How does this infer nihilism?It also means, that the everyday world as perceived by the senses - including all the finite moods - is an illusion. Save for the one and only substance, Spinoza is a metaphysical nihilist. — bobobor
What illusions imply are deception and deception is achieved through selective information i.e limited perception. For instance a bottle of vodka actually full of water; you won't know at first glance.In its normal use, the meaning of the verb "exist" implies that illusions do not exist. — bobobor
That's a problem. If there is no space, where's the substance? That's considering that the substance itself comprises its own space or space of self.Substance is aspatial and atemporal. — bobobor
I'm not sure how he arrived at that conclusion, but it doesn't really follow.Being infinite, it cannot have finite parts, and being indivisible, it cannot be measured. — bobobor
... Spinoza's statements about the nature of ultimate reality. According to him, only God exists. God is the only substance. — bobobor
It also means, that the everyday world as perceived by the senses - including all the finite moods - is an illusion. — bobobor
Save for the one and only substance, Spinoza is a metaphysical nihilist. — bobobor
"The everyday world" (i.e. natura naturata) "is an illusion" only in the sense that it appears ontologically separate from, or independent of, the infinite and eternal Substance (i.e. natura naturans) to finite Modes like us — 180 Proof
the perdurance of ephemeral surface waves relative to the long lasting ocean (i.e. Modes of Attributes relative to Substance) — 180 Proof
Where does Spinoza make that distinction? Sorry, but I cannot find any textual evidence in support of the interpretation that he differentiates between existent and real things.in the sense S conceives of the difference between existing and the real. — 180 Proof
how does 'exist' imply that illusions do not exist? — Shamshir
If there is no space, where's the substance? — Shamshir
God is the only substance. Substance is one, infinite and indivisible. All finite and divisible things are a product of the imagination, which means that plurality, finiteness and divisibility are all illusory. "Measure, time and number are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagining" (Letter to Meyer, 1663).
It also means, that the everyday world as perceived by the senses - including all the finite moods - is an illusion. Save for the one and only substance, Spinoza is a metaphysical nihilist. — bobobor
But, for Spinoza, even reason is a partially deficient kind of cognition which "regards a number of things at once". The highest kind of cognition is intellectual intuition. Please re-read the passage on water. — bobobor
Or in sum, to read any thinker accurately requires first shedding or suspending or "bracketing" one's own preconceptions as much a possible, to take the writer on, on his own terms. — tim wood
I don't agree.The "everyday world" is substance itself perceived in a confused and inadequate way through the senses. — bobobor
Where does Spinoza make that distinction? Sorry, but I cannot find any textual evidence in support of the interpretation that he differentiates between existent and real things. — bobobor
S makes the distinction sub specie aeternitatis between Natura Naturans (i.e. Substance) and Natura Naturata (i.e. Modes): the latter Non-Necessarily Exist - essences do not contain existence - and only are caused to exist only by the former which - its very essence contains existence - Necessarily Exists. — 180 Proof
Where does S state he is, as we seem to agree, an "acosmist" rather than a "pantheist — 180 Proof
all and any kinds of cognition and intellectual intuition would simply be emergent illusory phenomena like all the rest. — Janus
Maybe I'm out-of-court in this part of the discussion, but why must they be? Or more sharply, what, exactly, is meant by "resolve?" Or perhaps even, what, exactly, qualifies the contradiction that the diathelist allows. It cannot be all of them.you must resolve these contradictions. — bobobor
All finite and divisible things are a product of the imagination, which means that plurality, finiteness and divisibility are all illusory. — bobobor
The modifications of substance I call modes. Their definition, in so far as it is not identical with that of substance, cannot involve any existence. Hence, we can conceive them as non-existent. From this it follows, that, when we are regarding only the essence of modes, and not the order of the whole of nature, we cannot conclude from their present existence, that they will exist or not exist in the future, or that they have existed or not existed in the past; whence it is abundantly clear, that we conceive the existence of substance as entirely different from the existence of modes.
↪Fooloso4 I'd be interested in any comments on the passage I quoted above (and the article it comes from). I think the notion that there are 'degrees of reality' is important in this, because it allows for the conception of things that are more and less real. Whereas, for us, 'existence' is univocal, something either exists or doesn't. — Wayfarer
It seems to me that many commentators do not appreciate the force of Spinoza's statements about the nature of ultimate reality. According to him, only God exists. God is the only substance. Substance is one, infinite and indivisible. All finite and divisible things are a product of the imagination, which means that plurality, finiteness and divisibility are all illusory. "Measure, time and number are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagining" — bobobor
To repeat, [ ... ]
Unless you want to interpret him as someone who subscribed to dialetheism, you must resolve these contradictions. — bobobor
Your comparison seems to me unfair. — bobobor
So does the cosmos as we know it exist in Spinoza's ontology? — bobobor
As to degrees of reality, I think it is important for understanding the ontology of those who make use of it, but it is not a concept that I agree with. — Fooloso4
Well, I think it might help to make sense of the distinction between 'necessary' and 'contingent' being. — Wayfarer
"the cosmos" (i.e. Natura Naturata) exists (vide Einstein re: Spinoza) but only exists non-necessarily (i.e. contingently) — 180 Proof
1) X is in Y.
2) X depends notionally on Y (X cannot be understood without reference to what Y is).
3) X is not a part of Y.
To me, this is sheer conceptual confusion. Yet, 1), 2) and 3) should be true of all finite modes if they existed. So you better admit that no finite modes exist, on pain of contradiction. — bobobor
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