What is MFT?

Oh, sorry, I forgot that. It means minimal free will. "The minimal free will thesis (MFT) holds that at least some of the time, someone has more than one course of action that he can perform."

What if 4. is changed to "I don't believe in free will"? We would then be forced to conclude that we don't have free will. Whatever we believe seems to be true by this argument.

Well, the inferences made by the author aren't explicit, so I made a proof (which is kinda big) of of it and I changed 4 to "I believe in anything a". The conclusion remains the same. Actually, I think that it is exactly the fact that anything seems to be true under the assumption that determinism is true that implies that it is false. The proof goes as follows.

First, the proof of the presented argument:

(Here, I used sub-numbers to maintain the original numbers of the premises)

Second, the same proof but with "m" (the minimal free will thesis) changed to "a" (anything). The red arrows shows the changes made.


I used the following symbolism:

Fx = x is false,
S[x] = I should do x,
C[x] = I can do x,
D[x] = I do x,
Bx = I believe that x,
m = the minimal free-will thesis.
a = anything

Are there any errors?

That's above my pay grade. Sorry if you were looking for helpful comments.

I got it from "Proof of Free Will", by Michael Huemer. — Nicholas Ferreira

It should be mentioned that Huemer's argument is supposed to be a proof by contradiction against "determinism," which he defines as the contradictory of the "minimal free will thesis (MFT)", which "holds that at least some of the time, someone has more than one course of action that he can perform."

Anyway, the argument falls apart much earlier than intended. The premise "Whatever should be done can be done" implies the existence of a choice (as becomes immediately apparent when one begins to unpack its meaning). But this of course already contradicts determinism (as Huemer defines it). Huemer admits a similar objection of question-begging and tries to defuse it, but the fact remains that his argument is trivial and most of it is junk (everything that follows the second premise).

Thanks for mentioning that.
How does it implies the existence of anything? Premise 2 simply says that for any x, if x should be done, then x can be done. It doesn't even imply that there is something that should be done, nor that there is something that can be done. It is simply a universally quantified conditional sentence, without existential implications.

How does it implies the existence of anything? Premise 2 simply says that for any x, if x should be done, then x can be done. It doesn't even imply that there is something that should be done, nor that there is something that can be done. It is simply a universally quantified conditional sentence, without existential implications. — Nicholas Ferreira

So the argument can be expressed less rigorously as:
1. We should believe true statements
2. If we should believe true statements, we can.
3. In a deterministic world, it follows that we believe true statements.
4. I believe in free will.
5. Therefore, if the world is deterministic, free will is true, a contradiction.

2. Says that we can do what we should do. That seems unwarranted. Say I am an alcoholic. I should quit drinking. But perhaps I cannot.

I think what's happening here is that two different meanings of "can be done" are conflated. 2. Would be true if expressed as "whatever should be done is theoretically possible to do". But 3. uses can in the sense of "what is practically possible". Even for a determinist, the set of theoretically possible events does not equal the set of actual events.

How does it implies the existence of anything? Premise 2 simply says that for any x, if x should be done, then x can be done. It doesn't even imply that there is something that should be done, nor that there is something that can be done. It is simply a universally quantified conditional sentence, without existential implications. — Nicholas Ferreira

If the domain of quantification is empty (there are no choices), that entails determinism and denies MFT, shortcircuiting the argument.

Anyway, this is a crap paper. It looks like a parody of analytic moral philosophy: sterile and trivial logic exercise.

2. Says that we can do what we should do. That seems unwarranted. Say I am an alcoholic. I should quit drinking. But perhaps I cannot.

I think what's happening here is that two different meanings of "can be done" are conflated. 2. Would be true if expressed as "whatever should be done is theoretically possible to do". But 3. uses can in the sense of "what is practically possible". Even for a determinist, the set of theoretically possible events does not equal the set of actual events. — Echarmion

This is the author's justification for the second and third premises (which is in the full paper linked above):

My second premise is the "'ought' implies 'can'" principle: that is, to say that something should be done implies that it can be done. For example, suppose a student explains to me that he could not make it to class because his car broke down. One way I might respond would be by telling him that he could have made it to class some other way. But it would be nonsensical of me to say, "Yes, I understand that you could not have come to class, but you should have come anyway." In general, it is not the case that you should do the impossible. This is equivalent to saying that if you should do something, then you can do that thing.

The third premise states that, if determinism is true, then whatever can be done is actually done. This follows directly from the definition of determinism given above: determinists hold that any person, at any given time, has one and only one course of action open to him. Thus, according to determinists, if a person fails to perform an action, that means he literally was unable to perform it. Which implies that if a person is able to perform an action, then he performs it.

Maybe this can clarify a little.

If the domain of quantification is empty (there are no choices), that entails determinism and denies MFT, shortcircuiting the argument. — SophistiCat

Yes, this is right. Of course the domain of quantification isn't empty (by the premise 1), and I didn't deny that. What I said was that it doesn't follows from the second premise.

Well, I remain unconvinced. Let's imagine the professor in the example says something like "well you should have killed your neighbors and stolen their car". This works as a case for premise 2. It's not an impossible request, just an absurd one. But it doesn't work for premise 3 for any number of realistic circumstance, like if we assume the student is an ordinary law-abiding citizen and being on time isn't a matter of life and death. In a deterministic world, the request would never be fulfilled, so in that sense it cannot happen.

It's also telling that the conjunction of premises 2 and 3 is that, if determinism is true, everything that should happen does happen. That requires us to equate "should" with "can", which turns the second premise into a tautology (and also invalidates the first premise).

The argument goes as follows:

1. With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods. (premise)
2. Whatever should be done can be done. (premise)
3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. (premise)
4. I believe minimal free-will. (premise)
5. With respect to the free-will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 1,2)
6. If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 3,5)
7. If determinism is true, then MFT is true. (from 6,4)
8. Minimal free-willis true. (from 7)

I got it from "Proof of Free Will", by Michael Huemer. — Nicholas Ferreira

You posted a long mathematical/symbol proof. However most of us are just going to gloss over that because we have better things to do. You want to write out that "mathematical proof" in plain english, all 50 steps, so that we can critique it better. You realize scientific determinism arose out of people analyzing Newtonian Physics and stuff like that.

Math symbols can infact be unpacked and put into plain english for dumb people like us

So if you want us to take you seriously go ahead and start unpacking all 50 lines of that "math proof".

How does it implies the existence of anything? Premise 2 simply says that for any x, if x should be done, then x can be done. It doesn't even imply that there is something that should be done, nor that there is something that can be done. It is simply a universally quantified conditional sentence, without existential implications.
— Nicholas Ferreira

So the argument can be expressed less rigorously as:
1. We should believe true statements
2. If we should believe true statements, we can.
3. In a deterministic world, it follows that we believe true statements.
4. I believe in free will.
5. Therefore, if the world is deterministic, free will is true, a contradiction.

2. Says that we can do what we should do. That seems unwarranted. Say I am an alcoholic. I should quit drinking. But perhaps I cannot.

I think what's happening here is that two different meanings of "can be done" are conflated. 2. Would be true if expressed as "whatever should be done is theoretically possible to do". But 3. uses can in the sense of "what is practically possible". Even for a determinist, the set of theoretically possible events does not equal the set of actual events. — Echarmion

thank you for posting this and translating the thing. I agree.

Well, I remain unconvinced. Let's imagine the professor in the example says something like "well you should have killed your neighbors and stolen their car". This works as a case for premise 2. It's not an impossible request, just an absurd one. But it doesn't work for premise 3 for any number of realistic circumstance, like if we assume the student is an ordinary law-abiding citizen and being on time isn't a matter of life and death. In a deterministic world, the request would never be fulfilled, so in that sense it cannot happen.

It's also telling that the conjunction of premises 2 and 3 is that, if determinism is true, everything that should happen does happen. That requires us to equate "should" with "can", which turns the second premise into a tautology (and also invalidates the first premise). — Echarmion

lol. nice.

1. With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods. (premise)

This "argument" seems to go off the tracks at this point..and, unfortunately, "this point" is labeled #1.

#1 requires a conclusion...before all of the "premises" that supposedly will lead to the C.

Sounds as though Michael Huemer's "Proof of Free Will"...depends on "I will deem what I want to be true...to be true and will deem to be false what I want to be false. Then, using that as a bsis, I will arrive at the conclusion I decided was the correct conclusion before I applied any supposed logic.

Anyone who uses "I 'believe' X" as a premise...is a dingbat.

Either you are misrepresenting...or he is a dingbat.

Couldn't the same argument be used to prove any belief (including falsehoods)?

It's what comes from a thoughtless application of formalisms. The premise "Whatever should be done can be done" is only plausible in the context in which choices exist (whatever we take choices to mean). The corollary of this statement is "Whatever should not be done can be done." Taken together, these two statements express the idea that a moral should only makes sense when you have a choice between what should and what should not be done. If you have no choice, then moral considerations are irrelevant.

If you plug in the corollary "Whatever should not be done can be done" into the argument alongside the second premise and thoughtlessly crank the handle, then you can end up with this absurdity: determinism supposedly implies that you always do what should be done and what should not be done, all at the same time. Of course, if you remember that choice (supposedly) does not exist under determinism, then you will not get yourself in trouble like that. But this is why it makes no sense to extend the argument past the second premise.

3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. (premise)

This could be restated as 'whatever is possible is actual', which implies that there are no other possibilities except for what happens. [Should implies can, but if determinism is true, can equals is.]

However, this implies that if determinism is true, then we cannot necessarily refrain from believing falsehoods. We can only refrain from doing something where it is possible to do something else.

It's what comes from a thoughtless application of formalisms. The premise "Whatever should be done can be done" is only plausible in the context in which choices exist (whatever we take choices to mean). The corollary of this statement is "Whatever should not be done can be done." Taken together, these two statements express the idea that a moral should only makes sense when you have a choice between what should and what should not be done. If you have no choice, then moral considerations are irrelevant.

If you plug in the corollary "Whatever should not be done can be done" into the argument alongside the second premise and thoughtlessly crank the handle, then you can end up with this absurdity: determinism supposedly implies that you always do what should be done and what should not be done, all at the same time. Of course, if you remember that choice (supposedly) does not exist under determinism, then you will not get yourself in trouble like that. But this is why it makes no sense to extend the argument past the second premise. — SophistiCat

First of all most people would agree most if not all people do what they "should" do and very often 10 mintues later do what they "should not" do. Perhaps we should view people like ants or mice or dogs, in that we are dumb and we make decisions that scientifically determined or determined by dna and the situations we are put in. Whatever it is that matters to each individual dog (some argue sex, food whatever) is only dependent on nurture versus nature and/or scientific determinism. Perhaps we take ourselves to seriously & at the each moment if our desire is to make better future decisions, we should try to recall from past experience and apply that knowledge and/or logic to attempt (attempt) to make better future decisions.

In summary perhaps we should view ourselves as animals that are unlikely to have alot of control over what happens next.

Considering physics and particles determine the behavior of a car, why wouldn't it determine the behavior of a human?