The event is the existential junction of states (that is, of that which in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence. — Peirce, c. 1896
Time is a certain general respect relative to different determinations of which states of things otherwise impossible may be realized. Namely, if P and Q are two logically possible states of things, (abstraction being made of time) but are logically incompossible, they may be realized in respect to different determinations of time. — Peirce, c. 1905
Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of any assertion about them. — Peirce, 1902
Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of being, and as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a Thing, an ens having Existence as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premise, reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an ens having a Reality, consisting in a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of being. The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the thing lies in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies in its bringing qualities and things together. — Peirce, c. 1896
In a 1908 paper that established the parameters for many of the debates within the philosophy of time ever since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, and future only at different times--is viciously circular. McTaggart's implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular moment. In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.
On the contrary, it is continuous motion that is the reality, while discrete positions in space and discrete instants in time are both abstractions that we invented in order to describe motion.I think it’s self evident if you consider it in terms of what is “primary” or “more basic”, so I say time and space are actual, while velocity is abstract or virtual property, i.e. “relation”. — Zelebg
... nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion ... — Peirce, 1906
On the contrary, we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.Motion / change is the only way to perceive time, it is thus essential to be the focus of any time related argument, and also, just because we perceive time only indirectly should not fool us to think it is illusory. — Zelebg
In fact, if we did not directly perceive the continuity of time, then we would have no concept of continuity at all.To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception.
But to me it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time is directly perceived. — Peirce, c. 1895
One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. — Peirce, c. 1902
On the contrary, Zeno's paradoxes are only dissolved by recognizing the continuity of both space and time.Additionally, either time or space have to be discrete to avoid Zeno’s paradoxes. Or both have to be discrete, I forgot and can’t remember how I concluded that, but I insist it is true. — Zelebg
All the arguments of Zeno depend on supposing that a continuum has ultimate parts. But a continuum is precisely that, every part of which has parts, in the same sense. Hence, he makes out his contradictions only by making a self-contradictory supposition. In ordinary and mathematical language, we allow ourselves to speak of such parts--points--and whenever we are led into contradiction thereby, we have simply to express ourselves more accurately to resolve the difficulty. — Peirce, 1868
On the contrary, we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.
In fact, if we did not directly perceive the continuity of time, then we would have no concept of continuity at all.
On the contrary, Zeno's paradoxes are only dissolved by recognizing the continuity of both space and time.
All the arguments of Zeno depend on supposing that a continuum has ultimate parts. But a continuum is precisely that, every part of which has parts, in the same sense. Hence, he makes out his contradictions only by making a self-contradictory supposition. In ordinary and mathematical language, we allow ourselves to speak of such parts--points--and whenever we are led into contradiction thereby, we have simply to express ourselves more accurately to resolve the difficulty.
— Peirce, 1868
Considering Peirce's remarks on this topic in general and about ultimate parts in particular to be gibberish, along with suggesting that being continuous is synonymous with being infinitely divisible, demonstrates quite conclusively which one of us does not understand what "continuity" means.Peirce is talking gibberish ... continuous, i.e. infinitely divisible ... You either do not understand what “continuity” means or your logic circuit is broken ... Ultimate parts? It's gibberish. — Zelebg
Why invoke a guy from the 5th century BC? I tend to quote Peirce and other noteworthy philosophers when I believe that their own words are more perspicuous than any rephrasing that I might attempt, but YMMV.Why quoting a guy from the 19th century? Actually, why quote anyone ... — Zelebg
By contrast, Charles Sanders Peirce held that time is real and continuous. — aletheist
The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence. — Peirce, c. 1896
An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts": — aletheist
I am sorry, I honestly do not understand what you are requesting here. All I can say (again) is that the reality of time has nothing to do with how we arbitrarily mark and measure it. Changing one's location on earth does not actually add or subtract hours from time itself.As it relates to time, if you could enumerate for me which is considered an illusion, and which is considered real, I would greatly appreciate it. — 3017amen
As I said before in the other thread, every moment is present when it is present, but no longer present when it is past and not yet present when it is future. The only moment that is present now is the present moment, when the indeterminate future is becoming the determinate past.The video presents discourse over past, present and future perception of time, hence ..."every moment is present". — 3017amen
What specific Aristotle/Cantor distinctions do you have in mind? What exactly do you mean by "eternity" in this context?Notwithstanding the Aristotle/Cantor distinctions, how does eternity relate to Time? — 3017amen
Considering Peirce's remarks on this topic in general and about ultimate parts in particular to be gibberish, along with suggesting that being continuous is synonymous with being infinitely divisible, demonstrates quite conclusively which one of us does not understand what "continuity" means.
No, it is the conclusion of various arguments based on our phenomenal experience. I already provided a couple of them above, and here is another succinct example:That time is continuous is an unsupported assumption ... — Metaphysician Undercover
It follows from the first sentence that there is no such thing as an instant at all.We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant. — Peirce, c. 1893-5
That is not even remotely what the quoted paragraph says. Surely it is not in the least bit controversial to recognize that incompossible facts are realized at different times. An event simply corresponds to the transition from one state to the other.This is exactly what the following paragraph says, the existence of an "event" is a violation of the law of non-contradiction: — Metaphysician Undercover
Peirce assumes no such thing, and that is not how I described an event. I respectfully suggest carefully rereading the entire OP, but here is the most pertinent portion:Instead of saying that one state exists, followed in time by a distinctly different state, Peirce assumes the two incompatible states exist together, at the same time, as an "event". — Metaphysician Undercover
Let me try to spell it out more thoroughly. Before the commencement of the lapse of time at which the event is realized, an earlier state of things is realized, which is a fact as signified by the true proposition "S is P." After the completion of the event-lapse, a later state of things is realized, which is an incompossible fact as signified by the true proposition "S is not-P." The two incompatible states do not exist together, at the same time, because they are separated by the whole event-lapse; so the principle of contradiction is not violated. However, during the event-lapse itself, an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; so the principle of excluded middle is false while the event is in progress. It can be successfully maintained in classical logic because we are almost always reasoning about prolonged states of things, rather than states of change.An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things that is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs--an existential subject initially has one determination, such that a certain fact is realized; but then it receives a contradictory determination, such that a negation of that fact is realized. — aletheist
Again, I instead hold with Peirce that instants are artificial creations of thought for the purpose of describing states of things, including facts and events. Besides, if time were really composed of discrete instants at finite intervals, how would we get from one to the "next"? How could there be any continuity in our experience at all? In Peirce's words:In reality, the "event" is what is artificial, a mere description, completely dependent on perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is logically impossible for a state of things to be realized in the present instant and not to be at all so in the past and future. Were the instants independently actual, as they are in the Time of the analysts, memory would be a perpetual miracle. — Peirce, c. 1904
The argument which seems to me to prove, not only that there is such a conception of continuity as I contend for, but that it is realized in the universe, is that if it were not so, nobody could have any memory. If time, as many have thought, consists of discrete instants, all but the feeling of the present instant would be utterly non-existent. — Peirce, 1908
Everyone is always making some assumptions, and again, infinite divisibility is necessary but not sufficient for true continuity. The rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet no one seriously claims that they are continuous.Zeno is not making any assumptions, and his arguments are indeed about infinite divisibility, i.e time / space continuity. — Zelebg
Everyone is always making some assumptions, and again, infinite divisibility is necessary but not sufficient for true continuity.
The rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet no one seriously claims that they are continuous.
No, it is the conclusion of various arguments based on our phenomenal experience. I already provided a couple of them above, and here is another succinct example: — aletheist
We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant. — Peirce, c. 1893-5
Peirce assumes no such thing, and that is not how I described an event. — aletheist
An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts": — aletheist
Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. — Peirce, c. 1896
Let me try to spell it out more thoroughly. Before the commencement of the lapse of time at which the event is realized, an earlier state of things is realized, which is a fact as signified by the true proposition "S is P." After the completion of the event-lapse, a later state of things is realized, which is an incompossible fact as signified by the true proposition "S is not-P." The two incompatible states do not exist together, at the same time, because they are separated by the whole event-lapse; so the principle of contradiction is not violated. However, during the event-lapse itself, an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; so the principle of excluded middle is false while the event is in progress. It can be successfully maintained in classical logic because we are almost always reasoning about prolonged states of things, rather than states of change. — aletheist
Again, I instead hold with Peirce that instants are artificial creations of thought for the purpose of describing states of things, including facts and events. Besides, if time were really composed of discrete instants at finite intervals, how would we get from one to the "next"? How could there be any continuity in our experience at all? — aletheist
We are actually conscious of the past and the future, at the same time, so the first sentence is a falsity, we are not conscious of the present. The phrase I used, "at the same time" is the deficient phrase here, as demonstrated by relativity theory, and rejection of this phrase is what renders the law of non-contradiction impotent. Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future. That we are consciously aware of a present is an illusion. We are not aware of any such thing.
So, what we have here is a situation where "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, but we are conscious of the future and past together, not the present. so this definition of "the present" is incorrect. Here, "the present" is defined as a combination of future and past (what we are conscious of), and this leads to the problem of contradiction, as the present is now inherently contradictory. A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am sorry, I honestly do not understand what you are requesting here. All I can say (again) is that the reality of time has nothing to do with how we arbitrarily mark and measure it. Changing one's location on earth does not actually add or subtract hours from time itself. — aletheist
Of course he made assumptions, as all of us do.I said Zeno did not make any assumptions ... — Zelebg
If they were "all one and the same concept," then we would not have three different terms for them. I acknowledge that analog and digital loosely correspond to continuous and discrete, respectively; but again, infinitely divisible is not synonymous with continuous.... and time is either analog or digital, where analog, continuous, and infinitely divisible is all one and the same concept. — Zelebg
Wait, are you suggesting that the rational numbers are continuous? Even the analysts (Cantor etc.) deny that, claiming instead--also wrongly, in Peirce's view (and mine)--that the real numbers are continuous.Do you even know what you just said or why, are you a robot? — Zelebg
Again, there are no "lost hours." Your age in hours is always exactly the same as it would be if you stayed where you were born for your entire life. We simply adjust our patterns of behavior in accordance with when the sun rises and sets at each location where we find ourselves.So if I travel from west to east, how can I live the lost hours (or in the opposite east to west, you get to re-live them)? — 3017amen
The unit by which we measure time is arbitrary. A second is now defined as a certain number of vibrations of a cesium atom, although historically it was intended to be 1/86,400th of the time required for the earth to complete one rotation about its axis. We had leap day last week because the time required for the earth to complete one revolution around the sun is not an integer multiple of its rotations.The way we measure time cannot be arbitrary can it? — 3017amen
I am still not sure what exactly you mean by calling time an illusion. As the thread title indicates, my view is that time itself is real, although our perception of it (and everything else) is certainly fallible.If so, then is all of time an illusion I wonder? How can we escape from that illusion; hypothetically, is there a way to do that? — 3017amen
This is evident from the fact that we are consciously aware of motion. Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time.
Again, please provide your definition of "illusion" in this context. — aletheist
No, it does not. Again, there is never an instant or lapse of time at which incompatible states of things are realized such that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, which would violate the principle of contradiction. Initially there is a lapse at which a state of things is realized such that "S is P" is true. Then there is a lapse at which a state of change is realized such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; i.e., the principle of excluded middle is false. Finally there is a lapse at which a state of things is realized such that "S is not-P" is true.OK, let's assume "time is continuous" is a conclusion. It is a conclusion which forces us to accept violation of the law of non-contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, and that is precisely why the present cannot be an instant, but instead must be a lapse of time.Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, from a phenomenological standpoint the present is defined as that part of time of which we are conscious. Another way of putting it is that the temporal present corresponds directly to whatever is present to the mind.Since any period of time has an earlier part, and a later part, and "the present" is used to divide past from future in this way, then the opening phrase above, "we are conscious only of the present time", is a false statement, and that's where the problem lies. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, we must simply recognize that the present is an indefinite lapse of time--a moment--such that it cannot be sharply distinguished from the immediately past moment nor the immediately future moment:Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future. — Metaphysician Undercover
The present moment will be a lapse of time, highly confrontitial, when looked at as a whole, seeming absolutely so, but when regarded closely, seen not to be absolutely so, its earlier parts being somewhat of the nature of memory, a little vague, and its later parts somewhat of the nature of anticipation, a little generalized. It contains a central part which is still more present, still more confrontitial, but which presents the same features. There is nothing at all that is absolutely confrontitial; although it is quite true that the confrontitial is continually flowing in upon us ... Another plain deliverance of the percipuum is that moment melts into moment. That is to say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the same. — Peirce, 1903
Yes, but there is no inconsistency between this additional definition and what I have stated above.A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
In fact, boundaries are precisely the sort of thing for which the principle of excluded middle is false.The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future, involves them both. — Peirce, 1899
The present is when the indeterminate future becomes the determinate past, and as with any other event, this is realized at a lapse of time rather than an instant.Thus, a point of a surface may be in a region of that surface, or out of it, or on its boundary. This gives us an indirect and vague conception of an intermediacy between affirmation and denial in general, and consequently of an intermediate, or nascent state, between determination and indetermination ... [The Present] is plainly that Nascent State between the Determinate and the Indeterminate that was noticed above. — Peirce, 1905
No, the required premise is quite simply that we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.In general, the arguments presented do not include the premise required for the conclusion that time is continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover
As you pointed out, we are directly aware of motion; so we can go one step farther than Peirce did, and say that in the present moment we are directly aware that things are changing. That is what I mean when I say that the state of things in the present is an indefinitely gradual state of change--it is always the case that innumerable events throughout the universe are currently in progress.No more than the present moment directly confronts us. The future, however little future it may be, is known only by generalization. The past, however little past it may be, lacks the explicitness of the present. Nevertheless, in the present moment we are directly aware of the flow of time, or in other words that things can change. — Peirce, 1903
No, what I frankly find unintelligible is your entire paragraph that begins with this sentence.All this does is render the "event lapse" as unintelligible in relation to the two states of P and not-P. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, this is self-contradictory; if events were "separated" and "individuated," then they would necessarily be discontinuous. Besides, I explained already--more than once--that an event is realized at a lapse of time between two other lapses of time at which incompatible states of things are realized.If individual events exist within a continuity, then they must be separated, individuated from that continuity, by means of "instants". Without such instants as divisors, there are no separate events. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, events are undeniably real in the sense that contradictory states of things are realized at different determinations of time, which entails that there must be another determination of time at which the change from one state to the other is realized. The only alternative to an indefinitely gradual state of change at a lapse of time is an instantaneous event, which is impossible since there can be no change whatsoever at an instant.Therefore, Peirce is forced to apprehend events, as well as instants as artificial. — Metaphysician Undercover
Imagine a series of instantaneous photographs to be taken. Then, no matter how closely they follow one another, there is no more motion visible in any one of them than if they were taken at intervals of centuries. — Peirce, c. 1895
consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motion — aletheist
Thanks for your comments, but I am honestly not sure whether or how they bear on the thread topic. The fact that the speed of light in a vacuum is constant strikes me as consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motion. — aletheist
Thanks, I read it a couple of months ago and found it relatively unremarkable since Peirce had that insight a century earlier.Here is Peter Lynds' paper in which he postulates that there are no instants of time. — jgill
People who insist that space and time are composed of discrete positions and instants, rather than truly continuous.When you say continuous motion, who would argue with you on that? — christian2017
The motion is real, but speed and distance are measurements facilitated by marking positions and instants, and then comparing them with arbitrary unit intervals.As for discrete positions in space, if there was two galaxies or two asteroids roughly (roughly) in line with each other (hypothethical situation) and at at same time they were moving in opposite directions (roughly parallel to the original line that they form with each other), the speed with which they are moving and the distance traveled would be proof that discrete positions in space are not artificial creations. — christian2017
Usefulness does not entail reality; positions and instants are paradigmatic examples of "useful fictions."As for instants in time, well Calculus would teach that for calculation purposes, the concept of instances in time are real in the extent that they are used by engineers and physicists. — christian2017
I never suggested that it is a ridiculous concept, just that time is not composed of discrete instants, contra McTaggart.If you want to elaborate on why you think instances in time is a ridicoulous concept i would be more than happy to hear what you say. — christian2017
... John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory ... — aletheist
With Einstein's theory the situation was strikingly different. Take one typical instance— Einstein's prediction, just then confirmed by the finding of Eddington's expedition.
Now the impressive thing about this case is the risk involved in a prediction of this kind. If observation shows that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted. The theory is incompatible with certain possible results of observation—in fact with results which everybody before Einstein would have expected.[1] This is quite different from the situation I have previously described,when it turned out that the theories in question were compatible with the most divergent human behavior, so that it was practically impossible to describe any human behavior that might not be claimed to be a verification of these theories. — Karl Popper in 'Science as falsification' on the requirement to take a risk
Albert Einstein's 1905 special relativity challenged the notion of absolute time, and could only formulate a definition of synchronization for clocks that mark a linear flow of time. Einstein's equations predict that time should be altered by the presence of gravitational fields (see the Schwarzschild metric). That is, the stronger the gravitational field (and, thus, the larger the acceleration), the more slowly time runs. The predictions of time dilation are confirmed by particle acceleration experiments and cosmic ray evidence, where moving particles decay more slowly than their less energetic counterparts. Einstein's theory was motivated by the assumption that every point in the universe can be treated as a 'center', and that correspondingly, physics must act the same in all reference frames. There is no 'universal clock'. An act of synchronization must be performed between two systems, at the least. — Wikipedia on time in physics
1. Do you think then, that the reality of time is continuous (which would preclude/deny the law of noncontradiction) in nature? — 3017amen
And so when completed, I say: " Here, I just finished the calculation." That process of computation spanned or bridged the past, present and future. Does that in anyway, violate the law of noncontradiction? — 3017amen
This has no impact on the argument, I think, but it is quite possible we are only aware as a sequence of conscious instants in time. Motion can then be perceived via motion blur effect. — Zelebg
No, it does not. Again, there is never an instant or lapse of time at which incompatible states of things are realized such that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, which would violate the principle of contradiction. — aletheist
No, from a phenomenological standpoint the present is defined as that part of time of which we are conscious. Another way of putting it is that the temporal present corresponds directly to whatever is present to the mind. — aletheist
Yes, but there is no inconsistency between this additional definition and what I have stated above. — aletheist
The present is when the indeterminate future becomes the determinate past, and as with any other event, this is realized at a lapse of time rather than an instant. — aletheist
if events were "separated" and "individuated," then they would necessarily be discontinuous. — aletheist
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.