There are two kinds of belief. Linguistic and non linguistic. — creativesoul

What exactly distinguishes one from the other?

That's all I'm asking.

If it is saying that there are beliefs that have and others that have not been expressed in language, then it is trivial and I agree.

If it is saying that there are beliefs that cannot and others that can be expressed in language, then I think it wrong.

There are two kinds of belief. Linguistic and non linguistic.
— creativesoul

What exactly distinguishes one from the other? — Banno

It's the elemental constituency(the ingredients, so to speak) that matters most when talking about non linguistic and linguistic belief.

All belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things. Non linguistic belief consists of correlations drawn between different things, as does linguistic belief. That's the commonality that makes them what they are. The difference is the content of the correlation(the different things). Non linguistic belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things, none of which are language use. Linguistic belief consists of mental correlations drawn between language use and other things.

All belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

Ah. The Dogma.

If my previous argument is successful in showing that what is taken to be the case is not the same as a state of mind, then perhaps it might also show that what is taken to be the case is not the same as some mental correlation between different things.

But this perhaps leaves open that what is taken to be the case might be some correlation between different things - sans the mental furniture.

All belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul

Ah. The Dogma. — Banno

You know I've good reason(s) supporting this. Thus, you know it's not unsupported. Dogma always is.

...this perhaps leaves open that what is taken to be the case might be some correlation between different things.. — Banno

Better.

...this perhaps leaves open that what is taken to be the case might be some mental correlation between different things.. — Banno

Best.

The problem you have is shared by me. Translation is not readily forthcoming. That's where we were earlier, and we remain there. I do anyway. Still mulling it all over.

Instead of talk of belief, let's talk about what is taken to be the case, and to do so without further definition except as may come in the discussion that follows.

So I take it to be the case that this is a sentence of English in a thread about Wittgenstein. I take it to be the case that I am typing this post, and presumably you might take it to be the case that you are reading this post.

So one observation we might make is that taking something to be the case is a relation between some state of affairs and some individual, or if you prefer, some agent. — Banno

Taking it to be the case that this is a sentence of English in a thread about Wittgenstein requires thinking about language use while using it. It is existentially dependent upon language use. It involves language use. It's about language use. The same holds good of the other two examples above. Thus, they are all linguistic beliefs.

This one, however...

My cat takes it to be the case that the floor is solid. He does not, for example, tentatively test the floor with his paw to check for solidity before walking on it. He takes it to be the case that the floor is solid, despite his not being able to articulate this in English. — Banno

...is not. Cannot be.

Now what one takes to be the case is what one believes.

And hence, what one believes can be stated. — Banno

The floor is solid. <--------that's what you are proposing your cat takes to be the case and/or believes.

That doesn't sit well.

I'm just disincline to think that must be some neural network that corresponds to each and every possible belief, stated or unstated. — Banno

Yes, I'm gathering that very strongly from your repeated dogmatic dismissal of the idea. What I was actually asking for was any evidence or reasoning whatsoever to support that belief. Do you have some neuroscience demonstrating it to be the case? Do you have some idea that there isn't room in the brain for all that data? Do you just really really really not want it to be the case?...

what you said was that "a belief can be a particular neural network", which might be more indicative of the development of a technical sense of "belief" in neuroscience. — Banno

I said it 'can' be because it is yet unproven to be. we can't measure individual neuron activity yet, only clusters of activity. since we can't measure individual neurons we can't see what's going on at the scale required to code for such specific beliefs as "this bit of this particular floor is solid at this moment in time". Hence I try to still refer to it (when I remember) as a possibility.

We have about 86 billion neurons. Since each neuron can have as many as 10,000 synapses, that's 8.6 x10^13 architectural elements. Are you telling me you can think of more than 8.6x10^13 different beliefs that you and your body require at any one time, because even if you exercised a unique individual one of those beliefs every microsecond you could still go nearly three years without repeating one.

I am not making the claim that some particular neural network could not also be described in terms of some belief. — Banno

I can't make sense of this. How could a particular neural network be described in terms of some belief if

there is no neural net corresponding to the belief that the floor is solid — Banno

Are you suggesting that there are neural correlates for some beliefs but not others? That, in some respects, would seem even more odd than what I originally thought you were claiming. What would distinguish those which 'make the grade' and get coded as neural architecture from those which don't? and again, where would the others be?

I really don't know what else to say, or how to respond to some of your responses. It's as if we're talking past one another. I tried to simplify my position, but some of you didn't even respond; and if you did respond, I didn't understand the connection between what I said, and your response. I don't know what else to say without repeating myself.

It's as if I had argued that a brick is not a cow, and you replied by asking me for experimental evidence to support my claim.

A brick is not a cow because if I asked any for a cow to build a house with I would not get what I want. If I asked for a brick to milk I would not get what I want.

A brick is not a cow because no one uses the words 'brick' and 'cow' in that way. That's not the kind of case we have here. If that were the case you would not have to be telling us how to use the words correctly, there would be no discussion.

On classes, a brick is not a cow because one is an inert clay cuboid for building and the other is a type of animal from which we can extract milk.

It's not difficult. So humour me...

What is your evidence that there is no neural net corresponding to the belief that the floor is solid?

So humour me... — Isaac

No.

No — Banno

Really? That's the quality of discussion you want? You just espouse some dogmatic opinion and any contrary view is silenced with the standard cliche that it's "too wrong to even respond to". It's not the Solomon-like crushing blow you think it is, it's just boring.

I found @jamalrob to be quite clear:

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement. — jamalrob

Therefore, beliefs are not pre-linguistic or non-linguistic. Unless a belief is something else?

Therefore, beliefs are not pre-linguistic or non-linguistic. Unless a belief is something else? — Luke

But isn't this just begging the question? If a belief is "an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement." then it obviously follows that it must be linguistic, but this is no more than to say "if a belief is linguistic, then it is linguistic "

I think what @Sam26 is asking (though I'm not so sure now) is whether this need be the case. Obviously if we simply declare that beliefs are statements, then they are de facto linguistic, but that doesn't answer the question of whether declaring beliefs to be statements covers everything we need beliefs to do.

But isn't this just begging the question? If a belief is "an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement." then it obviously follows that it must be linguistic, but this is no more than to say "if a belief is linguistic, then it is linguistic — Isaac

As I asked, if that's not a belief then what is? Is it something that cannot be expressed in language?

As I asked, if that's not a belief then what is? — Luke

Then we're possibly on the same page. I asked the same question about the assertion that a belief is not a mental state. If it's not a statement, not a mental state, not state of some dualistic realm, then it seems to me that we're running out of things it could be.

So you agree that it is a linguistic rendering of an attitude or mental state?

So you agree that it is a linguistic rendering of an attitude or mental state? — Luke

I certainly think it's a mental state. I think whether it's a linguistic rendering is up to us, I mean it's just a word we can define it how we like, to a point.

The problem I have with restricting the term to statements is it just leaves us wanting of a term for 'that which causes a tendency to act as if something were the case' when it is not rendered as a statement.

In binocular rivalry experiments, for example, actions can be generated in response to a combined image set despite the subject only being aware of the dominant image. How are we to talk about such a tendency toward action if the word belief is reserved for that which is rendered as a statement?

Maybe we could distinguish the two types of tendency to act, but I'm not sure I see either the advantage or the precident. Other states of mind (such as affect) are described in terms of the state itself, not the linguistic rendering of the state.

The problem I have with restricting the term to statements is it just leaves us wanting of a term for 'that which causes a tendency to act as if something were the case' when it is not rendered as a statement. — Isaac

Not sure that I follow. Can you name any cases where we talk about beliefs in terms other than 'the belief that B', where B is a linguistic rendering of the belief?

It wasn't so much that we talk about beliefs in terms other than linguistic renderings, just that we don't, in other areas, infer this to mean that they consist of linguistic renderings.

We cannot talk about physical laws other than by their linguistic rendering. The law that "less dense materials rise relative to more dense ones". But we don't say that the law consists of the linguistic rendering, we say that the law consists of some physical relation between the two materials.

The same would be true, I think, of any such description of our models of how the world is, all the relations and patterns we see have to be rendered into statements in order to talk about them, but we also talk about them as if the had some physical existence in the world. I'm just not getting why there'd be any resistance to treating beliefs in the same way.

It wasn't so much that we talk about beliefs in terms other than linguistic renderings, just that we don't, in other areas, infer this to mean that they consist of linguistic renderings. — Isaac

I think we must do so here because 'that which causes a tendency to act as if something were the case' is something linguistic, or at least can only be attributed (especially to other animals) in those terms; in our linguistic community's terms.

So how do you see this differently from, say, laws of physics? They seem to me to have the same property, yet we talk about the relations as consisting of physically manifest patterns, not the statements thereof.

So how do you see this differently from, say, laws of physics? — Isaac

The laws of physics are not typically what we say 'causes a tendency to act as if something were the case', unless you want to try and reduce language use to physics.

No, but the statement of a belief is not what causes the tendency to act either, is it? Its the arrangement of neural connections in a certain form.

What I'm trying to draw a parallel between is the idea that a belief can actually be a certain arrangement of neural connections in the same way that a physical law or feature can actually be some arrangement of matter. We have to render both into statements to talk about them, but neither actually consist of the statement.

You seem to be saying that beliefs are necessarily a different kind of thing where the fact that we have to render them into statements carries some additional burden not applicable to physical laws or features. It's this step that I'm not understanding.

No, but the statement of a belief is not what causes the tendency to act either, is it? — Isaac

Might it be better to think of belief as an explanation of behaviour? Therefore, that the individual holds the (stated) belief is an explanation of the tendency to act.

You seem to be saying that beliefs are necessarily a different kind of thing where the fact that we have to render them into statements carries some additional burden not applicable to physical laws or features. It's this step that I'm not understanding. — Isaac

Maybe something got lost along the way. I agree with @jamalrob's statement that a belief is the linguistic rendering of an attitude or a mental state.

Maybe something got lost along the way. I agree with jamalrob's statement that a belief is the linguistic rendering of an attitude or a mental state. — Luke

I'd just like to clarify for anyone reading this that when I say "attitude", I don't mean it in the sense of a way of thinking (although it can be that), but more in the sense of an orientation: a bearing on or comportment towards one's environment, other people, and so on.

but more in the sense of an orientation: a bearing on or comportment towards one's environment, other people, and so on. — jamalrob

Doesn't a tree have an orientation toward its environment? But we wouldn't say a tree believes it should grow toward the sun.

Doesn't a tree have an orientation toward its environment? But we wouldn't say a tree believes it should grow toward the sun. — frank

You got me.

You got me. — jamalrob

Did I misunderstand you?