I don't think I understand what you're asking there. If I read the question literally, you're asking "what is the nature of "individuals thinking about x in a semantic manner," but then I'm not sure why you'd be asking that. — Terrapin Station

There’s a basic principle which I think defeats ‘brain-mind identity’ theory. This is that symbolic representation and abstraction literally cannot be understood as a physical process. They can be instantiated physically, which is how written symbols and codes are possible (not to mention computers and calculators). But the fundamental intellectual acts that form the basis of abstraction, logic and rational inference inhere wholly and solely in the relations of ideas. They are purely and only intellectual in nature, they are not physical.

One argument for this is that exactly the same ideas can be represented in completely different symbolic forms. Not only via different languages, but also via different media - like, binary code, written text, and so on. In all such cases the information remains invariant, but the representation is completely different. So, what is different, and what stays the same? The representation and the medium differs, but the information content remains exactly the same. And this is only possible because information inheres in different logical domain to the physical.

One argument for this is that exactly the same ideas can be represented in completely different symbolic forms. — Wayfarer

Don't you have to not be a nominalist to believe that that can be literally true?

Just think about the argument on its merits. If you can demonstrate something wrong about it, then I'll revise my view.

Sure, we are maximally similar to other human beings, but we are also similar to rocks in a whole load of ways. We still need a principle to tell us when we can make the inference and when we can't. Do you have a way to decide? — bert1

There are degrees of similarity with regards to (bio)chemical composition and functionality. Rocks are less similar than humans in this regard.

Are you fishing for certainty with regards to "needing a principle" to make inferences about where consciousness is located?

Are you fishing for certainty with regards to "needing a principle" to make inferences about where consciousness is located? — numberjohnny5

Not necessarily certainty, a tentative hypothesis would be fine. It's the obvious question to ask someone who thinks that we can infer consciousness in other brains, but not in rocks.

Why isn't that enough? What else are you looking for? — Terrapin Station

It's not enough for a more general conclusion, such as the one you give:

We know from a lot of evidence that consciousness is a property of our brains. — Terrapin Station

Just think about the argument on its merits. If you can demonstrate something wrong about it, then I'll revise my view. — Wayfarer

The problem with it on my view is that you're positing numerically distinct identicals (as in different instances of "the same (exact/identical) thing"), and there are no such things on my view (as I'm a nominalist).

It's not enough for a more general conclusion, such as the one you give: — bert1

Why not? It seems to be more than enough for that. You'd have to try to support why you feel otherwise

Here’s something for you:

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=GLIol6viKkI

What you have is:

A subjective experience of one of the 42 concepts is reliably correlated with brain event A
Brain injury affects subjective experience in humans in systematic predictable ways
Drugs affect human experience in systematic predictable ways
Therefore, consciousness is a property of our brains

...there's too much missing. I'm not insisting on a strictly deductively valid argument, but I'd like to see some of the gaps filled in.

You could try something more precise, for example:

Brain event of type A is necessary and sufficient for subjective experience of type a in humans
Brain event of type B is necessary and sufficient for subjective experience of type b in humans
and so on, for C, D , E, F etc
Therefore, all subjective experiences in humans are dependent on and necessitated by corresponding brain events

The conclusion there has a clearer connection with the premises. We've moved from the particular to the general in a reasonably transparent manner.

But even that doesn't tell us much that's interesting about consciousness, apart from that at least one thing in nature is conscious, namely, brains. It doesn't get us anywhere nearer to figuring out if, say, a rock is conscious, or not.

EDIT: typos fixed

...there's too much missing. I'm not insisting on a strictly deductively valid argument, but I'd like to see some of the gaps filled in. — bert1

Gaps such as?

The premises do not mention consciousness, yet consciousness appears in the conclusion.
The conclusion is a general statement about consciousness, but the premises are all about experiences in humans.

The premises do not mention consciousness, yet consciousness appears in the conclusion.
The conclusion is a general statement about consciousness, but the premises are all about experiences in humans. — bert1

Is that addressing my question?

First off, I'm not forwarding anything in the manner of a deductive argument. Why would you be reading it that way?

Is that addressing my question? — Terrapin Station

Yes

First off, I'm not forwarding anything in the manner of a deductive argument. Why would you be reading it that way? — Terrapin Station

I thought you were trying to say something, offering evidence for a conclusion.

I thought you were trying to say something, — bert1

lol

offering evidence for a conclusion.

Exactly. Which doesn't imply anything like a deductive argument.

It implies some kind of rational process amenable to enquiry on a philosophy forum. Do you really see no disconnect between the evidence and the conclusion you drew from it?

The problem with it on my view is that you're positing numerically distinct identicals (as in different instances of "the same (exact/identical) thing"), and there are no such things on my view (as I'm a nominalist). — Terrapin Station

If your principles are challenged by an argument, then you've either got to defeat the argument or change your principles.

If your principles are challenged by an argument, then you've either got to defeat the argument or change your principles. — Wayfarer

It's not my "principles," per se, it's the way the world factually happens to be (on this view, of course, but it's an empirical matter). The argument is defeated because it's positing something false about the world.

The argument is defeated because it's positing something false about the world. — Terrapin Station

But, you haven't given any argument for it. You've simply said 'Because of nominalism, it can't be true'. Whereas I'm actually making an argument! And I think it's a good argument. So far, your response is basically, 'well, I don't like it'. And as this is supposed to be a philosophy forum, I think if you're going to bother saying something, it has to add up to more than that.

What makes THIS assortment of molecules (humans) conscious where THAT one isn't (machines, inanimate objects). If you exclude supernatural explanations (souls and the like) then you see that humans are nothing more than date processing, self duplicating biological machines. — khaled

The issue here is this: the mind itself, what is that 'makes humans conscious', whilst it may or may not be 'supernatural', it is not an object of cognition. There is nothing anywhere that you can point at or objectify and say it is 'mind'. You can only infer the reality of mind in others because of their behaviour. As for knowledge of your own mind - well, it's kind of contradictory to say that you know your mind - the mind is the subject of knowledge, "that which is knowing". But you can never really know it, in the same sense that the eye cannot see itself, and the hand can't grasp itself. But the mind is the unknown knower.

The OP is simply an expression of the wish to avoid this conclusion, which is distinctively non-scientific, and therefore threatening.

But, you haven't given any argument for it. You've simply said 'Because of nominalism, it can't be true'. — Wayfarer

So, nominalism isn't the case because of an argument for it. It's the case because it's what the world is like factually.

It's just like the surface of the Earth being 75% water isn't the case because of an argument for it. It's the case because that's what the Earth is like factually.

Now, if someone doesn't believe that the surface of the Earth is 75% water, we'd have to figure out why they believe something other than that, and we can try to find ways to convince them otherwise, which might include something like deductive arguments, but that's all about trying to persuade someone. The facts in no way hinge on an argument.

To say that it has anything to do with what I like or dislike is comical. I don't like/dislike that the Earth is 75% water. It's just a fact that it is. By the same token, I don't like or dislike that nominalism is the case. It just is. Those are the facts. It's what the world is like whether we are fond of the fact or not, whether we're aware of it or not, etc.

So, nominalism isn't the case because of an argument for it. It's the case because it's what the world is like factually. — Terrapin Station

First - your argument is not empirical, but metaphysical. It is not an argument about any state of affairs in the world, but a statement about the way language and thought proceed.

Now I say that for arguments to be coherent, they have to rely on general terms. And general terms are those which are true in all cases, across the board. Now I'm arguing that these general terms are in some important sense the same as universals. Universals are true of whole classes of things. So if nominalism denies this, saying that all general terms are only names, then I don't see how you can ever really present a coherent argument about anything. Every argument only deals with a particular thing, and never with classes, kinds, and general causes.

As for knowledge of your own mind - well, it's kind of contradictory to say that you know your mind - the mind is the subject of knowledge, "that which is knowing". But you can never really know it, in the same sense that the eye cannot see itself, and the hand can't grasp itself. But the mind is the unknown knower. — Wayfarer

You have a wonderful way of expressing concepts, I always enjoy reading them )

Tibetan buddhism defines concentric spheres of knowledge:
1. that which we know but dont know that we know
2. that which we know that we know
3. that which we know we cannot know
4. that which we dont know that we cannot know.

Strangely, mlost people in the west find themselves in the outermost sphere. Consciousness more properly belongs in the third, as you say.

First - your argument is not empirical, but metaphysical. — Wayfarer

No, first, I'm not forwarding an argument in the sense of premises implying some conclusion.

Secondly, it is empirical, and metaphysical and empirical are not distinct in the manner in which you're trying to suggest.

Let's sort through those two things before moving on.

You have a wonderful way of expressing concepts, I always enjoy reading them — ernestm

Kind of you to say so!

Tibetan buddhism defines concentric spheres of knowledge: — ernestm

It rings true, but I'd be interested if you could dig up a reference for that.

Secondly, it is empirical, — Terrapin Station

How is nominalism an empirical argument, then?

How is nominalism an empirical argument, then? — Wayfarer

We're talking about what the world is like factually, empirically. Either only particulars exist or universals exist too (or instead). That's a matter of what sorts of things there are, just like any other empirical matter.

as soon as you argue about ‘what kinds of things exist’ then you’re no longer talking empiricism but philosophy. How many species of X there are, how many types of Y, what causes A to happen - they’re empirical questions. But when you’re talking about ‘existence’, then you’re discussing first philosophy, metaphysics.

as soon as you argue about ‘what kinds of things exist’ then you’re no longer talking empiricism but philosophy — Wayfarer

The two aren't mutually exclusive.

How many species of X there are, how many types of Y, what causes A to happen - they’re empirical questions. — Wayfarer

And that's how many species of x exist, how many types of y exist, etc.

That's a matter of what sorts of things there are, just like any other empirical matter. — Terrapin Station

Just to re-focus: the discussion about whether only particular things are real, or whether universals are also real, is not an empirical question, because it's *not* about existing phenomena. In fact 'what the world is like' is also not an empirical question, because you don't have another empirical world to compare this world to. All of this is in the domain of metaphysics, not empiricism; not an empirical matter.

Just to re-focus: the discussion about whether only particular things are real, or whether universals are also real, is not an empirical question, because it's *not* about existing phenomena. — Wayfarer

This is incorrect. It is about what phenomena exist, what those phenomena are like. That's empirical and metaphysical.