Panpsychism is trying to solve the irreducibility of conscious experience by spreading it out through everything so that it's a building block instead of just mysteriously emerging. — Marchesk
Heat is only weakly emergent. Heat is an aggregate of ordinary motion. If you model the motion of all the particles in a physical system, you model all the thermodynamic properties of that system too. Heat is only emergent in the sense that you don't have to model things at the molecular level to get heat -- you can just model the aggregate property and ignore all that finer detail. — Pfhorrest
Ditto. Ditto. :up:What’s so ‘mysterious’ about emergent properties? This is where most of the panpsychism ideas look juvenile at worst and idiotic at best. Emergence is a CONSCIOUSLY observable (and scientifically measurable) property.
... Heat is an emergent property, but a molecule has no ‘heat’ ... I’d like to see an argument presenting how ‘heat’ is an innate property of all matter (including molecules). — I like sushi
To repeat. My MAIN qualm is with people naively suggesting atoms are ‘conscious’ with the poor defense of ‘just a different kind of conscious’ - which is nonsensical. — I like sushi
Try imagining something. Remember an event that happened. Feel sad. Feel joy. These are things that are mental states. P-Zombies presumably don't do that but somehow act as they do. — schopenhauer1
Functionalism only addresses the easy problem of access consciousness. Critics then ask “but what about the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness?” Panpsychists reply “that’s a trivial general feature of everything, nothing special in need of explanation.” Critics then ask “So my sock is conscious just like I am?” And we reply “no, not just like, but your sock is functionally different from you too. That difference is an easy problem, already answered by functionalism.” — Pfhorrest
Panpsychism simply says that... — Pfhorrest
No, I think it has already also required,
"some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective"
— Pfhorrest
but doesn't seem keen to admit it. — bongo fury
It says that there is a first person perspective that is had, — Pfhorrest
These are all still qualia. If humans were really P-Zombies and did not entertain qualia (but nonetheless acted just as though they did), would there be any need for panpsychism as an explanation? I'm puzzled by the general line here - if a person can do all the things I do but without qualia, then it seems we could explain these behaviours without recourse to any additional property beyond those uncovered by science so far. Where would panpsychism be required? — Graeme M
If an object has no functional role of its own, how is it proposed that it could be attended by mental states (even if limited). A sock has no inherent functionality, its function is derived. — Graeme M
And this perspective was already on the physicist's menu, or not? — bongo fury
And this perspective was already on the physicist's menu, or not?
— bongo fury
It depends on the physicist’s philosophical views. — Pfhorrest
some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective — Pfhorrest
If he’s an eliminativist — Pfhorrest
then no, he denies that there is such a thing. — Pfhorrest
If he’s an emergentist then yes, — Pfhorrest
some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective — Pfhorrest
where that completely different metaphysical thing started happening — Pfhorrest
Ok, so "first person perspective" wasn't some innocuous physical concept to do with frames of reference. — bongo fury
But what about the "weaker" of this species, who is either functionalist or has some other (e.g. Pantagruel's "systems" or my "symbolic competence") explanation for the emergence, which doesn't at all require that what emerges is anything but an aspect of material behaviour? — bongo fury
Ok, so "first person perspective" wasn't some innocuous physical concept to do with frames of reference.
— bongo fury
I , as a panpsychist, think it is. — Pfhorrest
It’s only emergentism that makes it out to be anything metaphysically weird. — Pfhorrest
not invoking anything in addition to physical stuff, just a different perspective on that physical stuff. — Pfhorrest
Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism. — Pfhorrest
That person is not providing any answer at all to the question of phenomenal consciousness. — Pfhorrest
We don’t know if they think there is no such thing, — Pfhorrest
if it somehow emerges from nothing — Pfhorrest
Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.
— Pfhorrest
No, but it is usually implied by it. — bongo fury
Eliminativism is the view that consciousness is not real — bert1
Qualia is brute sensation (e.g. seeing green, hearing noise, etc.). Although imagination, and memories probably rely on qualia, etc. they are not the same as qualia. My point was there are other internal states besides just qualia that one can have. And I don't understand why you would be deflating the issue. The very question regarding the Hard Question is to understand how/why internal states are equivalent to brain processes. Anything else is not the world we live in, but P-Zombie world. That is not ours though, so it is a big deal. — schopenhauer1
Everything has a function, in the sense meant by functionalism, which is different from the sense you seem to mean. A function in the sense that it responds to inputs with some output: if you do something to it, it does something in response. The function of a sock or a rock is very trivial, but it still has one. Imagine for clarity that you were programming a simulation and you had to code what such a virtual object does in response to other events in the virtual world: you have to code in that the rock moves in response to being pushed, for example. That’s a kind of functionality. — Pfhorrest
ur brains can and do compute a vast amount of information for which we have no felt analog. That is also what we assume computers do - undertake complex computations for which there is no felt analog, no inner experience. No qualia. Qualia are all there is, as far as the hard problem goes. — Graeme M
Qualia are all there is, as far as the hard problem goes. — Graeme M
My proposition is that, on this kind of definition, were mental states not experienced (were they not attended by qualia) they should not require an explanation. There'd be no hard problem and as a consequence no claims for panpsychism. — Graeme M
No, you admitted that an eliminativist (usually a physicalist) would rule it out. — bongo fury
Yes, an extra, 'meta' perspective. — bongo fury
No, but it is usually implied by it. — bongo fury
That person is not providing any answer at all to the question of phenomenal consciousness.
— Pfhorrest
For someone who has defined that question in metaphysical terms, perhaps not. — bongo fury
We don’t know if they think there is no such thing,
— Pfhorrest
Ditto. — bongo fury
if it somehow emerges from nothing
— Pfhorrest
Remember, it doesn't have to be a substance: a physical goo or a metaphysical woo. — bongo fury
In the form of panpsychism I defend the fundamental units of nature are “quantum events occurring in space-time”. In Whitehead’s form of process philosophy “Process and Reality” the most fundamental units are “actual occasions” which invariably have both a mental aspect and physical aspect or pole. The mental or experiential pole has to do with incorporation of elements of the past and possibilities of the future as well as relations to other events (what Whitehead calls prehension). I have a read a lot of presentations of panpsychism and this is the form which I defend.First, the argument goes that all objects, presumably down to very small scales (atoms?) must have some kind of mind. . — Graeme M
Yes there are many different forms and kinds of mind but they are all of the same ontologic nature. There are many different forms of physicality but they are all the same ontologic nature. In fact the physical and the mental are dual aspects of the same fundamental unit of nature (neutral monism). I won’t defend any form of panpsychism other than a monistic variety. The kind of unified, integrated experience that we call “human consciousness” can only be present in a unified integrated structure like the brain. Physically damage the brain and you damage or lose “consciousness”. I won’t defend the statement “rocks are conscious”. I won’t defend the statement “electrons are conscious”. Consciousness in my mind is a relatively rare form of mind or experienceSecond, minds are expressed to varying degrees of sophistication according to the sophistication of the system (object), perhaps to the greatest sophistication in humans (in our experience, at least). . — Graeme M
Our “experience”, our “mind”, our “consciousness” cannot be adequately or satisfactorily explained in purely physical terms. No description of neural pathways, metabolic activity, neurotransmitters or brain waves entails the actual “experience” of the subject. This is sort of Mary’s and red, the scientific description versus the first person experience. One should also asks who or what is conducting science, asking the questions, doing the experiments, interpreting the results, you can not take the observer out of the science completely.Third, mind is not an actual physical substance (I use the term loosely and am aware it probably means something in philosophy different from my usage). That is, it isn't like say gravity or the electromagnetic force which can be measured and which have a direct causal relationship to the world. . — Graeme M
Mind (experience) and Matter (the physical) are inseparable aspects of the same fundamental basic neutral monistic ontology (events, occasions). Reality is a process not a “thing”, a becoming not a “being”. When we talk about particles with properties we are really talking about events with relations (to other events, to the past and to the future).Fourth, matter isn't a manifestation of mind but rather mind is a manifestation of matter. Minds emerge from, are caused by, or are separate from, matter, nonetheless minds are directly attributable to material events. — Graeme M
Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.
— Pfhorrest
No, but it is usually implied by it. — bongo fury
Which direction do you mean that implication to go? — Pfhorrest
In the form of panpsychism I defend the fundamental units of nature are “quantum events occurring in space-time”. In Whitehead’s form of process philosophy “Process and Reality” the most fundamental units are “actual occasions” which invariably have both a mental aspect and physical aspect or pole. The mental or experiential pole has to do with incorporation of elements of the past and possibilities of the future as well as relations to other events (what Whitehead calls prehension). I have a read a lot of presentations of panpsychism and this is the form which I defend. — prothero
Good question! It's the same old problem that philosophers and scientists have been wrestling with for millennia. David Chalmers gave the Mind/Body problem its modern name : The Hard Problem.What problem is it that panpsychism attempts to answer? — Graeme M
The notion that the physical world is an idea (or dream) in the mind of god, is an ancient explanation for the existence of reality. Dreaming was believed to be magical, in the sense that things that don't exist in reality can be conjured up in dreams. That made sense to primitive people, but in our scientific age, we want more details about the hows & whys. In any case, a Creative Mind of some kind has always been the ultimate answer to those basic questions. The only alternative answer atheists have to offer is the shoulder shrug of Multiverse theory : "it is what it is --- don't ask why".maybe something such as the mind of God. — Graeme M
Psyche (soul) was indeed their best explanation for the emergence of Life & Mind from ordinary matter. And Psyche was most closely identified with human consciousness and reasoning ability. But the weakness of Panpsychism is the implication that stones and atoms are conscious of the outside world, including their fellow stones and particles. Yet, again modern thinkers find it hard to believe that dumb rocks have a "life of the mind" . That's why I prefer to use a term that has less religious and philosophical baggage : Information. It's similar to Spinoza's Single Substance of the Universe. And is now thought to be the "basic constituent" of the universe, by some scientists.As I understand it, panpsychism is the claim that mentality (consciousness, experience?) is a basic constituent of the universe. — Graeme M
"Sophistication" may be a better word for the evolution of Mind, than the more common term "Complexity". Information is not just numerically complex, it is integrated and irreducibly structured. The Santa Fe Institute has been studying Complexity for thirty years, and that includes Information Theory. But, as scientists, they were mostly looking into meaningless syntax-only Shannon Information, defined as structure-destroying Entropy. They are now studying meaningful semantic structure-creating Bayesian Information, in pursuit of Big Questions and Hard Problems.Second, minds are expressed to varying degrees of sophistication — Graeme M
True. Mind is not a physical thing, but a process of enforming (making sense of) experience. But in it's generic form as Information, it's an ontological meta-physical "substance" : the essence of Being, not the atoms of Objects.Third, mind is not an actual physical substance — Graeme M
Yes. Mind is a function of the material brain. It's what living brains do. It converts physical sensations into metaphysical concepts. But, according to the Enformationism Thesis, Mind-stuff and Body-stuff are merely different forms of Generic Information (causal, creative, power to enform, energy).Fourth, matter isn't a manifestation of mind but rather mind is a manifestation of matter. — Graeme M
Your hypothetical question answers its own query : Qualia are not "describable and measurable" Quanta. Hence the necessity for a different way to measure and describe Qualia and there role in physical Reality. We need to understand mental Qualia, because they are what gives meaning to life in a material world. :smile:if the problem of qualia were to be resolved in like manner to other physical matters (ie qualia are a describable and measurable physical event), would that undercut the rationale for positing panpsychism? — Graeme M
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