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The undetermined object of an empirical intuition
is entitled appearance. — Kryneizov

I get the passage. The appearance itself lacks form. The mind forms it. Hegel thought the same thing, except he called the appearance of the world "myself". Kant thinks you are the intuition that forms the noumena into the phenomena

If form and matter, as Kant understands them, still escapes you, think of how light incident on your eyes is somehow organized into what you see. — tim wood

For Hegel, the noumena is prime matter, coming from nothing, and you are the form of the world, especially your body. Teilhard described this as "you are not a part of the universe completely owned, but the whole universe partially owned". Same thing. Kant stayed inside, instead of being adventurous philosophically. Same in his life

I understand now Tim. The rays of light enter the eye in the opposite direction in which they appear; the mind rearranges the data from the eye. Thank you.

The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation,
so far as we are affected by it, is sensation. — Kryneizov

That pre-assumes that an object exists. It is the sensation that is primary not the 'object'.

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Among the difficulties in many discussions on Kant is that one - or both - have not understood him. Without understanding, no target can be established, and no criticism can hit a target that does not exist. — tim wood

One or both what?

One can only go by what a person has written or said. One can agree or disagree with what they have said. While the understanding of what they intended to say may be significant, it is not essential.

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Why does Kant separate the appearance into form and matter? Why does he suppose that the sensations cannot already be given to us ordered a certain way, and instead supposes that sensations are just give to us in a disordered way? It seems like an arbitrary distinction he makes in order to create the need for pure intuition and the Categories. — Kryneizov

Some of the reason why is Kant's endeavor to "save" causality from Hume who said that is an arbitrary scheme we apply to phenomena to make it into a story. As that idea applies to "sensation", Kant is accepting that criticism and having the matter both ways:

The organization of the encounter with "matter" requires an operation be set up on the side of the perceiver to process it. It is "formal" as a matter of agency. But there is a point of contact with the not formal that is "material". If one is to express the situation in that way, Kant is not the worse thing to happen to a person.

Another way to look at it is to compare with Aristotle's De Anima. How things get perceived in that scheme is that some element in the material things is a player in how the perceiver makes the encounter actual for them. The potential being is perceived actually. How that could happen is not explained but assumed because, heck, it seems to be what is happening.

While the understanding of what they intended to say may be significant, it is not essential. — A Seagull — tim wood

Hmm. The not-rhetorical question becomes, "How would you know?" With Kant, a question with some weight.[/quote]

Well yes , a crucial question.. How does one know anything?

With regard to the understanding of other people's contributions to philosophy, it is a personal thing. It comes down to whether their contribution fits in with what one already knows about the world. and whether their assumptions and logic make sense and are acceptable. And the amount of effort one exerts in trying to understand the contribution may depend upon how interesting one considers their conclusions to be.

With Kant, a question with some weight. — tim wood

Weighty indeed. 25 years, four volumes, 1600-odd pages, being groped and pawed over ever since. Throw in half-dozen semi-conflicting translations......what’s not to like?

Why does Kant separate the appearance into form and matter? — Kryneizov

Short answer - because he's critiquing, and improving, Aristotle's form-matter (hylomorphic) dualism. Bear in mind that Kant makes considerable use of the pre-existing Aristotelian categories - his categories of the understanding are adapted nearly verbatim from Aristotle (see here, table at bottom). And hylomorphism is a fundamental principle of Aristotelian, and therefore traditional, philosophy. Kant doesn't reject hylomorphism altogether, but re-interprets it in light of his overall project.

There's a very good current textbook on Kant's theory of judgement which has a whole chapter on this, Kant's Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason - part II is devoted to Kant's transcendental hylomorphism.

Of course the terminology sounds daunting, but when you understand the logic of 'matter-form' dualism, I think it makes a great deal of sense. It is found throughout Aquinas and much later scholastic philosophy. Basically, think of the 'forms' as something like 'the idea of something'. A form is what makes a thing 'this thing' as apart from 'that thing' - it confers identity. Whereas matter itself is indeterminate, it's simply the primal stuff which, until it 'receives' form, is not intelligible, because it has no kind, resemblance, principle, etc. Bear in mind, Aristotle's 'hyle' is derived from 'timber' i.e. 'that from which things are made or carved'; so it doesn't correspond with 'matter' in the modern sense of the elements of the periodic table. I suppose you could understand the hylomorphic schema as being like a kind of poetic allegory, but I find it extremely attractive as an idea. Have a read of this blog post.

I suppose you could understand the hylomorphic schema as being like a kind of poetic allegory, but I find it extremely attractive as an idea. — Wayfarer

And what do you use it for?

A form is what makes a thing 'this thing' as apart from 'that thing' - it confers identity. Whereas matter itself is indeterminate, it's simply the primal stuff which, until it 'receives' form, is not intelligible, because it has no kind, resemblance, principle, etc. Bear in mind, Aristotle's 'hyle' is derived from 'timber' i.e. 'that from which things are made or carved'; so it doesn't correspond with 'matter' in the modern sense of the elements of the periodic table. — Wayfarer

that's a really good way of breaking it down. Once a thing is seen 'as a thing', its fitted into a vast network of other things and their relations. Kant's limitation is that he has trouble considering consciousness (or, better, life, living) outside of this cognitive way of relating to things as instances-of. He also can't provide an account of where this network of things comes from - implicit in his system is that the whole cognitive complex has to have already been given, somehow. There's no way to account for novelty.

And what do you use it for? — A Seagull

It's an important topic in philosophy, although that doesn't necessarily make it useful in any other sense.

Once a thing is seen 'as a thing', its fitted into a vast network of other things and their relations... — csalisbury

...through the process of apperception whereby the mind relates particulars to classes and categories. That kind of analysis even filters through into phenomenology and indeed cognitive science (there's such a topic as 'Kantian cognitive science'.)

Think of it as underlying the structure of consciousness - the means by which knowledge organises itself into categories and intelligible relations. Then you begin to see more clearly the relationship of thought with the intelligible order - that mind grasps the ideas of things, whereas the senses grasp their material form to create a coherent whole (coherent meaning 'holding together').

Where it's very difficult for us moderns to grasp, is that for us, the 'ideas' are identified as the activities of the brain, which itself is the product of evolutionary biology. So 'ideas' can't have any foundational reality if they're understood in those terms - they're a product, not a cause. Somehow - we presume according to broadly Darwinian principles - the capacity for ideas emerge in response to the requirements of natural selection. However I find that attitude irreducibly reductionist.

There's no way to account for novelty. — csalisbury

He critiqued the then-prevailing notion that 'the ideas' were unchangeable essences that persisted in timeless static perfection. In medieval philosophy that manifested as the belief that the heavens were supposed to literally be changeless (hence the 'ethereal realms' - remember that supernovae were objects of superstitious awe, because they signified change in what was supposed to be the 'changeless realm'.) But I really need to read those chapters in the book I mention above, which goes into Kant's criticism of traditional hylomorphism in more detail.

Is Kants intuitions nominalistic though? Anyone

And what do you use it for? — A Seagull
It's an important topic in philosophy, — Wayfarer

Well you may consider it to be an important topic in philosophy, but I don't.

Important topics in philosophy need to be clearly identified with clear ideas regarding them, otherwise they are indistinguishable from irrelevancies.

If a complex topic is to be divided into categories then those categories have to be clear and significant otherwise it is a pointless exercise.

IMO Kant fails to do this and also uses many words whose meaning is, at best, ambiguous which is why I regard it as an irrelevance.

Why do you consider it to be an important topic?

...through the process of apperception whereby the mind relates particulars to classes and categories. That kind of analysis even filters through into phenomenology and indeed cognitive science (there's such a topic as 'Kantian cognitive science'.)

Think of it as underlying the structure of consciousness - the means by which knowledge organises itself into categories and intelligible relations. Then you begin to see more clearly the relationship of thought with the intelligible order - that mind grasps the ideas of things, whereas the senses grasp their material form to create a coherent whole (coherent meaning 'holding together').

Where it's very difficult for us moderns to grasp, is that for us, the 'ideas' are identified as the activities of the brain, which itself is the product of evolutionary biology. So 'ideas' can't have any foundational reality if they're understood in those terms - they're a product, not a cause. Somehow - we presume according to broadly Darwinian principles - the capacity for ideas emerge in response to the requirements of natural selection. However I find that attitude irreducibly reductionist. — Wayfarer

I may be fanning my vanity, but I flatter myself I can understand both modern skepticism and appreciation of the scholastics. Wherever you stand, it's a fact that new things like, say, computers didn't exist from the beginning of time. Recognizing a computer as a computer, for a kantian, presupposes an existent concept [computer]. The raw matter of sense gets organized into the [computer] form. Only, there were no computers when Kant was alive. That form had to have developed at some point. How does that work? A lot of Kant has to be heavily modified or augmented for his stuff to work beyond mere recognition of a pre-existent conceptual web. I spent a couple years on Kant, & I truly don't think there's anything to explain this kind of idea-genesis in him. I like Kant, don't get me wrong, but you can see his limits here.

Not sure I follow, but I'll leave it for now, as I think it will digress into one of the interminable arguments about AI.

fair enough, but i don't want you to leave thinking this is an AI question. I could have said 'Nike Airs' or even ' baseball cards' instead of 'computers', and it would have been the same point.

Whether in the idealist or realist paradigm, nominalism seems to say individuality and difference define an object. Essentialism says things are defined by what is common. I was wondering what was in common among these viewpoints

Whether in the idealist or realist paradigm, nominalism seems to say individuality and difference define an object. — Gregory

https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/article/william-ockham-man-who-started-decline-west/

https://www.academia.edu/36162636/What_s_Wrong_with_Ockham_Reassessing_the_Role_of_Nominalism_in_the_Dissolution_of_the_West

Is Kants intuitions nominalistic though? Anyone — Gregory

The pure intuitions of space and time, as the basis for a priori knowledge, are ideals and therefore not consistent with nominalist principles. A posteriori intuitions, based in sense appearances, are consistent with nominalism. However, the pure intuitions are necessary in Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic to account for the form of the a posteriori sense intuitions. I believe a nominalist would have to reject the pure intuitions, as inconsistent with nominalism, but then propose another way to account for the form of a posteriori sense intuitions.

The theory concerns humans in general, and how experience relates to knowledge. As such, it doesn’t matter what it is we know about, but only how we go about knowing it. The same fundamental human cognitive apparatus is in play now, as was in play in the late 18th century.

Kant himself would already have the form of Nike “Airs”, as an intuition of a “foot covering”, the form of baseball cards as an intuition of some kind of “portrait art”. The names for those as we know them are mere judgements, or, cognitions as particular things, which he would accept as an experience, even if he gave them different names. Foot covering being a lot simpler than baseball cards, of course, because Kant would also need experience of the game in order to justify that the cards serve as a cognition of a specific kind of portrait art. But still, he would have been able to figure out a priori what the cards represent in general......buncha guys participating in some cricket-like kind of group event, maybe.

Computers as we know them Kant may have had no experience, but he certainly would have understood what it means to compute, so some sort of sensible matter used in computing would have appeared to him, a priori, as the form, that is, would have afforded him an intuition, of “computer” specific to his time. Abacus, astrolabe, slide rule.....stuff like that.

I believe a nominalist would have to reject the pure intuitions, as inconsistent with nominalism, but then propose another way to account for the form of a posteriori sense intuitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure about that. One's intuition would be different from others. It would be the same situation, except it was more solipsistic. I don't see why nominalism is any inferior a spirituality to forms of Platonism.

Kant himself would already have the form of Nike “Airs”, as an intuition of a “foot covering”, the form of baseball cards as an intuition of some kind of “portrait art”. — Mww

:up:

I don't see why nominalism is any inferior a spirituality to forms of Platonism. — Gregory

Because it says that ideas are 'mere words', whereas for (medieval) realism, universals and concepts are real independently of any speech-acts or cognitive apprehension by individual minds. Of course, in medieval realism, this was easily accounted for by allocating such ideas to the divine intellect, which is obviously not an acceptable move for non-theists.

There's a lot of literature and discussion of this point, if I had any sense that there was an interest in it, I'd post some references.

1) form and and matter, when believed to perceived in an object by an Aquinas or Aristotle, says something objective about the object. For a Kant, the form and matter are noumena

2) why do people get a warm fuzzy sense when they think things have resemblance, but not from difference. Thomists always think their spirituality is not only superior but the only logically valid one. I don't respect that

Why does Kant separate the appearance into form and matter? Why does he suppose that the sensations cannot already be given to us ordered a certain way, and instead supposes that sensations are just give to us in a disordered way? It seems like an arbitrary distinction he makes in order to create the need for pure intuition and the Categories. — Kryneizov

If he would suppose that they are g i v e n us ordered that would be "objectivism"? Kant wants to formulate a new concept of subject. He subjectivizes the form to be our rational knowledge.