(1) There is a range of sets of such descriptions xyz such that some set of the range must be true if the description A is to be true. But the range can only ever be roughly indicated, and the way to indicate it is by giving a few diverse examples. — Anscombe, 'On Brute Facts'
(2) The existence of the description A in the language in which it occurs presupposes a context, which we will call "the institution behind A "; this context may or may not be presupposed to elements in the descriptions xyz. For example, the institution of buying and selling is presupposed to the description "sending a bill", as it is to "being owed for goods received", but not to the description "supplying potatoes ".
(3) A is not a description of the institution behind A.
(4) If some set holds out of the range of sets of descriptions some of which must hold if A is to hold, and if the institution behind A exists, then " in normal circumstances" A holds. The meaning of "in normal circumstances" can only be indicated roughly, by giving examples of exceptional circumstances
in which A would not hold.
(5) To assert the truth of A is not to assert that the circumstances were "normal"; but if one is asked to justify A, the truth of the description xyz is in normal circumstances an adequate justification: A is not verified by any further facts.
(6) If A entails some other description B, then xyz cannot generally be said to entail B, but xyZ together with normality of circumstances relatively to such descriptions as A can be said to entail B
you can't see the distinction between appealing to social norms to set out what "moral and immoral" mea — fdrake
analysing social situations to re-evaluate what the topic of moral philosophy — fdrake
No, actually. You should read. — frank
Investigating what this tradition/consensus is is a matter of induction, either from experience or scientific investigation (samples, statistical analysis etc). Investigating what traditions hold and in what circumstances is a matter of psychology. — Isaac
Is your ethical outlook law-bound? Do you accept that this is problematic for an atheist?
Or do you suspend worrying about it since it works for you without any philosophical infrastructure? — frank
I do explain my actions in terms of kindness and integrity rather than in terms of the greatest happiness and categorical imperatives. — Banno
That legislation can be for oneself I reject as absurd;
She says at the beginning that we need a more adequate philosophy of psychology, but it's not really that, it's her treatment of how we get 'owes' to be a fact. Her explanation here is confusing to me so I could easily have this wrong, but all I get out of it (both here and in 'Brute Facts') is that 'owes' refers just to a circumstance which most people would use 'owes' to identify. What criteria they are using is not yet fixed, but simply held by tradition. I owe the grocer for the potatoes (after he has delivered them) simply because that it the state of affairs most people would consider had arisen as a result of that prior fact. Even though some instances where we would use some label 'owes' can have their history/tradition elucidated by reference to other more brute facts/institutions (justifying that A is done by reference to xyz) but such a relationship between A and xyz is held in normal circumstances by tradition.
Also, we only have a speculative, pragmatic description of 'owes', fringe cases are up for debate and (local) consensus wins.
Investigating what this tradition/consensus is is a matter of induction, either from experience or scientific investigation (samples, statistical analysis etc). Investigating what traditions hold and in what circumstances is a matter of psychology. — Isaac
I have to say though, I don't quite understand the role that 'psychology' has to play in the paper. The places where Anscombe invokes it seem arbitrary to me - I can't gork (grok?) why she does it when she does. The closest I can get is when she talks of the 'mesmeric' effect of moral oughts, and perhaps a psychology needed to understand that effect. Anyone have any further ideas? — StreetlightX
It bypasses a part of ethics that seems - well - almost autistic; lacking in a theory of mind. — Banno
David, in a fit of temper, kills your calf. He ought pay for the inconvenience - a question of simple justice. But you are moved to forgive him and hence to refuse recompense, perhaps realising that his act was quite out of character. You forgo what is just in order to be merciful. — Banno
Just that second sentence, where she wants an "adequate philosophy of psychology"... a philosophy of psychology is not a psychology; and adequate for... doing morality? — Banno
I don't think that for Anscombe "...owes..." comes for any induction or consensus. It's more that if one admits to receiving the spuds after having asked for them, one has misunderstood the nature of the transaction if one then insists that one is not in dept to the grocer.
...SO the difference would be that between understanding and agreeing to join in the group enterprise of creating the institution of paying for one's spuds, and just understanding a simple transaction from the point of view of the grocer - he thought you would pay for the spuds. — Banno
Point being, this seems to me to show the poverty of deontology - it is moral to do otherwise then what the rules say. — Banno
Well, it's not going to hurt for us to understand how minds work if our aim is to tell folk what to do with them... — Banno
Yes, ethics and morals are entirely matters of tradition/ consensus, and it is not possible to examine those from some "higher" perspective in order to judge whether they are "justified" or not. So forget psychology; it will only ever tell us what people do, not what they ought to do. — Janus
The unbolded seems authorized by the text; the bolded seems far more extrapolative and ambigious in its textual warrant. The very question of induction is nowhere raised for instance, — StreetlightX
if one admits to receiving the spuds after having asked for them, one has misunderstood the nature of the transaction if one then insists that one is not in dept to the grocer. — Banno
understanding and agreeing to join in the group enterprise of creating the institution of paying for one's spuds, and just understanding a simple transaction from the point of view of the grocer - he thought you would pay for the spuds. — Banno
the meaning of the transaction was that if the grocer provides the spuds then you will pay for them; that there is no further analysis needed. — Banno
It bypasses a part of ethics that seems - well - almost autistic; lacking in a theory of mind. — Banno
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