By the way I added more to my previous response.

No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands. Again, it's just part of the inherited background. The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrong, since when do we need to justify that we have hands, unless it's in a very special context, like waking up from an operation. What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context?

No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands. — Sam26

But we justify orange juice is sweet by our taste? You seem to be inconsistent here.

In my example, I am not speaking in front of skeptical philosophers who are doubting the external world. I am a job applicant who is being ask if I have two hands because the job requires two hands to operate the machinery. I can answer yes or no. If one of my hands was amputated due to an injury the answer is"no". In this circumstance, this can be counted as a statement of knowledge.

The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrong — Sam26

.

Not in general, it depends on the circumstance.

What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context? — Sam26

Agree here that the use of "doubt" is questionable in Moore's context. But why could we not say that Moore is justified in saying "I know I have two hands." by just showing the audience such objects.

In PI 325, Wittgenstein says the following, 'The certainty that I shall be able to go after I have had this experience-seen the formula, for instance,-is simply based on induction.' What does this mean?- 'The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction.' Does that mean that I argue to myself: 'Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?' Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground? Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty. Is our confidence justified? - What people accept as a justification is shown by how they think and live."

Is not this the case with Moore when he shows the skeptical philosopher his hands thus demonstrating the absurdity of doubting such a thing?

But we justify orange juice is sweet by our taste? You seem to be inconsistent here. — Richard B

Yes, it does seem that way, but here it's important to note the relationship between knowing and doubting (very important), which Wittgenstein points out. So, when trying to separate those beliefs (they are arational beliefs) which are bedrock, and not part of any epistemological justification, it's crucial to ask oneself, "Does it make sense to generally doubt this belief?

In the case of Moore's propositions there are very few contexts that we doubt, for e.g., that we have hands. It's something we have, it's part of the inherited background of being human (at least for most), and we sure don't doubt that we are human, unless you're a skeptical idealist. Again, similar to the inherited background of chess, viz., the rules, pieces, and the board. How can we doubt the inherited background our lives?

If we take my e.g., "The orange juice is sweet," we do come to know this in various ways, by tasting it is the most common (sensory experience), but asking someone is another way of knowing (justification through testimony). Does it make sense to doubt that the orange juice is sweet? Yes, we may be asking ourselves or others if it's ripe, or if it's sweet enough and not sour. So, this proposition is not the same as Moore's propositions, viz. called variously, hinge, bedrock, foundational, or basic propositions (I don't believe they are propositions in the normal sense, which is why they have a special name attached to them. It has to do with how they function in our epistemological language-games, viz, as the very building blocks of our epistemological language.).

Moore is demonstrating his knowledge of his hands, and it's this knowledge, demonstrated by proof, that is supposed to rebut the skeptic. Wittgenstein, of course, argues against this. Wittgenstein points out that much of our certainty (I call this certainty subjective certainty, as opposed to objective certainty, the latter is knowledge) is arrived at in the course of our lives, as we act within this reality. I don't in many cases arrive at some of these beliefs through some logical process, which is the point. It's through our interaction with the world that this subjective certainty comes out. Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen.

I think I will make OC my first video. Making videos going from the Tractatus to OC is something I'd like to do, and I will continue to work on it, but I'm going to concentrate on OC. Besides there are many videos that cover the T. and the PI, but not as many on OC.

Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen. — Sam26

I find it strange to say a basic belief is “I have two hands”. Not only is absurd to say “I doubt I have two hands”, but also “I believe I have two hands” or “I am convince I have two hands”, when, in fact, I have two hands. If other people would start challenging me on this, I would think they have gone mad, or psychologically manipulating me for some reason. Additionally, if one would say, “Well I could imagine that you have been drug and your hands have been amputated, yet you feel certain that you have hands.” My response could be, So what, just because you could imagine such a thing does not make it possible, it could be that I am immune to such drugs and hallucinations. Lastly, why are we calling something “knowledge” as something that excludes possible doubt. This seems too unnecessary of a high bar for a concept that is use in everyday life. It seems Wittgenstein could not cure himself of this philosophical view of “knowledge.”

I find it strange to say a basic belief is “I have two hands”. Not only is absurd to say “I doubt I have two hands”, but also “I believe I have two hands” or “I am convince I have two hands”, when, in fact, I have two hands. — Richard B

Of course, but I'm not saying that the statement, "I believe I have hands," is any better. The beliefs Wittgenstein is referring to in many cases, are the beliefs that are shown in our actions. When I sit in a chair, open a door, pick up a pencil, etc., all of these actions reflect beliefs. This is why some philosophers refer to them as animal beliefs, and why I sometimes refer to these bedrock beliefs as pre-linguistic. Not all bedrock beliefs are pre-linguistic, but many are.

The following is what Googles AI chat service, called Bard, said about Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I thought is was pretty good.


"Ludwig Wittgenstein's final notes, On Certainty, are a series of reflections on the nature of knowledge and certainty. In these notes, Wittgenstein argues that there are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions, which Wittgenstein calls "hinge propositions," are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world.

"Wittgenstein argues that hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action. For example, we cannot doubt that we have bodies, that the world is external to our minds, or that the past is real. These propositions are so basic to our understanding of the world that they cannot be doubted without undermining the very possibility of knowledge itself.

"Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language. His work has been praised for its insights into the nature of knowledge and the limits of skepticism. However, it has also been criticized for being too vague and unconvincing. Nevertheless, On Certainty remains an important work of philosophy that continues to be studied and debated today.

"Here are some of the key points of Wittgenstein's argument in On Certainty:

"There are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions are called "hinge propositions."

"Hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action.

"Hinge propositions are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world. Without them, we would be unable to make sense of anything.

"Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language."

2/29/24
The Tractatus:

In light of some of the remarks made in the thread “Wittgenstein’s creative sublimation of Kant,” I will explain some parts of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus again. This will be done without regard to what has been said in the earlier parts of this current thread. In other words, I will be starting over from this point forward.

Wittgenstein covers a wide range of topics in the Tractatus, including, but certainly not limited to the nature of the world, the nature of language, logic, mathematics, and even mysticism. Wittgenstein did not think that many philosophers would understand his thinking in the Tractatus. However, today it is not as daunting as it was when it was first written because we have access to much more information about Wittgenstein and the backdrop of the times. The Tractatus is a difficult work to master, and there are many disagreements about what Wittgenstein meant by this or that remark.

We know what the Tractatus is about, namely, that many of the problems of philosophy are related to a misunderstanding of the logic of language. He states this in the preface. What Wittgenstein means by the logic of language is spelled out in his account of the nature of language and how language connects with the world. He believed that logic was key to this understanding. So, the three major subjects of the Tractatus are logic, language, and the world. For Wittgenstein philosophy was about logic and metaphysics (Nb. p. 93). Wittgenstein never changed his mind, even in his later philosophy, that logic revealed something important about language. Although in his later philosophy vis-à-vis the Philosophical Investigations logic is more expansive, that is, it is not restricted to an a priori investigation. His later philosophy gives logic a much wider role, which is revealed in the cultural uses of language.

There seems to be no doubt that Wittgenstein believed the world had an a priori structure, and it is logic that would reveal this structure. Specifically, logic would reveal how language connects to the world. “My work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world (Nb. p. 79).”

In a now famous letter to von Ficker Wittgenstein says:

The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing. I have managed in my book to put everything firmly in place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book.

Ethical claims are meaningless but ethics is not. Ethics lies outside the limits of logical constructs and analysis. It is experiential , existential. From within the world, logic. From without, ethics and aesthetics. The two transcendentals of the Tractatus.

I agree.

Post 2

The Tractatus is divided into seven major propositions, and these propositions are divided and further subdivided. The seven propositions are the following:

1. “The world is all that is the case (T. 1).”
2. “What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
3. “A logical picture of facts is a thought (T. 3).”
4. “A thought is a proposition with a sense (T. 4).”
5. “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T. 5).”
6. “The general form of a truth-function is [p, ξ, N(ξ)]. This is the general form of a proposition (T. 6).”
7. “What cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (T. 7).”

I’m not going to give a detailed account of all of these propositions. I’m only going to give some of the highlights of the book. You don’t need to understand all of the details, nor do you need to understand the logic to understand the main ideas of the Tractatus.

The Tractatus begins with “The world is all that is the case.” For Wittgenstein, this is all reality or all that exists. “The world is the totality of facts, not of things (T. 1.1).” Facts for Wittgenstein are states of affairs which are not things (not a list of things like table, chairs, mountains, etc), but the arrangement of things (things are Wittgensteinian objects) and their relationship to each other.

“The world is determined by the facts, and their being all the facts (T. 1.11).” It’s all the facts in combination that make up the world, and thus define the world as Wittgenstein envisions it. Moreover, it’s “…the totality of facts [that] determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case (T. 1.12).”

“The facts in logical space are the world (T. 1.13).” I’ll say more about this later.

“The world divides into facts (T. 1.2).” My interpretation of this is that when talking about what’s factual we are talking about a small part of the totality of facts. For example, the Earth has one moon is a fact, but it’s only one part of the larger whole. The larger whole being the totality of facts that make up the world.

Facts are separate from propositions, that is, a true proposition is a picture of a particular state of affairs. We'll talk more about this when we get to proposition 2 and 3.

edit: 3/11/24

Facts for Wittgenstein are states of affairs which are not things (not a list of things like table, chairs, mountains, etc), but the arrangement of things and their relationship to each other. — Sam26

By 'things' he means simple or elementary objects not configurations of things such as tables and chairs.

Objects are simple.

(2.02)

Objects make up the substance of the world.
That is why they cannot be composite.

(2.021)

Tables and chairs are composite. This is not nit picking. It is essential for understanding both the ontology of the Tractatus and the logical structure of language.


.

From what I've read and heard things in this statement are not objects. We're not at the object stage yet. However, that is a possible interpretation of this passage. And I know what objects are, namely that they're simples. I'll talk more about objects later.

Facts themselves are made up of things like tables and chairs. However, facts are then broken down into atomic facts, which are broken into objects. Objects being the smallest component part of an atomic fact. The atomic fact is what's broken into objects. He hasn't started down this line of thought yet.

He does explicitly state that things are objects in 2.01, so I stand corrected.

From what I've read and heard things in this statement are not objects. — Sam26

2.01:

A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

A combination of elementary objects would be a state of affairs. A table is a combination of elementary objects. A fact of the world.

We're not at the object stage yet. — Sam26

I think that this is where he is at. This is what he begins with. Elementary configurations of elementary objects. But what he says would also be the case with compound objects or things. The world is not a collection of separate things.

You missed my acknowledgment of that mistake, you are correct about the things in 1.1 being objects, which he points out in 2.01.

Continuing with the summary...

Post 3

"A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)." The things/objects are possible constituents of states of affairs (2.011). It's not a perfect example, but think of the points on a line, the points aren't much of anything by themselves, i.e., until they're combined to form a line or a circle. It's somewhat similar to Wittgenstein's objects (although we have no examples of objects), i.e., objects by themselves don't do much of anything, other than to provide the substance that makes up the possible world of facts. It's a kind of metaphysical reality that Wittgenstein believes is dictated by logic.

objects by themselves don't do much of anything — Sam26

Objects contain within them all of the possible ways in which they can combine.

If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) (2.0123)

As you point out, we have no examples of objects. This raises the question of in what way we can know these objects.

If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all
its internal properties. (2.01231)

If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given. (20124)

It would seem that we know these objects in so far as they are the source of the possibilities of the world. From themselves they generate the world through the ways in which they combine.

There is a bottom up order to the universe.

Declaring "I have two hands," may or may not fall under the category of conviction, i.e., there are contexts where it might be appropriate. — Sam26

It's not a conviction, it's simply something I see or feel. If I have two hands, and I can see or feel, I can see or feel that I have two hands. What could it mean to doubt it?

If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all
its internal properties. (2.01231)

If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given. (20124)

It would seem that we know these objects in so far as they are the source of the possibilities of the world. From themselves they generate the world through the ways in which they combine.

There is a bottom up order to the universe. — Fooloso4

This seems to invoke things in themselves. Do you read it as suggesting that we can know any "internal properties" of objects, or is all we can know of objects "external properties"?

Do you read it as suggesting that we can know any "internal properties" of objects, or is all we can know of objects "external properties"? — Janus

Well, to begin we would have to identify the objects.Wittgenstein does not do this. We do not even know what these objects are let alone knowing internal or external properties except that internal to them they must have the ability to combine with other objects.

See the SEP Article Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism.

The nature of "object' is contentious; it might be bets to acknowledge this and move on

(For my part I'll go along with Anscombe that objects are particulars and un analysable.)

Well, to begin we would have to identify the objects.Wittgenstein does not do this. We do not even know what these objects are let alone knowing internal or external properties except that internal to them they must have the ability to combine with other objects. — Fooloso4

I get that the "objects" Wittgenstein refers to are not ordinary objects but logical simples or something like that. But they seem to be as inscrutable, and hence as propositionally useless, as Kant's 'things in themselves'

But they seem to be as inscrutable, and hence as propositionally useless, as Kant's 'things in themselves' — Janus

I agree that they are inscrutable and propositionally useless, but Wittgenstein's argument is about the possibility of propositions.

Just as elementary facts consist of objects, elementary proposition consists of names. (4.22)

We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possible forms of elementary
propositions.

Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with different meanings, we are
also unable to give the composition of elementary propositions.

(5.55)

Simple names function as the names of simple objects, but this does not mean they name things in the way tables and chairs do. They are not the names of 'this' or 'that'. They are about the form not the content of propositions.

Simple names function as the names of simple objects, but this does not mean they name things in the way tables and chairs do. They are not the names of 'this' or 'that'. They are about the form not the content of propositions. — Fooloso4

Again, this seems conceptually similar to the ding an sich since the term does not refer in the ordinary sense as with naming table and chairs but is about the form "in itself' as opposed to 'for us'.

My point is in the context of Moore's statements in his papers A Defense of Common Sense (1925), and Proof of an External World (1939) in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty, and Wittgenstein's responses. Moore claims that he knows that he has two hands, but Wittgenstein argues against this idea, although he sympathizes with Moore's claims.

The point here is to see Wittgenstein's connection between knowing and doubting, i.e., the logical connection between the two concepts. I don't think anyone has ever pointed this out in the way Wittgenstein has in OC. When someone claims to know, one of our natural responses is "How do you know?" This question introduces the doubt into our epistemology. We want to know how it is that you know, what's your justification; and when someone points to their inner feelings (their convictions), this is not the language-game of epistemology, although some argue otherwise. I think they're mistaken.

(Sometimes we forget that we often use the concept know as an expression of a conviction. It's not an epistemological use of the word know as JTB, it's just an expression of how strong our conviction is about the belief. These convictions are often expressed with great emphasis but have very little or no justification. They're mere beliefs or opinions.)

Wittgenstein sees statements like "I know I have hands." more akin to an expression of a conviction because he views these kinds of propositions as bedrock, i.e., they form the backdrop of reality that allows us to create epistemological language-games. One of the ways to identify these kinds of bedrock propositions is to ask if it makes sense to doubt them (in a particular context), which is an identifying mark of being bedrock or hinge. A difficulty arises because there are instances where these propositions can and are justified within a particular context and Wittgenstein points this out, but he believes that in Moore's context they are hinge propositions, not generally susceptible to doubt. They give life to our language-games of knowledge and doubt, just as the pieces, board, and rules of chess give life to the game of chess. Doubting hinges would be akin to doubting that a bishop moves diagonally.

Thanks for your articulate explanation. I have no argument with anything you've said there. I would use different language, though. I don't think I have a conviction that I have two hands, as if there could be any doubt. To my way of thinking 'conviction' like 'belief' suggests the possibility of being wrong. I know that I have two hands because I can see them, feel them, use them—there is no possibility of being wrong, no possibility of doubt.

I agree, I wouldn't say you have a conviction that you have two hands either. What Moore is saying amounts to a conviction according to W.

:up:

Post 4

It's important to understand that Wittgenstein is trying to answer the question of why it’s possible to make statements about the world. He answers this by doing an a priori investigation, which is very distinct from his later philosophy. Wittgenstein believes that it’s through purely logical analysis that we can come to understand how propositions connect to the world of facts. He assumes this from the beginning. It’s an a priori investigation that will provide the solution to philosophical problems. He also believed that even vague propositions (Nb p. 70), once logically understood, are not vague, but have a clear logical structure. Once you have a clear understanding of the logical structure of propositions, then you essentially have a clear understanding of all the propositions of philosophy. This is partly the reason why Wittgenstein believed after completing the Tractatus that he had solved the problems of philosophy. It’s his logical analysis of the proposition, and specifically how it connects to the world, that draws him to this conclusion.

“What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).” We use language, specifically propositions, to make statements of facts about the world. States of affairs are not the same as propositions, they are quite distinct. The world is made up of facts (states of affairs), viz, the totality of all the facts (T 1.11). You might not agree with Wittgenstein’s notion of facts being composed of objects (objects being the simplest component of an atomic fact), but his notion of facts as states of affairs existing in reality and quite separate from propositions, I believe, is a good one; and many philosophers, including myself, use it. States of affairs make up reality, but not as Wittgenstein envisioned it in the Tractatus, but I digress.

Much can be said about Frege’s influence on the Tractatus. In fact, some of Wittgenstein’s ideas reflect Frege’s ideas. For example, Wittgenstein and Frege are trying to break down propositions into their simplest form. Frege’s work marked the beginning of what became known as logical atomism. Frege also introduced the distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) in linguistic expressions. There are other important ideas that Wittgenstein got from Frege, but it’s beyond the scope of these remarks.

but his notion of facts as states of affairs existing in reality and quite separate from propositions — Sam26

Ignores relational facts, as best I can tell. A fact can obtain between objects, but not be either. A distance is a fact, but is not an object. It's not anything except a brain delineating a straight line through space between two objects. But that distance obtains.

You don't seem to be thinking about Wittgensteinian objects, which are not objects in the traditional sense.