Russell's Tirade, recounted in The Prevalence of Humbug, caught my attention.

Quite amusing.

But humbug? Or bullshit? It certainly shows the manipulative nature of the issue.

Especially by pretentious word or deed:

So pretence often accompanies bullshit, but is not essential to it.

I can bullshit you all day long, without any whiff of air or my nose being up.

I am not the only one capable of this 'round here in these parts... although the more passionate ones believe in theirs, so I am not sure if it counts as such.

I am. I'm almost certain I have my own copy... at least one.

Frankfurt wants to offer a theory about the commonly used term "bullshit". He overtly notes that the topic/notion does not seem to have been clearly accounted for at all. This seems a bit odd, as a result of everyone knowing that there's so much of it pervading our everyday lives on a continual basis. So, Frankfurt seems to think - and I would readily concur - that a detailed account is long since overdue.

As just mentioned, Frankfurt's search on detailed accounts of bullshit found no results. The closest thing he found in English was the notion of humbug, but he seemed to believe that the two were not quite synonymous enough to be interchanged at random without significant loss of meaning. So, he was not happy drawing a semantic equivalence between the two. However, it seemed he did find the notions close enough that it be worth comparing them as a means to tease out what bullshit is - in part at least - from adopting and/or using the relevant similarities within the notion of humbug.

What followed is pretty much the rest of the book. It is quite intriguing if for no other reason than the methodological approach he then puts to use. He sets out the notion of humbug, taking it's parts into very careful consideration...

Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes.

although the more passionate ones believe in theirs — god must be atheist

Eloquent bullshit*** can degrade discourse, but believing one's own bullshit is THE cardinal sin.

*** "If you can't dazzle them with facts, then baffle them with bullshit."

Can a discussion about bullshit be anything other than bullshit? Is analytical distance possible? Or can one only lament?

*** "If you can't dazzle them with facts, then baffle them with bullshit."
8h — Bitter Crank

:rofl: :up:

What followed is pretty much the rest of the book. It is quite intriguing if for no other reason than the methodological approach he then puts to use. He sets out the notion of humbug, taking it's parts into very careful consideration...


Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes. — creativesoul

The first thing he focuses upon is the bit about deceptive misrepresentation, bringing attention to the intent or design to deceive. This means that part of humbug includes a certain state of mind. Since what counts as being humbug invariably depends upon the state of mind of the language user, it cannot be identical to just the utterance by which the humbug is perpetrated. He noted the similarity here with a lie, in that both are directly tied to the intent to deceive, and neither are identical to the falsity or any other properties of the statement. He then notes that in some accounts of lying there must be false statements made, and in others there need not be so long as the speaker believes it is false and by making it intends to deceive.

Then he takes on the 'short of lying' aspect, for humbug somehow falls short of lying although both are made intending to deceive. As Banno noted earlier, Frankfurt seems to think that Black's notion of humbug evokes a continuum upon which both lying and humbug rest, with the latter falling short of lying. He says the following on page 3...

Black’s phrase evokes the notion of some sort of continuum, on which lying occupies a certain segment while humbug is located exclusively at earlier points. What continuum could this be, along which one encounters humbug only before one encounters lying?

Frankfurt then moves on to the next bit...

Especially by pretentious word or deed: There are two points to notice here. First, Black identifies humbug not only as a category of speech but as a category of action as well; it may be accomplished either by words or by deeds. Second, his use of the qualifier “especially” indicates that Black does not regard pretentiousness as an essential or wholly indispensable characteristic of humbug...

Frankfurt clearly interprets Black as not regarding pretentiousness as an elemental constituent of all humbug instances, and he seems to clearly agree when concerning bullshit...

The fact that a person is behaving pretentiously is not, it seems to me, part of what is required to make his utterance an instance of bullshit.

Harry, the author, takes great pains to draw some kind of boundary between lies, truths and bullshit and he does that on the basis of mental states which I construe is just an attitude/orientation to truth: the liar and the truth-teller both acknowledging the value truth while the bullshitter simply doesn't care. It's probable that the author does that because he's prevented from using truth value because according to him both lies and bullshit overlap on falsehood, and bullshit being occasionally true.

That by itself isn't adequate to render bullshit as a distinctly unlikable character and so Harry must and does, in order to stop bullshit from gaining legitimacy in the world of the subjective, promulgate the existence of an objective reality the truths of which bullshit, according to him, doesn't care for.

Do I agree with Harry?

I don't know. He's made a point but is it the point - the last word on bullshit?

He mentions the conjunction of ignorance on issues and occasions of discourse that require knowing these issues as ingredients to bake the bullshit cake. This is true only if we buy into his argument but it sets the bar too high in my opinion. After all it seems like he's literally demanding omniscience before we open our mouths or put pen on paper. Discourse is not always about truth: it can be about opinion and while I hold that truth is objective it's not downloadable in . Ergo, Harry's definition of bullshit is too broad to my liking and taints what is otherwise healthy and necessary discourse with the negativity associated with bullshit. Also, he doesn't even mention, forget about making, the necessary connection with not caring for the truth, the attitude I mentioned earlier. How do we know that ignorant people don't care about the truth?

One thing that puzzles me is that while the categories of truth and lies on one side and bullshit on the other is based on the attitude to truth, Harry claims that bullshit can be both false and true. The former, that bullshit can be false is obvious enough but the latter, that bullshit can be true is harder to digest: Harry only makes an analogy with counterfeiting and refers us to how the counterfeit is made in an attempt to make his point which is probably that *true* bullshit is made in a different way than the typical truth. What does he mean by this? Is it me or is the analogy a failure? Have you ever been in a situation where bullshit was an appropriate label for truth? Maybe I'm missing something.

For me the meaning of bullshit is revealed in its usage, a usage that's unique and not shared by "lie" or "truth" and that's as follows:

Interjection

bullshit!

(vulgar, slang) An expression of disbelief or doubt at what one has just heard. — Wiktionary

Note that "bullshit" is an interjection which is something neither "lie" nor "truth" is in ordinary discoure. The status as an interjection is, for all purposes, exclusive to "bullshit". There's a conspicuous absence of a direct reference to truth value: only an allusion is made by the word "disbelief" which would imply an impression that an assertion is false. Why this is important is because the singular usage of "bullshit" as an interjection may help us know how bullshit differs from lies and truths.

Accordingly in my opinion the word "disbelief" in the definition of "bullshit" as an interjection is of prime importance. Say someone claims that mount Rushmore is the tallest mountain in the world. The listener, given that he knows of Mount Everest, will immediately cry foul - bullshit!!! This is a case of when the listener's knowledge exposes a falsehood and then we react with disbelief. These are basically times when bullshit is false: just like Harry claims.

Another situation is when a claim is an exaggeration e.g. claiming that the tallest mountain in the world is Mount Everest and it's 300 km in height. Here the listener needn't rely on any knowledge but simply count on her common sense that informs her that a 300 km high mountain is impossible. This is a case of bullshit where there is truth but it's exaggerated to such an extent that it is met with disbelief - bullshit!!!

In this view bullshit is more about the listener, his knowledge of the world and the limits of what is possible or not and how that interacts with the claims made by others, than the bullshitter. I think such an interpretation does justice to the differences in the way we use the words "lie", "truth" and "bullshit" which I hope points to something unique about each word in general and "bullshit" in particular.

In order for a series of statements to remain bullshit I'd argue they have to fall below some threshold of importance. In example, if your instructing some one on how to disarm a bomb over the phone. Any information you pass without qualification would imply a high degree of certainty, because of the "importance" of the information being accurate.

I can imagine plenty of cases where a lie is considered bullshit because it lacks importance. Such as embellishing a story, conflating plausibility with actuality, or simply reporting assumptions like facts. In addition to making careless omissions for the sake of maintaining a position. All of which can be considered lies if the truth of matter is of great enough significance. The Boeing 737 Max is a good example where the context alone makes the misrepresentation of certainty a lie, so a lie is severe bullshit I suppose.

Using the height example, from above, if I'm measuring a rope for bungee jumping and some one misreports the distance to the ground; they aren't bullshitting, but rather telling a lie. The number itself isn't the "lie" but the misrepresentation of the certainty regarding the number is the lie.

Interesting how folk want to jump to the end.

All agreeable, Creative.

Misrepresenting: two different ones. One is misrepresenting what is the case; the other is misrepresenting what one believes.

Frankfurt talks of "misrepresenting one's mental state" - I think belief will do.

A belief is always a belief that such-and-such. Hence, misrepresenting what one believes is always misrepresenting two things: that such-and-such is the case; and that one believes that such-and-such is the case.

But I will grant the case that one might misrepresent some other mental state - claiming to be in pain when one is not, for example.

Does one believe that one is in pain? It seems incongruous to deny this.

The discussion of "short of lying" becomes a bit more problematic.

I baulked at

Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me.

and yet:

I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket.

Frankfurt says that asserting one has twenty dollars in ones pocket does not imply that one believes one has twenty dollars in one's pocket, but that a reasonable person might so judge.

But consider what Moore might say: is would be inconsistent to assert "I have twenty dollars in my pocket, but I do not believe I have twenty dollars in my pocket".

I think Frankfurt has erred here.

There was a time when a (wo)man showed up and said something and everyone believed s/he was saying the truth.

That was the time from grade 1 through grade 4;
That was the time of Western movies;
That was the time of heroes and villains;
That was the time I was happy because I felt my trust had not been betrayed.
That was the time before differentiation appeared big time. Differentiation in values and opoinions of opinions; not just differentiation between objects and other objects, between people and other poeple.

Does this matter in regard to the overall project? The orator example is clearer, I think. The orator, according to Frankfurt does not care what his audience believes with regard to god and history; only that they draw a certain conclusion about what he, the orator, believes about such things. A prime example of humbug.

But that's not right. The orator's aim is the endorsement by their audience. If the audience does not admire those who are patriotic and god-fearing, the oration fails. Indeed it is those who do not accept these values who are most likely to recognise the humbug.

The discussion of "short of lying" becomes a bit more problematic.

I bulked at
Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me.

and yet:
I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket.

Frankfurt says that asserting one has twenty dollars in ones pocket does not imply that one believes one has twenty dollars in one's pocket, but that a reasonable person might so judge.

But consider what Moore might say: is would be inconsistent to assert "I have twenty dollars in my pocket, but I do not believe I have twenty dollars in my pocket". — Banno

Without Moore's addition, it makes sense: the listener has no way of knowing whether Frankfurter has 20 bucks in his pocket. If Frankfurter swears on his mother's grave, crosses his heart, and sells his soul to Satan on the spot in front of you to witness it, you still haven't got an assurance that he has $20 in his pocket.

If you add Moores statement, you merely create a nonsensical situation. I think Moores' addition would be more accurate this way: "I have twenty dollars in my pocket, but you may believe or not that I have twenty dollars in my pocket." It is not my, Frankfurter's belief that is at stake; but his audience's.

Does this matter in regard to the overall project? The orator example is clearer, I think. The orator, according to Frankfurt does not care what his audience believes with regard to god and history; only that they draw a certain conclusion about what he, the orator, believes about such things. A prime example of humbug.

But that's not right. The orator's aim is the endorsement by their audience. If the audience does not admire those who are patriotic and god-fearing, the oration fails. Indeed it is those who do not accept these values who are most likely to recognise the humbug. — Banno

I am not sure if it's values that are lied about, or facts. The orator may give an example of how value affects behaviour; and the example is the key. If the audience KNOWS that the example's event were different from how they had happened in reality, then they call "humbug". If the example's facts are right on, then there is no humbug.

if the orator states "the example is right because the person's values dictated him or her to act that way", then it's the same thing as the twenty dollar in my pocket: the audience has no way of knowing.

But there is more: the audience also knows that the orator has no way of knowing the values of the person; only the person knows his own values. However, even if the person who had acted states to the audience, "I did this because of the values I have", the audience has no way of knowing, only believing. "I have twenty dollars in my pocket" is the same unverified claim as "I have this value". The twenty dollars can be verified; the values can't.

A belief is always a belief that such-and-such. Hence, misrepresenting what one believes is always misrepresenting two things: that such-and-such is the case; and that one believes that such-and-such is the case. — Banno

If one has a false belief, then his misrepresenting his own belief may produce that he is representing things truthfully.

This is not a slippery slope; it is an on-off situation, where the initial state dictates each state after a switch to the opposite.

Moore's paradox.

Would that make concern trolling a kind of bullshitting? Pretending to care when you don’t?

The whole point of Moore’s paradox is that it is not logically contradictory for something to be true and yet someone believes otherwise, but if that someone SAYS that it’s true but that they believe otherwise, it sure SOUNDS like a contradiction even though it’s logically not.

My resolution to the paradox is to differentiate between asserting or as I say “impressing” opinions, and expressing opinions. When you say that something is true, you impress to the listener that it is true, but also express your own belief that it is true. If you then follow that up with impressing on the listener that you believe otherwise, that impression contradicts the preceding expression, even though it doesn’t contradict the preceding impression.

I'd follow Searle's analysis. One presupposition of making an assertion is that the speaker believes what is asserted. That presupposition is what is contradicted in Moore's example.

SO what I am taking issue with is the analysis of humbug - and hence of bullshit - as being short of a lying. Frankfurt has it that in both bullshiting and indulging in humbug, the speaker makes an assertion that they do not believe, and yet is not quite telling a lie.

In the article cited, Black talks of breaches of language use in terms of misfires, caused by ignorance or incompetence, and violations in which what is breached is what he calls the framework underpinning mutual understanding...

Violations maliciously trade upon and undermine the implicit understandings that underpin successful communication and co-operation. and hence erode the foundations of social existence.

That framework is not at all unlike the presuppositions noted by Searle, without which felicitous discussion is unachievable.

Moore's paradox is another example of a violation of that framework.

Here's something nice:

lying, as a species of deceit, would be futile in the absence of general efforts to be truthful.

...Black.

The discussion of "short of lying" becomes a bit more problematic.

I baulked at
Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me.

and yet:
I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket.

Frankfurt says that asserting one has twenty dollars in ones pocket does not imply that one believes one has twenty dollars in one's pocket, but that a reasonable person might so judge.

But consider what Moore might say: is would be inconsistent to assert "I have twenty dollars in my pocket, but I do not believe I have twenty dollars in my pocket".

I think Frankfurt has erred here. — Banno

This may be worth spending a bit more time teasing out what Frankfurt was doing... making sense of Black's implication that one can deliberately misrepresent ones own thoughts, feelings, and/or attitudes and still somehow fall short of lying...

Black probably means that humbug is not designed primarily to give its audience a false belief about whatever state of affairs may be the topic, but that its primary intention is rather to give its audience a false impression concerning what is going on in the mind of the speaker...

If I lie to you about how much money I have, then I do not thereby make an explicit assertion concerning my beliefs. Therefore, one might with some plausibility maintain that although in telling the lie I certainly misrepresent what is in my mind, this misrepresentation — as distinct from my misrepresentation of what is in my pocket — is not strictly speaking a lie at all. For I do not come right out with any statement whatever about what is in my mind. Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me. On the other hand, it is unquestionable that in so affirming, I provide you with a reasonable basis for making certain judgments about what I believe. In particular, I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket. Since this supposition is by hypothesis false, I do in telling the lie tend to deceive you concerning what is in my mind even though I do not actually tell a lie about that...

This is the bit that expands upon...

A belief is always a belief that such-and-such. Hence, misrepresenting what one believes is always misrepresenting two things: that such-and-such is the case; and that one believes that such-and-such is the case. — Banno

Note... he(Frankfurt) calls it a lie, it's just not a lie told about his own belief... it's about the amount of money in his pocket...

He's trying to make sense of how one could be said to be deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief but somehow fall short of lying...