Incidentally, this line of reasoning is more or less exactly what drew me towards these kinds of thinkers; the notion of human freedom as guaranteed by some liberal conception of universality always struck me as cartoonish and ridiculous, and it always seemed to me that it'd only be by working through the processes of subjectivization that one could ever, in any coherent manner, speak about freedom.
Because to think 'live is lived' is exhausted by our 'thoughts, beliefs, intuitions and experience' is to conceive of life in a horrifyingly narrow and morbidly 'intellectualist' manner. Rather than live life in ones head, life generally is concerned with the things I do, the things I say, the actions I take. And perhaps even more importantly, the things done to me, said of me, that impel me and make claims upon me; life as composed of habits, regularities, flourishes of creative engagement amongst rhythms of time and movement, punctuated with time wasting, routine, imposition, sleep, intensity, and so on.
But being subject to forces beyond our control does not equal being utterly controlled by such forces, and I have never yet heard or read a convincing account of how, if we are immanent material beings and nothing but immanent material beings, the kind of (libertarian) freedom in the sense that I understand to be necessary for moral responsibility could be thought to be possible. — John
But, where I disagree is that I do not see this kind of self-creation as the kind of radical freedom that must be presumed to ground genuine moral responsibility. I would say that freedom only comes to us in the terms in which we think ourselves. If we think ourselves as immanently and exhaustively constituted as individual parts of cultural, social, historical and discursive processes, whether unreflectively and disempoweredly other-constituted or reflectively and empoweredly self-constructed, there can be no radical freedom for us, because we cannot think of ourselves as such. — John
The one universal thing about selves is the fact that they are all truly free. This does not mean that the individual, as a cultural subject is free, it means that the self, insofar as it is spirit, is not restricted to its cultural subjectivity. But if the individual does not believe this ( i'e' has no faith) , then of course the individual cannot be free; irrespective of how brilliantly and ingeniously it manipulates what it understands to be its cultural constitution and 'constructs itself as a work of art'
So freedom cannot ever be an "abstract truth" but rather something that must first be believed (on the basis of our intuitions and lived experience) before it can be fully lived. — John
I have tried to disabuse you of this erroneous reading several times but it's not sinking in. Once again, my position is that one can be said to be free in principle regardless of whether one believes it; but one will not live that freedom if one denies it. — ""John
If one confines freedom to physical actions and the way in which within the society freedoms are bestowed or deprived, it is in itself to relegate freedom to a byproduct of a mechanistic robotic process, presumably deterministic to boot. — Punshhh
Is this freedom, he is confined within the constraints of his conditioned subject, perhaps his fight for the presidency is the only thing he has left as a possibility of braking free of his distorted circus of a life and experiencing for a brief moment some freedom. — Punshhh
The perception of her humanity. We're done here. — Mongrel
Let's look at another example of a subject, Ghandi, someone who was content with his food bowl and the ability to weave his own loin cloth. He lived far more freedom than Trump does, by the freedoms expressed from his mind and enjoying a few genuine friendships and a humble constructive role within his society.
Ghandi exercised his intellect and sculpted, crafted his own mind and psychological life with freedom of imagination and creative intellectual vision. Such freedom emerges in the mind of a subject who is somehow transcendent of their social conditioning. — Punshhh
I can't make much sense of this or how it connects to what is the issue here. Wasn't Heidegger a historicist and wasn't Foucault actually pretty close to him? — Πετροκότσυφας
If how we feel is where freedom resides, then one needs to have the concept of freedom in order for freedom to have any meaning for them. — Πετροκότσυφας
What does this tell us about our world though? Nothing. To say any of these things could be says nothing about what is. So yes, all the events of the world could be played out by philosophical zombies, but are they? Is it true? Or are we concious subjects?
Such a personality is not free insofar as they act out emotional compulsions. So that is another sense in which the discussion of what might constitute freedom is meaningful - and one near to the idea of freedom in the tradition of philosophy. (That said, there is nothing preventing a discussion of that subject from the perspective of post-modern philosophy.)
, my answer would be "Apparently nothing, and yet everything" or "Nothing that we can plainly talk about and everything that we cannot plainly talk about".what is missed in this or these kind of explanation? — Punshhh
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