So you should.

I'm in for a minor medical procedure later today and have been off solids for two days; perhaps my hour of need is leading me to seek approval.

The fundamental misapprehension of which I spoke is evident in the very phrasing that "there are linguistic and prelinguistic beliefs". It's not clear how this could even be stated in terms of what is taken to be the case and what is not...

That's the long-term objection I've had to much of what @creativesoul has to say on this topic.

A belief just is an attitude to the world (or a mental state if you like) when rendered as a statement. — jamalrob

No! A belief is not a mental state.

So the next observation might be that, because we can be mistaken, what we take to be the case is distinct from what is the case. — Banno

How can this be so. The belief that the cat is in kitchen has merely been replaced with one that she is in the hall. That too might be mistaken. They are not two different kinds of thing ("what we take to be the case" and "what is the case") they are two instances of the same type of thing ("what we take to be the case" in response to some evidence, and "what we take to be the case" in response to some new evidence). I'm not seeing what the concept of "what is the case" is usefully doing here.

there is no particular neural network that in some sense corresponds to or represents my cat's taking it that the floor is solid. — Banno

Where are you getting that idea from? Could you cite me the source(s) you're working from on this.

How do you explain, for example, how some patients with damage to the parietal lobe, are unable to reach accurately towards visual targets that they unequivocally report seeing, if there's no neural network corresponding to "taking its spatiotemporal position to be the case" then why does damage to some network destroy that particular belief (as demonstrated by behaviour)?

No! A belief is not a metal state. — Banno

Yes, I see that now. Maybe I was pandering to the masses.

No! A belief is not a metal state slate. — Banno

Fixed it. :up:

there is no particular neural network that in some sense corresponds to or represents my cat's taking it that the floor is solid.
— Banno

Where are you getting that idea from? — Isaac

Think it through. Are you going to argue that there is a particular neural net of some sort for the floor's being solid? Another for the cup being in the cupboard? Another for there being a poppy in the front garden and another for that poppy being pink? One for each of the innumerable unstated things that are taken as true as I get up to open the window?

One for every conceivable belief that might be stated?

And notice that while there is no neural net corresponding to the belief that the floor is solid, there are presumably neural networks that account for being able to walk across that floor. And presumably for reaching towards something.

Perhaps its not that neural networks correspond to or represent beliefs so much as that they embody them.

The belief that the cat is in kitchen has merely been replaced with one that she is in the hall. — Isaac

Actually, one might have either belief, and yet still be wrong. This is simply the grammatical distinction between such-and-such being true, and so-and-so believing it to be true. The salient point being that the distinction has been made.

If we must find a place in my cat's neural network for his taking the floor to be solid, it will be evident in such things as his capacity to make his legs work in such a way as to walk across the floor, to jump, run, and otherwise to engage with a solid floor. — Banno

Overall good post, but here I sense a problem. What gives your cat confidence the floor is solid so that it moves its legs confidently across it? It's not the ability to move legs confidently. There must be some other neural network that provides confidence in your kitchen floor, corresponding to past experiences from which the cat gained the belief in solidity of that surface or surfaces like it in general.

Compare that to when your cat is not confident in something, such as hiding when hearing a strange person.

What gives the cat confidence the floor is solid so that it moves its legs confidently across it? It's not the ability to move legs confidently. — Marchesk

Isn't it? Isn't that precisely how a neural network does learn, by reinforcing specific outcomes?

If a kitten on occasions encountered a fluid floor, it might well learn to test first before it walks confidently. SO the ability to move confidently reinforces the confident movement.

Isn't it? Isn't that precisely how a neural network does learn, by reinforcing specific outcomes? — Banno

I think animals do more than what the current neural networks are capable of. And that that would be form concepts about the world. For animals, this would be non-linguistic. It's conceptual in different way, maybe based on combining related images and smells and what not to make inferences about the world, particularly novel situations.

...concepts... — Marchesk

More mental furniture.

The argument I presented above treated belief as what is taken to be the case, and in so doing I hope undermined the reification of belief as a neural structure or a state of mind.

In treating beliefs as what is taken to be the case, we stop treating belief as a thing and start seeing it as a way of behaving.

It's not too hard to do the same with other supposed pieces of mental furniture such as concepts. What you call "forming a concept" is not creating a thing in one's mind so much as learning to use words in a certain way. So learning the concept "blue" is no more than learning how to use the word "blue".

I don't agree with behaviorism, and I think there's a lot more going on in the brain than being able to move about.

That's my belief, right or wrong.

Think it through. Are you going to argue that there is a particular neural net of some sort for the floor's being solid? Another for the cup being in the cupboard? Another for there being a poppy in the front garden and another for that poppy being pink? One for each of the innumerable unstated things that are taken as true as I get up to open the window? — Banno

Yes. I asked you for sources, you do realise you're espousing a theory about how the brain works (or in this case, doesn't) you're own incredulity does not constitute evidence.

Let'ssstart with what you think is wrong with there being a neural network for each of these beliefs. Do you think the brain will run out of space, if so how much space do you think a belief such as the ones you list takes up, and how much space do you think we have. You must have some pretty clear ideas on this for you to be so certain there isn't room. Or is there some other reason you find the concept so incredulous.

Secondly, if the belief (the tendency to act as if) is not stored in the brain, where do you think it is? In the air, the ether, some dualistic field?

One for every conceivable belief that might be stated? — Banno

One for every 'conceivable' belief? With what do we do the conceiving if there's not room in our brains for all the conceivable beliefs?

And what I proposed is not behaviourism, and we do much more than just move about.

And what I proposed is not behaviourism. — Banno

Well, it walks like a behaviorist and talks like one. A more hip, modern one, but when you say:

In treating beliefs as what is taken to be the case, we stop treating belief as a thing and start seeing it as a way of behaving. — Banno

My behaviorist alarm is triggered. And then you wish to empty my head of all the mental furniture!

It's a common misunderstanding.

The fundamental misapprehension of which I spoke is evident in the very phrasing that "there are linguistic and prelinguistic beliefs". It's not clear how this could even be stated in terms of what is taken to be the case and what is not...

That's the long-term objection I've had to much of what creativesoul has to say on this topic. — Banno

While I still admire the clarity in your post, it does not make for much of a valid objection to a differing position, such as my own. I'm actually not sure how far apart we are. I suspect that we're very close, aside from my tendency to speak about belief in terms of it's elemental constituents(ingredients) whereas you're prone to talk about it in terms of what's taken to be the case.

To use that difference, or apparent translation difficulty as reason for objection/rejection is to reject another position because of the inherent incommensurate/incompatibility of translating one into the terms of the other. I'm reminded here of your rejection of the very idea of incompatible conceptual schemes. Yet, here we are. It's not clear how "there are non linguistic and linguistic beliefs" could be stated(translated) in(to) terms of what is taken to be the case and what is not.

A vein of thought deserving more of my attention.

Again... I commend that post!!!

:smile:

find the concept so incredulous. — Isaac

@StreetlightX has been prepared to defend this kind of barbarism but doubtless he has no shame. :worry:
And you, Sir?

So... I'm just disincline to think that must be some neural network that corresponds to each and every possible belief, stated or unstated.

But that would seem to be what is implied, if every belief is a particular neural network. Of course what you said was that "a belief can be a particular neural network", which might be more indicative of the development of a technical sense of "belief" in neuroscience.

Notice that I am not making the claim that some particular neural network could not also be described in terms of some belief.

In treating beliefs as what is taken to be the case, we stop treating belief as a thing and start seeing it as a way of behaving. — Banno

Banno's suggestion here to stop treating belief as a thing is spot on. Belief is not a single thing. Belief certainly does not have a spatiotemporal location.

Alright then try: I have no clear idea what "there are non linguistic and linguistic beliefs" could be saying.

If it is saying that there are beliefs that have not been expressed in language, then it is trivial and I agree.

If it is saying that there are beliefs that cannot be expressed in language, then I think it wrong.

If it is saying something else, then I know not what.

It's a common misunderstanding. — Banno

A question is whether your approach to belief can explain all of your cat's behaviors. Animals need to problem solve and adapt to a changing environment. Deep learning has been very successful in limited domains involving lots of data to train on and fixed domains. But animals don't always have that luxury.

and...?

and...? — Banno

There seems to be more going on in your cat's head than you allow yourself to believe.

Hope your procedure has the best possible results...

Much of my admiration for you is had in the helpfulness of your participation. You and several others here have broadened the scope of my own understanding by bringing up stuff that I had not yet considered...

We have sharpened one another's thoughts. Of course, that's true from where I sit regarding consequences of my engagements with you, but I'm assuming it goes both ways...

:wink:

Again, kudos on that post!

and...? — Banno

Let's take tool use. I know how to use some tool. But the tool doesn't solve my current problem. Upon thinking over the situation, I realize that if I combine use of this tool with another tool in the right way, my problem is solved. The combining of the two tools to fix the problem isn't something I learned. It's novel. And we see animals do things like this when they figure out how to get to get at some food for the first time.

The ability to solve problems, assuming it's not just trial and error, means having some conceptual understanding of the world that can be manipulated in novel ways.

but I'm assuming it goes both ways... — creativesoul

Yep.

There's something unconvincing about an argument, from which the key term can be removed...

The ability to solve problems, assuming it's not just trial and error, means having some understanding of the world that can be manipulated in novel ways. — Marchesk

...so what exactly was conceptual doing there?

Alright then try: I have no clear idea what "there are non linguistic and linguistic beliefs" could be saying.

If it is saying that there are beliefs that have not been expressed in language, then it is trivial and I agree.

If it is saying that there are beliefs that cannot be expressed in language, then I think it wrong.

If it is saying something else, then I know not what. — Banno

Too much philosophy.

There are two kinds of belief. Linguistic and non linguistic.

That's all it's saying.

...thought better...