It rings true, but I'd be interested if you could dig up a reference for that. — Wayfarer
There’s a basic principle which I think defeats ‘brain-mind identity’ theory. This is that symbolic representation and abstraction literally cannot be understood as a physical process. They can be instantiated physically, which is how written symbols and codes are possible (not to mention computers and calculators). But the fundamental intellectual acts that form the basis of abstraction, logic and rational inference inhere wholly and solely in the relations of ideas. They are purely and only intellectual in nature, they are not physical. — Wayfarer
All of that just to form the simple concept of ‘apple’.
For there to be some kind of nonphysical apple concept, it would need to perfectly mirror the physical world, like a nonphysical world matching and perfectly aligned with the physical world. The ultimate redundancy. — praxis
Not at all -- the opposite, in fact. What you recognise when you recognise an apple, is a type, which can then be generalised to all such types, and a superset of types. — Wayfarer
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.