...argued that both deontology and consequentialism assume a foundation for ethics in the concept of obligation, which makes no sense in the absence of a lawgiver which or who imposes it...
I am. But it seems to me that the only way is to KISS it. Accordingly I ask for some preliminary definitions, even if tentative and provisional.Any one interested in discussing? — Banno
...argued that both deontology and consequentialism assume a foundation for ethics in the concept of obligation, which makes no sense in the absence of a lawgiver which or who imposes it... — Banno
What about the autonomy of reason?obligation, which makes no sense in the absence of a lawgiver which or who imposes it...
Banno
The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. — Anscombe
The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say - and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of 'ought,' ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible... — Anscombe
We can now state some of the relations which at least sometimes hold between a description, say A, and descriptions, say xyz, of facts which are brute in relation to the fact described by A.
(1) There is a range of sets of such descriptions xyz such that some set of the range must be true if the description A is to be true. But the range can only ever be roughly indicated, and the way to indicate it is by giving a few diverse examples.
(2) The existence of the description A in the language in which it occurs presupposes a context, which we will call "the institution behind A "; this context may or may not be presupposed to elements in the descriptions xyz. For example, the institution of buying and selling is presupposed to the description "sending a bill", as it is to "being owed for goods received", but not to the description "supplying potatoes ".
(3) A is not a description of the institution behind A.
(4) If some set holds out of the range of sets of descriptions some of which must hold if A is to hold, and if the institution behind A exists, then " in normal circumstances" A holds. The meaning of "in normal circumstances" can only be indicated roughly, by giving examples of exceptional circumstances
in which A would not hold.
(5) To assert the truth of A is not to assert that the circumstances were "normal"; but if one is asked to justify A, the truth of the description xyz is in normal circumstances an adequate justification: A is not verified by any further facts.
(6) If A entails some other description B, then xyz cannot generally be said to entail B, but xyZ together with normality of circumstances relatively to such descriptions as A can be said to entail B. — Anscombe, 'On Brute Facts'
I think what Anscombe is trying to say is that Aristotle confuses Intellectual and moral failings, as we understand them. — csalisbury
Her approach seems to be that all legislation is parliamentary, — csalisbury
This is a substantialist prejudice. Man's reason can legislate on his passions. For example. — David Mo
conscience (an intuitive faculty) — Galuchat
Nice start. It'd be best to keep an eye on the big picture while examining the detail. — Banno
private language argument; that is, one cannot make sense of following a private rule, because one could have no way of verifying that one was indeed following the rule. Consider the case in which you believe you are following a rule, but actually you are mis-remembering the rule — Banno
Sure. But your other posts have demonstrated your lack of insight, so I don’t much care what you think. — Banno
Even I have not received such outright blatant disrespect from the grumpy old goat, and I'm at odds with him(and myself at times) intentionally... — creativesoul
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