Some of the best minds in history have presented very reasonably arguments for theism. — EnPassant

Indeed they have. My point a while ago. But theirs is based in faith, not existence, not knowledge.

When we say that someone is biased (about something), we also mean that they are wrong, right? Or can a biased person somehow be right? — Pussycat

Yes, a biased opinion is a wrong opinion.

Thing is that there is no real criterion for bias, neither one can know whether they are biased — Pussycat

We can know someone is biased if we know of some reasons, some point of view, they are not accounting for.

We can never be sure that we are not biased, but we can tell when someone is and demand that they correct for that. And then keep doing that, forever, moving ever and ever closer to completely unbiased.

You cannot seriously compare theism to flat earthism. Some of the best minds in history have presented very reasonably arguments for theism. It is a reasonable viewpoint.

I stated on what basis I did so, and I stand by it. And some of the best minds in history have presented arguments for theism that are, without exception, invalid or question-begging (e.g. the causal/cosmological, ontological, teleological, moral, transcendental, etc. arguments or so-called "proofs" of God's existence). Being among the best minds in history doesn't mean ones arguments are necessarily sound (see: well, virtually any philosopher you care to pick, from Plato to Wittgenstein or anyone in between- they're all still human, and so not immune to error).

But since the philosophical arguments for God's existence are all invalid or question-begging, and there is no substantial amount of empirical evidence for the existence of God, theism is without sufficient rational warrant- it is not reasonable. Which the smarter/more insightful theists (e.g. Aquinas, Luther, Paul) have often conceded, emphasizing faith as a necessary condition for theistic belief (and faith, in the relevant sense, just is belief in the absence of sufficient evidence). But then, lacking sufficient warrant places it in the company of other rationally disreputable views, such as those that I mentioned. As they say, the truth hurts... but that doesn't mean its not still the truth nevertheless.

no substantial amount of empirical evidence for the existence of God — Enai De A Lukal

what would empirical evidence for a transcendent being comprise? I mean, if you reject out of hand all of the Biblical and other accounts of miraculous occurences, which I presume you do, where or how would you seek empirical evidence? What kind of instrument would you use? What would you be looking for? Would you use the Hubble? ('Look - out there - 25 parsecs to the left of Proxima Centauri.....what's that?!?....)

The point is, the absence of empirical evidence for a transcendent being says precisely nothing beyond the obvious statement that empiricism itself has certain criteria which purported transcendent beings will invariably fail to meet.

No, not out of hand. The only things that can be dismissed out of hand are trivialities- i.e. logical falsehoods, self-contradictions. But evidence for scriptural claims, instances of miracles, etc would indeed be one candidate here, i.e. evidence for the existence of God, the absence of which undermines theism (which is precisely what we find, and thus the irrationality of theism).

But you do make a good point here (although it may not have been intentional)- it may well be that belief in (non-trivial) transcendent entities is inherently irrational, since evidence of such things may well be precluded as a matter of definition. But theism is rarely consistent in this respect so its mostly moot, as the God of western monotheism is causally active in the world- not only in the initial creatio ex nihilo, but in the perpetual sustenance of the world, and periodic interventions therein (e.g. the person of Jesus Christ, miracles, etc.) and is thereby distinguished from deistic deities.

Never mind evidence for the existence of God, how about evidence against the existence of him? Hello Problem of Evil.

what would empirical evidence for a transcendent being comprise? — Wayfarer

What would evidence for invisible garden fairies look like? Sagan's garage dragon? Fictional characters? Perhaps more pertinently, how would you differentiate?

The point is, the absence of empirical evidence for a transcendent being says precisely nothing beyond the obvious statement that empiricism itself has certain criteria which purported transcendent beings will invariably fail to meet. — Wayfarer

And thus things ranging among fictional characters, imaginary beings, hallucinations, what-have-you, come to life. Especially in the minds of humans. What would prompt insisting on their existence in the first place?

Agreed. It seems pretty clear that on the whole, the available evidence (the problem of evil, miracles, other scriptural truth-claims, etc) is far more consistent with the non-existence of God, and highly inconsistent with His existence. And as I said, the sharper/more insightful theists have been aware of this, and thus their emphasis on faith as a necessary condition for theistic belief: there is no sufficient rational or evidential basis. Thus we see Thomas himself- he of the celebrated arguments for the existence of God- say things like

The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ... Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all.
(Summa, Secunda Secundæ Partis, Q1 A5)

or that

It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason... For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God... And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.(Q2 A4)

and of course, despite the oft-quoted canard to the contrary, absence of evidence is evidence of absence (indeed, this is a theorem of probability theory). So there is an asymmetry here between the theist and the atheist.. its just not the one EnPassant claimed: the evidence strongly favors atheism and disfavors theism.

(so say what you will about the fideists, at least they're honest with themselves on this count)

What would evidence for invisible garden fairies look like? Sagan's garage dragon? Fictional characters? Perhaps more pertinently, how would you differentiate? — jorndoe

Well, 'God' may be an 'invisible garden fairy' to you, but that might only be a reflection on your belief system.

But you do make a good point here (although it may not have been intentional)- — Enai De A Lukal

Condescension noted.

It might be that 'God' is beyond reason, not beneath it. The most compelling argument for (at least) a higher intelligence, is the fact of the rational order of the Universe. It is something which many people think science explains, but in reality, science relies on it, it doesn't explain it. And explaining that order - for that matter, explaining what natural laws actually are - may likewise be beyond the scope of science even in principle. (It's just this which leads to a lot of nonsense about multiverses.)

Thomas himself- he of the celebrated arguments for the existence of God- — Enai De A Lukal

Worth noting that none of the medieval 'proofs' were remotely considered as anything like a proof in the modern or scientific sense. There was a long-gone blog post which showed that these were mainly understood as exercises in intellectual edification for the faithful, never as rhetorical or polemical devices for unbelievers. The fact that the Dawkins of this world seize on them as examples of terrible empirical evidence merely goes to show their utter incomprehension of the kind of arguments they really are.

I should also protest, on behalf of those who profess a faith, even if I'm not necessarily amongst them, that 'faith' is not 'clinging to nonsensical propositions in the face of evidence to the contrary'. For those with a religious faith, when asked for what constitutes 'evidence', they will simply gesture towards the fact of existence.

Well, 'God' may be an 'invisible garden fairy' to you, but that might only be a reflection on your belief system. — Wayfarer

*whooosh* ?

Well, the point is, belief in God is foundational to the ethical system of Western culture, whereas the existence of garden fairies or unicorns is for the most part inconsequential.

, you're not really responding to my comment. Oh well.

I wasn't saying that it was unintentional that you made a good point- I don't doubt you're perfectly capable of making good points and do so quite frequently- the part that I suspected might be unintentional was that you gave the impression that the bit about transcendent deities lacking evidence as a matter of definition/necessity was intended as an objection or counter-argument to what I said.. when in fact its a point I'm quite happy to grant. If I misinterpreted the thrust of your comment I apologize.. but I don't think I did.

And so similarly, "beyond" or "beneath" is a distinction without a difference here, since God's existence escaping rational evaluation rules out positive belief every bit as much as negative disbelief (and by the same token). Either way its a maneuver the theist is welcome to, though I expect few have the stomach for it if knowing what it entails- it basically amounts to sawing off the branch they're sitting on.

Worth noting that none of the medieval 'proofs' were remotely considered as anything like a proof in the modern or scientific sense. There was a long-gone blog post which showed that these were mainly understood as exercises in intellectual edification for the faithful, never as rhetorical or polemical devices for unbelievers.

Agreed. Which is why someone like Aquinas had a good deal more sense than his modern counterparts- e.g. William Lane Craig, Edward Feser, Alvin Plantinga and so on- who somehow believe that these invalid or question-begging arguments are sound or persuasive, despite purportedly being professionals (or at least trained) philosophers! Aquinas at least was aware of the nature of his project, and its limitations, as other fideists have been before and since.

I should also protest, on behalf of those who profess a faith, even if I'm not necessarily amongst them, that 'faith' is not 'clinging to nonsensical propositions in the face of evidence to the contrary'. For those with a religious faith, when asked for what constitutes 'evidence', they will simply gesture towards the fact of existence.

Who are you quoting here? I never defined faith as "'clinging to nonsensical propositions in the face of evidence to the contrary". Faith in the relevant sense is believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence/warrant. This quote here doesn't even make sense- how can you have evidence to the contrary of a nonsensical proposition? If its genuine nonsense, how could you tell what would count as evidence for or against?

William Lane Craig, Edward Feser, Alvin Plantinga and so on- who somehow believe that these invalid or question-begging arguments are sound or persuasive, despite purportedly being professionals (or at least trained) philosophers! — Enai De A Lukal

As I always do I'll just put it out there that I know next to nothing. But this strikes me as absurd.
What do you mean "purportedly"? I would personally call my own rationale into question rather than call trained philosophers out for failing to make their arguments valid. That's the first thing one ought to do? Where does this happen?

I can see unsound and persuasive. And I can certainly agree that premises of arguments for God are contentious. But the former 2 seem grand. I'm not entirely convinced that your condescending tone is justified.

The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ... Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all.
(Summa, Secunda Secundæ Partis, Q1 A5) — Enai De A Lukal

Sure but, Again, from someone who knows close to nothing. Aquinas mentions principles. Self-evident in the eyes of all. Does he not believe that his 5 arguments are based on these very principles that he believed all can see? He didn't take them as proofs but still as ways to argue for God?

you gave the impression that the bit about transcendent deities lacking evidence as a matter of definition/necessity was intended as an objection or counter-argument to what I said.. — Enai De A Lukal

It was. You were asking what 'substantial empirical evidence' there might be - having already declared that all rational argument was invalid or question begging. And I'm point out, it's not an empirical question. So asking for empirical evidence of an issue which is not subject to empirical evaluation is a kind of category error. (On the other hand, I have actually come across a form of evidence for divine intervention, although in light of the above, it might not be worth bringing it up.)

William Lane Craig, Edward Feser, Alvin Plantinga and so on- who somehow believe that these invalid or question-begging arguments are sound or persuasive, despite purportedly being professionals (or at least trained) philosophers! — Enai De A Lukal

I'm not at all inclined towards Craig, I don't his personality or argumentative style. Plantinga and Feser I read. I find them quite competent philosophers, but then, I'm not a convinced atheist; I don't share their religious convictions, but I think their philosophical arguments against naturalism and materialism are quite sound, on the whole.

Either way its a maneuver the theist is welcome to, though I expect few have the stomach for it if knowing what it entails- it basically amounts to sawing off the branch they're sitting on. — Enai De A Lukal

That's something I often say about Daniel Dennett. He, after all, insists that humans are essentially 'moist robots', that free will is an illusion, and that what we understand as the mind is really the concerted behaviour of billions of unconscious cellular components - 'unconscious competence', he calls it. In which I case, I ask, how does he himself have anything to say? How can what he argues 'make any difference'? We're all simply tools in the first place. Whereas, if the religions are right, then there's at least the possibility of eternal felicity, and things happen for a reason above and beyond what is determined by material necessity.

Anyway, the argument I always hark back to is the 'argument from reason'. I might start a thread on that.

It was.

It was intended to be... but it turned out it wasn't. And hence my comment about it being unintentional. But you not only effectively conceded the point, you put it in stronger terms than I had- i.e. God as lacking evidence for his existence, as a (necessary) matter of definition, rather than a contingent fact of experience. Like I said, I'm happy to grant this because its perfectly consistent with what I've said; if transcendent entities cannot have evidence for their existence, by their very definition, then by their very definition belief in their existence can never be rationally warranted.

I'm not at all inclined towards Craig, I don't his personality or argumentative style. Plantinga and Feser I read. I find them quite competent philosophers, but then, I'm not a convinced atheist; I don't share their religious convictions, but I think their philosophical arguments against naturalism and materialism are quite sound, on the whole.

We are quite explicitly talking about arguments for the existence of God, not arguments against naturalism or materialism or anything else. Not sure why you brought this up.

That's something I often say about Daniel Dennett.

That's nice. Also not relevant to the present topic, but thanks for the bit of personal trivia, I guess?

As I always do I'll just put it out there that I know next to nothing. But this strikes me as absurd. What do you mean "purportedly"? I would personally call my own rationale into question rather than call trained philosophers out for failing to make their arguments valid.

I mean allegedly. Reportedly. I'm not sure how else to put it. They have academic credentials that should prevent the sorts of errors that infest these arguments. Like being able to discern whether a given argument is deductively valid, apart from whether or not they personally happen to accept the conclusion. And indeed in much of their other work they're perfectly capable philosophers (well, Feser and Plantinga at any rate- I'm not convinced WLC is anything but a blowhard and a fanatic). I guess its just something about personal religious commitments that make objective analysis or reasoning highly difficult. And for that reason we should be immediately suspicious of arguments that purport to establish what we already believed as a matter of faith or upbringing, that they are not post-hoc rationalizations that are measured for the conclusion.

And I'm not exactly going out on much of a limb here, I doubt there are many arguments that have been more thoroughly or frequently refuted than these arguments for the existence of God. That they are neither sound nor persuasive is more or less taken for granted at this point, and has been for a long time (by virtually everyone save those philosophers who make a living by formulating such arguments). Heck, in many instances, they still fail for the same reasons documented literally centuries ago by the likes of e.g. Hume. And certainly there are more modern (and rigorous) treatments, not least of which being Sobel's excellent Logic and Theism which gives full formal/symbolic step-by-step breakdowns of these arguments so that one can see precisely where they go wrong (in the cases where they are simply deductively invalid, as in the case of the traditional ontological argument). Moreover, its a pretty predictable result, given just a basic appreciation for how deductive arguments work: you can only get out what you put in, they can't establish any new facts, but merely bring out what was logically contained in the premises. That's ultimately all a deductive inference is. So its almost trivial to say that any/all valid arguments for the existence of God must be question-begging at some level... else the conclusion could not logically follow from that particular set of premises and they would have to be deductively invalid.

We are quite explicitly talking about arguments for the existence of God, not arguments against naturalism or materialism or anything else. Not sure why you brought this up. — Enai De A Lukal

It seems obvious to me that most of the arguments against the existence of God are grounded in materialism and/or naturalism. Am I mistaken?

Again, we're talking quite explicitly about arguments for the existence of God. You know, the causal/cosmological, ontological, teleological, etc arguments. Even if we grant (if only for the sake of argument) that all of e.g. Feser's arguments against naturalism or materialism are sound and persuasive, it would not follow that his or anyone else's arguments for the existence of God are not invalid or question-begging (and so utterly unpersuasive). These two things could both be true. So its irrelevant, unless it was intended as "whataboutism", in which case its just fallacious. And I expect everyone on this board is familiar with your feelings about materialism at this point, so it gets tiresome that you insist on inserting it into every discussion regardless of whether its relevant or not. We get it, materialism= bad, and anyone who says materialism=bad is OK in your book. Great, awesome, whatever- that doesn't mean that the traditional philosophical arguments for God's existence aren't still rubbish.

Like I said, I'm happy to grant this because its perfectly consistent with what I've said; if transcendent entities cannot have evidence for their existence, by their very definition, then by their very definition belief in their existence can never be rationally warranted. — Enai De A Lukal

'Rational warrant' and 'empirical evidence' are different things. Empirical evidence, as construed by modern naturalism, starts, as a matter of principle, by excluding consideration of anything beyond the natural domain, and then demands evidence to the contrary, having already made the in-principle commitment not to consider it.

Within the natural domain, there is an endless variety of phenomena to study - but, from a philosophical point of view, can the argument be made that naturalism has discovered the primal cause of existence? I would say, at this time, that has to be answered in the negative, because, as is well-known, current scientific cosmology is riven by apparently irresolvable arguments about whether the Universe is even, in fact, a universe.

Atheism rejects this contention as a matter of principle, but it can't do that as a matter of evidence; both sides see the same phenomena, its their interpretation of what it means that is at issue. As far as a Plantinga is concerned, belief in God has a rational warrant, on the traditional grounds - anticipated by Plato - that the harmony and intricacy of the natural world bespeaks an intentional creation. The counter-arguments from scientific naturalism, are what seem question-begging from that perspective, because they assume that the order of the cosmos is somehow self-generating or spontaneously occuring

I think that's what is behind Wittgenstein's exclamation that 'At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. So people stop short at natural laws as at something unassailable, as did the ancients at God and Fate.'

So, again, I think the argument from natural law to a first principles is quite rationally warranted. Whether you believe it is again, largely a matter of disposition.

Even if we grant (if only for the sake of argument) that all of e.g. Feser's arguments against naturalism or materialism are sound and persuasive, it would not follow that his or anyone else's arguments for the existence of God are not invalid or question-begging (and so utterly unpersuasive). — Enai De A Lukal

Again - as you point out - it's comes down to a matter of conviction, no matter what the arguments, as you point out. But it is stimulating to debate an articulate opponent, even though we're plainly on opposite sides of the fence.

Sure. And hopefully it goes without saying that even spirited disagreement (shall we say) doesn't imply any personal animus (but I'll go ahead and say it nonetheless, just in case).

But its late so I'll respond to the rest of your comment tomorrow.

And I'm not exactly going out on much of a limb here, I doubt there are many arguments that have been more thoroughly or frequently refuted than these arguments for the existence of God. Heck, in many instances, they still fail for the same reasons documented literally centuries ago by the likes of e.g. Hume. And certainly there are more modern (and rigorous) treatments, not least of which being Sobel's excellent Logic and Theism which gives full formal/symbolic step-by-step breakdowns of these arguments so that one can see precisely where they go wrong — Enai De A Lukal

I'll have to read many of these relevant books before I get an opinion on the matter. Perhaps I won't see it the same way you do.

(in the cases where they are simply deductively invalid, as in the case of the ontological argument). Moreover, its a pretty predictable result, given just a basic appreciation for how deductive arguments work: you can only get out what you put in, they can't establish any new facts, but merely bring out what was logically contained in the premises. That's ultimately all a deductive inference is. So its almost trivial to say that any/all valid arguments for the existence of God must be question-begging at some level... else the conclusion could not logically follow from that particular set of premises. — Enai De A Lukal

But then whats the point in saying that they're question begging? If all the premises are correct then the conclusion must follow? We can't just swoop away deductive arguments altogether for begging the question as such, right? Is only the ontological argument invalid?
Surely these arguments are rejected for other reasons than these two.

Indeed they have. My point a while ago. But theirs is based in faith, not existence, not knowledge. — tim wood

There are many arguments based on a reasonable assessment of the situation we find ourselves in. Eg the cosmological argument, the fine tuning argument, etc. The argument that the universe seems intelligently designed because it is intelligently designed is not easy to refute - like the man said 'Sometimes a cigar is a cigar'. Sometimes things really are what they seem to be. Positing multiverses and what not is not an answer. That is, for the most part, pulling rabbits out of hats to make the question go away.

As for claims to personal awareness of God. These are brushed aside with baseless accusations of 'Delusion'. That is not an argument.

'Rational warrant' and 'empirical evidence' are different things. Empirical evidence, as construed by modern naturalism, starts, as a matter of principle, by excluding consideration of anything beyond the natural domain, and then demands evidence to the contrary, having already made the in-principle commitment not to consider it. — Wayfarer

The scientific methodologies do not inherently (heck, you could launch examinations of "supernatural magic" if there was much to examine).
They're just self-critical, seeking to self-error-correct, minimize bias, falsify, all that.
And it so happens that, say, Sagan's garage dragon, fictional characters, imaginary beings, hallucinatory claims, etc, tend to be discounted as a consequence. And why wouldn't they anyway? Mental attempts to populate the world with such ... stuff doesn't make it so.
If you cannot differentiate whether, say, Shiva or Yahweh are fictional or real, then why insist (and preach indoctrinate proselytize) that they're real in the first place? (If pressed, I might take this a step further, and say that some such activities converge on fraud or deception.)

As for claims to personal awareness of God. These are brushed aside with baseless accusations of 'Delusion'. That is not an argument. — EnPassant

Sometimes, and that's (imo) too bad. but then there are people who are indiscriminate in their use of language - and their thinking.

The argument that the universe seems intelligently designed because it is intelligently designed is not easy to refute — EnPassant

Intelligently designed how or for what?

what would empirical evidence for a transcendent being comprise? — Wayfarer

“Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”

If a giant voice would emerge from nowhere saying:

"Hey humanity, it's God here! I know that some of you have doubted my existence, so just to make certain that everyone knows I'm real - for the next 24 hours I'm going to reverse the rotation of the earth".

And sure enough the next morning the sun rises in the west.

That - or something equivalent - would be sufficient empirical evidence. Of course it would be most helpful if the giant voice would also tell us the proper religion:

"Oh, and by the way? The Methodists have the correct religion. OK, either the Methodists or the Sunni Muslims. Either one is fine with me" :razz:

If a giant voice would emerge from nowhere saying: [...] — EricH

Grant me "divine superpowers" for a couple days, and I might just be convinced.
Evan Baxter SceneBruce Almighty (2m:22s youtube)
(The fun I'd have...) :D