Yes, but what about computer robots that process information from sensory systems (detecting level of pressure on their surface when touching objects, the information in the light and vibrating air molecules, and chemicals in the air) for the purpose of navigating its environment and finding sources of energy to replenish its finite supply? It's nervous system would consist of the necessary wiring for the transmission of electrical signals between the sensory devices and the computer brain. Would this entity possess a "what it is like"?As I said in the answer above; it seems we have al least some motivation to ask the question of bats, since there is every indication that they are percipient beings, as we find ourselves to be. There is little motivation to ask the question of toasters since we have zero reason to believe they are percipient. Same goes for computers. — Janus
As I said in the answer above; it seems we have al least some motivation to ask the question of bats, since there is every indication that they are percipient beings, as we find ourselves to be. There is little motivation to ask the question of toasters since we have zero reason to believe they are percipient. Same goes for computers. — Janus
I would say the neurological structures of a bat are immeasurably more complex than any computer's program, and are probably not all that much less complex than the human. — Janus
I am unclear what Nagel is really asking. — Harry Hindu
[...] bats, birds and humans are subjects of experience ought to be non-controversial.
Whereas, I would argue that no device, no matter how complex or advanced, is a subject of experience, because it doesn't possess any of the attributes of subject-hood. A device can emulate or simulate the activities of living beings, but it's not actually 'a being'; it's a device, or a mass of networked devices. — Wayfarer
What would you say subject-hood entails, and what is it dependent on? — Merkwurdichliebe
Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.”
Keith Frankish and Daniel Dennett are too proponents that conscious experience is an illusion produced by some yet to be discovered mechanism in the brain. By this, illusionists mean that we're being fooled by a cognitive trick into believing we have experiences of color, sound, pain, etc, leading some philosophers to propose there is a hard problem of trying to explain those experiences inside a scientific framework (the terminology of physics, chemistry, biology and neuroscience or cognitive science). Consciousness is compared to a magic show, where the brain fools us using some slight of cognition we're not aware of. — Marchesk
This is a caricature of Dennett's position. — SophistiCat
But Dennett shows no sign of backing down. So, how would you argue with him? — Wayfarer
I suppose one way to tackle it, is to suggest that, whatever this is, it is just precisely what 'eliminative materialists' deny is real. Conversely, its nature is just precisely what those who talk about 'the hard problem' are referring to. — Wayfarer
One of the problems with comparing humans and computers, is that computers don't actually have a neurological structure, that is, if what we are referring to by "neurological" is a product of evolutionary biology. — Merkwurdichliebe
I wouldn't even consider Dennett a third tier philosopher. He is more of a theorist. And from a philosophical perspective, all you have to do is sit back quietly and watch his theories eat themselves. — Merkwurdichliebe
And what about those who regard it as a particular operation contextualized in some propositional format? — Merkwurdichliebe
I think this is unfair to Dennett, who by any account is a serious philosopher even if you disagree with him. Have you actually read Dennett? I know there are some who post on here who despise him even though they have never read his actual works. — Janus
At least some if what is required for that is ‘tacit knowledge’ - the kind of background that can only be imparted through culture and language. — Wayfarer
Devils’ own job trying to specify it. — Wayfarer
going even deeper. Is there not something unspeakable about lived experience, something that is unquantifiable, and informal? — Merkwurdichliebe
system to conceptualise — Wayfarer
Yes. I believe that is what those quaint old philosophy types called ‘the mystery of being’. — Wayfarer
So I asked ‘do you have any data for “bachelors”? She thinks for a minute and then says “Bachelor - is that a commodity (olive)?’ I realise she is guessing - doesn’t know what a bachelor is, but takes a shot at it. ‘Yes’, I say, just to be mischievous. ‘Good’, comes the reply. ‘I’ll remember’. — Wayfarer
I’m inclined to think that life overflows or exceeds the bounds of reason, but that doesn’t make it irrational. — Wayfarer
Perhaps there’s an analogy between the oft-quoted resemblance of genius and madness; they’re alike in being outside the middle of the bell curve of normality, but they’re not the same. — Wayfarer
He is saying that our intuitive, unexamined folk theories of "conscious experience" should not be trusted and given a privileged status, simply because they are ours. — SophistiCat
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.