1. With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods. (premise)
2. Whatever should be done can be done. (premise)
3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. (premise)
4. I believe minimal free-will. (premise)
5. With respect to the free-will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 1,2)
6. If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 3,5)
7. If determinism is true, then MFT is true. (from 6,4)
8. Minimal free-willis true. (from 7)
Fx = x is false,
S[x] = I should do x,
C[x] = I can do x,
D[x] = I do x,
Bx = I believe that x,
m = the minimal free-will thesis.
a = anything
I got it from "Proof of Free Will", by Michael Huemer. — Nicholas Ferreira
How does it implies the existence of anything? Premise 2 simply says that for any x, if x should be done, then x can be done. It doesn't even imply that there is something that should be done, nor that there is something that can be done. It is simply a universally quantified conditional sentence, without existential implications. — Nicholas Ferreira
How does it implies the existence of anything? Premise 2 simply says that for any x, if x should be done, then x can be done. It doesn't even imply that there is something that should be done, nor that there is something that can be done. It is simply a universally quantified conditional sentence, without existential implications. — Nicholas Ferreira
2. Says that we can do what we should do. That seems unwarranted. Say I am an alcoholic. I should quit drinking. But perhaps I cannot.
I think what's happening here is that two different meanings of "can be done" are conflated. 2. Would be true if expressed as "whatever should be done is theoretically possible to do". But 3. uses can in the sense of "what is practically possible". Even for a determinist, the set of theoretically possible events does not equal the set of actual events. — Echarmion
My second premise is the "'ought' implies 'can'" principle: that is, to say that something should be done implies that it can be done. For example, suppose a student explains to me that he could not make it to class because his car broke down. One way I might respond would be by telling him that he could have made it to class some other way. But it would be nonsensical of me to say, "Yes, I understand that you could not have come to class, but you should have come anyway." In general, it is not the case that you should do the impossible. This is equivalent to saying that if you should do something, then you can do that thing.
The third premise states that, if determinism is true, then whatever can be done is actually done. This follows directly from the definition of determinism given above: determinists hold that any person, at any given time, has one and only one course of action open to him. Thus, according to determinists, if a person fails to perform an action, that means he literally was unable to perform it. Which implies that if a person is able to perform an action, then he performs it.
If the domain of quantification is empty (there are no choices), that entails determinism and denies MFT, shortcircuiting the argument. — SophistiCat
The argument goes as follows:
1. With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods. (premise)
2. Whatever should be done can be done. (premise)
3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. (premise)
4. I believe minimal free-will. (premise)
5. With respect to the free-will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 1,2)
6. If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 3,5)
7. If determinism is true, then MFT is true. (from 6,4)
8. Minimal free-willis true. (from 7)
I got it from "Proof of Free Will", by Michael Huemer. — Nicholas Ferreira
How does it implies the existence of anything? Premise 2 simply says that for any x, if x should be done, then x can be done. It doesn't even imply that there is something that should be done, nor that there is something that can be done. It is simply a universally quantified conditional sentence, without existential implications.
— Nicholas Ferreira
So the argument can be expressed less rigorously as:
1. We should believe true statements
2. If we should believe true statements, we can.
3. In a deterministic world, it follows that we believe true statements.
4. I believe in free will.
5. Therefore, if the world is deterministic, free will is true, a contradiction.
2. Says that we can do what we should do. That seems unwarranted. Say I am an alcoholic. I should quit drinking. But perhaps I cannot.
I think what's happening here is that two different meanings of "can be done" are conflated. 2. Would be true if expressed as "whatever should be done is theoretically possible to do". But 3. uses can in the sense of "what is practically possible". Even for a determinist, the set of theoretically possible events does not equal the set of actual events. — Echarmion
Well, I remain unconvinced. Let's imagine the professor in the example says something like "well you should have killed your neighbors and stolen their car". This works as a case for premise 2. It's not an impossible request, just an absurd one. But it doesn't work for premise 3 for any number of realistic circumstance, like if we assume the student is an ordinary law-abiding citizen and being on time isn't a matter of life and death. In a deterministic world, the request would never be fulfilled, so in that sense it cannot happen.
It's also telling that the conjunction of premises 2 and 3 is that, if determinism is true, everything that should happen does happen. That requires us to equate "should" with "can", which turns the second premise into a tautology (and also invalidates the first premise). — Echarmion
1. With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods. (premise)
3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. (premise)
It's what comes from a thoughtless application of formalisms. The premise "Whatever should be done can be done" is only plausible in the context in which choices exist (whatever we take choices to mean). The corollary of this statement is "Whatever should not be done can be done." Taken together, these two statements express the idea that a moral should only makes sense when you have a choice between what should and what should not be done. If you have no choice, then moral considerations are irrelevant.
If you plug in the corollary "Whatever should not be done can be done" into the argument alongside the second premise and thoughtlessly crank the handle, then you can end up with this absurdity: determinism supposedly implies that you always do what should be done and what should not be done, all at the same time. Of course, if you remember that choice (supposedly) does not exist under determinism, then you will not get yourself in trouble like that. But this is why it makes no sense to extend the argument past the second premise. — SophistiCat
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