I am challenging your description of what the writing is about. If it is not worthy, just ignore it.

If it is not worthy, just ignore it. — Paine

Every objection is worthy, my friend :smile:



So, from 4.001 we know that the entirety of language is simply every possible proposition.

This makes sense, given that to a proposition corresponds a possible state of affairs.

From 4.11, we know that the language of natural science is all true propositions.

So, we know that all the propositions of natural science are a subset of all possible propositions.

Okay, so where does this leave metaphysics? Well, since we know from 4.111 that philosophy is not one of the sciences, we know that it isn't confined to only true propositions, but can and does use possibly true propositions. Thought experiments are a good example, as are intuition pumps.

This distinction between philosophy and science draws clear limits on what metaphysics can accomplish, however, it does not outrightly reject its possibility. Philosophy cannot, for example, tell us whether any of our metaphysical speculation is accurate - it does not produce true propositions, like science which Witt points out in 4.112

Rather, it elucidates, or clarifies things by offering mental pictures that we can imagine.

I appreciate your willingness to continue the conversation. I apologize for my intemperate comment.

If I can pull together a response, I will put it in your thread since this comment is a continuation of what is said there.

In PI 325, Wittgenstein says the following, 'The certainty that I shall be able to go after I have had this experience-seen the formula, for instance,-is simply based on induction.' What does this mean?- 'The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction.' Does that mean that I argue to myself: 'Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?' Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground?... — Richard B

I also disagree with "The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction".

Language less creatures can be certain that touching fire hurts, and rightfully so. Being burned by fire causes one to draw the correlation between the behavior and the pain(correctly attribute/recognize causality). It only takes once.

Some who've been burned learn to talk about it, others prior to being burned.

One knows that touching fire hurts by virtue of touching fire and drawing correlations/associations and/or connections between what they did and the subsequent pain. In a language less case, the experience grounds the certainty. There is no justification possible, if that requires language use.

...Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty. Is our confidence justified? - What people accept as a justification is shown by how they think and live."

A language less creatures' certainty is shown, not argued for. That certainty is based upon previous experience, and it depends - in no way, shape, or form - upon "the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty"