As I said in the answer above; it seems we have al least some motivation to ask the question of bats, since there is every indication that they are percipient beings, as we find ourselves to be. There is little motivation to ask the question of toasters since we have zero reason to believe they are percipient. Same goes for computers.

:rofl: I don't guano about that!

As I said in the answer above; it seems we have al least some motivation to ask the question of bats, since there is every indication that they are percipient beings, as we find ourselves to be. There is little motivation to ask the question of toasters since we have zero reason to believe they are percipient. Same goes for computers. — Janus

Yes, but what about computer robots that process information from sensory systems (detecting level of pressure on their surface when touching objects, the information in the light and vibrating air molecules, and chemicals in the air) for the purpose of navigating its environment and finding sources of energy to replenish its finite supply? It's nervous system would consist of the necessary wiring for the transmission of electrical signals between the sensory devices and the computer brain. Would this entity possess a "what it is like"?

Again, I am unclear what Nagel is really asking. It seems to me that anything that exists would possess a what it is like to be that thing. It exists an amalgam of the characteristics that define what it is. Apples have the properties of ripeness and fructose levels. These are part of what it is to be an apple. I am not an apple so I cannot experience what it is to be an apple. Is this what Nagel is asking, or is there something more that Nagel is implying to being something? Maybe it's more of a question of whether or not an apple, computer or bat has experiences? What is an experience?

As I said in the answer above; it seems we have al least some motivation to ask the question of bats, since there is every indication that they are percipient beings, as we find ourselves to be. There is little motivation to ask the question of toasters since we have zero reason to believe they are percipient. Same goes for computers. — Janus

I agree that there is reasonable ground to consider the similarities between the cognition of bat and human. However, when we enter the realm of unfettered speculation, why should we not go further. For example, it could be argued that it is just as reasonable to compare the similarities between human rationality and the logic of computers (as predicate calculus attempts).

My problem is that the human being is impossibly complex, and there is much more happening in being human than in being a bat or computer. Of course this is more speculation.

The thing is we know that we experience. We observe our neural similarity to animals, so it is natural enough to suppose that they also experience. The sensors on robots or thermostats or whatever that. along with computer programs in the robot "brain" via fairly simple electric mechanisms cause the robot to respond in more or less diverse ways is not substantively analogous to the human CNS.

Animals cannot tell us that they experience but their behavior, which certainly appears to be stimulated by fear, hunger, isolation, pain and so on certainly suggests that they do experience.

I don't guano about that! — Janus

:lol:

Guano is a delicacy in certain cultures. :yum:

I would say the neurological structures of a bat are immeasurably more complex than any computer's program, and are probably not all that much less complex than the human.

:rofl: and then :vomit: I don't guano about that!

I would say the neurological structures of a bat are immeasurably more complex than any computer's program, and are probably not all that much less complex than the human. — Janus

One of the problems with comparing humans and computers, is that computers don't actually have a neurological structure, that is, if what we are referring to by "neurological" is a product of evolutionary biology.

I am unclear what Nagel is really asking. — Harry Hindu

He's drawing attention to the fact that bats (by extension, us also) are subjects of experience. The phrase 'what it is like' is rather awkward, but I think saying that bats, birds and humans are subjects of experience ought to be non-controversial.

Whereas, I would argue that no device, no matter how complex or advanced, is a subject of experience, because it doesn't possess any of the attributes of subject-hood. A device can emulate or simulate the activities of living beings, but it's not actually 'a being'; it's a device, or a mass of networked devices; ultimately an enormous array of on-off switches, processing an enormous stream of ones and zeros.

(This was one of the connotations of the title of Asimov's ground-breaking 60's series, 'I, Robot'. The title implies that the robots in question have developed self-awareness, or subjectivity. )

[...] bats, birds and humans are subjects of experience ought to be non-controversial.

Whereas, I would argue that no device, no matter how complex or advanced, is a subject of experience, because it doesn't possess any of the attributes of subject-hood. A device can emulate or simulate the activities of living beings, but it's not actually 'a being'; it's a device, or a mass of networked devices. — Wayfarer

I agree. Yet, I anticipate strong objections from the knowing ones.

What would you say subject-hood entails, and what is it dependent on?

What would you say subject-hood entails, and what is it dependent on? — Merkwurdichliebe

Well, there's a million-dollar question for you.

I suppose one way to tackle it, is to suggest that, whatever this is, it is just precisely what 'eliminative materialists' deny is real. Conversely, its nature is just precisely what those who talk about 'the hard problem' are referring to. (Incidentally, at this point it's useful to point to Chalmer's original paper.)

Dennett, et al, say that consciousness itself is the collective output of millions of cellular transactions which collectively give rise to the illusion of subject-hood, selfhood, and the apparent first person reality of the mind.

If that sounds preposterous, well, you're not alone in so thinking. Dennett's first book on the subject was called Consciousness Explained, but critics, including Nagel and John Searle, said it ought to be called 'Consciousness Ignored', as that is precisely what it must do.

Dennett's most recent book, From Bacteria to Bach and Back, takes the same tack, with Nagel again saying:

Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.”

David Bentley Hart said of the same book, that 'Some of the problems posed by mental phenomena Dennett simply dismisses without adequate reason; others he ignores. Most, however, he attempts to prove are mere “user-illusions” generated by evolutionary history, even though this sometimes involves claims so preposterous as to verge on the deranged.'

But Dennett shows no sign of backing down. So, how would you argue with him?

Keith Frankish and Daniel Dennett are too proponents that conscious experience is an illusion produced by some yet to be discovered mechanism in the brain. By this, illusionists mean that we're being fooled by a cognitive trick into believing we have experiences of color, sound, pain, etc, leading some philosophers to propose there is a hard problem of trying to explain those experiences inside a scientific framework (the terminology of physics, chemistry, biology and neuroscience or cognitive science). Consciousness is compared to a magic show, where the brain fools us using some slight of cognition we're not aware of. — Marchesk

This is a caricature of Dennett's position. Dennett does not say that conscious experience is an illusion, in the sense of being unreal. He is saying that our intuitive, unexamined folk theories of "conscious experience" should not be trusted and given a privileged status, simply because they are ours.

This is a caricature of Dennett's position. — SophistiCat

Not so - it is exactly what Dennett says. In 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea', he says “through the microscope of molecular biology, we get to witness the birth of agency, in the first macromolecules that have enough complexity to ‘do things.’ ... There is something alien and vaguely repellent about the quasi-agency we discover at this level — all that purposive hustle and bustle, and yet there’s nobody home.

Love it or hate it, phenomena like this exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe.' Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, 202-3.

Dennett (and Dawkins) are the poster boys for neo-Darwinian materialism, and this is exactly what neo-Darwinian materialism proposes.

But Dennett shows no sign of backing down. So, how would you argue with him? — Wayfarer

I wouldn't even consider Dennett a third tier philosopher. He is more of a theorist. And from a philosophical perspective, all you have to do is sit back quietly and watch his theories eat themselves.

"Subject-hood"...

I suppose one way to tackle it, is to suggest that, whatever this is, it is just precisely what 'eliminative materialists' deny is real. Conversely, its nature is just precisely what those who talk about 'the hard problem' are referring to. — Wayfarer

And what about those who regard it as a particular operation contextualized in some propositional format?

One of the problems with comparing humans and computers, is that computers don't actually have a neurological structure, that is, if what we are referring to by "neurological" is a product of evolutionary biology. — Merkwurdichliebe

Right, computers don't have neurological structures, and that's why we have little reason to seriously consider the possibility that they might experience anything in the kind of way that we think we and other animals do.

I wouldn't even consider Dennett a third tier philosopher. He is more of a theorist. And from a philosophical perspective, all you have to do is sit back quietly and watch his theories eat themselves. — Merkwurdichliebe

I think this is unfair to Dennett, who by any account is a serious philosopher even if you disagree with him. Have you actually read Dennett? I know there are some who post on here who despise him even though they have never read his actual works.

And what about those who regard it as a particular operation contextualized in some propositional format? — Merkwurdichliebe

What does it take to ‘contextualise’? I worked at an A.I. startup over Christmas and they were finding it extremely difficult to get their system to contextualise. At least some of what is required for that is ‘tacit knowledge’ - the kind of background that can only be imparted through culture and language. Devils’ own job trying to specify it.

I think this is unfair to Dennett, who by any account is a serious philosopher even if you disagree with him. Have you actually read Dennett? I know there are some who post on here who despise him even though they have never read his actual works. — Janus

You might be right. I won't argue.

I read him a while ago when studying atheism. I wasn't really impressed, and I felt he was rehashing many old empiricist dilemmas that have been long rendered indisputably repugnant to common sense.

At least some if what is required for that is ‘tacit knowledge’ - the kind of background that can only be imparted through culture and language. — Wayfarer

But going even deeper. Is there not something unspeakable about lived experience, something that is unquantifiable, and informal?

Devils’ own job trying to specify it. — Wayfarer

Devil never does, does he?

Case in point. I was going through a dataset of supermarket sales quarter by quarter. One of the selection criteria was ‘shopper type’ - like, single persons, couples, parents with children. So I asked ‘do you have any data for “bachelors”? She thinks for a minute and then says “Bachelor - is that a commodity (olive)?’ I realise she is guessing - doesn’t know what a bachelor is, but takes a shot at it. ‘Yes’, I say, just to be mischievous. ‘Good’, comes the reply. ‘I’ll remember’.

going even deeper. Is there not something unspeakable about lived experience, something that is unquantifiable, and informal? — Merkwurdichliebe

Yes. I believe that is what those quaint old philosophy types called ‘the mystery of being’.

system to conceptualise — Wayfarer

Do you mean it couldn't extrapolate its binary logic into some abstraction of meaning? Go figure?

There is something else going on in natural language than what can be explained in propositional logic. And this has to do with the fact that many of the cleverest philosophers in the present age have found refuge in the sky castles of speculation, and lost sight of what it is to simply live.

Yes. I believe that is what those quaint old philosophy types called ‘the mystery of being’. — Wayfarer

What primitive idiots. They don't know the secret to life, like we do in the present age. :razz:

So I asked ‘do you have any data for “bachelors”? She thinks for a minute and then says “Bachelor - is that a commodity (olive)?’ I realise she is guessing - doesn’t know what a bachelor is, but takes a shot at it. ‘Yes’, I say, just to be mischievous. ‘Good’, comes the reply. ‘I’ll remember’. — Wayfarer

I think I had an identical exchange with some one else here on TPF. :grin:

@Wayfarer

I have one more concern. How can we confidently assert that propositional logic has some correspondence to life, when we haven't even determined whether or not life is rational? How do we account for the possible irrational aspect which would completely ellude any rational form?

This point always seems to be ignored.

I am a firm believer in power of reason. I’m inclined to think that life overflows or exceeds the bounds of reason, but that doesn’t make it irrational. There’s what is beyond reason, and there’s also irrationality, but they’re not same thing. Perhaps there’s an analogy between the oft-quoted resemblance of genius and madness; they’re alike in being outside the middle of the bell curve of normality, but they’re not the same.

The point about what is called ‘scientific’ rationalism is that it is ultimately always concerned with what can be measured and empirically known. There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with that, but if applied to philosophy, it can only ever give rise to something like positivism. Or to put it another way, methodological naturalism is misapplied as metaphysical naturalism - which is pretty well what Dennett exemplifies.

Traditionalist rationalism is an entirely different matter, but that’s another topic altogether.

I’m inclined to think that life overflows or exceeds the bounds of reason, but that doesn’t make it irrational. — Wayfarer

Perhaps there’s an analogy between the oft-quoted resemblance of genius and madness; they’re alike in being outside the middle of the bell curve of normality, but they’re not the same. — Wayfarer

It seems like from the perspective of human reason, anything exceeding its bounds would appear to be quite similar to what is considered irrational. I assume you use reason to mean the faculty by which I can apprehend something rational.
Maybe you can explain how I am mistaken.

And, this is leading into a deeper philosophical question which is becoming lost in the great understanding of the present age, a much more important question: whether man discovers or creates his knowledge of the world (perhaps the hard question).

He is saying that our intuitive, unexamined folk theories of "conscious experience" should not be trusted and given a privileged status, simply because they are ours. — SophistiCat

Right, but then he uses this to argue like Keith Frankish that subjectivity is an illusion.

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/illusionism.pdf

Dennett's definition of consciousness is purely objective: functional, behavioral or neurophysiological with no additional experiential properties or stuff to go along with it. The colors, sounds, feels, are a trick of the brain.

This is where Chalmers and Dennett part company, but they understand each other's positions well. When you read or hear them debate each other's arguments, it's exactly on the point of whether subjectivity is real or an illusion.