No deductive argument will settle any of these issues: it simply pushes the problem back by introducing new premisses subject to the same issues. Still, the same structure is found in other disciplines. For instance, in mathematics, chains of reasoning ultimately run back to axioms, and the question of their justification eventually arises (Maddy 2011).

The first was given by Russell. Philosophical problems are solved only when science finally tackles them. Philosophers handle all questions which scientists at the present moment cannot investigate or answer. The obvious objection would be that, there are many philosophical problems that will never fall under science such as ethics and further more, it still does not tell us why philosophers can't solve such problems. — Wittgenstein

perfectly rational, intelligent and neutral party — Wittgenstein

I see no reason why an approach to answering questions about morality that is just as solid as the physical sciences' approach to answering questions about reality cannot be found, and widely adopted, — Pfhorrest

The nature of a philosopher is to argue — Colin Cooper

...if only philosophical discourse were not the province of humans. — Frank Apisa

Watching philosophers talk is sort of like watching a bird with a broken wing keep flapping it, and trying to readjust, not understanding what's wrong — Snakes Alive

Philosophers approach the unknown. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, you could find a solution - but would it be the right one? Would it set out what we ought to do? If you agree with the mooted solution, you would say yes; but if you disagree, well, off we go, disagreeing again. — Banno

As do garbagemen. — Banno

Put more simply, in hopes of engaging a few philosopher's attention-- philosophers are about as qualified to understand any aspects of the universe, themselves included, as Bugs Bunny and Elmer Fudd in a think tank full of carrots. — Greylorn Ell

Philosophers are not intellectually qualified to understand physics — Greylorn Ell

I hold that the relationship of philosophy to the sciences is the same as that between administrative fields (technology and business) and the workers whose tools and jobs they administrate. Done poorly, they constantly stick their nose into matters they don't understand, and tell the workers, who know what they are doing and are trying to get work done, that they're doing it wrong and should do it some other, actually inferior, way instead, because the administration supposedly knows better and had better be listened to. But done well, they instead give those workers direction and help them organize the best way to tackle the problems at hand, then they get out of the way and let the workers get to doing work. Meanwhile, a well-conducted administration also shields the workers from those who would detract from or interfere with their work (including other, inferior administrators); and at the same time, they are still watchful and ready to be constructively critical if the workers start failing to do their jobs well. In order for administration to be done well and not poorly, it needs to be sufficiently familiar with the work being done under its supervision, but at the same time humble enough to know its place and acknowledge that the specialists under it may, and properly should, know more than it within their areas of specialty. I hold that this same relationship holds not only between administrators and workers, but between creators (engineers and entrepreneurs) and administrators, between scientists (physical or ethical) and creators, and most to the point here, between philosophers and scientists. Philosophy done well guides and facilitates sciences, protects them from the interference of philosophy done poorly, and then gets out of the way to let the sciences take over from there, to do the same for creators, they to do the same for administrators, they to do the same for all the workers of the world getting all the practical work done; whether that work be the original job of keeping our bodies alive using the original tool of our bodies themselves (i.e. medicine and agriculture), the job of making of new tools to help with that (i.e. construction and manufacturing), multiplying and distributing our power to do that (i.e. energy and transportation), or multiplying and distributing our control over that power (i.e. information and communication). — “The Codex Quarentis: The Metaphilosophy of Analytic Pragmatism

There seems to me to be a profound miscomprehension in the idea that we might find the solution to ethical questions; as if they were out there, under a rock or hidden in a calculation. No, we choose ethical solutions. — Banno

There seems to me to be a profound miscomprehension in the idea that we might find the solution to ethical questions; as if they were out there, under a rock or hidden in a calculation. No, we choose ethical solutions.

And that's my answer to ↪Wittgenstein; philosophers disagree because there need be no one correct answer to the questions they ask. One is not obligated to this or that solution. Instead, we make our choices. — Banno

...if only philosophical discourse were not the province of humans.
— Frank Apisa
:up:

But it is. Unfortunately, one cannot always say "I do not know"; one is obliged to choose. To stay home or to go out? Meat or veg? Sanders or Trump? "I don't know" will not suffice here. — Banno

Wittgenstein
329
↪Colin Cooper
↪Frank Apisa

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our philosophies,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings." — Wittgenstein

If any reasonably well-known philosophical argument for a substantive conclusion had the power to convert an unbiased ideal audience to its conclusion (given that it was presented to the audience under ideal conditions), then, to a high probability, assent to the conclusion of that argument would be more widespread among philosophers than assent to any substantive philosophical thesis actually is. (van Inwagen 2006, pp. 52–3) — Wittgenstein

The author discusses 3 different reasons for the persistent disagreement among philosophers and refutes them. I have tried to summarize them.

The first was given by Russell. Philosophical problems are solved only when science finally tackles them. — Wittgenstein

The second reason provided argues that philosophical arguments rely heavily on many other fields where the direction of progress cannot be predicted and as long as the other fields make progress, philosophical ideas will be undermined. — Wittgenstein

There are certain branches of philosophy such as logic ( where there isn't a lot of dependence on hypothesis of other disciplines but there is still disagreement among logicians. — Wittgenstein

The final reason which the author represents and refutes is the idea that we may have some sort of cognitive limitation due to evolution and as such, we cannot solve philosophical problems. — Wittgenstein