Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes.
Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes.
although the more passionate ones believe in theirs — god must be atheist
*** "If you can't dazzle them with facts, then baffle them with bullshit."
8h — Bitter Crank
What followed is pretty much the rest of the book. It is quite intriguing if for no other reason than the methodological approach he then puts to use. He sets out the notion of humbug, taking it's parts into very careful consideration...
Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes. — creativesoul
Black’s phrase evokes the notion of some sort of continuum, on which lying occupies a certain segment while humbug is located exclusively at earlier points. What continuum could this be, along which one encounters humbug only before one encounters lying?
Especially by pretentious word or deed: There are two points to notice here. First, Black identifies humbug not only as a category of speech but as a category of action as well; it may be accomplished either by words or by deeds. Second, his use of the qualifier “especially” indicates that Black does not regard pretentiousness as an essential or wholly indispensable characteristic of humbug...
The fact that a person is behaving pretentiously is not, it seems to me, part of what is required to make his utterance an instance of bullshit.
Interjection
bullshit!
(vulgar, slang) An expression of disbelief or doubt at what one has just heard. — Wiktionary
Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me.
I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket.
Without Moore's addition, it makes sense: the listener has no way of knowing whether Frankfurter has 20 bucks in his pocket. If Frankfurter swears on his mother's grave, crosses his heart, and sells his soul to Satan on the spot in front of you to witness it, you still haven't got an assurance that he has $20 in his pocket.The discussion of "short of lying" becomes a bit more problematic.
I bulked at
Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me.
and yet:
I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket.
Frankfurt says that asserting one has twenty dollars in ones pocket does not imply that one believes one has twenty dollars in one's pocket, but that a reasonable person might so judge.
But consider what Moore might say: is would be inconsistent to assert "I have twenty dollars in my pocket, but I do not believe I have twenty dollars in my pocket". — Banno
Does this matter in regard to the overall project? The orator example is clearer, I think. The orator, according to Frankfurt does not care what his audience believes with regard to god and history; only that they draw a certain conclusion about what he, the orator, believes about such things. A prime example of humbug.
But that's not right. The orator's aim is the endorsement by their audience. If the audience does not admire those who are patriotic and god-fearing, the oration fails. Indeed it is those who do not accept these values who are most likely to recognise the humbug. — Banno
A belief is always a belief that such-and-such. Hence, misrepresenting what one believes is always misrepresenting two things: that such-and-such is the case; and that one believes that such-and-such is the case. — Banno
Violations maliciously trade upon and undermine the implicit understandings that underpin successful communication and co-operation. and hence erode the foundations of social existence.
The discussion of "short of lying" becomes a bit more problematic.
I baulked at
Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me.
and yet:
I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket.
Frankfurt says that asserting one has twenty dollars in ones pocket does not imply that one believes one has twenty dollars in one's pocket, but that a reasonable person might so judge.
But consider what Moore might say: is would be inconsistent to assert "I have twenty dollars in my pocket, but I do not believe I have twenty dollars in my pocket".
I think Frankfurt has erred here. — Banno
Black probably means that humbug is not designed primarily to give its audience a false belief about whatever state of affairs may be the topic, but that its primary intention is rather to give its audience a false impression concerning what is going on in the mind of the speaker...
If I lie to you about how much money I have, then I do not thereby make an explicit assertion concerning my beliefs. Therefore, one might with some plausibility maintain that although in telling the lie I certainly misrepresent what is in my mind, this misrepresentation — as distinct from my misrepresentation of what is in my pocket — is not strictly speaking a lie at all. For I do not come right out with any statement whatever about what is in my mind. Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me. On the other hand, it is unquestionable that in so affirming, I provide you with a reasonable basis for making certain judgments about what I believe. In particular, I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket. Since this supposition is by hypothesis false, I do in telling the lie tend to deceive you concerning what is in my mind even though I do not actually tell a lie about that...
A belief is always a belief that such-and-such. Hence, misrepresenting what one believes is always misrepresenting two things: that such-and-such is the case; and that one believes that such-and-such is the case. — Banno
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