline rush....whatever. One never thinks......is this where I’m supposed put a smile on my face? Is this the right time to cuss the bad guy, applaud the good guy?

Reason with respect to emotion enters the stage when the response expected, or considered appropriate, doesn’t conform to the feeling, re: being punished (remorse) for something you didn’t do (anger), or, what’s worse, being given credit (pride) for something you didn’t do (shame).

Community schcommunity. My flourishing is more important to me than the flourishing of the herd. I am a strong-minded individual, not a sheep. Herd-morality is wrong relative to my morality whenever it conflicts with what's good for me. It has nothing to do with what's detrimental to the flourishing of the herd. And herd-morality isn't whatever is beneficial to the flourishing of the herd, it is whatever the herd judges to be right or wrong. I was hoping earlier that historically factual examples of herd-morality would actually get you to think and to see the error in this type of thinking. What if, for example, you were a slave in a society where master-morality was predominant? The herd would go along with that, because slaves are good to have. They would see slaves as a lower class that aren't valuable except for their utility. If they disobey, it is justifiable to punish them harshly. How does that morality sit with your individual sense of right and wrong? Is the herd right or are you right?

Right so morality consists in intersubjective participation. It exists for the purposes of the community; to protect individuals from harm so that there can be a community. That doesn't mean that individuals cannot have there own moral feelings and dispositions, but if those feelings and dispositions are at variance with the community to any significant extent, the individual will at best be a sociopath, clinging to the fringes of his or her community while secretly or not so secretly trying to undermine it, and at worst will be a criminal or an outcast with little or no community at all.

Yes, I accept that that's your own personal romantic vision of an ideal end towards which morality should be directed. But that's all it is, and you can't force agreement.

You're kidding yourself if you think you can survive without the community. What will you do for food and shelter, not to mention companionship? Nothing is stopping you from going to live as a hermit. This "strong-minded indivdiual" is just posturing!

Herd morality that doesn't benefit the herd will not last for long. Some brilliant individual(s) will come along and overthrow it. Human communal life is always a work in progress. The main point anyway is that when it comes to the central moral issues (murder, rape, torture, and so on) there is little to no variance within or across communities. That is because murder, rape, torture and so on cannot be generally approved of and widely practiced without destroying community. That is an objective fact. You allude to Nietzsche; where did he ever condone such acts?

The things you say are too simpleminded to bother responding to — Janus

Yeah, I'm sure that's the reason that you can't come up with a better rebuttal. Sign me up for that bridge you're selling, too.

Of course, but so what? — Janus

So that's what we're referring to by this being subjective rather than objective. And that's what makes it not factually correct or not (to prefer one thing to another).

Those people exist and share attitudes, don't they? — Janus

Sure. But that's nothing objective, and nothing correct versus incorrect.

Shared attitudes which will be more or less suitable to the flourishing of communities, no?

Per how they're defining "flourishing," sure. But what of it? That doesn't make anything objective or correct morally.

It's not my personal vision; it's a general phenomenological fact of community. If you don't think so, then provide some counter-examples.

Sure. But that's nothing objective, and nothing correct versus incorrect. — Terrapin Station

It is objectively so that they share the attitudes, and the effects such shared attitudes have on communities are objectively so, and communities are objectively more or less harmonious or riddled with conflict.

Per how they're defining "flourishing," sure. But what of it? That doesn't make anything objective or correct morally. — Terrapin Station

Flourishing versus declining is, when it comes to communities. equivalent to solidarity versus division, harmony versus conflict and these can be observed at work within communities, in other words they are empirically assessable. If some moral attitude increases conflict within community, then it is incorrect; it is the wrong strategy.

It's obviously your personal vision. It's a vision, and it's coming from you personally. I don't even think that this discussion is about that sort of thing, I think you veer off-topic when you talk about what you think the purpose of morality should be.

And also, given that the "sociopath" dismissal has long since been exposed and refuted without any attempt at rebuttal, I don't know why you are repeating it: a) you're not qualified to make that diagnosis, and b) it's basically just an ad hom.

It is objectively so that they share the attitudes, and the effects such shared attitudes have on communities are objectively so, and communities are objectively more or less harmonious or riddled with conflict. — Janus

But that's just changing the topic. The topic is whether moral stances themselves are subjective or objective, and whether moral stances qua moral stances can be correct/incorrect.

No one is arguing that people don't really share attitudes (etc.) when they do, or that behavior isn't what it is, or that the states of communities aren't what they are.

These things are all perfectly obvious to anyone who allows themselves to see them, so, no, it's not just my "personal vision". Of course, it's coming from me personally, but so what? That sounds like Terrapin's stupid simplistic definition of "subjective" as being in or of minds. Of course subjectivity is that trivially, within a certain definition and set of presuppositions, but it is also much more than that, because individuals are embedded within their communities.

It's becoming tedious to argue with you, like it is with terrapin, because you both refuse to address any points as they are made, but instead distort them so that you can attack them within the context of your own inadequate presuppositions. No one can stop you from continuing to do that; so no matter waht I say you can always come back with some shit or other. But there's no point to that.

Of course subjectivity is that trivially, within a certain definition and set of presuppositions, but it is also much more than that, because individuals are embedded within their communities. — Janus

Obviously I'm not saying anything like "individuals are not embedded within their communities." The only thing that would be simpleminded is thinking that I'm saying anything at all like that.

The problem is that being embedded in your community doesn't make mental phenomena communal phenomena. Mental phenomena, qua mental phenomena, still only occurs in individuals. And moral stances are mental phenomena.

It's just like, say, ice phenomena, qua ice phenomena, only occur in or "of" water. But obviously the water in question is embedded in a non-water environment, which has various influences on the ice phenomena in question. And it would be ridiculous to assume that anyone is supposing that the water in question isn't embedded in an environment. But guess what? Ice phenomena are still only in or "of" water. (Simplifying of course so that we're not talking about other types of ice.)

But that's just changing the topic. The topic is whether moral stances themselves are subjective or objective, and whether moral stances qua moral stances can be correct/incorrect. — Terrapin Station

I have never claimed that moral stances are "correct/ incorrect" in themselves. What could that even mean? You argue that they are correct or incorrect only in relation to individuals; and I say that is simplistic, because individuals are not isolated entities, but are embedded in communities, and that therefore moral stances are correct or incorrect, or more aptly suitable or unsuitable, relative to communities. I have also argued that there are central moral dispositions which are virtually universal within and across communities. If you don't agree all you need to do is provide some counterexamples; of communities that condoned murder, rape, torture and so on of their own citizens.

Mental phenomena, qua mental phenomena, still only occurs in individuals. And moral stances are mental phenomena. — Terrapin Station

This is simpleminded. It is based on seeing individuals as self-contained atoms, and ignoring the fact that everything we can say about individuals' mental lives is the result of culture; a shared phenomenon.

And the moral stance that says that it is only the individual that matters is itself an unsuitable disposition for the flourishing of community.

Ice phenomena are still only in or "of" water. (Simplifying of course so that we're not talking about other types of ice.) — Terrapin Station

Another example of simpleminded thinking! "Ice phenomena" are of the whole various sets of conditions that give rise to them. Water is not isolated from the environment any more than we are isolated form our communities and the wider world of nature. You would benefit from studying some ecology, it might provide some correctives to your simplistic nonsense.

You're kidding yourself if you think you can survive without the community. What will you do for food and shelter, not to mention companionship? Nothing is stopping you from going to live as a hermit. This "strong-minded indivdiual" is just posturing! — Janus

Straw man alert! I said nothing whatsoever about surviving without the community. Try again. I said "strong-minded individual", not "isolated hermit" or "Bear Grylls wannabe"!

Herd morality that doesn't benefit the herd will not last for long. — Janus

Again, herd-morality has nothing necessarily to do with what's beneficial or detrimental to the flourishing of the herd. It is just whatever the herd judges to be right or wrong.

And it's not true that a morality which doesn't benefit the herd won't last long. It has lasted since the very beginnings of humanity right up to the present day. Non-cooperative strategies have been around for about as long as cooperative strategies, and if the former had a zero success rate, then it would have disappeared a long, long time ago, but it very obviously hasn't. It's what capitalism is built on, for heavens sake! Competition. What you must mean instead is that it won't dominate, but that suggests an ignorance of history and of global affairs. There are countless examples of master-morality dominating a society, and holding on to the reins of power for significant periods of time. Do I even need to give examples?

I'm afraid your points about being overthrown, community goals being a work in progress, murder, rape, and so on, and about approval, and destroying a community, and what Nietzsche did or didn't condone, all completely miss my point.

My point is simple enough. It's about what matters to me, as an individual, in an ethical context. It's about what or who I am subservient to, and that is not the herd, not for my sense of right or wrong. They can only try to influence my morality, and either fail or succeed in doing so. They cannot dictate morality to me, because I am an autonomous moral agent and a strong-minded individual. I am neither sheep nor slave, but master of my own morality. You can deny and argue until the cows come home, but the fact of the matter is that I know myself better than you do. You're stuck on the outside, trying to peer in from a distance.

@Janus, by the way, you haven't answered the following:

And herd-morality isn't whatever is beneficial to the flourishing of the herd, it is whatever the herd judges to be right or wrong. I was hoping earlier that historically factual examples of herd-morality would actually get you to think and to see the error in this type of thinking. What if, for example, you were a slave in a society where master-morality was predominant? The herd would go along with that, because slaves are good to have. They would see slaves as a lower class that aren't valuable except for their utility. If they disobey, it is justifiable to punish them harshly. How does that morality sit with your individual sense of right and wrong? Is the herd right or are you right? — S

What's your answer?

And...? You're not really saying anything ethically relevant until you add, "And this is good!", and that would be a subjective moral judgement from an individual subject. It is an expression which ties everything you just said to you and your moral judgement in a manner consistent with subjective moral relativism. In other words, it is good for you.

It seems futile to try to argue against that. What else could it be? Dogmatists, like Tim (nice, but...) and creativesoul, would of course merely assert something along the lines that it's simply, absolutely, objectively good, irrespective of all of that, but that's no argument and can rightly be dismissed. The less they say, the better, because there's rarely if ever any philosophical substance to it. And the latter seems frankly deluded that his crackpottery is the ultimate solution to all of philosophy.

Let me ask you this. Would you say that what's suitable or not to a community hinges on what people desire with respect to the community?

It doesn't matter to me that your personal vision is shared by others or is influenced to some extent by the community in the context of what I'm getting at. Inter-subjectivity? Sure. Influenced by external factors, such as the community, to some extent? Sure. Please don't circle back to things I haven't denied and have already addressed. Yes, we are a bunch of subjects who have moral judgements in common. Yes, we live in communites, not in complete isolation. I don't think that anyone here is denying that, they're disputing the logical relevance of it to what we're getting at, as opposed to what you might want to talk about instead. We seem at cross-purposes, where you seem to want to talk about something besides the issue. The issue, as I see it, is not merely whether or not your personal vision is shared or popular or good for the herd. You know that I think that morality is much more than that, and I don't think that you've presented any successful argument for exclusively adopting your narrower way of looking at it. I'm talking about what morality fundamentally is, what it is that you and I and the herd are fundamentally doing when we do ethics. That is not about what you judge should be the purpose of morality or anything of that nature. How many times? You are creating your own problems by disregarding the strict context that participants such as myself and Terrapin are setting. This discussion is, after all, supposed to be about our positions: mine and Terrapin's, and largely Isaac's too, I think. The opening post quoted a passage of text from one of Terrapin's posts, and I agreed with it and have been arguing in support of my own similar position, although a great deal of my time has been spent correcting misunderstandings and identifying fallacies.

It matters a great deal that your personal vision isn't necessarily my personal vision. Two individual moral agents don't have to see eye-to-eye. That is precisely what normative ethics is for! We would hardly find much use for it otherwise. We are individual moral agents, each with our own unique sense of right and wrong, and what we should or shouldn't do, and what's important or what's more important, and so on. And this is true in spite of having things in common, and sharing certain judgements, and living in a community, and whatever other irrelevancies you've raised.

Remind me, what's your argument against this, again? If I recall correctly, I think it was something along the lines of: "You're a sociopath! You're not Bear Grylls! I value the community! My opinion is more popular than yours! But... but... the herd wouldn't flourish if...". It is pretty laughable stuff. And it does not indicate a critical approach akin to that of Nietzsche, which questions the very values which many of us so often take for granted, especially since the dominance of Christian morality.

But whatever, go ahead and throw your toys out of the pram.

What would be the distinction between the morality you are discussing with T and S, and laws? Why are you calling it morality instead of law?

Both of the positions you describe are equally simplistic, and my position seems like the obvious synthesis:

a) Morality is relative to the individual.

b) Morality is relative to the community.

c) Morality is relative to the context, including both individual and community.

Of course, morality is - on a fundamental level - relative individually, because a community is just a group of individuals who happen to have certain things in common. That a morality is relative to a community is just to say that it is relative to this individual, and that individual, and this other individual, and that other individual...

I'm not looking to argue about it. Just want to see if you're talking about my position. I respect your opinion. Otherwise I wouldn't be asking. I deliberately try to avoid any sort of anthropomorphism. I do see how it is related, as a result of being about all thought/belief, and morality is a kind, but...

It certainly is tangential.

PM me... if you would. Just want to avoid being guilty of the charge is all... A decades worth of work ought not be guilty of such.

Since some seem to have trouble comprehending the painfully obvious... Cognitive dissonance rears it's ugly head again...

There are conflicting statements, including moral statements. That's just the way it is. We all know this to be true. That claim corresponds to what has happened, what is happening, and what will most certainly continue to happen barring an extinction event.

If there are no conflicting statements under subjective moral relativism, then it fails miserably as a means for taking proper account of the way things actually are.

That's where I am at on a simple 'foundational' level wrt moral discourse. It makes the most sense on a simple to understand level. It can tolerate our fallibility. In fact, it uses it as part of the argument/position.

The difficulty, some say, is saying where goodness comes from, or some such...

It's the aim. It is discovered by virtue of trial and error. The fact that we can be wrong also refutes the idea that what is good is equivalent to our belief about it.

You've already admitted to having made that mistake. We all have made that mistake, I would think...

Use your own example.

Ouch. Oh boy, that is one hell of a wasted decade. :grimace:

What does that mean? "Imbued in us"?
— creativesoul

An undeveloped albeit intrinsic quality present at birth.

Are you claiming that you, as a human, do not have any emotional content within your reasoning?
— creativesoul

No. I’m saying I can Reason with respect to emotion when it’s called for. Feelings are not cognitions, which is why they have no object of their own. The body supplies the object, re: tears, butterflies, sheer delight or sheer adrenaline rush....whatever. One never thinks......is this where I’m supposed put a smile on my face? Is this the right time to cuss the bad guy, applaud the good guy?

Reason with respect to emotion enters the stage when the response expected, or considered appropriate, doesn’t conform to the feeling, re: being punished (remorse) for something you didn’t do (anger), or, what’s worse, being given credit (pride) for something you didn’t do (shame). — Mww

This, I am fairly certain, highlights the remarkable differences between Kant's framework, and my own...

An undeveloped albeit intrinsic quality present at birth.

I wouldn't put it that way, but I also do not entirely disagree. Let's flesh this out a bit more.

I agree that neither physiological sensory perception nor emotions are equivalent to cognition(thought/belief). They are an irrevocable elemental constituent thereof. They are necessary for all thought/belief(all cognition is existentially dependent upon them both). I think we agree there, but I also think that that is where we part...

You want to separate complex thought/belief(about pre-existing thought/belief) from both it's content(what it's about) and it's own elemental constitution. There's also an aspect of existential dependency that is not being taking into proper account.

We are very close to talking past one another, and actually may already be doing so.

I am talking about what all thought/belief consists of and relating that to the fact that pure reason consists entirely of thought/belief. You're offering specific examples of situations where the thinker does not deliberately consider emotion. I'm not denying that. Grant it, without hesitation. It misses my point...

Pure reason is thinking about thought/belief(they are one in the same prior to metacognition, and even afterwards they consist of exactly the same core - mental correlations). So, for now at least, let this pass. I do distinguish between the two, particularly in cases where one is suspending one's judgment as a pre-requisite for entertaining another possible explanation/worldview/position. Prior to metacognition(thinking about thought/belief) there is no difference.

As best I can tell:We are unique in the animal world in that way. We are the one ones capable of isolating our mental ongoings and then considering them as a subject matter. Here is where the distinction between our report and what we're reporting upon is pivotal.