You apparently think that moral stances can be arrived at via reason and that reason somehow transcends people as individuals. — Terrapin Station
That's why it would be wrong to say "it's my gut feeling that we should arrest anyone whose names begins with M", because a) its so unlikely, given our common experience, that this is a gut feeling, and b) without some seriously convoluted thinking, such a policy is unlikely to yield anything close to the sorts of gut feelings people tend to have. — Isaac
You're not really a subjectivist on this stuff, then. — Terrapin Station
That you have the stance you do isn't the same as saying that your stance is correct and alternates are incorrect in general. — Terrapin Station
You apparently think that moral stances can be arrived at via reason and that reason somehow transcends people as individuals. — Terrapin Station
That I endorse a more sensible way of approaching the matter — S
You don't think it's just more sensible to you though. You think it's more sensible in general. Which is not a subjectivist view. — Terrapin Station
As you've agreed, you think that reason transcends personal opinion, and you think that moral views can be arrived at via reason. Again, this is not a subjectivist view. — Terrapin Station
I'm not a subjectivist on reason, if that's what you mean. — S
Right. "More sensible" is "in accordance with reason," and you're not a subjectivist on that. Since you think that moral stances can be reasoned, you're not actually a subjectivist on moral stances.
I am a subjectivist on reason. — Terrapin Station
I am a subjectivist on reason. — Terrapin Station
I'm a moral subjectivist, but reason is objective. There's no inconsistency in that. — S
Moral stances can be reasoned whether one is a moral subjectivist or a moral objectivist and irrespective of which of those positions is true. You reason your moral stances, too. — S
Well that's easily refuted. If reason were subjective, then, for example, whether affirming the consequent is reasonable would be moot. But it's not. — S
Again, it's just that you're not a subjectivist on reason, and via objective reason, you believe that you can arrive at correct moral stances. — Terrapin Station
There could just be different opinions about it where one opinion isn't correct where that has nothing to do with how any particular individual is thinking about it. — Terrapin Station
You think that your moral stances are correct, — S
No, I don't at all. It's not that I don't want to use that word. What I'm saying is that my moral stances don't extend beyond me in some way where there's some sort of error that other people are committing in not feeling the same way about them. — Terrapin Station
In practice do I think that my musical preferences are correct? — Terrapin Station
Okay, so no, I don't think my musical preferences are correct (I take it). I was asking because I sincerely had no idea what your response would be.
So I'd have to figure out why you'd think that "in practice, I think my ethical views are correct," but "in practice, I do not think that my musical preferences are correct." — Terrapin Station
Would there be a way to express preferences but convince you that one doesn't think they're correct at the same time? — Terrapin Station
I'd say that if someone's philosophical position is at odds with how they behave at times, they have problems with their philosophical position.
So I don't actually ever behave as if I think my moral stances are correct rather than simply how I feel about things, what I'd prefer, etc. — Terrapin Station
Like I said before, that's probably because you interpret things differently. I think your interpretation is the more unusual. — S
No, I'm not valuing it at all. Again, it's fine if something is usual. I'm just not going to speak for anyone else and claim that anything I do is usual. — Terrapin Station
how we behave when we're not conscious of some philosophical position we're committed to, in contrast to consciously expressing ourselves in accordance with that philosophical position. — S
I just don't believe that. — S
I think that you often fail to recognise the problems which arise as a result of your unusual premises, — S
I think that you think you're objectively correct just because you think something, even though intellectually you realize this is a problem. It's still something that's pretty deeply ingrained in you. "Problems which arise," for you, amounts to, "having different opinions (about what's okay, what's acceptable, what's the case, etc.) than I do." That's very transparently the case with you. — Terrapin Station
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