What exactly do you mean by the square root of NOT? I thought you were talking about the square root of the word "not", which doesn't make sense to me. Whatever it is, is it to do with logic or physics? If the latter then, again, it's irrelevant to what I'm talking about, which is logic. — Michael

Because the square root of NOT exists in Reality, it is a logical operator available to any physical entity capable of using it to reason, whether it makes "sense" to you or not.

That neither explains to me what the square root of NOT means nor addresses my claim that "only mental phenomena exists" does not logically entail "only my mental phenomena exists". So, again, it has nothing to do with what I'm saying.

"Are you claiming that idealism is a sentence" is a yes or no question. Try typing less in response to a yes or no question. — Terrapin Station

Fine, then my answer is "yes". Idealism is the sentence "only mental phenomena exists". For idealism to be the case is for the sentence "only mental phenomena exists" to be true. And so, for idealism to entail solipsism is for the sentence "only mental phenomena exists" to entail the sentence "only my mental phenomena exists". Which it doesn't.

Or, my answer is "no". Idealism is the sole existence of mental phenomena. For idealism to be the case is for only mental phenomena to exist. And so, for idealism to entail solipsism is for the sole existence of mental phenomena to entail the sole existence of my mental phenomena. Which it doesn't.

Either way, idealism doesn't entail solipsism. One can be an idealist without being a solipsist. Just as physicalism doesn't entail physical-solipsism (only my physical body exists).

It is straightforward logic that one can coherently assert that only X exists without asserting that only my X exists. There's no simpler way to put it.

Thanks for answering finally.

Okay, so when I talk about idealism, I'm not talking about a sentence. Insofar as you see it as a sentence, we're talking about different things.

Since I'm not talking about a sentence, what logically follows from sentences is irrelevant to what I'm talking abuot.

Okay, so when I talk about idealism, I'm not talking about a sentence. Insofar as you see it as a sentence, we're talking about different things. — Terrapin Station

But you are. The idealist is making the claim "only mental phenomena exists". You're then saying that the idealist is obligated to also make the claim "only my mental phenomena exists".

Since I'm not talking about a sentence, what logically follows from sentences is irrelevant to what I'm talking abuot.

If you're not talking about a sentence then you're not talking about logical entailment, as logical entailment just is a relationship between sentences.

Right, so you believe that you know what I'm talking about contra what's in my mind?

You used the term "logical entailment". Logical entailment is a relationship between sentences. Therefore, you're talking about sentences. Again, straightforward logic. So I don't need to read your mind to know what you're talking about. I only need to read the words you've written.

If you're not talking about sentences then you can't bring up logical entailment.

And even if you want to talk about logical entailment without mentioning sentences, it's still the case that it's wrong to claim that if only mental phenomena exists then it logically follows that only my mental phenomena exists.

Can't in what sense?

This is getting tiresome. "Only mental phenomena exists" does not entail "only my mental phenomena exists". That only mental phenomena exists does not entail that only my mental phenomena exists. Whether you want to think about this in terms of sentences or something else, it is simply the case that idealism does not entail solipsism, and no amount of persistent denial is going to refute the logic of this.

You have a weird aversion to answering questions. It must be like a control thing for you or something, where you feel like you're being controlled or manipulated if you just straightforwardly answer questions.

Unfortunately, I have a view of not straightforwardly answering questions where I won't participate/won't move on if folks won't do it, because I consider it a fundamental criterion of having a good-faith, good-natured conversation, and that's all that I'm interested in.

SO, can't in what sense?

I've answered a number of your questions. Not once have you tried to show that idealism entails solipsism. This isn't about control but about you refusing to engage in a meaningful manner. All you do is avoid addressing the significant points I make and instead ask red herring questions about irrelevant things.

So I'm done with you. You've failed to support your claim that idealism entails solipsism. And you can't, because it doesn't. It's straightforward logic. One can claim that only mental phenomena exists without having to claim that only one's own mental phenomena exists, just as one can claim that only physical bodies exist without having to claim that only one's own physical body exists.

I've answered a number of your questions. — Michael

You've answered a couple yes, even though it was like pulling teeth. But it's not as if I have some minimum bar you need to pass and then I'll just ignore if you'll no longer have what I consider a conversation.

So can't in what sense?

The patterns would have been of their own creation, how they interpreted what they saw. So they would have made geometrical figures, patterns, to represent what they experienced (saw). Since the interpretations of what they saw were inaccurate, so were the patterns they created. Why not call these geometrical figures, these patterns, false representations? — Metaphysician Undercover

The point being, that you can make adequate predictions while maintaining false representations. One could claim that a dragon takes the earth in its mouth every evening, and brings it around, through the underground, spitting it out in the morning, and still predict that the sun will rise. You seem to be questioning whether these representations are actually false. I would say that they are false. How then, does the ability to predict come about if the representations are false? — Metaphysician Undercover

"Reliability" is produced by accuracy in the numbering system. This is where you find the value of inductive reasoning, in its relationship to numbering. We can entirely remove the pattern, and rely solely on the numbers. It has always been (infinite number of days), in the past, that the sun rises the next day, so we conclude that it will continue. We need not speculate about patterns to produce this conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

The pattern is inherent in the numbers though; in the data; in the observations. In the most basic argument saying "the sun will rise tomorrow", the observational data is a series of 1's or checked boxes representing each previous consecutive day recording the fact that the sun rose on that day. The pattern is repeating ones. It's the same kind of reasoning which makes statistical arguments strong: induction. The fundamental truth behind "the sun rising", whether supposedly moved by dragon or chariot, does not change that fact that whatever it is, it appears to rise reliably.

The reason why you can believe that a chariot pulls the sun across the sky each day and still be able to predict when and where it will next rise with great precision and reliability is because that predictive power is predicated on precise observations of a real phenomenon which is itself reliable (it has a pattern) (which is the actual "rising and setting" of the sun), not the bit about the chariot or the strength of it's horses.

I would say that falsification comes about in different ways. First there is falsification with respect to the numbers themselves. Suppose the people found 365 days between when the sun came up at the same place. That's not quite right, so after a number of years, 365 days would be falsified, and they would have to adjust. Secondly, falsification also comes about in respect to the relationship between the geometrical patterns, and the numbers. That there are not precisely 365 days in a year indicates something. It indicates that the year and the day are not parts of the same phenomenon. There is incompatibility, inconsistency between the year and the day, because we cannot make a representation of a year, in which a day remains incomplete. Therefore we must have two distinct geometrical representations, one which represents the day, and one which represents the year. There is a much more evident incompatibility between the month (moon cycle) and the year. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you're describing is an issue with precision rather than reliability or even accuracy. Overtime the inconsistency between the "365" day cycle of the "year" can be noticed and measured, even by ancients presuming they're around long enough to notice it, and then can be accounted for with an even longer unit of time which describes how many years it would take (of 365 days with leap years, or otherwise) for the imprecision (the gained or lost position of the earth in it's rotation around the sun when one year is described by a whole number of days) to come add up to one full rotation of the earth around the sun, when the cycle then would restart. This longer count would of course also have some imprecision, but an even longer count could then be constructed to reduce the imprecision even further.

Precision is great, but only a certain amount of it is needed depending on what we're discussing. If we're arguing about whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, I don't need precision beyond "the sun rose every day within memory" in order to (through induction) identify a pattern with which to make the prediction "the sun will rise tomorrow". If I want to predict when or where the sun will rise over the horizon, then I need more precise observations (what we begin to call measurements). If I want to be able to make these predictions further and further into the future, then I will require more precise measurements in order to maintain the same level of precision in those predictions.

The thing of note here though, the thing which I think is of value to the thread, and which I've been trying to point out, is that the simplistic argument "the sun will rise tomorrow because it has always done so in the past" uses a particular form of reasoning which happens to be exactly the same as the reasoning which serves a large role in the foundation of "scientific objectivity" as a whole; repeatably. Repeatability is perhaps the best standard we have for approaching objective certainty in a world where we lack an un-doubtable source of knowledge. The OP is wondering how we can know for sure whether or not there is an external or objective reality. I'm here to tell him that we cannot know for sure, but what we CAN do is look for consistencies which would indicate that such an objective reality exists, but more importantly which also would pragmatically force us to behave as if there is one. The repeatability of experimentation in science and the reliable predictive power that this repeatability permits is what makes science a source of useful knowledge. We can never be absolutely certain that all the laws of physics wont all suddenly change one day, making science useless, but until then the overwhelming consistency of the empirical phenomenon that scientific theories are developed from represents an extremely strong inductive argument which is why science itself is strong.

Gravity is something whose fundamental nature we do not yet fully understand, we just approximate it's force with mass and distance. And yet, the sheer consistency with which we measure it's force allows us to construct theories and to make reliable predictions about what effect it will have on particular bodies of mass. Maybe one day we will fully understand gravity (like how people used to dream they would one day fully understand the sun), but until then we will have to settle for only being able to reliably predict it with very marginal degrees of imprecision (like how the ancients reliably predicted the rising of the sun without knowing the deeper nature behind the phenomenon.).

Gravity is something whose fundamental nature we do not yet fully understand, we just approximate it's force with mass and distance. And yet, the sheer consistency with which we measure it's force allows us to construct theories and to make reliable predictions about what effect it will have on particular bodies of mass. — VagabondSpectre

Unless we need to do accurate calculations for GPS, orbits of planets close to the sun, black holes, gravitational waves, the big bang, and indeed some long range missile targeting. Then we can't just approximate "its force with mass and distance", rather we need to deal with what we know gravity to be.

I don't need precision beyond "the sun rose every day within memory" in order to (through induction) identify a pattern with which to make the prediction "the sun will rise tomorrow". — VagabondSpectre

Yes, that is precisely how we are able to predict with absolute reliability that the next swan we encounter will be white.

Reality is everything that exists. Awareness is thoughts and memories and sensations. Exactly as it is for the realist. It's just that whereas the realist would say that both awareness and non-awareness things exist, and so that "reality" refers to awareness and non-awareness things, the idealist would say that only awareness exists, and so that "reality" refers only to awareness.

Again compare with "intelligent species" and humanity. That the former refers only to the latter is not that they mean the same thing or that humanity doesn't exist. — Michael

I'm saying that it is redundant to use these terms. If reality is everything that exists and nothing else exists except awareness, then you are simply being redundant. In what instances would you use these terms separately and not be talking about the same thing. How could you use these terms in two different sentences and not be meaning the same thing? You need to define "meaning".

Well maybe that's because I'm thinking of the word "my" in the way a realist does. You need to define "my" if it means something different to you or I will never understand. — Harry Hindu

It means what the realist means. I don't understand what's hard to understand. You can't go from "only bodies exist" to "only my body exists" and so you can't go from "only mental phenomena exists" to "only my mental phenomena exists". — Michael

Exactly. And you also can't go from "only this mental phenomenon exists" to "other mental phenomenon exists". So, "my" is a term that has no meaning for an idealist. So to use terms like "I" and "my" is meaningless and causes confusion. Only mental phenomena exists. There is no "my".

Objects of the mind are not minds themselves. They are components of a mind. So you can't call the objects of the mind other minds. If you did, then that would give them a perspective - which is something that exists outside of your experience of it.

I wouldn't need to go from "only bodies exist" to "only my body exists" because it is clear that other bodies besides mine exist. I can't say that for other minds though because I have never experienced another mind before - only by proxy, like right now reading your posts. I can even distinguish your post from my posts. If I couldn't then how could I be having a conversation at all? If I didn't, then what purpose would be the use of language?

How can any idealist argue for the existence of something that they have never experienced? You have never experienced other minds, only other bodies. You infer the existence of other minds by the behavior of other bodies, just as we infer the existence of atoms through the behavior of matter. What you are saying is that you are sure that something you never experience exists, yet the things you experience don't exist when you don't experience them. You are being contradictory. — Harry Hindu

Except the claim isn't "the things I experience don't exist when I don't experience them". It's "things don't exist when they're not being experienced". It doesn't matter if I experience them, only that they are experienced.

The only idealism you're even considering is a solipsistic kind. But not all idealisms are solipsistic. — Michael

You're being inconsistent again. I can't converse with someone who refuses to be consistent. If your argument is that something exists when another mind besides mine experiences it goes nowhere because you haven't shown why it is you believe other minds exist where things can exist that you don't experience yet they are still experienced. How do you know that they are being experienced outside of your own when you question the existence of things outside of your experience. If you can't provide a meaningful answer without being contradictory then I won't waste my time here. If you have something to teach then I'm all ears, but so far it's been nothing but contradiction and confusion.

Unless we need to do accurate calculations for GPS, orbits of planets close to the sun, black holes, gravitational waves, the big bang, and indeed some long range missile targeting. Then we can't just approximate "its force with mass and distance", rather we need to deal with what we know gravity to be. — tom

We predict the force of gravity between two objects by looking at their mass and the distance between them. This is physics 101. We don't know what gravity is unfortunately, so rocket scientists have do things my way... With precise approximation...

Yes, that is precisely how we are able to predict with absolute reliability that the next swan we encounter will be white. — tom

Reliability is not the same as "absolute reliability".

It's neither absolutely reliable that the next swan you see will be white, nor absolutely reliable that the sun will rise tomorrow. These things can be considered "reliable" (one much more so than the other) but we cannot call them certain.

I think you might be missing something here. #2 is the conjectured *explanation* of #1. The reason that certain regularities exist is that the sun orbits the earth, and you cannot, via any logical process arrive at #2 via #1.
...

Science begins when an explanation of certain phenomena, be they regularities or irregularities, is proposed. Why does the sun orbit the earth? Why do we have seasons? Why can't Demeter and Zeus just get along? — tom

I'm not talking about "explanations", I'm talking about empirical observations. I was pointing out that measuring and recording the suns behavior (#1) is how we can gain predictive power over it (through strong induction based on sound observations), not by "explaining" it.

As far as "science begins when explanations are proposed" goes, you have it completely backwards. Science does not "begin" with an explanation. It begins with a lack of an explanation, and then uses evidence and reason, like measurements of when and where the sun rises over the horizon, to try and figure out more and more functional (and presumably accurate) understandings.

Science does not begin with explanations, it ends with them; that's it's final goal or product. Science decidedly begins with that most basic and fundamental activity of data collection.

We predict the force of gravity between two objects by looking at their mass and the distance between them. This is physics 101. We don't know what gravity is unfortunately, so rocket scientists have do things my way... With precise approximation... — VagabondSpectre

We haven't done that for 100 years.

It's neither absolutely reliable that the next swan you see will be white, nor absolutely reliable that the sun will rise tomorrow. These things can be considered "reliable" (one much more so than the other) but we cannot call them certain. — VagabondSpectre

Just don't go to Australia Eh?

We haven't done that for 100 years. — tom

How do we predict how much force one massive object will exert upon another through gravity?

What is the fundamental mechanism of gravity?

I'm not talking about "explanations", I'm talking about empirical observations. I was pointing out that measuring and recording the suns behavior (#1) is how we can gain predictive power over it (through strong induction based on sound observations), not by "explaining" it. — VagabondSpectre

OK, so you have a record of past risings and settings of the sun. I have a record of milkman and postal deliveries to my house. I guess that makes us even?

I predict that there will be a milk delivery on Monday morning and a 66% chance of post. I am scientist!

As far as "science begins when explanations are proposed" goes, you have it completely backwards. Science does not "begin" with an explanation. It begins with a lack of an explanation, and then uses evidence and reason, like measurements of when and where the sun rises over the horizon, to try and figure out more and more functional (and presumably accurate) understandings. — VagabondSpectre

But in reality, most scientific theories are rejected because they are bad explanations. Geocentrism was rejected for that reason, despite, as you point out, its predictive reliability.

Science moves on, and we are in the era of unexperienced predictions. Entanglement was unexperienced for 50years, as was the Higgs. Gravitational waves were unexperienced for 100 years.

Science does not begin with explanations, it ends with them; that's it's final goal or product. Science decidedly begins with that most basic and fundamental activity of data collection. — VagabondSpectre

You mean like flogiston or the luminiferous aether is the end?

How do we predict how much force one massive object will exert upon another through gravity?

What is the fundamental mechanism of gravity? — VagabondSpectre

Are you asking for a science lesson?

OK, so you have a record of past risings and settings of the sun. I have a record of milkman and postal deliveries to my house. I guess that makes us even?

I predict that there will be a milk delivery on Monday morning and a 66% chance of post. I am scientist! — tom

You are misunderstanding the point or claim that I made. I never said that the simple argument that the sun will rise tomorrow (from experience) was a scientific claim or scientific argument, I merely pointed out it's similarity with the strength and type of reasoning that actual scientific arguments employ in the foundation of their proofs.

The sun rising every day for the last million days is like a repeated experiment which has always given the same result. Reproducible evidence. It's the cumulative inductive reasoning which gives us confidence in the foundational assumptions that we make about the world in order to facilitate, reinforce, and expand our understanding of it.

Where science begins and ends is a matter that is hard to pinpoint (see: Demarcation problem). Whether it's in the initial theorizing or exploration of hypotheticals, or in data collection, or in analysis of that data, or in the corrections then made to existing models, or all of it, I'm not exactly sure. What I can tell you though is that the confidence that we have in many of the scientific facts we rely on are strong not because they describe basic fundamental and objective truths (many of them don't, science has flaws), they're strong because the predictions we can make with them are reliably repeatable, including the initial experiments and predictions used to establish their normative parameters in the first place.

Here in this thread asking for how we can approach objectivity, I'm (trying to) explain how science achieves this.

Yes scientific theories, the big ones anyway, amount to vast explanatory models which employ many sub-theories and laws which interact with each other to model larger systems, but the nuts and bolts of these theories are all derived from repeatable experiments (giving them "predictive power"). And yes, sometimes hypothetical phenomenon are supposed in order to explain other phenomenon, even when we have had no direct experience of them, but these hypothetical inferences about what exists also stem directly from observations of other phenomenon, and they remain "hypothetical" (i.e: not scientific fact) until we can actually confirm their existence with direct, reproducible, evidence. That is to say, the Boson was not a scientific fact until we were able to actually "observe" it (repeatably).

Are you asking for a science lesson? — tom

If you understand the mechanism of gravity, please don;t waste your time on me, write a paper about it and submit it to a physics journal for peer review at your earliest convenience.

Here's the equation for determining the force that gravity exerts between two objects:

Force of gravity=(Mass of object one)(mass of object two)/ (distance between them squared)

There is also something called "the universal gravitational constant", which is essentially just a modifier which assumes mass measurements in Kg's and outputs a force measurement in Newtons (IIRC).

Am I wrong?

Am I wrong? — VagabondSpectre

Yes

Could you give me a keyword to search in google so I can figure out how? I did provide an explanation of my position at least. Would you like direct links? This should do : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s_law_of_universal_gravitation

1916

How does Einstein's general relativity contradict Newtons law of universal gravitational attraction?

Say I want to figure out what trajectory and velocity to use in order to make a rocket slingshot around the moon, which theory do I use? General Relativity or Newtonian physics?

Are you trained in physics at all? I'm just curious as to which one of us ought to be giving the science lessons...

The pattern is inherent in the numbers though; in the data; in the observations. — VagabondSpectre

No, that's the point I am making, there is no pattern inherent in the numbers. The pattern is a property of how the numbers are applied. So numbers, as objects, ideal objects, don't have inherent patterns. Take "two" for example, it indicates two distinct entities classed together under the same title, "two", but there is no necessary pattern within these two entities. But when "two" is related to "one", and to "three", or other numbers, then we have an ordering, which is a pattern. There is no pattern within the object itself, "two", or "the number", the pattern is created by the application of the number.

In the most basic argument saying "the sun will rise tomorrow", the observational data is a series of 1's or checked boxes representing each previous consecutive day recording the fact that the sun rose on that day. — VagabondSpectre

See here, it is the series of 1's, and the checking, which creates the pattern. But let's not forget my original point, "the sun rose" is not a fact, it is a falsity. The sun did no such thing, the earth is spinning in relation to the sun. The capacity for prediction creates the illusion of objective certainty, but if the premise, "the sun rose" is an inaccurate, imprecise, or in this case false, description, then the conclusion "the sun will rise tomorrow", is equally false or imprecise.

The point being, that the predictive power, which science gives us, is only an illusion of objective certainty. If the observed, and predicted event is incorrectly described, then the predictive capacity may hide a profound falsity. The predictive capacity makes one believe that there is an objective truth there, when really there is a profound falsity. All that is required, is for the scientists involved to agree on a description of the event, then the prediction of that described event is supposed to validate the objective certainty of that event. But how is it the case that people agreeing on a description can validate the objective truth of that description?

Suppose we see a dark spot on the horizon, you and I, and we agree that it is a big rock. We can predict that every time we walk past this place, we will see a big rock in the distance on our right. We assume to have objective certainty about this big rock, because the dark spot is always over there whenever we walk by. Perhaps this dark spot isn't even a big rock though. The predictive capacity has hidden a deeper misunderstanding, such that there was no objective truth there in the first place.

We can never be absolutely certain that all the laws of physics wont all suddenly change one day, making science useless, but until then the overwhelming consistency of the empirical phenomenon that scientific theories are developed from represents an extremely strong inductive argument which is why science itself is strong. — VagabondSpectre

We can know, with a high degree of certainty that some of our descriptions will prove to be inaccurate. This we know from experience. Because of this, we can assume that the "laws of physics" will need to be changed to account for new, better descriptions. Therefore we can have a high degree of certainty that the laws of physics will change.

No, that's the point I am making, there is no pattern inherent in the numbers. The pattern is a property of how the numbers are applied. So numbers, as objects, ideal objects, don't have inherent patterns. Take "two" for example, it indicates two distinct entities classed together under the same title, "two", but there is no necessary pattern within these two entities. But when "two" is related to "one", and to "three", or other numbers, then we have an ordering, which is a pattern. There is no pattern within the object itself, "two", or "the number", the pattern is created by the application of the number. — Metaphysician Undercover

The pattern is that the sun is visible in the sky every day; that's the pattern, not the numbers or symbols we use to represent them.

See here, it is the series of 1's, and the checking, which creates the pattern. — Metaphysician Undercover

The sun appearing in the sky every day IS the pattern. The pattern is there whether I check a box, scribble a one to record it, or not. The pattern may be caused by physical forces I do not understand and my ability to observe it limited, but I can still describe a phenomenon which I observe, and make inductive predictions from how consistently the "phenomenon" (a bright thing appearing over the horizon) behaves.

But let's not forget my original point, "the sun rose" is not a fact, it is a falsity. The sun did no such thing, the earth is spinning in relation to the sun. The capacity for prediction creates the illusion of objective certainty, but if the premise, "the sun rose" is an inaccurate, imprecise, or in this case false, description, then the conclusion "the sun will rise tomorrow", is equally false or imprecise. — Metaphysician Undercover

All "the sun rises" necessarily means is that "A big warm bright thing appears in the sky everyday over the horizon". That's not false. It might not be an absolutely thorough explanation of what the sun is, but I never claimed that the example argument I provided produces a thorough explanatory model. The only thing we gain from the argument I presented is predictive power in and of itself, over the bright thing, which is the phenomenon it records. Think of it as analogous to "I could see the sun from here yesterday, and every day before that, therefore I could see the sun from here tomorrow". I'm not saying anything about what the sun is on a fundamental level, how it was created, what causes it to appear to move across the sky, etc... All I can tell you is when and where it will appear, whatever it is. I understand your point, that "the sun orbiting the earth is falsity", but it's against a position that is completely irrelevant to the one I've articulated.

The point being, that the predictive power, which science gives us, is only an illusion of objective certainty. If the observed, and predicted event is incorrectly described, then the predictive capacity may hide a profound falsity. The predictive capacity makes one believe that there is an objective truth there, when really there is a profound falsity. All that is required, is for the scientists involved to agree on a description of the event, then the prediction of that described event is supposed to validate the objective certainty of that event. But how is it the case that people agreeing on a description can validate the objective truth of that description? — Metaphysician Undercover

"People agreeing" does not confirm or invalidate the "objective truth" of something. But in science we use "agreement" as a tool to approximate objectivity. On an individual level, scientists seek to find "descriptions" (sometimes to describe, sometimes to explain, sometimes to predict) of things which "agree" with observation and experimentation. There's a second level of "agreement" which is between individual scientists and their various theories; this is helpful for catching mistakes made by one individual, and for testing theories against one another to see what "agrees" and can be combined into a more comprehensive description of whichever physical system they seek to model.

That our descriptions, models, laws, and predictions remain consistent with observation and experimentation does not "confirm" their objectivity, but it does "approximate or approach" it. Even if there's no such thing as objectivity as the OP suggested, then this consistent "agreement with observation and experimentation" still can be used as a tool to point to more and more reliable (and perhaps more useful)"subjective truth".

Suppose we see a dark spot on the horizon, you and I, and we agree that it is a big rock. We can predict that every time we walk past this place, we will see a big rock in the distance on our right. We assume to have objective certainty about this big rock, because the dark spot is always over there whenever we walk by. Perhaps this dark spot isn't even a big rock though. The predictive capacity has hidden a deeper misunderstanding, such that there was no objective truth there in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said what the phenomenon was, you did. All I said was there is a dark spot on the horizon, and with my recorded observations of it's "relative position" over time I have identified a pattern which allows me to predict where this dark spot will appear tomorrow. I don't claim to have knowledge about what the dark spot is; that's your own presumption, I've never said it was a rock. All I claim is to have reliable predictive power over where this dark spot is going to be on the horizon tomorrow.

We can know, with a high degree of certainty that some of our descriptions will prove to be inaccurate. This we know from experience. Because of this, we can assume that the "laws of physics" will need to be changed to account for new, better descriptions. Therefore we can have a high degree of certainty that the laws of physics will change. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not talking about the inherent fact that science is incomplete or has flaws, I'm talking about the constant physical laws which science seeks to describe and understand. The constant improvement it makes to itself is essentially this process of approaching or approximating "objectivity and reliability". It's the fact that things appear to remain consistent which persuades us that whatever we uncover about them through repeatable experimentation (predictions) and observation (regardless of whether that knowledge is objective certainty or not), is worth knowing.

But by "laws of physics suddenly changed" I meant things like: "What if gravity suddenly reversed the direction of it's force?", "What if the speed of light suddenly slowed?", "What if the nuclear bonds holding atoms together suddenly became stronger or weaker?", "What if empty space suddenly became electrically conductive"?. These are the kinds of things which we hope will never change, because if they did then some or all of what we pragmatically rely on as scientific or even just general fact could suddenly change, and continue changing, forever, rendering some or all of our current models useless and evidently "not objective".

The pattern is that the sun is visible in the sky every day; that's the pattern, not the numbers or symbols we use to represent them. — VagabondSpectre

I don't think so, the pattern is in the description, it is described as a pattern. It is dark then it is light, that's how it is described. When it is light, it is called "day". Not by coincidence, the sun is in the sky when it is light. That the sun is "in the sky every day" , is the description. But is the sun really "in the sky", or is the description really inaccurate? The sky is the atmosphere, and the sun is not in the atmosphere. And if the description is inaccurate, then how is the pattern real? The sun is not really in the sky, so this is a false pattern on account of a false description.

The sun appearing in the sky every day IS the pattern. The pattern is there whether I check a box, scribble a one to record it, or not. — VagabondSpectre

No, I don't think so. The sun appearing in the sky every day is a description. Unless someone makes that description, how is that pattern actually there?

On an individual level, scientists seek to find "descriptions" (sometimes to describe, sometimes to explain, sometimes to predict) of things which "agree" with observation and experimentation. — VagabondSpectre

You seem to missing the point. Observations are themselves descriptions. Unless the scientists can agree on the terms of description, then the same event will be described differently by different scientists, hence there will be varying observations, which are actually just different descriptions of the very same thing. The point I am making is that when the scientists come to agreement as to how to describe a specific type of event, this does not ensure that the agreed upon description is an objective truth concerning that event. Agreement doesn't produce objective truth.

I never said what the phenomenon was, you did. All I said was there is a dark spot on the horizon, and with my recorded observations of it's "relative position" over time I have identified a pattern which allows me to predict where this dark spot will appear tomorrow. I don't claim to have knowledge about what the dark spot is; that's your own presumption, I've never said it was a rock. All I claim is to have reliable predictive power over where this dark spot is going to be on the horizon tomorrow. — VagabondSpectre

Your missing the analogy. The observation itself is a description of the occurrence. Even to call it "a dark spot on the horizon" is a description. The truth or falsity of the prediction depends just as much on the accuracy of the description, as it depends on the occurrence of the described event. That is why "the sun will rise tomorrow" is a false prediction. It is false because the description is false, the sun is not rising, the earth is spinning. It only appears like the sun is rising, but this is an illusion.

Your observation, "the sun rose yesterday" is a description. You and all your colleagues might agree that these are adequate terms for the observation. But this does not make it true that the sun rose yesterday, just because you and all your colleagues "observed" this. The description you provided, which constitutes your "observation", is itself a falsity. Despite the fact that everyone involved "observed" this, it is still a falsity, because the observation that they all agreed upon was inaccurate.

But by "laws of physics suddenly changed" I meant things like: "What if gravity suddenly reversed the direction of it's force?", "What if the speed of light suddenly slowed?", "What if the nuclear bonds holding atoms together suddenly became stronger or weaker?", "What if empty space suddenly became electrically conductive"?. These are the kinds of things which we hope will never change, because if they did then some or all of what we pragmatically rely on as scientific or even just general fact could suddenly change, and continue changing, forever, rendering some or all of our current models useless and evidently "not objective". — VagabondSpectre

My point is, that if your observations are not proper descriptions of the events which are occurring, if they are just the "agreed upon descriptions", then the current models are already "not objective", they may well be falsities, despite the fact that they may be highly useful in terms of predictability. Therefore predictability doesn't provide any type of objective truth.

I don't think so, the pattern is in the description, it is described as a pattern. It is dark then it is light, that's how it is described. When it is light, it is called "day". Not by coincidence, the sun is in the sky when it is light. That the sun is "in the sky every day" , is the description. But is the sun really "in the sky", or is the description really inaccurate? The sky is the atmosphere, and the sun is not in the atmosphere. And if the description is inaccurate, then how is the pattern real? The sun is not really in the sky, so this is a false pattern on account of a false description — Metaphysician Undercover

The "sun" "appears" in the "sky" every "day". There's nothing untrue about this. The sun is visible each day from the surface of the planet earth. No amount of trying to enforce semantic technicalities to say this is "unobjective" will change this observable truth.

An observation does not have to amount to a complete description of something, it can be specific, incomplete, or even be inherently an abstraction. "The sun rises every day" is a very simple observation and the strong inductive argument which arises from it is extremely specific: the sun is visible with predictable regularity. Again this does not say anything about what the sun "is" beyond that whatever it is, "it's visibility from the surface of the earth follows a cyclical pattern".

No, I don't think so. The sun appearing in the sky every day is a description. Unless someone makes that description, how is that pattern actually there? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because presumably the sun would be visible from the surface of the Earth even if people were not around to describe it, as evidenced by the proliferation of plant life.

You seem to missing the point. Observations are themselves descriptions. Unless the scientists can agree on the terms of description, then the same event will be described differently by different scientists, hence there will be varying observations, which are actually just different descriptions of the very same thing. The point I am making is that when the scientists come to agreement as to how to describe a specific type of event, this does not ensure that the agreed upon description is an objective truth concerning that event. Agreement doesn't produce objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreement does not ensure objective truth, but it makes regular truth more reliable.

We can differ about whether it's permissible to say "the sun will rise at 5:30" instead of "The earth spinning will result in the star at the center of our solar system being visible at 5:30 eastern standard time from New York city", but both of our "descriptions/observations" can be said to be true because they both contain truth: the moment that the sun becomes visible at a given point on the planet. This is why you saying that "the sun will rise at 5:30 is falsity" actually does not address the argument in question. The argument never established what the sun is, it only establishes when it becomes visible (or that it will become visible).

Your observation, "the sun rose yesterday" is a description. You and all your colleagues might agree that these are adequate terms for the observation. But this does not make it true that the sun rose yesterday, just because you and all your colleagues "observed" this. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're still using semantics to try and make your point while missing the one you are trying to criticize.

"The sun rose" does not mean "the sun is inside of the earth's atmosphere". It means, "The sun was visible yesterday". That's the observation and nothing more. Now, the fact that we observe things repeatedly and that our observations agree with one another, as in the case of the sun's visibility, does not produce objective truth, but it does function as a tool to help us approach universally reliable truths.

My point is, that if your observations are not proper descriptions of the events which are occurring, if they are just the "agreed upon descriptions", then the current models are already "not objective", they may well be falsities, despite the fact that they may be highly useful in terms of predictability. Therefore predictability doesn't provide any type of objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Repeatable observations of reliable phenomenon assist in producing models which allow us to reliably predict various aspects of said phenomenon. It's not objective truth; it's reliable and useful truth; that's science.