First...There is no difference, even in principle, between a neural message saying we are seeing a red apple and one saying we are seeing (having our bodily state modified by) a red apple.
It seems to me that grasping this difference requires a direct intuition of the object as an object, as other -- and this, or something functionally equivalent, is missing from our model. — Dfpolis

Second...What a neural signal encodes is immaterial as long as the response to it is biological effective (evolutionarily fit). However, if consciousness of objects is solely due to awareness of neurally encoded content, we can have no basis for thinking objects are distinct from ourselves. To do so we must grasp an intelligible difference between our self and the object, and there is none in the neural signal. — Dfpolis

Third, the idea that neural impulses act as a signs glosses over and obscures the dynamics of sensory awareness. — Dfpolis

Like the problem of distinguishing self-data from object-data, this seems to intimate that we have a ca­pacity to grasp intelligibility that is not fully modeled in our present understanding. — Dfpolis

it doesn' seem possible to ground these concepts in something physical. — Relativist

That doesn't prove mind is grounded in the nonphysical, it may just be an inapplicable paradigm. — Relativist

Consciousness is that which mediates between stimulus and response. — Relativist

Physical" means now the reality it calls to mind now. Its meaning may change over time (and has), but the present paradigms are based on our conceptual space as it now exists. Changing paradigms involves redefining our conceptual space, and a consequent redefinition of terms such as "physical" and "natural." — Dfpolis

...if consciousness of objects is solely due to awareness of neurally encoded content, we can have no basis for thinking objects are distinct from ourselves. To do so we must grasp an intelligible difference between our self and the object, and there is none in the neural signal. — Dfpolis

E.g. reference to "information" seems problematic, because information connotes meaning, and meaning entails (conscious) understanding - which seems circular, and it doesn' seem possible to ground these concepts in something physical. — Relativist

Communication (including: data, encoding, code, message, transmission, conveyance, reception, decoding, information) is a good analogy for the sensation process if a physical (as opposed to only semantic) type is acknowledged. — Galuchat

It's a useful analogy in some contexts, but it may not be the best analogy for analyzing the ontology of mind. — Relativist

A visual image is something distinct from the object seen, it's a functionally accurate representation of the object. — Relativist

It seems as if a concept is a mental object, but when employed in a thought, it may more accurate to describe it as a particular reaction, or memory of a reaction: process and feeling, rather than object. — Relativist

Signals are not only transmitted from environment to body to mind, but also from mind to body to environment. The capacity for motor coordination differentiates object (other) and self in the mind of a sentient being. — Galuchat

I am not arguing for solipsism. I take as a given that we are conscious of objects other than ourselves. Rather than questioning this datum, I am trying to understand the dynam­ics making it possible — Dfpolis

I agree, but how does this allow us to distinguish body states from external states? — Dfpolis

I think that mind is an integrated set of organism events which produce an individual's automatic and controlled acts, so; an open sub-system of (at least certain) organisms (e.g., those having a central nervous system). But, the ontology of mind is off-topic. — Galuchat

Do you mean rather, how does this allow us to distinguish body states from the states of other objects? — Galuchat

I suggest that it's a consequence of the neural connections being different. — Relativist

For those of us who are not physicalists

how do I distinguish a signal indicating the existence of a condition causing pain from a signal that says only that a pain receptor is firing? Since they are one and the same signal, I do not see how I can. — Dfpolis

In Descartes' Error neurophysiologist Antonio Damasio argues that our knowledge of the external world started as neural representations of body state and evolved into representations of the external world as the source of changes in our body state:

I see three problems with this otherwise plausible hypothesis: (1) It requires one neural state to encode mul­tiple concepts. (2) There seems to be no mechanism thise "solution" could have evolved. (3) Neural states do not represent as other signs do.

To take your example, how do I distinguish a signal indicating the existence of a condition causing pain from a signal that says only that a pain receptor is firing? Since they are one and the same signal, I do not see how I can.

Just to make one thing clear. There is no such thing as “immaterial” or “non-physical”, it’s a self-contradiction. — Zelebg

From a 3rd person perspective, neural states represent mental content in the form of electromagnetic and chemical signals, just like virtual reality of a simulated content is represented inside the computer in the form of signals between the logic gates and other circuits. — Zelebg

so it’s too optimistic to expect we could yet explain the ghost in the machine. — Zelebg

Meaning comes from the grounding inherent in a decoder / interpreter system, also called personality, identity, ego, self... — Zelebg

When a pain receptor is fired, the mind experiences it as the quale "pain". That is the nature of the mental experience. — Relativist

For example, my intention to go to the store acts to motivate my motion toward the store.

Would you care to show the contradiction? Please define "material" and "existence" and then show that existence entails material. I ask this because on the usual understandings these terms do not mean the same thing.

Your argument simply begs the question by assuming, a priori, that everything must be "made of something."

Of course, but what I am discussing is the first person perspective -- how it is that we know the difference between body states and object states.

While I agree, this does not solve the problem I am raising.

Yes, it does. How does this allow us to distinguish data on the sensor state from data on the sensed? — Dfpolis

Intentions, and other mental states, feelings and qualities, are not immaterial, they are virtual. — Zelebg

To exist is to be (made of) something rather than nothing. — Zelebg

Can you give examples of what you are talking about? — Zelebg

See the OP. The same signals indicating I am seeing an apple also indicate that my retinal state has change.

I have no idea what this means. "Virtual" usually means "potential." Clearly, my actual intentions are not longer potential.