You apparently think that moral stances can be arrived at via reason and that reason somehow transcends people as individuals.

You apparently think that moral stances can be arrived at via reason and that reason somehow transcends people as individuals. — Terrapin Station

This is the point we reached when you and I spoke about this last. I think the issue is that people are having a hard time believing that your gut instinct delivers policy recommendations to you out of nowhere. Yes we all have gut feelings valuing different things and those are indeed arbitrary, but they are rarely (never in my experience) in the form of fully fledged legal policies. We feel varying degrees of compassion for others, varying degrees of value to autonomy, varying widths to our circles of concern... But I simply don't believe that we have gut feelings about some specific laws. Our conclusions about these things are an attempt to get our gut feeling values out of the society we find ourselves in. That's why it would be wrong to say "it's my gut feeling that we should arrest anyone whose names begins with M", because a) its so unlikely, given our common experience, that this is a gut feeling, and b) without some seriously convoluted thinking, such a policy is unlikely to yield anything close to the sorts of gut feelings people tend to have.

So what I'm saying here is, I simply don't believe that legal positions simply arrive in your conscious mind fully formed without having first gone through some rational process linking such a policy to the achievement of some more fundamental objective.

That's why it would be wrong to say "it's my gut feeling that we should arrest anyone whose names begins with M", because a) its so unlikely, given our common experience, that this is a gut feeling, and b) without some seriously convoluted thinking, such a policy is unlikely to yield anything close to the sorts of gut feelings people tend to have. — Isaac

I'd certainly agree that it's unusual. I wouldn't say that someone can't be unusual, however. Especially because I know and have known a lot of really weird people.

In general, I'm the last person who would insist that people must be similar to me in their thinking, the way they reason, etc.

You're not really a subjectivist on this stuff, then. — Terrapin Station

No, that's a non sequitur.

That you have the stance you do isn't the same as saying that your stance is correct and alternates are incorrect in general. — Terrapin Station

That I endorse a more sensible way of approaching the matter than you do isn't the same as putting forward a stance that isn't compatible with subjectivism or for which the term "correct" can't apply.

You apparently think that moral stances can be arrived at via reason and that reason somehow transcends people as individuals. — Terrapin Station

Moral stances can indeed be arrived at through reason, just not reason alone or "pure reason". And yes, I suppose you could say that reason transcends personal opinion. An individual can be unreasonable, someone's personal opinion can be completely wrongheaded.

That I endorse a more sensible way of approaching the matter — S

You don't think it's just more sensible to you though. You think it's more sensible in general. Which is not a subjectivist view. As you've agreed, you think that reason transcends personal opinion, and you think that moral views can be arrived at via reason. Again, this is not a subjectivist view.

Yes, certain actions are not wrong because they are illegal, certain actions are illegal because they’re wrong. This is why we cannot appeal to law for our morality, as many have done here.

You don't think it's just more sensible to you though. You think it's more sensible in general. Which is not a subjectivist view. — Terrapin Station

No, whether it is or isn't will depend on how you interpret that. You must be interpreting it in a way which leads you to that conclusion, so just don't do that.

As you've agreed, you think that reason transcends personal opinion, and you think that moral views can be arrived at via reason. Again, this is not a subjectivist view. — Terrapin Station

I'm not a subjectivist on reason, if that's what you mean. The objectivity of reason is part of what distinguishes it from opinion. And don't deliberately phrase what I've said in a misleading way. I'm not a rationalist. Even Hume acknowledged the role of reason. Hume wasn't a rationalist. It's true that reasoned opinion, the right opinion, transcends the personal opinion of some whacko. That's consistent with subjectivism, just not subjectivism of your more radical, unrestrained, individualist brand.

I'm not a subjectivist on reason, if that's what you mean. — S

Right. "More sensible" is "in accordance with reason," and you're not a subjectivist on that. Since you think that moral stances can be reasoned, you're not actually a subjectivist on moral stances.

I am a subjectivist on reason.

Right. "More sensible" is "in accordance with reason," and you're not a subjectivist on that. Since you think that moral stances can be reasoned, you're not actually a subjectivist on moral stances.

I am a subjectivist on reason. — Terrapin Station

I'm a moral subjectivist, but reason is objective. There's no inconsistency in that. Do you need me to explain that to you? Moral stances can be reasoned whether one is a moral subjectivist or a moral objectivist and irrespective of which of those positions is true. You reason your moral stances, too.

I am a subjectivist on reason. — Terrapin Station

Well that's easily refuted. If reason were subjective, then, for example, whether affirming the consequent is reasonable would be moot. But it's not.

I'm a moral subjectivist, but reason is objective. There's no inconsistency in that. — S

Sure, I don't think it's inconsistent, I just don't agree with it.

Moral stances can be reasoned whether one is a moral subjectivist or a moral objectivist and irrespective of which of those positions is true. You reason your moral stances, too. — S

Sure. No disagreement there, either.

Again, it's just that you're not a subjectivist on reason, and via objective reason, you believe that you can arrive at correct moral stances.

Well that's easily refuted. If reason were subjective, then, for example, whether affirming the consequent is reasonable would be moot. But it's not. — S

There could just be different opinions about it where one opinion isn't correct where that has nothing to do with how any particular individual is thinking about it.

Again, it's just that you're not a subjectivist on reason, and via objective reason, you believe that you can arrive at correct moral stances. — Terrapin Station

Of course I'm not a subjectivist on reason. And yes, you can arrive at correct moral stances through reason. You think that your moral stances are correct, just like I think that my moral stances are correct. You just don't want to use those words, whereas I have no problem with doing that. And the only other alternative to arriving at the correct moral stance through reason is to do so coincidentally through guessing or something. There's no such thing as "subjective reason", and the term "objective reason" is redundant.

There could just be different opinions about it where one opinion isn't correct where that has nothing to do with how any particular individual is thinking about it. — Terrapin Station

It's not a matter of opinion, so in that sense it doesn't matter whether there are different opinions about it. Whoever says that it's reasonable is objectively mistaken.

You think that your moral stances are correct, — S

No, I don't at all. It's not that I don't want to use that word. What I'm saying is that my moral stances don't extend beyond me in some way where there's some sort of error that other people are committing in not feeling the same way about them.

For me, it's exactly like musical or food preferences. I wouldn't think that someone is making an error in not having the same musical or food preferences that I do.

No, I don't at all. It's not that I don't want to use that word. What I'm saying is that my moral stances don't extend beyond me in some way where there's some sort of error that other people are committing in not feeling the same way about them. — Terrapin Station

In practice, and going by my understanding of the statement, you do think that your moral stances are correct, in spite of what you say. To deny this would be a performative contradiction.

In practice do I think that my musical preferences are correct?

In practice do I think that my musical preferences are correct? — Terrapin Station

I reject your suggestion that what I said of you in relation to moral stances is sufficiently similar to musical preferences to make that analogy a true analogy.

Okay, so no, I don't think my musical preferences are correct (I take it). I was asking because I sincerely had no idea what your response would be.

So I'd have to figure out why you'd think that "in practice, I think my ethical views are correct," but "in practice, I do not think that my musical preferences are correct."

Okay, so no, I don't think my musical preferences are correct (I take it). I was asking because I sincerely had no idea what your response would be.

So I'd have to figure out why you'd think that "in practice, I think my ethical views are correct," but "in practice, I do not think that my musical preferences are correct." — Terrapin Station

On second thought, maybe you do act as though your musical preferences are correct. A lot of people do that, actually. And YouTube comments would be evidence of this.

Would there be a way to express preferences but convince you that one doesn't think they're correct at the same time?

Would there be a way to express preferences but convince you that one doesn't think they're correct at the same time? — Terrapin Station

Yes, I suppose so, in a sense, but now you're moving away from my point, which was about how we behave when we're not conscious of some philosophical position we're committed to, in contrast to consciously expressing ourselves in accordance with that philosophical position.

I'd say that if someone's philosophical position is at odds with how they behave at times, they have problems with their philosophical position.

So I don't actually ever behave as if I think my moral stances are correct rather than simply how I feel about things, what I'd prefer, etc.

I'd say that if someone's philosophical position is at odds with how they behave at times, they have problems with their philosophical position.

So I don't actually ever behave as if I think my moral stances are correct rather than simply how I feel about things, what I'd prefer, etc. — Terrapin Station

Like I said before, that's probably because you interpret things differently. I think your interpretation is the more unusual.

Like I said before, that's probably because you interpret things differently. I think your interpretation is the more unusual. — S

I wouldn't ever claim to be usual, haha.

If something about me is usual, that's fine, but it's not something I'd claim.

You overvalue being unusual.

No, I'm not valuing it at all. Again, it's fine if something is usual. I'm just not going to speak for anyone else and claim that anything I do is usual.

No, I'm not valuing it at all. Again, it's fine if something is usual. I'm just not going to speak for anyone else and claim that anything I do is usual. — Terrapin Station

I just don't believe that. I think that you often fail to recognise the problems which arise as a result of your unusual premises, and you compound the matter by seeing value in their unusualness.

how we behave when we're not conscious of some philosophical position we're committed to, in contrast to consciously expressing ourselves in accordance with that philosophical position. — S

How you behave when you are unconscious of what you're doing reveals a lot of truth. Peoples' behavior is frequently at odds with what they espouse as a position or belief. But the proof is in the pudding.

I just don't believe that. — S

Okay ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

I think that you often fail to recognise the problems which arise as a result of your unusual premises, — S

I think that you think you're objectively correct just because you think something, even though intellectually you realize this is a problem. It's still something that's pretty deeply ingrained in you. "Problems which arise," for you, amounts to, "having different opinions (about what's okay, what's acceptable, what's the case, etc.) than I do." That's very transparently the case with you.

I think that you think you're objectively correct just because you think something, even though intellectually you realize this is a problem. It's still something that's pretty deeply ingrained in you. "Problems which arise," for you, amounts to, "having different opinions (about what's okay, what's acceptable, what's the case, etc.) than I do." That's very transparently the case with you. — Terrapin Station

But what I'm saying doesn't have to be objectively correct for it to be right over and above the opinion of someone who says something completely barmy, and in addition to that, erroneously suggests that all opinions are equal, when they're not. I don't even need to think that, or to make that claim.

The problem clearly isn't that the opinion of someone who thinks that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "M" is different to mine. I don't believe for a second that you can't see what the actual problem is. Think about the consequences! That would cause a lot of problems. And that it would cause a lot of problems is the problem. Wilful blindness to the problem isn't a justification.