As I said, the pain signal (in effect) reaches a transducer which produces the mental state of localized pain. Does this much sound plausible? If so, what is your specific issue? — Relativist

My issue is that the same signals indicate I am seeing an apple as indicate I am seeing (my retinal state is being modified by) and apple. So how do we use the signal to know that there is an apple as opposed to the state of my retina has changed?

If the mind is immaterial, as you assume — Relativist

I do not assume the mind is immaterial. I deduce from the data of experience that it has both physical and intentional operations.

the issue seems to he: how do physical, electro-chemical signals produce the related mental states — Relativist

I do not assume that "electro-chemical signals produce the related mental states." Following Aristotle, I see this as the work of the agent intellect, which acts in the intentional, not the physical, theater of operations.

Clearly, anything that can act in any way exist

Can "something that acts" be made of nothing, or it must be made of something?

I said "it’s most accurate and pragmatic to call it “virtual reality”, a sort of simulation". — Zelebg

Aside from the fact that this claim is wholly unsupported by data, there is no reason to suppose simulating physical (simulation) operations can generate intentional operations.

Aside from the fact that this claim is wholly unsupported by data, there is no reason to suppose simulating physical (simulation) operations can generate intentional operations.

It is supported by every single data, some of which I already explained. Programs are intentions.

I do not assume that "electro-chemical signals produce the related mental states." — Dfpolis

I suggest that we can deduce this is the case.

I do not assume that "electro-chemical signals produce the related mental states." Following Aristotle, I see this as the work of the agent intellect, which acts in the intentional, not the physical, theater of operations. — Dfpolis

But surely you must agree that sensory perception originates in physical processes, and ultimately mental states arise. This implies there is a causal chain from the physical to the mental. This suggests that somewhere in the chain, there is a final physical event followed by an initial (non-physical) mental event. There can be parallelism, but at the fundamental level, physical-mental causation has to be taking place. Mental causation entails the converse. I refered to this interface as a "transducer". It seems unavoidable if the mind is non-physical.

I do not assume the mind is immaterial. I deduce — Dfpolis

I have not deduced it, so I'm considering it a premise, for sake of discussion. Challenging it would entail a different discussion.

Programs are intentions. — Zelebg

No, programs implement the intentions of their programmers. They themselves are signs requiring human interpreters to actually signify.

I do not assume that "electro-chemical signals produce the related mental states." — Dfpolis

I suggest that we can deduce this is the case. — Relativist

Please do so.

surely you must agree that sensory perception originates in physical processes, and ultimately mental states arise. — Relativist

I agree that neural processes are physical. Whether or not mental states arise from them depends on whether or not we attend to them. The act of attending to them is an act of awareness (aka the agent intellect).

This implies there is a causal chain from the physical to the mental. — Relativist

No, it shows that the agent intellect can transform physically encoded data to concepts (mental intentions).

at the fundamental level, physical-mental causation has to be taking place. — Relativist

Why?

It seems unavoidable if the mind is non-physical. — Relativist

Immaterial does not mean physically impotent. The laws of nature are not made of matter; nonetheless, they effect physical transformations.

I do not assume the mind is immaterial. I deduce — Dfpolis

... Challenging it would entail a different discussion. — Relativist

We had that discussion earlier, when I showed that and why intentional realities are not reducible to material realities.

No, programs implement the intentions of their programmers. They themselves are signs requiring human interpreters to actually signify.

No? Who is interpreting the signs in your DNA? And what do you call a process constrained by a set of instructions, such as processes in your body, your cells and organs, if not a program? Who wrote the function for your heartbeats, your blood flow, and your digestion? It’s all programs, and programs implement intentions too.

Who is interpreting the signs in your DNA? — Zelebg

Normally, no one. DNA does not work by being a sign, but mechanically. Hence, it needs no interpretation or interpreter. It is a "program" in an analogous way compared to a computer program, which is to say equivocally so. (Or do you think of God as a programmer?) When it is a "sign" of a structure, the interpreter is a molecular geneticist.

Did you see "Hugo"? The atomaton in it had a program that caused it to draw. No interpretation was required. So the program did not act as a sign, except in relation to a human programmer or interpreter.

And what do you call a process constrained by a set of instructions, such as processes in your body, your cells and organs, if not a program? — Zelebg

We use words analogously to cover new needs. As a result various uses need not mean the same thing, and what they name need not work in the same way. Normal instructions and rules are signs which must be interpreted by a mind before they can be implemented. There is no such set of instructions in human physiology. Rather, there are laws of nature that act on initial physical states to produce later physical states without need of interpretation. So we must be careful not to be fooled when the same words are used with differ meanings in different cases.

I am, however, glad that you see that the laws of nature are works of Mind.

I agree that neural processes are physical. Whether or not mental states arise from them depends on whether or not we attend to them. The act of attending to them is an act of awareness (aka the agent intellect). — Dfpolis

OK, this suggests mental states contingently arise. Nevertheless, the relevant mental states do not arise without the physical input.

at the fundamental level, physical-mental causation has to be taking place.
— Relativist

Why? — Dfpolis

Sensory perception ceases when there's a physical defect. This is strong evidence that the physical processes are in the causal chain even if there are immaterial dependencies as well (like attentiveness).

Immaterial does not mean physically impotent. The laws of nature are not made of matter; nonetheless, they effect physical transformations. — Dfpolis

Laws of nature describe physical-physical causation. Mental-physical and physical-mental is unique.

This implies there is a causal chain from the physical to the mental.
— Relativist

No, it shows that the agent intellect can transform physically encoded data to concepts (mental intentions). — Dfpolis

How does the physically encoded data get into an immaterial mind? How do you explain the dependency on physical processes? If you deny the dependency, why does input cease when the equipment is defective? It seems to me the only plausible explanation is that the physical processes cause immaterial mental states. The attentiveness issue doesn't refute this, it just adds a switch.

I hope you can see that I'm treating mind as an immaterial object, and merely trying to infer how the mind interfaces with the world.

The same signals indicating I am seeing an apple also indicate that my retinal state has change. — Dfpolis

Two different signals are involved in the process of sensation.
Light (one type of signal) changes retinal states. Photoreceptors (rods and cones) in the retina transform light into neural signals.

Neural signals and visual perception are related by correlation, not causation.
So, do neural codes signify conscious content?
They may signify conscious content, or semi-conscious content (e.g., sleep, automaticity, or the reception of subliminal and/or supraliminal stimuli), or both (in the case of dual processing).

DNA does not work by being a sign, but mechanically. Hence, it needs no interpretation or interpreter.

DNA is a set of instructions and it is perfectly valid to call them symbols, as we do in genetics. Besides, there are no signs in the computer either, once the program starts execution it’s all hardware. Everything is mechanical / electrical, and that has absolutely no bearing on whether it needs “interpretation” or it doesn’t. DNA replication programs and every other biological process are obvious examples.

We use words analogously to cover new needs. As a result various uses need not mean the same thing, and what they name need not work in the same way. Normal instructions and rules are signs which must be interpreted by a mind before they can be implemented. There is no such set of instructions in human physiology. Rather, there are laws of nature that act on initial physical states to produce later physical states without need of interpretation. So we must be careful not to be fooled when the same words are used with differ meanings in different cases.

Narrow thinking will not help your understanding. Those were rhetorical questions, but instead of to realize your errors, you are trying to explain what is obviously false. Are you a zombie?

I am, however, glad that you see that the laws of nature are works of Mind.

The point was, you were wrong:

1. even computer programs are not symbolic at the time of execution
2. programs do not need programmers or interpreters to do their program
3. programs do not need programmers to exist, they can spontaneously evolve

OK, this suggests mental states contingently arise. Nevertheless, the mental states do not arise without the physical input. — Relativist

That is the usual case. However, you may wish to read W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (1960) to have more data to reflect upon.

Sensory perception ceases when there's a physical defect. This is strong evidence that the physical processes are in the causal chain even if there are immaterial dependencies as well (like attentiveness). — Relativist

I agree that consciousness is usually awareness of neurally encoded data. I think I said that in my OP. That does not mean that neurally encoded data is sufficient, only that it is normally necessary.

Laws of nature apply to physical-physical causation. Mental-physical and physical-mental is unique. — Relativist

Are you sure? I have argued (elsewhere) that the laws of nature are essentially intentional. Like human committed intentions, they effect ends. My arriving at the store is immanent in my initial state and decision to go to the store. The final state of a physical system is immanent in its initial state and the laws of nature. They meet Brentano's criterion for intenionality of pointing beyond themselves by pointing to later states.

How does the physically encoded data get into an immaterial mind? — Relativist

The immaterial aspect of the mind (the power to choose and attend, aka aware) has no specific "place;" however, experience tells us it generally attends to data processed by and encoded in the brain -- and we have a reasonable idea of how data gets there.

It seems to me the only plausible explanation is that the physical processes cause immaterial mental states. — Relativist

They inform the mental states, but to inform is not to be an efficient cause. Plans may inform a process, but they do not cause the process.

Two different signals are involved in the process of sensation.
Light (one type of signal) changes retinal states. Photoreceptors (rods and cones) in the retina transform light signals into neural signals. — Galuchat

The signals in the brain indicate that the state of our rods and cone has changed.

Neural signals and visual perception are related by correlation, not causation. — Galuchat

So, in your view, no dynamics links neural signals and visual perception??

So, do neural codes signify conscious content? — Galuchat

No, and that is my point. We do not first become aware (or ever become aware) of our neural state and then interpret what that state means. For an (instrumental) sign to work we need to be aware of what the sign is, and then decide what it means. There is no such process here. So calling neural pulses "signs" only increases confusion.

So, in your view, no dynamics links neural signals and visual perception?? — Dfpolis

I don't know what the link is between neural signals and various types of perception. And I don't think current neuroscience has explained it.

Currently, I am inclined to think that it may be emergent (i.e., a property and/or effect not attributable to organism components in isolation or in sum).

What do you think it is?

There is no such process here.

What is it you expected to find, what exactly do you claim is missing?

The immaterial aspect of the mind (the power to choose and attend, aka aware) has no specific "place;" however, experience tells us it generally attends to data processed by and encoded in the brain -- and we have a reasonable idea of how data gets there. — Dfpolis

It seems to me the only plausible explanation is that the physical processes cause immaterial mental states. — Relativist

They inform the mental states, but to inform is not to be an efficient cause. Plans may inform a process, but they do not cause the process. — Dfpolis

Even if your mind is not spatially located, your brain is - and there's clearly a strong connection between your mind and your brain. Your mind doesn't obtain sensory input from your next door neighbor's brain. This suggests some sort of ontic connection between something located in space and something that is not. (There is an ontic connection between positively charged and negatively charged particles).

Besides sensory input, the mind utilizes memories, and it seems the memories must be physically located in the brain, or at least some necessary neural correlates are in the brain. (By that, I mean that in the absence of those physical neural correlates, the mind cannot attend to a memory). This is the implication of memory loss due to trauma and disease. Do you agree?

You rejected my suggestion that the brain causes mental states, so I assumed you must think the brain reads and interprets neural states. But you also denied that the mind is interpreting neural states (you said to Galuchat, " We do not first become aware (or ever become aware) of our neural state and then interpret what that state means."). What's left?

No, and that is my point. We do not first become aware (or ever become aware) of our neural state and then interpret what that state means. For an (instrumental) sign to work we need to be aware of what the sign is, and then decide what it means. There is no such process here. So calling neural pulses "signs" only increases confusion. — Dfpolis

Nevertheless, functional neuroimaging links the spatiotemporal properties of neural response and the cognitive state of a subject. So, neural signals signify conscious and/or semi-conscious content.

"In each of these techniques, images generated while the subject is in one cognitive state may be directly compared, on a location-by-location basis, with images generated while the subject is in a second, different state."
Talavage, T. M., Gonzalez-Castillo, J., & Scott, S. K. (2014). Auditory neuroimaging with fMRI and PET. Hearing research, 307, 4–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heares.2013.09.009.

This establishes correlation, but not causation.
Does neural response cause perception, or does perception cause neural response?