The "sun" "appears" in the "sky" every "day". There's nothing untrue about this. The sun is visible each day from the surface of the planet earth. No amount of trying to enforce semantic technicalities to say this is "unobjective" will change this observable truth.
An observation does not have to amount to a complete description of something, it can be specific, incomplete, or even based on an abstraction. "The sun rises every day" is a very simple observation and the strong inductive argument which arises from it is extremely specific: the sun is visible with predictable regularity. Again this does not say anything about what the sun "is" beyond that whatever it is, "it's visibility from the surface of the earth follows a cyclical pattern". — VagabondSpectre
You're still using semantics to try and make your point while ignoring the one you are trying to criticize. — VagabondSpectre
Repeatable observations of reliable phenomenon assist in producing models which allow us to reliably predict various aspects of said phenomenon. It's not objective truth; it's reliable and useful truth; that's science. — VagabondSpectre
Yes, the point is that semantics is important to objective truth. You seem to think that you can dismiss the problem by saying "that's just semantics". That doesn't make the issue go away, it's just a case of you finding an excuse to ignore it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Models which predict reliably is not truth at all, it's predictability. As I've just demonstrated, the capacity to predict can hide profound falsity which lies beneath. Therefore the capacity to predict is really irrelevant to truth and falsity. Prediction is derived from conclusions of deductive logic. The truth or falsity of the conclusions depends on the truth or falsity of the premises. The premises may be derived from conclusions of inductive reasoning, but the truth or falsity of these inductive conclusions is an issue of semantics. Whether "the sun rises each morning", "water boils at 100 degrees Celsius and freezes at zero", "the sky is blue", are true or not, is an issue of semantics. — Metaphysician Undercover
By definition the term objective includes all subjective perceptions.How can you really define the distinction between objective and subjective if we only ever are subjective. — intrapersona
By definition the objective world is a brute fact.The objective world remains only ever an inference at best. — intrapersona
If you had charitably interpreted what I was saying, you would have acknowledged that my point was not to say or even imply that "the sun moves through the sky while the earth remains still", but instead that "whatever the sun does (or does not do), it does so with observable consistency, which can be the basis for an inductive argument which can be strengthened through additional repetition". — VagabondSpectre
Everytime you say "truth", somehow I think you're always referring to "ultimate and objective truth". Well what is that? Does it even exist? Can we ever refer to something as "true" and not be inherently stating a falsehood? I've been very clear from the beginning, in every single one of my posts, that "objective certainty" is not achievable. I've not been concerning myself with it or been discussing it at all since my first post or only to clarify that science and what we call "objective scientific fact" is not founded on deductive certainty, it is founded in inductive likelihood from consistency in observations and reliable predictions. It's a whole different kind of truth than the truth you continuously charge me with not recognizing that science does not produce. — VagabondSpectre
The superficial induction based truths, if strong enough from the get go, tend to remain true, while the deeper truths, which are also founded in induction, provide additional explanatory and predictive power which the more superficial truths lack. — VagabondSpectre
The fact that the earth spins does not falsify the actual meaning of the statement "the sun rises..." — VagabondSpectre
You're basically using plato's allegory of the cave to try and convince me that my statements are "false" when all I'm trying to do is point out that the more consistently the shadows on the wall behave, the more reliably we are able to predict their future behavior. I'm pointing at consistency in the behavior of the shadows and you are saying broadly "you can never be certain of shadows", but I never said that we could be certain, I said that the more consistently these shadows behave the more confident we can be in predicting the future behavior of said shadows. — VagabondSpectre
You know very well at this point what I think; consistency in observation gives rise to an inductive argument that is the basis for the whole of science. I have never said this amounts to "objective truth", I've been going well out of my way to define it thusly:The thread questions "objectivity". You seem to think that consistency in observation is synonymous with "objective". I've demonstrated that consistency in observation does not imply "truth". My claim is that since it doesn't imply truth, we should not consider this to be objectivity. — Metaphysician Undercover
" I'm pointing at consistency in the behavior of the shadows and you are saying broadly "you can never be certain of shadows", but I never said that we could be certain, I said that the more consistently these shadows behave the more confident we can be in predicting the future behavior of said shadows. "
"Repeatable observations of reliable phenomenon assist in producing models which allow us to reliably predict various aspects of said phenomenon. It's not objective truth; it's reliable and useful truth; that's science. "
"It's the fact that things appear to remain consistent which persuades us that whatever we uncover about them through repeatable experimentation (predictions) and observation (regardless of whether that knowledge is objective certainty or not), is worth knowing." — Vagabond
Now, you have provided no principle whereby we can proceed logically from consistency in observation to your claim of observable consistency. Do you see the difference? We have as evidence, consistency in observation. Consistency is a property of the observations, the descriptions, that's my point. How do you proceed to the conclusion that consistency is a property of the object, to claim "observable consistency"? — Metaphysician Undercover
The op deals with a difference between objectivity and subjectivity. Is it your claim now, that there is no such thing as objectivity? I think there is objectivity, but truth is essential to it. — Metaphysician Undercover
"There's no proof against solipsism; perhaps the thing of which we are most certain of is actually our own prevailing lack of absolute certainty." — vagabond
OK, so how do we determine whether the superficial induction based conclusions are true or not? Let's take the sun rising example. Your claim was that no person would deny that the sun rises, and therefore it is true. I deny it, and have explained how it is clearly false. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well it's not metaphorical, it is a statement of perspective "from this perspective, the sun becomes visible at A time and at Y vector". It's an observation and repeatability is the source of it's strength.Yes, it clearly does falsify the actual meaning of that statement. The sun is the subject. It is engaged in the activity of rising, according to the meaning of the statement. But clearly the sun is not involved in any such activity, the earth is the proper subject here, engaged in the activity of spinning. The sun rising is a false description of what is occurring. Why do you not accept the reality, that this is a false description? You want to give to "the sun rises", a metaphorical meaning, and claim that there is "truth" in this metaphorical meaning. But you haven't explained how there is truth in metaphor. — Metaphysician Undercover
You're missing the point. What is consistent is the observations, the descriptions. You conclude that the shadows are behaving consistently because there is consistency in the descriptions. But that's not the case, the consistency is in the observations, the descriptions, not in the shadows being observed. Perhaps it's like the sun rising, the shadows are not doing anything at all, the human mind is active, making it appear like the shadows are active. Isn't this what eternalism says? — Metaphysician Undercover
To summarize my intention in this thread, I sought to provide a useful alternative to objective certainly after having contested that we do not currently possess very much objective certainty, if any. — VagabondSpectre
I disagree. We can be certain that solipsism is not the case. Solipsism leads to an ill defined infinite regress that would not allow you to form any conclusions about the existence of anything (including yourself).
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Self-Recursion.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_regress
That is to say that if the term self is not distinct and mutually exclusive of the term not self, then there is no conclusion that you can draw whatsoever.
This meany by definition the terms self and not self are independent of one another.
People don't seem to understand that we would not be able to make any sense out of anything if solipsism was true.
This is just a consequence of logic.
If you could only reference/access yourself (solipsism) then you would be stuck in an infinite loop of trying to define self by referring to self, by referring to self, by referring to self...ad infinitum.
But if a not self exists (objective reality), you can break the infinite cycle by reference self as that which is distinct from not self. — m-theory
What I see people argue is this...
"The only thing we experience is our perceptions, therefor basis of our reality of is our perception."
That is fine if that is how you want to define terms but it is essentially a bare assertion about semantics and not an argument that demonstrates a point.
I say we have access to our subjective information which is nothing but objective information that has been processed by our brains. — m-theory
I realize that this is not particularly interesting to think about, but the debate is really about semantics and is not that interesting in the first place.
I truly don't understand how people believe there is some profound philosophical dilemma here?!?
:-| — m-theory
Consider the brain in a vat scenario. A powerful scientist could be feeding impulses from a simulation into your brain in exactly the same way as if your brain was in a skull, rendering you unable to determine if the world you perceive actually extends beyond your potentially simulated or deceptive perceptions.
This isn't exactly full blown solipsism, but it establishes a primitive case which can cast some (albeit minimal) doubt on whether or not our perceptions even indirectly reflect an external or objective world.
Skepticism can really do away with a lot if it is applied to the extreme, but luckily pragmatism regularly steps in and sets us straight. — VagabondSpectre
In my mind, (heh),The problem of an ill defined infinite regress inherent in solipsism makes it more difficult for us to make sense of things or to be certain of them, but the dilemma of solipsism is not that it has much (if any) merit as a hypothetical model, it's rather that many of it's variations cannot be fully falsified or discounted as a possibility. When it comes to "things of which we are certain", I do not count the statement "solipsism is not true" to be among them. — VagabondSpectre
Consider the brain in a vat scenario. A powerful scientist could be feeding impulses from a simulation into your brain in exactly the same way as if your brain was in a skull, rendering you unable to determine if the world you perceive actually extends beyond your potentially simulated or deceptive perceptions. — VagabondSpectre
This isn't exactly full blown solipsism, but it establishes a primitive case which can cast some (albeit minimal) doubt on whether or not our perceptions even indirectly reflect an external or objective world. — VagabondSpectre
Solipsism is not really a profound philosophical dilemma, but it is a proper hard dilemma none the less. Whether or not I (you) live in a solipsistic world in the end would change nothing of consequence as far as our perceptions are concerned, so I (you) don't have any reason to waste much time trying to validate or falsify it. — VagabondSpectre
That is what I've been arguing is really the case, the real external world isn't anything like the way that we perceive, and describe it. That is evident from the example which we've already discussed, "the sun rises". The description refers to what we perceive, but we now know that what we perceive is not anything like what is really the case. We could extend this to our understanding of substance in general, molecules and atoms etc., what we perceive is completely different from what is really the case. Since this extreme difference exists, between how we perceive, and describe, the external world, and what we've determined is really the case, it may just as well be a brain in the vat scenario. We still haven't gotten beyond analyzing the impulses, understanding them well enough, to the point of determining the necessity for a "powerful scientist" sending us these impulses. — Metaphysician Undercover
You want to assume that consistency in observations implies necessarily that there is consistency in the external world. So let's start with a real skeptic's position, let's assume that it is possible that there is no scientist at all, absolutely nothing external, just a mind, and the mind itself is producing all the images of perception.
Notice that I introduce this premise as a possibility. This is to counter your assumption that consistency in observation necessarily implies consistency in the thing observed. If we allow that the mind itself is capable of creating, and this is what is implied by the concept of free will, that the mind can create without the necessity for external causation, then it is possible that the observed consistency is completely created by the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the point which I've been attempting to bring to your attention. If we allow the principles of free will, we allow that the mind itself creates without external cause. So when we proceed to analyze consistency in observations, we need to be able to distinguish which aspects of that consistency are created by the mind, and which aspects are proper to the thing being observed. — Metaphysician Undercover
You think pragmatism sets us straight, but that is not the case at all. Pragmatism is what inclines us to create consistencies, and in creating these consistencies the real inconsistencies are hidden. By loosing track of the real inconsistencies through the claim of consistency, misunderstanding thrives. — Metaphysician Undercover
In order to form any notion of self there must exist a not self distinct and independent from that self.
If in reality there were no such distinction then you would lapse into an ill defined infinite regress of self referencing self ad infinitum. — m-theory
People concluding geocentrism as a result of observing the obscured and then not obscured visibility of the sun at a particular point on the visible horizon shows how sometimes perception CAN be misleading, but nothing we have yet discovered through reason or science suggests that the observation or experience we colloquially refer to as "sunrise" is an illusion, or a farce, or inherently not reflecting of a true external reality. — VagabondSpectre
You're willing to say that geocentrism is clearly false because heliocentrism has greater explanatory or predictive power (it's supporting evidence), so what makes you then so quick to assert that heliocentrism is equally as false? — VagabondSpectre
Even if my mind creates everything I experience, there can still be consistency in my observations. Whether or not my perception of something (a shadow I mistake for a person for instance) is actually a perception created by my mind might not alter the fact that I consistently observe or perceive it. Even though I may totally misunderstand what something is, I can still observe it (and misunderstand it) consistently. — VagabondSpectre
In either case the observations themselves have consistency. — VagabondSpectre
If past observations (despite a prevailing misunderstanding) are more and more consistent, the predictions of future observations (despite the same prevailing misunderstanding) become inductively stronger and stronger. — VagabondSpectre
That's the whole point though, what we see as "the sun rising" is not a true external reality. You keep insisting that it is, refusing to face the reality of the situation. The sun does not rise, despite the fact that we see the sun rising. — Metaphysician Undercover
What science has demonstrated very clearly to us, is that we do not perceive the external reality the way that it truly is. We do not perceive molecules, or atoms, or sub-atomic particles. Sure, you might argue that we taste and smell molecules, but we don't, we taste tastes, and smell smells. Let's face the facts, the way that we perceive things is not the way that they are, according to what science tells us. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not predictive power which makes me prefer heliocentrism. As I explained, prediction is based in recognizing consistencies, and geocentrism had great predictive power as well. What heliocentrism gives us is the capacity to understand many inconsistencies. The reason why I believe that heliocentrism is still false is that there are many inconsistencies which persist. There are inconsistencies in our understandings of space, time, electromagnetism, and such things. Further, when I go outside in the morning, I can feel the sun touch me with its warmth. And as much as our sense perceptions may be inaccurate, touch, as a fundamental feeling, is fairly reliable. So I do not believe that there is space between the sun and myself. Just like we talk about space between you and I, I know there is not space there, there is air, I can feel it on my face, and the air is the earth's atmosphere, part of the earth. Likewise, we talk about space being between us and the sun, but that's not space, it's the sun's atmosphere, or field or something. So just like I am within the earth, being in its atmosphere, I am also within the sun, being within its field, or some such thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is possible although it seems unlikely. This is what I meant by "We cannot defeat solipsism".Yes, this is the point I was trying to make, our minds could be creating all the consistency which we observe. In this case, the consistency would not be within "it", the thing being observed, it would be within the mind only. The thing being observed would be totally inconsistent, but the mind is making it appear to be consistent. Do you believe that this is possible? — Metaphysician Undercover
This might be true, but do you not see a big difference between "there is consistency in the thing being observed", and, "there is no consistency in the thing being observed, but my mind is creating the appearance of consistency"? — Metaphysician Undercover
So this is the problem I was referring to earlier. The observations become more consistent, the predictions become more reliable, but the misunderstanding remains. The problem is that the misunderstanding becomes stronger and stronger, because the reliability of the predictions creates the illusion that there is no misunderstanding, that all is understood. Then we do not bother to doubt this, what is perceived as an understanding but is really a misunderstanding, because the predictions are so reliable, that we don't even think that it might be a misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
Assuming that the reality was that there was no distinction from self and not self would leave you in an ill defined infinite regressing loop from which no conclusions could be drawn.What if the things which I perceive of as "not-self" are actually just works of fiction from my subconscious with no actual continuous existence beyond me imagining myself interacting with them or my subconscious mind temporarily simulating them in my conscious experience? — VagabondSpectre
There is no logically consistent way to hold that solipsism is true.In this case it would still be coherent to say "not-self" and solipsism hold true. — VagabondSpectre
From a logical standpoint the subjective world necessarily entails an objective world.
If we cannot be certain of one then by definition we cannot have certainty about the other.
A true solipsist would be an epistemological nihilist and assert that we could be sure of nothing at all.
And that statement itself would be something about which we could not be sure of.
This is why you cannot have any epistemological foundation with nihilism or solipsism.
The assertion "All things are uncertain" is itself an uncertain claim that regresses infinitely before it can ever reach a true or false conclusion. — m-theory
I don't understand why "makes sense" from a human perspective is is presumed to be an inherent quality of "objective reality"... — VagabondSpectre
Furthermore, the scenarios do seem to "make sense" to me. Are you suggesting that the world cannot be such that I am not something with continuous existence beyond your perceptions of me? — VagabondSpectre
solipsism can't be made any sense of outside of a context of a realist picture of the world--which is how you presented your scenarios, but by framing it in those contexts, one necessarily undermines solipsism. If either ontological or epistemological solipsism are true, then that realist picture of what the world is like shouldn't make sense--because in both cases (ontological and epistemological solipsism) you can't know that realist picture. If any brand of solipsism is true, one can't know minds versus other sorts of things in the first place. — Terrapin Station
I understand what you mean by saying that a realist framework (i.e "the other" pragmatically and semantically exists (per prevailing perception)) is required for us to categorize and interact successfully (pragmatically) with the phenomena within the realm of our experiences. — VagabondSpectre
So as a skeptical tool, if we assume solipsism, we have no skepticism whatsoever. We'd be certain of everything, and there would be no mind/other stuff cleavage, which wouldn't be solipsism after all. — Terrapin Station
I submit the following questions: "Are you certain you're not a brain in a vat à la Decartes? If so how? If not, presuming that you are in fact a brain in a vat, could you ever be certain of that, if anything? Would skepticism be useless from your perspective? Skepticism could in fact be what leads you to currently surmise that you are a brain in a vat in the first place, could it not?". — VagabondSpectre
As far as I can tell you say that "not-self" would be incoherent if solipsism were true, and since "not-self" is coherent, solipsism must be untrue. — VagabondSpectre
I also do not understand why being uncertain that "not-self" exists means we must also be uncertain that "self" exists. — VagabondSpectre
I understand why something like "an orange" cannot be coherently defined unless we can say "not an orange", but in solipsism "self" is construed to represent the fundamental source of everything that exists. It becomes a matter of equivocation to argue that since we casually experience "not-self" solipsism results in incoherency because "self" under solipsism refers to the fundamental source of everything, not the way we interpret our casual experiences. — VagabondSpectre
Perhaps I should amend my hard position though; the thing we are most certain of, aside from perhaps our own existence (cogito ergo sum), is our overall prevailing lack of certainty. — VagabondSpectre
P.S, I'm somewhat less than enamored with solipsism as a hypothesis of any merit or utility than you might think, however since I cannot deliver a proof that it solipsism is certainly not the case, I admit that I cannot fully defeat it. — VagabondSpectre
So from my perspective, as a realist, skepticism isn't useless, but for a skeptical alternative to be worth consideration, there need to be reasons beyond possibility that it might be true. Thus, if someone suggests "We might be brains in vats," the first thing I think is, "Okay, but why would we believe that?" There would need to be reasons to believe it--some sort of evidence, primarily, beyond the mere possibility of it, otherwise it's not worth bothering with. — Terrapin Station
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.