Ontology is about how what is relates to what we know. The materialist is saying that what is stands independently of what we know. The materialist is basically saying "I don't know anything until the world tells me." For some strange reason somebody started calling that realism... I don't quite understand why.

The materialist is saying that what is stands independently of what we know. — Mongrel

People say all sorts of things about materialism here that I don't agree with as a materialist. This is one of them. Maybe it's just a matter of how you're expressing the above, but at least as expressed, my materialism doesn't amount to that.

but at least as expressed, my materialism doesn't amount to that. — Terrapin Station

I was having difficulty expressing the thought... different brands of ontology are basically different ways of picturing the relationship between ontology and epistemology. It's a simple thought that somehow gets complex when put into words.

I think materialism is like a musical strain (where cultures are symphonies over time.) But as a card-carrying materialist, what does it amount to.. to you?

But as a card-carrying materialist, what does it amount to.. to you? — Mongrel

That everything extant is comprised of (dynamic structures/relations of) matter.

(Not sure what you're saying there)

The materialist is saying that what is stands independently of what we know. The materialist is basically saying "I don't know anything until the world tells me." For some strange reason somebody started calling that realism... I don't quite understand why. — Mongrel

Realists argue for the independence of things. Materialists argue that all things are material. The latter might entail the former, but the former doesn't entail the latter. Objective idealists, for example, are realists but not materialists. And depending on what is meant by "matter", physicalists are another example of realists who aren't materialists.

And others might reject the very notion of some fundamental substance (and so wouldn't be materialists, physicalists, or idealists), but nonetheless claim that things are independent (and so be realists).

And some might say things aren't that thingly. I've borrowed this from Anon before: An object is a slow event.

Even physicalists (as many materialists have taken to calling themselves) don't claim to know the intrinsic nature of matter. (Of course, it could be question that's beside the point) Perhaps energy is eternal delight, as Blake announced. Or was it bert?

Realists argue for the independence of things. Materialists argue that all things are material. The latter might entail the former, but the former doesn't entail the latter. Objective idealists, for example, are realists but not materialists. And depending on what is meant by "matter", physicalists are another example of realists who aren't materialists. — Michael

OK. But if realists argue that things are independent, what is the opposing view? That things aren't independent? If things are dependent.. then on what?

I've been looking for how Nietzsche would have used the word. In the 19th Century, the most common meaning of realism had to do with painting, literature, and theater.

And others might reject the very notion of some fundamental substance (and so wouldn't be materialists, physicalists, or idealists), but nonetheless claim that things are independent (and so be realists). — Michael

Some just focus on causation. You're a physicalist if you believe all causes are physical.

(Not sure what you're saying there) — Terrapin Station

That was my response to your message that materialists believe everything is material. I was making a giant diagram relating all ontological brands with their accompanying epistemology and you're like... "No. It has nothing to do with epistemology. They just think everything is material." :)

OK. But if realists argue that things are independent, what is the opposing view? That things aren't independent? If things are dependent.. then on what? — Mongrel

I think the easiest way to understand the independence of things is with reference to Dummett's account of realism and anti-realism. If the truth of "X exists" is verification transcendent than X is an independent thing, and if it isn't then it isn't.

Some just focus on causation. You're a physicalist if you believe all causes are physical.

And to say that a cause is physical is to say that the causal object/process is made of physical stuff?

Haha, oh--well, I wouldn't say that realism implies any particular epistemological view. I don't see how that wouldn't be misleading to suggest. It would be like suggesting that atheists have particular views on evolution, or science in general. "Atheism" simply denotes one fairly simply, straightforward view or status, and doesn't imply, even if it tends to be correlated with, other views.

If we were talking about philosophy of perception per se, there's "naive realism" or "direct realism," but that's a stance specifically on how perception works/what perception's relationship to what's perceived is, Realists certainly do not need to be naive/direct realists on perception.

Dummett's account of realism and anti-realism. If the truth of "X exists" is verification transcendent than X is an independent thing, and if it isn't then it isn't. — Michael

That certainly doesn't work for me, because of my view on what truth is/how it works as well as my view about whether sentences can refer mind-independently, my view on meaning, my view on what propositions are, etc.

That certainly doesn't work for me, because of my view on what truth is/how it works as well as my view about whether sentences can refer mind-independently, my view on meaning, etc. — Terrapin Station

Which is why I (and I believe a few others) think that your self-proclaimed realism isn't realism (as it's usually understood) at all.

Of course, if you just want to call your view "realism", then you're more than welcome to. But it does get confusing when the label is used for two (or more) vastly different positions.

Well, realism isn't usually understood per Dummet's definition, or with respect to something specifically about truth claims.

Conventional philosophical definitions are rather along the lines of:

"the belief that some aspects of reality are ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc." (Wikipedia)

"the viewpoint which accords to things which are known or perceived an existence or nature which is independent of whether anyone is thinking about or perceiving them." (Encyclopedia Britannica)

"First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table's being square, the rock's being made of granite, and the moon's being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. Likewise, although there is a clear sense in which the table's being square is dependent on us (it was designed and constructed by human beings after all), this is not the type of dependence that the realist wishes to deny." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I think the easiest way to understand the independence of things is with reference to Dummett's account of realism and anti-realism. If the truth of "X exists" is verification transcendent than X is an independent thing, and if it isn't then it isn't. — Michael

So if something has the property of independence are we not supposed to ask: "Independent of what?"

And to say that a cause is physical is to say that the causal object/process is made of physical stuff? — Michael

You know, I may have been thinking of naturalism: all causes are natural causes.

The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. — Terrapin Station

And I understand this as saying that the truth of "the moon exists" is verification transcendent.

Or at the very least, that this is what it must mean if it's to count as realism. If you want to say that the moon exists independently of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter but also that the truth of "the moon exists independently of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter" is verificiation-immanent then I'd count that as metaphysical anti-realism.

That would work if one were a truth realist. I'm not. Realism, in general, doesn't imply truth realism. Realism, in general, doesn't imply anything like a thoroughgoing realism about everything, because, after all, no realist is going to say that human thought, belief, etc. is independent of human thought, belief, etc.

Haha, oh--well, I wouldn't say that realism implies any particular epistemological view. — Terrapin Station

Really? I thought it's primary weakness is that it falls back on Correspondence.

Really? I thought it's primary weakness is that it falls back on Correspondence. — Mongrel

No. A realist could employ any conceivable truth theory--correspondence, pragmatic, consensus, coherence, etc.

OK.

That would work if one were a truth realist. I'm not. — Terrapin Station

Sure, and my claim is that traditional realism is (implicitly, if not also explicitly) truth-realism. It's historically tied to the correspondence theory of truth. If all you want to say is that "mind-independent things exist" is true, but not also that this statement is made true by some verification-transcendent truth-condition, then it isn't traditional realism. I think that if one says that "mind-independent things exist" is true, but that truth is to be understood according to something like the coherence theory of truth, then you're a metaphysical anti-realist.

Chalmers' paper on ontological anti-realism argues for something much like this. The distinction between the truth-realist and the truth-anti-realist both claiming that mind-independent things exist is akin to his distinction between the nominalist and the Platonist both claiming that numbers exist. Although they're both making the same assertion, what they mean by it is very different; they're arguing for different metaphysics.

my claim is that traditional realism is (implicitly, if not also explicitly) truth-realism. It's historically tied to the correspondence theory of truth. If all you want to say is that "mind-independent things exist" is true, but not also that this statement is made true by some verification-transcendent truth-condition, then it isn't traditional realism. — Michael

You can say that, but you're simply saying it. It would require extensive empirical evidence. And that empirical evidence would have to support not that truth realism and correspondence theory are typically correlated with realism (in other words, the simple fact that most realists tend to be truth realists and/or tend to employ correspondence theory wouldn't work); it would have to be evidence of people saying or at least strongly implying that realism includes truth realism and correspondence theory, otherwise it isn't realism.

It also couldn't be evidence of simply a handful of philosophers asserting or at least strongly implying this. To claim that it's the traditional view, you'd need evidence of that being the widespread view.

Do you have that evidence available?

By the way, I do personally adhere to correspondence theory, but on my analysis it is a subjective affair--as all "truth phenomena" are, whether people believe that to be the case or not. So the idea of truth possibly being verification transcendent doesn't work on my view.

The distinction between the truth-realist and the truth-anti-realist both claiming that mind-independent things exist is akin to the distinction between the nominalist and the Platonist both claiming that numbers exist. Although they're both making the same assertion (and so both saying that this claim is true), what they mean by it is very different; they're arguing for different metaphysics. — Michael

That seems completely unsupported/arbitrary by the way. Does he have some sort of argument for that?

It might make sense if one were defining realism in a manner such as Dummett, but that underscores why trying to define realism that way doesn't work.

That seems completely unsupported/arbitrary by the way. Does he have some sort of argument for that? — Terrapin Station

Yes, he has a paper: http://consc.net/papers/ontology.pdf

I started reading through it already. So far, the mention I see of the number analogy has absolutely nothing to do with truth realism. I'm searching for a section that might,

What does he call truth realism in the paper? That phrase doesn't occur . . . (later edit) ah--I found one place where he uses "objective and determinate truth values." So I'll search for stuff about objective truth values.

You can say that, but you're simply saying it. It would require extensive empirical evidence. And that empirical evidence would have to support not that truth realism and correspondence theory are typically correlated with realism (in other words, the simple fact that most realists tend to be truth realists and/or tend to employ correspondence theory wouldn't work); it would have to be evidence of people saying or at least strongly implying that realism includes truth realism and correspondence theory, otherwise it isn't realism.

It also couldn't be evidence of simply a handful of philosophers asserting or at least strongly implying this. To claim that it's the traditional view, you'd need evidence of that being the widespread view.

Do you have that evidence available? — Terrapin Station

Not to hand. But you just need to read what people have said (and often between the lines). Very few self-proclaimed realists will claim that the existence of the moon is independent of human experience and belief and linguistic practices but that this claim is only true because, for example, it coheres with some axiomatic sentences within our language game. If someone were to say something like this then I would think it quite right to call them anti-realists.

Very few self-proclaimed realists will claim that the existence of the moon is independent of human experience and belief and linguistic practices but that this claim is only true because, for example, it coheres with some axiomatic sentences within our language game. — Michael

And I'd not disagree with that in the slightest. But I already explained this. It's a correlative belief. It's not part of what realism refers to.

It's no different than it being a fact that very few atheists will say that evolutionary theory is hogwash. But atheism doesn't refer to a stance on evolutionary theory. The beliefs simply have a strong positive correlation with respect to atheism.

I found a place where Chalmers says, "We are now in a position to state ontological realism and anti-realism more precisely. Ontological realism, at least in its strongest variety, holds that every unproblematic ontological existence assertion has an objective and determinate truth-value."

I completely disagree with that. I'm looking for whether he provides any sort of argument to support that characterization of ontological realism.

(One unrelated earlier big problem with Chalmers paper is that he actually says that ontological realism started with Quine! haha)