Wayfarer I am afraid you understand the word "pleasure" in a very restricted sense. To you it may only mean base, or not base, physical pleasure.

Reading the text, to me what PFHorrest means by "pleasure" or more specificially, "hedonism" or "hedonistic reward" is the good feelings accompanying any of the following (not an exhaustive list) independent of each other:

accomplishment
physical pleasing
emotional well being and rapture
happiness
satisfaction with life
peace with the world and with oneself
knowing to have paid one's own dues properly
lack of contention other than in entertaining activities not intended to hurt someone (sports, games, card games, games of skills and / or chance)
loving and being loved
seeing your young flourish
etc.

I have to admire the fact, however, that you chewed your way through that wall of text. PFHorrest indeed has a tendency to prolixity. It is the one thing that stops me from reading his posts. The only thing.

I am afraid you understand the word "pleasure" in a very restricted sense. — god must be atheist

It was appropriate, in the context. Sure, 'pleasure' can be construed in many ways, but here we're talking about one of the main factors underlying ethics, and I'm afraid that I don't think either hedonism or the satisfaction of appetite provides that. And besides, many of the items on your list are not emblematic of pleasure so much as of happiness, which may or may not be derived from pleasure. You can derive great pleasure from love, for example, but sometimes it also demands great sacrifice, and causes great pain. But we don't think less of love for that.

Compare Freud: to him, this principle was libido. That too has a narrow meaning - sexual appetite - but also a broader one, which manifests in all kinds of ways, as it is something like 'the will to live'. But the main reason Jung broke from Freud was exactly because he felt Freud's 'libido' was too narrow to account for human drives generally. I'm making a similar criticism here, although I've more or less given up on making headway with it.

don't think either hedonism or the satisfaction of appetite provides that. — Wayfarer

Why not? You have to show that.

Pleasure can be attained by helping others. By satisfying one's sense of empathy.

Pleasure can be attained by self-sacrifice for the greater good.

I don't know why you insist that hedonic motivation is "below the level" of the topic.

many of the items on your list are not emblematic of pleasure so much as of happiness, — Wayfarer

Happiness is pleasure. You can't say happiness is neutral or suffering.

You are still incapable of divorcing the concept of pleasure from phyisical pleasure. That is a limitation I wish you to overcome.

Compare Freud: to him, this principle was libido. That too has a narrow meaning - sexual appetite - but also a broader one, which manifests in all kinds of ways, as it is something like 'the will to live'. But the main reason Jung broke from Freud was exactly because he felt Freud's 'libido' was too narrow to account for human drives generally. — Wayfarer

Precisely. You are stuck on pleasure = libido; I am trying to make you see that pleasure = anything that feels good. (Including intellecutal, moral, and sacrificial pleasures.)

Happiness is pleasure — god must be atheist

I don't agree that they're the same, but I am not going to make a detailed argument for that, other than to observe that oftentimes the pursuit of pleasure does not end in happiness, and that it is possible to forgo pleasure and still be happy.

I am sorry. I don't mean they are the same. Happiness is pleasureable. Happiness is one of the many forms of pleasure.

I misspoke.

nstead, I say, look at what the physical sciences do do instead of that, and adapt that to ethical inquiry, by substituting empirical experiences (experiences that "seem true or false", and upon interpretation give rise to opinions about reality) with hedonic experiences (experiences that "seem good or bad", and upon interpretation give rise to opinions about morality). — Pfhorrest

The difference is that you have a reliable point of reference in the case of physical sciences that's not there for morality. It's not only that those experiences are subjective, it's that those experience are already informed by morality. We do not suddenly wake up when we are 18 or so when we have enough maturity to think about this, and start experiencing good and bad things in a vacuum... we already have been conditioned into some form of morality, which will influence how we value those experiences. So how does that work as an objective science, we measure morality by a moving standard that is itself informed by morality?

What do you even mean by "being moral"? — Pfhorrest

Making right moral decisions. What is right is, of course, the very subject of morality.

The criteria for the success of what? A moral science, or generally any system of morality? The criteria for success of those things is to provide a means of answering questions about morality. When someone wonders what is moral, how do they figure it out? When two people disagree about what is moral, how do they resolve those difference? Answering how to do that, how to figure out those answers to questions about morality, is the criteria for the success of a system of morality. — Pfhorrest

So any procedure for answering moral questions will do, as long as it is comprehensive? No other criteria of success are required?

That you think I'm even trying to do that shows you haven't understood a word that I've said so far. — Pfhorrest

If by that you mean that I haven't read your articles on morality, then no, I haven't. That wasn't the subject of this thread.

I predict you'd respond here "aha! So you're starting with a system of morality already, your 'ought' premises, just like I said!" But no, no more than the physical sciences start with some set of unquestionable "is" premises. — Pfhorrest

That sort of Cartesian scheme that you outline doesn't remotely resemble the way science is done. But even if your approach was better at aping science, that still wouldn't make it any better than a cargo cult, because you still aren't thinking about why you do what you do. Why should morality resemble science?

I'm not denying hedonism. I thought I'd been pretty clear about that.

I'm denying that hedonism necessarily means that whatever a majority desires is good, in the same way that I would deny that empiricism means that whatever a majority perceives is true.

Firstly, perceptions are subject to interpretation. But even if we go down to the level of sensations, which aren't, a majority isn't good enough. All of them count.

Likewise, desires are subject to interpretation. But even if we go down to the level of appetites, which aren't, a majority isn't good enough. All of them count.

We don't "do empiricism" by polling people about their perceptions, and we shouldn't "do hedonism" by polling people about their desires. What do we do instead of that, when we "do empiricism"? And how can we adapt that to a better way to do hedonism too?

In any case, when combined with all the rest of my ethical principles, especially liberalism, hedonism just boils down to "if you want to claim that this is wrong, you need to show how it hurts someone". I still get the impression that you think it means people selfishly and short-sightedly over-indulging in the most base and carnal pleasures.

The difference is that you have a reliable point of reference in the case of physical sciences that's not there for morality. It's not only that those experiences are subjective, it's that those experience are already informed by morality. We do not suddenly wake up when we are 18 or so when we have enough maturity to think about this, and start experiencing good and bad things in a vacuum... we already have been conditioned into some form of morality, which will influence how we value those experiences. So how does that work as an objective science, we measure morality by a moving standard that is itself informed by morality? — ChatteringMonkey

You seem to be thinking of moral beliefs. I'm not talking about that. I'm not saying we base morality on what people think is moral; that has all the problems you just outlined. I'm not even saying we base morality on what people want. I'm saying we base morality on what feels good or bad to people.

It's the difference between "I am hungry" (an experience, an appetite), "I want a burrito" (a desire), and "I deserve a burrito" (moral beliefs). I'm not saying that you thinking you deserve a burrito should be a moral consideration, or even you wanting a burrito should be a moral consideration, but your feeling of hunger should be a moral consideration, and any complete moral plan of action will not just leave your hunger unsatisfied, though it may not give you the burrito you want or agree that you deserve one.

So any procedure for answering moral questions will do, as long as it is comprehensive? No other criteria of success are required? — SophistiCat

If I understand the question correctly then yes, but I suspect this is a trap somehow.

If by that you mean that I haven't read your articles on morality, then no, I haven't. That wasn't the subject of this thread. — SophistiCat

No, I just mean the many words I have already written in this thread.

That sort of Cartesian scheme that you outline doesn't remotely resemble the way science is done. — SophistiCat

What "Cartesian scheme" are you talking about, that doesn't remotely resemble the way science is done? Science is definitely objectivist, and critical (as in skeptical), and phenomenal (empirical), and on most modern accounts at least, what I called "liberal", which in this context basically means falsificationist. All I'm claiming about science is that it operates somewhere within those broad restraints: you're not going to get science done if you're making relativist claims (that reality depends on opinion), appeals to faith or authority, or to evidence beyond observation. I said all of this before, I don't know why I have to repeat myself.

But even if your approach was better at aping science, that still wouldn't make it any better than a cargo cult, because you still aren't thinking about why you do what you do. Why should morality resemble science? — SophistiCat

I'm getting tired of that naked insult there being repeated, and the implication that I'm not thinking about the motives behind this. I already explained them in great length in response to Wayfarer last night.

I'm not just saying "hey, let's copy science! that will work!" I developed general principles about inquiry of any sort, out of more specific principles about both descriptive and prescriptive fields; my epistemology borrows from liberal deontological methodologies, for instance. I then applied those general principles about inquiry of any sort to both inquiry about reality, and inquiry about morality. Not because of a starting assumption that morality has to copy science, but because there's no reason not to apply those general principles of inquiry to one kind of inquiry and not others; they're general principles after all. Those principles applied to inquiry about reality give a broadly scientific method: critical rationalist epistemology and empirical realist ontology. The same principles applied without any modification to inquiry about morality therefore automatically give a moral analogue of that method.

I didn't set out to build a moral science, I set out to investigate questions about how to investigate questions about both reality and morality, and wound up with general principles that could be applied to both. You're the one saying that a special exception should be made for moral inquiry. That's what calls for justification, not just applying the same principles as I would to any other inquiry.