does it follow that if the problem of qualia were to be resolved in like manner to other physical matters (ie qualia are a describable and measurable physical event), would that undercut the rationale for positing panpsychism? — Graeme M
If minds were the function of systems to undertake say logical operations on information, ie to undertake computations, we'd have to conclude that computers do this. And that seems relatively explicable. We could expect that human brains are doing similar computational processes, also explicable. We could conclude that information is ubiquitous, that computations are possible, and that the universe has the property that systems can undertake computations. But isn't that already known, accepted and explained? So panpsychism can't be making that claim. — Graeme M
Panpsychism is trying to solve the irreducibility of conscious experience by spreading it out through everything so that it's a building block instead of just mysteriously emerging. — Marchesk
We certainly haven't reduced the mysteriousness - we've just re-invented the nature of the entire universe with a stuff that previously didn't exist and can't be measured. — Isaac
We haven't reduced the 'how' questions - we still have the question of how this stuff interacts with matter only now it's interacting with all matter. — Isaac
Why couldn't unexplained emergence be a brute fact? Are there some limits/preferences about what can and cannot be a brute fact? — Isaac
There are plenty of arguments for the hard problem. Basically, no amount of objective explanation gets you to subjectivity. They're incompatible. — Marchesk
No, but I think complex novel things emerging is considered spooky in a way that brute fundamental things are not. — Marchesk
Well, at the moment perhaps. Isn't it feasible that an explanation may be forthcoming? — Graeme M
I'm not trying to dismiss panpsychism, I just don't get how it even flies as a serious contender. — Graeme M
Well, if the world contains both physical stuff and consciousness, but there doesn't seem to be a way for the physical stuff to produce consciousness, then an alternative would be that all physical stuff is conscious. — Marchesk
ou previously said that the thing that emerged was "complex and novel", now you're claiming it's so fundamental and obvious it can't be ignored. Which is it? — Isaac
Panpsychism is trying to solve the irreducibility of conscious experience by spreading it out through everything so that it's a building block instead of just mysteriously emerging. — Marchesk
gather from some of the articles I have read this means that any material object has a mind, of sorts at least. — Graeme M
So what we think ofaas — Pantagruel
then you can begin to see howimmaterial things can participate in what we call consciousness — Pantagruel
To many enthusiasts, panpsychism isn't so much an explanatory theory of consciousness, but an Occam's Razor style argument that non-living systems should be considered to have identical metaphysical properties as living systems, on the basis that there is no falsifiable justification for considering their metaphysical properties to be different. — sime
It [panpsychism] “explains” why my socks and bubblegum are conscious, even though no one thought they were, but it doesn’t explain why the human brain is conscious the way the human brain is conscious, which is what we actually want to know. — Zelebg
It [panpsychism] “explains” why my socks and bubblegum are conscious, even though no one thought they were, but it doesn’t explain why the human brain is conscious the way the human brain is conscious, which is what we actually want to know. — Zelebg
When you familiarize yourself with the theory and the vocabulary, then you can begin to see how material things can participate in what we call consciousness, to the extent that they likewise instantiate these properties or tendencies. — Pantagruel
Ordinary functionalism explains what is different between human brains and your socks. All that’s left after that “easy problem” is some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective at all, beyond just the third person behavioral differences. Panpsychism simply says that that is not a special thing that mysteriously arises only in human brains somehow; instead it’s a trivial thing that’s everywhere always, and only those functional differences actually make any difference. — Pfhorrest
From this perpsective, the main difference between panspsychism and eliminative materialism is optimism. — sime
So, it still comes back to qualia though doesn't it? P-Zombies are used to make this distinction about qualia-laden systems, but presuming we actually could have a P-Zombie, would we be inclined to posit anything about the P-Zombie that needs to be explained by panpsychism that cannot already be explained by existing theory? — Graeme M
I think there is something different between the claims of panpsychism and functionalism, though? — Graeme M
OK, but isn't that just saying what we already know and why there is a problem? Brains are material things that engage in complex processes, so this statement boils down to saying that consciousness is the same as complex system properties. Is anyone convinced by that? Isn't this just claiming that Chalmers' easy problems explain the hard problem? — Graeme M
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