I believe he would say existence is not a real predicate, — 3017amen

I didn't use existence as a predicate. And neither would have Russell. Existence in predicate calculus is specified via the existential quantifier. I can't put in the formal logic notation for that here, so I just wrote it out in English as "There exists an x". When you write it out in predicate calculus, the "There exists an" is written as a backwards "E" instead, and the universal quantifier "for all" is written as an upside-down "A".

In any case, nothing in Russell's project implied propositions should be tautologies. Quite to the contrary. He just wanted to be able to translate the meaning of all propositions into formal logic, and consequently assert that all propositions have truth values. Not tautalogical truth values. Rather truth values that might (or might not) be determined empirically and/or via reasoning or other methods.

|>ouglas

In any case, nothing in Russell's project implied propositions should be tautologies. Quite to the contrary. He just wanted to be able to translate the meaning of all propositions into formal logic, and consequently assert that all propositions have truth values. — Douglas Alan

Well with all due respect, that's really not making sense:

A priori=formal logic=potential for tautologies.

I didn't use existence as a predicate. — Douglas Alan

With all due respect, I think you did. You said S (x).
No?

I really don't know what to say to you that I haven't already. A proposition written in formal logic is sometimes a tautology but is typically not. If I write

a -> b

that's not a tautology. It's just a formal way of saying that if a is true, then b is true. Not only that, but this might be a false assertion. Just because I write something down formally, doesn't force it to be any more true than if I write it in words. I.e., if I write

If Joan is wearing a red dress, then she is drinking a caramel macchiato.

That caries no more or less weight than the formal logic version:

Let d be true if and only if Joan is wearing a red dress.
Let m be true if and only if Joan is drinking a caramel macchiato.
d -> m

They are just different ways of asserting the same thing. And what they are asserting could be true or they could be false.

Russell did not have any intention of trying to translate propositions into tautologies. He wanted the formal logic version of the proposition to be true when the English language version of the proposition is true and the formal logic version of the proposition to be false when the English language version of the proposition is false.

With all due respect, I think you did. You said S (x) — 3017amen

This is not using existence as a predicate. S(x) is a predicate that only holds true when x is Santa Claus. It has nothing to do with existence. It's just a normal predicate that is true for somethings (i.e., Santa Claus) and false for other things (e.g., a caramel macchiato).

Maybe I shouldn't have used Santa Claus, because since Santa Claus is fictional, S(x) is actually false for all x. But Santa Claus was a canonical problem for Russell's project, so just comes to mind as a reflex. I.e., we must have spent an entire month in Philosophy of Language trying to figure out how one might get Russell's project to work with propositions such as "Santa Claus wears a red suit", which is true, even though there is no such thing as Santa Claus. This is problematic for Russell, since how do we translate this sentence into formal logic so that it is still true in formal logic.

I'm pretty sure that Russel had an answer for this, but at this point I don't remember what it was. And IIRC, I think that his solution was not widely considered to be very satisfying.

|>ouglas

I think he was at one time, then basically discovered it's limitations — 3017amen

I think not. He was definitely an influence on the logical positivists, but he was not a positivist himself. I can find no source on the Internet that claims that he ever was. Also, he claimed to be an agnostic. But to a logical positivist, something that could not be verified was considered to be meaningless. Since the existence of god cannot be verified, a positivist would take any claims about "god" to be meaningless, and consequently, a positivist cannot be an agnostic, who could assert meaningful things using the term "god". (I suppose that there could be a positivist who thinks that the existence of god can be proven from first principles. But in that case, they would not be an agnostic. I don't think there were any such positivists, however.)

|>ouglas

My point is that in "ordinary language" mathematical truths are typically considered to be facts. — Douglas Alan

If you prefer to limit yourself to the ordinary language which is always imprecise, I have no objection. I thought you were referring to expert opinion -your PhD teacher, the scientists... The first one -OL- doesn't interest me much. Which are we speaking of?

Would you like to wager on what his answer will be? — Douglas Alan

Ask him the question as I put it, please. Don't water it down. I'm intrigued by his answer.

If you prefer to limit yourself to the ordinary language which is always imprecise, I have no objection. I thought you were referring to expert opinion -your PhD teacher, the scientists... The first one -OL- doesn't interest me much. Which are we speaking of? — David Mo

I have a degree in Philosophy from MIT. I was trained that when you want to address questions that are important to normal people, then you have to use the same language that they use, at least for the terms which they'd use to express the question. If you don't, then you will end up answering a different question than the one they asked by changing the meaning of the words on them.

I really have no interest in debating the merit of this approach anymore. I understand that jargon has its use. It's used heavily in all of the philosophy that I've studied. But the jargon is not substituted for the words used in the question being addressed. It is only used only in the innards of the argument.

I really don't have anything more to say on this topic that I haven't already said.

|>ouglas

I have a degree in Philosophy from MIT. — Douglas Alan

I find it very strange that at MIT no one has explained to you the difference between factual and formal sciences, analytical and synthetic propositions or truths of reason and truths of facts. And pure and applied mathematics, of course.

Here is an interesting article on the subject: https://philarchive.org/archive/MARMBP-5 . Given your degree you should not find any problem in reading it.

I keep wondering what your teacher has to say on the subject. What a pity.

I find it very strange that at MIT no one has explained to you the difference between factual and formal sciences — David Mo

I've never heard of such a distinction. Are you talking about the difference between theoretical and experimental science? I am quite familiar with that distinction. I didn't study much philosophy of science, however, other than Kuhn.

And pure and applied mathematics, of course. — David Mo

At MIT, it was never my experience that there was some sharp dividing line between the two. At least at the undergraduate level. Applied mathematics was just pure mathematics that you might need in the course of being an engineer, and other pure mathematics might have no applications yet. Or none that would be of interest to a typical engineer.

Engineering departments also had their own highly developed math, such as Laplace transforms and Z-transforms, that the math department did not seem at all interested in. Though when I talked to mathematicians about this sort of math, when I described it, I was told at times that I should feel privileged to have learned such interesting math, even though it was not the sort of the math that they themselves had ever studied.

I keep wondering what your teacher has to say on the subject. What a pity. — David Mo

Which teacher? I got my degree a long time ago. I.e., 1988. Though I continued to take some classes at MIT into the late 90s. Some of my professors are now, sadly, dead. E.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson and George Boolos. And Ned Block moved to NYU.

Regarding reading a paper that uses some particular jargon use of the word "fact", I have no problem with jargon as long as it is explained, used consistently, and understood as jargon and not lay usage. I have never claimed that the way that I have been using the word "fact" is the one true usage of it. Only that it is the typical lay usage of it, and the way that it was generally used in my education. It is also supported, as I have pointed out numerous times, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, as a common usage in Philosophy.

So, I have no clue why anyone would disagree with anything I have said. Everything I have asserted is completely innocuous. I have never said that anyone else is using the term "fact" incorrectly. I have only asserted that I am not using the term incorrectly. Since the SEoP backs me up on this, please take any further objections to them.

|>ouglas

Which teacher? — Douglas Alan

Right. You mentioned your boss. I understood it was a reference to his master in the degree. I could have used your boss's opinion that you quoted. But it doesn't matter.

I've never heard of such a distinction. — Douglas Alan

Here's a classic: Carnap, Rudolf: "Formal and Factual Science" (1935):

As an example of a problem in the logic of science, we shall deal in what follows with the problem of the relationship between two major fields of science, namely, the formal sciences (logic, including mathematics) and the factual sciences (embracing the totality of all empirical disciplines: physics, biology, psychology, sociology, history, etc.). (New York: 123) — Carnap

It doesn't matches theoretical and empirical, I think. Better deductive-inductive.

that the math department did not seem at all interested in. — Douglas Alan

What you are talking about is how the pure-applied distinction is reflected in university departments. You are familiar with the applied mathematics that falls within the realm of factual science. I don't think you are familiar with the turmoil that caused in the field of philosophy of science the emergence of non-Euclidean mathematics . Or with the problem of how certain purely formal mathematical developments are then applied to empirical reality, which is another problem that has fascinated theoretical scientists and philosophers since Leibniz or before... but leaves engineers or biologists indifferent.

I have no problem with jargon as long as it is explained, used consistently, and understood as jargon and not lay usage — Douglas Alan

If the use of jargon bothers you, you're lost in philosophy... or science. I imagine you'd have a hell with Boolos. I don't understand much of what he writes. Putnam, it seems, doesn't either. I take some comfort in that.

Whether the use of jargon is a result of the need to be more precise in one's ideas or to attract attention is not clear to me. Since I sometimes do not understand it, I tend to think that it is more the latter. But it may be a prejudice of my ignorance. So I'm careful about this. Humility is one of the conditions of the philosopher that they generally don't have.

Now, independently of the abuse of jargon, the problem of the relationship between formal and factual sciences seems to me to be serious. And I don't think it can be solved from ordinary language. "Facts" in ordinary language has a lot of meanings that are continually intermingled. For example: if we talk about mathematical facts on the Internet -9 Amazing Math Facts!, and similar- , it is in relation to applied mathematics. Which leaves the formal-factual problem that is essential in theoretical physics and scientific revolutions in the lurch. That is not good.

Right. You mentioned your boss. I understood it was a reference to his master in the degree. I could have used your boss's opinion that you quoted. But it doesn't matter. — David Mo

My boss has a PhD in linquistics. I was just using him as another piece of evidence in how the word "fact" is used by a layperson. In general, linguists are only concerned with how language is used by laypersons, and not how grammarians, etc., think they should be using language. (Though I'm sure that there are also linguists who study the jargon of subcultures, etc.)

Here's a classic: Carnap, Rudolf: "Formal and Factual Science" (1935): — David Mo

Well, that's pretty old. Almost all of my Philosophy education (other than Philosophy 101) was oriented around engaging in current debates. (Or rather in debates that were current at the time.) The purpose for this, I suppose, is that you couldn't write papers by simple regurgitation. You had to think for yourself and present your own unique arguments.

Consequently, I may have lost some historical perspective. On the other hand, in the little Philosophy of Science that I did study, these distinctions from 1935 were no longer being made.

but leaves engineers or biologists indifferent. — David Mo

This would also leave me indifferent, even though I have a deep interest in Philosophy. But mostly only how it relates to Philosophy of Mind. And maybe to ethics. But I didn't study ethics deeply.

This said, I do have something of an interest in Kuhn's revelation that science doesn't work nearly as cleanly as one was taught in high school. But I haven't done any deep studies in this area of philosophy.

If the use of jargon bothers you, you're lost in philosophy — David Mo

The use of jargon doesn't not bother me in the slightest. As long as the users of it are clear that they are using jargon, why they are using jargon, use it clearly, and don't slily substitute it for lay usage when answering a philosophical conundrum that has been expressed in lay language.

|>ouglas

It seems to me that what you do not get, is that if "true" = "fact" then the distinction is jargon. E.g., "these two words mean the same thing, but I'm using them to mean different things in this here usage." But the two do not mean the same thing. Using them interchangeably, then, is an error because that use assumes that they are the same things when they are not. Does the world come to an end, then? Of course not! But if you speak wrong to someone on the assumption the someone is ignorant and they do not happen to be, then how are they to understand you?

For example,
You: "fact means true!"
Someone: "Uh, no it doesn't."
You: "Oh, sorry! You didn't go to college, or at least my college, so I thought you were stupid, or at least ignorant. Let me correct myself. What I really meant was...".

But the two do not mean the same thing. — tim wood

I'v presented more than a bit of evidence that they do to the intelligent layperson. I've also proven that they are also used this way by at least enough philosophers to have this usage documented in the SEoP.

You: "Oh, sorry! You didn't go to college, or at least my college, so I thought you were stupid, or at least ignorant. Let me correct myself. What I really meant was...". — tim wood

You are being complete disingenuous. It's you who started with the name calling.

|>ouglas

Well, that's pretty old. — Douglas Alan

Einstein is even older. It happens that in philosophy of science and in science it is convenient to be aware of the theories of the past that are still valid. The thinkers of the past often said things that were clearer and more profound than today stars of philosophy. In any case, on the subject of definitions of "fact", the distinction made by Carnap between formal and factual (natural) sciences is fully valid. See here or here.

This said, I do have something of an interest in Kuhn's revelation that science doesn't work nearly as cleanly as one was taught in high school. — Douglas Alan

I find Kuhn very convincing as well. Especially convincing when he warns that science is more than just what engineers do.

when answering a philosophical conundrum that has been expressed in lay language. — Douglas Alan

Ordinary language is specially confuse when using the word "facts". For example: "mathematical facts" and "a matter of fact". Therefore a more analytic "jargon" is needed.

The thinkers of the past often said things that were clearer and more profound than today stars of philosophy. — David Mo

That may very well be true, But that doesn't mean

(1) That I have the time or interest to pursue their particular theories. I already spent enough of my life trying to figure out how it is true that Santa Claus wears a red suit when Santa Claus doesn't exist.

(2) That the jargon they used is the one true jargon of philosophy.

Ordinary language is specially confuse when using the word "facts". For example: "mathematical facts" and "a matter of fact". Therefore a more analytic "jargon" is needed. — David Mo

All I am asserting is that when you answer the type of philosophical conundrum that is of interest to a layperson, your answer better have actually answered the intended question and not a different one. I think that it is common for philosophers to do so by becoming so entrenched in their own jargon that they no longer even understand lay usage of words.

For an example of someone who is very careful not to make this mistake, I highly recommend Parfit's book "Reasons and Persons". In it, he answers the age-old question, "If I get into that infernal Star Trek transporter, when I am transported down to the planet, will it still be me? Or will I have died, and the person on the planet will just be some poor sap who is deluded that they are me?"

Parfit answers this question deftly, while being careful to preserve the meaning of the question asked, and not answer a different question by sloppy substitution of jargon for lay usage.

|>ouglas

Words are symbols of concepts. They act as the means of making concepts into mental concretes. They allow the storage of a conceptual integration that can be recalled on demand. Words are references to a concept. — BrianW

A definition describes the basis of integration of a specific concept. It describes the essential nature of the concept. It differentiates all other particulars from those included under the concept. — BrianW

Are the concepts of 'truth' and 'fact' completely differentiated in the way they are defined and symbolised? No, I don't think so. Also, no source of information, philosophy, linguistics or other, seems to have completely differentiated them. However, there is a concept, a principle, which seems to be the source or the fundamental upon which their respective definitions and symbolism are based. Right now, I can only explain that concept as, "that which is." It can be what is designated as reality or existence but, both fact and truth are attempts to symbolise aspects of 'that which is'.

Information and knowledge are other words whose definitions and conceptions are not completely differentiated, and kinda relate in one way or another. I don't think we have, as yet, developed the kind of context (or perspective) in which they could be completely uncoupled. The many arguments in this thread may be proof of that.

your answer better have actually answered the intended question and not a different one. I think that it is common for philosophers to do so — Douglas Alan

You said that it is very common for philosophers to answer a question without answering this particular question. After that, you raised the question of what identity is in a very tangled way. So, what the philosopher needs to do is clarify the question. How does Parfit respond to this? Usually here the layman starts to get exasperated. He wants a clear and simple answer to a confusing and complex question. But this is not the philosopher's fault. It's a problem of mass culture and political demagogy. Factual powers are not interested to teach people to ask questions.

Don't shoot the philosopher. He's doing his best. Although he's not always very good.

Don't shoot the philosopher. He's doing his best. Although he's not always very good. — David Mo

I'm not shooting the philosopher. Having studied a lot of philosophy in my day, I've seen what I feel are some ways that it can go wrong, and have expressed my opinion on some practices that can be used to improve it.

What I have suggested is not out of the mainstream of contemporary philosophical thought. In fact, it is how I was admonished to think by Judith Jarvis Thomson in Philosophy 101 when I violated this "best practice". Her advice has stuck with me all of these years.

|>ouglas