And by what standard, pray tell, do you judge the reliability of your system of morality? — SophistiCat
Short answer: Same way I judge the reliability of science.
Long answer is about 80,000 words if you care to read it. You could start here for just the objectivity part or the last section of this for a general overview. — Pfhorrest
Yes, I understand that you have some pet utilitarian system — SophistiCat
The criteria of success for a system of ethics themselves belong in the ethical category. You have to have ethical judgment before you can judge a system of ethics. But if you already have ethical judgment, then what need is for a system? — SophistiCat
I don't see those as exceptions, I see them as fundamental disagreements. Ghandi, certain Buddhists, MLK, Quakers have fundamental disagreement around violence and killing. It's not an exception, it's across the board. Deontologists vs. consuentialists have fundamental disagreements. IOW it is for many Ds not possible to justify killling certain people regardless of the consequences. Whereas Cs can accept killing if in the end it leads to less innocent people dying. There are fundamental disagreements about what is a person, what is innocent and then how to prioritize various 'things we want to avoid or attain..' — Coben
In this discussion of morality, the definition of subjectivity that I'm concerned about is the one that asserts that morality is opinion, feelings, taste and hence doesn't lead to objective moral truths. As I said before even if morality is about personal feelings, so subjective, the causal patterns in re these feelings are sufficiently generalizable, i.e. the causes of happiness and sorrow seem to be similar for all people irrespective of cultural, social, economic, variations, that it allows us to be rational about what must follow thereof; in other words, we can be objective about what sort of moral theory is consistent with, morality's essence, our feelings. For example, there's a universal dislike for murder - we feel offended by it - and this can be the basis of the objective moral truth thou shalt not kill. — TheMadFool
Do the criteria of success for a system of science themselves belong in the science category? Must you have a scientific judgment before you can judge a system of science?
No. Same with ethics. — Pfhorrest
Whether ethical principles are right or wrong is an ethical question — SophistiCat
No, it's a meta-ethical question. Just like the foundations of the physical sciences are found in answers to meta-physical questions (broadly, including epistemology in there). — Pfhorrest
to think that science is principally guided by philosophical doctrines, other than the ones that emerged organically in the course of its own development. — SophistiCat
Why do those ones deserve an exception?
The physical sciences we have today began as a branch of philosophy, "natural philosophy", that pretty much solved its foundational questions and then went on to do the business of applying them. — Pfhorrest
There is no reason to think that moral philosophy cannot do the same thing, solve those foundational questions, and go on to start doing ethical sciences by applying those. — Pfhorrest
Science didn't wait around for its foundational questions to be solved before it could get off the ground - if it did, it would have been waiting to this day. Historical nomenclature aside, what we today recognize as science came together haphazardly as a living practice, rather than as a systematic application of a fully developed philosophical program. If anything, metaphysics and epistemology have for the most part been playing catch-up to science, taking its practice and its findings as a subject of study. — SophistiCat
It is impossible to do science without agreement on foundational things like empiricism and realism and some form of rationalism (as in rejecting appeals to intuition, authority, etc). Those practicing scientists may not have all made explicit their philosophical assumptions, but the work they did as a community had to take them for granted; those who continued to dispute those principles did not become part of the scientific community, but instead became its opponents, disputing its results on what scientists consider fallacious philosophical grounds. Because those scientists had at least an implicit philosophical framework in common. — Pfhorrest
There is a clear trend of moral thinking moving toward a more “scientific” methodology based on common experience and critical reasoning, we just haven’t fully developed a consensus on how exactly those principles all fit together yet. — Pfhorrest
Science is done the way it is done not because scientists have come to an agreement about its philosophical foundations (even the philosophical community is far from such an agreement) — SophistiCat
if we adopt the principle of universality: if an action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us. Those who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to themselves the standards they apply to others—more stringent ones, in fact—plainly cannot be taken seriously when they speak of appropriateness of response; or of right and wrong, good and evil. — Chomsky
All we need for an "ethical science" is that kind of broad agreement. — Pfhorrest
If you don't understand why you do what you do — SophistiCat
Because while you busy yourself with procedural details of how to reduce morality to a utilitarian optimization, you don't ask what any of that has to do with being moral. What are the criteria of success (other than aping the superficial trappings of science)? How do you jump the is-ought gap? — SophistiCat
if we adopt the principle of universality: if an action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us. Those who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to themselves the standards they apply to others — Chomsky
Because while you busy yourself with procedural details of how to reduce morality to a utilitarian optimization, you don't ask what any of that has to do with being moral. — SophistiCat
The criteria for the success of what? A moral science, or generally any system of morality? The criteria for success of those things is to provide a means of answering questions about morality. When someone wonders what is moral, how do they figure it out? When two people disagree about what is moral, how do they resolve those difference? Answering how to do that, how to figure out those answers to questions about morality, is the criteria for the success of a system of morality.What are the criteria of success (other than aping the superficial trappings of science)? — SophistiCat
That you think I'm even trying to do that shows you haven't understood a word that I've said so far. I'm staying entirely within "ought", starting from "ought" and following to "ought", just proceeding in a way analogous to the ways we've been successful at starting with "is" and following to "is".How do you jump the is-ought gap? — SophistiCat
The physical sciences start with uncertain "is" hypotheses and try to rule them out to get an ever-narrower range of remaining possibilities, they don't start with some presumed facts and derive others from those. — Pfhorrest
Naturalism certainly starts with the axiom of 'nothing beyond nature' . You yourself start with that presumption — Wayfarer
Applied to the endeavor of inquiry, that means always assuming that there are genuine answers (not mere opinions) to be found, even if you haven't found them yet. That ("hope" applied to inquiry) is the principle I call "objectivism". — Pfhorrest
You can't possibly test claims about things beyond all experience ("beyond nature"), so any claims about that are inherently unquestionable, and so violate the principle to hold everything open to question ("criticism"). — Pfhorrest
This *is* a kind of utilitarianism, as I and others here have said, even though you keep disputing it. The basic definition of utilitarianism is 'the greatest good for the greatest number', and I don't see how you're not saying that. — Wayfarer
The problem is, that 'the bounds of experience' are very much culturally-conditioned also. If you're in a culture that values spiritual experience, then such experiences are by nature not out of bounds.There are ways of disseminating them, ways of navigating them. That's one of the meanings of culture. — Wayfarer
At the end of the day an ethical philosophy has to provide for an unqualified good - something which is good as a matter of fact, not opinion. — Wayfarer
Phenomenalism may superficially sound similar to nihilism (there being nothing more to things than their experiential qualities sounds superficially similar to there being no actual things but only the appearance of them), but as previously elaborated in my essays against nihilism and against transcendentalism, I differentiate clearly between the two, and hold to objectivism. Conversely, while objectivism may sound like it could entail transcendentalism, for the same reasons but in reverse, I have already explained why I think it does not, and still hold to phenomenalism as well. An objective phenomenalism is not nihilistic, and a phenomenal objectivism is not transcendent. Likewise, liberalism may superficially sound similar to fideism (not requiring justification to hold a belief sounds superficially similar to condoning appeals to faith), but as previously elaborated in my essays against fideism and against cynicism, I differentiate clearly between the two, and hold to criticism. And conversely, while criticism may sound like it could entail cynicism, for the same reasons but in reverse, I have already explained why I think that does not, and still hold to liberalism as well. A critical liberalism is not fideistic, and a liberal criticism is not cynical.
I strongly suspect that such chains of inference at least tacitly underlie many philosophical views: those who see the rejection of fideism for criticism leading (so they think) to cynicism and thus nihilism, and to the rejection of transcendentalism for phenomenalism and thus (so they think) to nihilism again, rightly reject nihilism and thus (as they think necessary) phenomenalism with it, along with cynicism and thus (as they think necessary) criticism along with it, embracing transcendentalism and the fideism that it entails as their only hope (so they think) against nihilism. Conversely, those who see the rejection of nihilism for objectivism leading (so they think) to transcendentalism and thus fideism, and to the rejection of cynicism for liberalism and thus (so they think) to fideism again, rightly reject fideism and thus (as they think necessary) liberalism along with it, along with transcendentalism and thus (as they think necessary) objectivism along with it, embracing cynicism and the nihilism that it entails as their only hope (so they think) against fideism. This confusion of liberalism with fideism, or equivalently of criticism with cynicism, and likewise of phenomenalism with nihilism, or equivalently of objectivism with transcendentalism, leads many people, I suspect, to see the only available options as a transcendent fideistic view, or else a cynical nihilistic view. The differentiation of those superficial similarities and so the opening up of possibilities besides those two extremes is the key insight at the core of my entire general philosophy, embracing objectivism without transcendentalism, criticism without cynicism, liberalism without fideism, and phenomenalism without nihilism. — The Codex Quaerentis: Commensurablism
Instead, I say, look at what the physical sciences do do instead of that, and adapt that to ethical inquiry, by substituting empirical experiences (experiences that "seem true or false", and upon interpretation give rise to opinions about reality) with hedonic experiences (experiences that "seem good or bad", and upon interpretation give rise to opinions about morality). — Pfhorrest
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