The undetermined object of an empirical intuition
is entitled appearance. — Kryneizov
If form and matter, as Kant understands them, still escapes you, think of how light incident on your eyes is somehow organized into what you see. — tim wood
That pre-assumes that an object exists. It is the sensation that is primary not the 'object'. — A Seagull
Among the difficulties in many discussions on Kant is that one - or both - have not understood him. Without understanding, no target can be established, and no criticism can hit a target that does not exist. — tim wood
One or both of the disputants.One or both what? — A Seagull
Indeed "one" can do anything they choose to do. The value, if any, lies in the merit of the agreement or disagreement, not the fact of it.One can agree or disagree with what they have said. — A Seagull
Hmm. The not-rhetorical question becomes, "How would you know?" With Kant, a question with some weight.While the understanding of what they intended to say may be significant, it is not essential. — A Seagull
Why does Kant separate the appearance into form and matter? Why does he suppose that the sensations cannot already be given to us ordered a certain way, and instead supposes that sensations are just give to us in a disordered way? It seems like an arbitrary distinction he makes in order to create the need for pure intuition and the Categories. — Kryneizov
While the understanding of what they intended to say may be significant, it is not essential. — A Seagull — tim wood
Why does Kant separate the appearance into form and matter? — Kryneizov
A form is what makes a thing 'this thing' as apart from 'that thing' - it confers identity. Whereas matter itself is indeterminate, it's simply the primal stuff which, until it 'receives' form, is not intelligible, because it has no kind, resemblance, principle, etc. Bear in mind, Aristotle's 'hyle' is derived from 'timber' i.e. 'that from which things are made or carved'; so it doesn't correspond with 'matter' in the modern sense of the elements of the periodic table. — Wayfarer
And what do you use it for? — A Seagull
Once a thing is seen 'as a thing', its fitted into a vast network of other things and their relations... — csalisbury
There's no way to account for novelty. — csalisbury
And what do you use it for? — A Seagull
It's an important topic in philosophy, — Wayfarer
...through the process of apperception whereby the mind relates particulars to classes and categories. That kind of analysis even filters through into phenomenology and indeed cognitive science (there's such a topic as 'Kantian cognitive science'.)
Think of it as underlying the structure of consciousness - the means by which knowledge organises itself into categories and intelligible relations. Then you begin to see more clearly the relationship of thought with the intelligible order - that mind grasps the ideas of things, whereas the senses grasp their material form to create a coherent whole (coherent meaning 'holding together').
Where it's very difficult for us moderns to grasp, is that for us, the 'ideas' are identified as the activities of the brain, which itself is the product of evolutionary biology. So 'ideas' can't have any foundational reality if they're understood in those terms - they're a product, not a cause. Somehow - we presume according to broadly Darwinian principles - the capacity for ideas emerge in response to the requirements of natural selection. However I find that attitude irreducibly reductionist. — Wayfarer
Whether in the idealist or realist paradigm, nominalism seems to say individuality and difference define an object. — Gregory
Is Kants intuitions nominalistic though? Anyone — Gregory
I believe a nominalist would have to reject the pure intuitions, as inconsistent with nominalism, but then propose another way to account for the form of a posteriori sense intuitions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Kant himself would already have the form of Nike “Airs”, as an intuition of a “foot covering”, the form of baseball cards as an intuition of some kind of “portrait art”. — Mww
I don't see why nominalism is any inferior a spirituality to forms of Platonism. — Gregory
Why does Kant separate the appearance into form and matter? Why does he suppose that the sensations cannot already be given to us ordered a certain way, and instead supposes that sensations are just give to us in a disordered way? It seems like an arbitrary distinction he makes in order to create the need for pure intuition and the Categories. — Kryneizov
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