So are you claiming there's some foundation to knowledge? What is it?

Nothing of the sort. I am just pointing out that Wittgenstein starts from assumptions about the nature of truth and knowledge that were common to his niche, but which are not common to philosophy more broadly. His conclusions follow from these assumptions.

If one starts with different assumptions (which presumably might stem from different hinge propositions), then it doesn't seem like Wittgenstein's conclusions will follow. Yet presumably his conclusions are supposed to be universal, covering the whole of epistemology.

For instance, I don't think one has the demonstrate that a faculty of noesis exists in order to point out that presupposing as a given that it doesn't seems unwarranted. So too for the assumptions about the relationship between truth/intelligibility and language.

If one is troubled by Wittgenstein's conclusions the most obvious next question is: "are his premises true? What reasons does he give for us to accept them?"

They certainly don't seem like premises that "must be accepted as the very basis of using language."

I am just pointing out that Wittgenstein starts from assumptions about the nature of truth and knowledge that were common to his niche — Count Timothy von Icarus

Could you expand on that? What assumptions about the nature of truth and knowledge do you think he started with?

The opening of TLP makes several clear. The ones that jumped to mind as problematic are:


"Noesis (a non-discursive, non-linguistic, reflexive grasp of truth) is impossible."
"Truth is strictly a property of propositions,"
"Judgement is only proper to discursive reason, not to simple (reflexive) understanding,"
"Everything and anything is only intelligible and true or false as respects its context in a language or some belief system," ... etc.
"It is not the case that truth is first in things, then in the senses, then in the intellect, and that human language is a sign/symptom of truth, but rather truth is a property of language games."

The term "noesis" has been revived by modern thinkers in a number of ways that are quite different from the term's historical meaning, so perhaps that is a source of confusion here..................................I think it's fairly obvious that Wittgenstein doesn't think such a faculty exists — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not only Wittgenstein, but many modern philosophers don't accept the concept of Transcendental Aprioris, of which noesis is a part.

As described by MR Burgess, noesis is a part of Transcendental Apriorism, a Rationalist doctrine originated by Plato. It proposes that a solitary thinker using pure reason can unlock the deepest mysteries of external reality. This is an epistemological problem, the notion that the pure human intellect, purged of sensory contamination, can transcend the limits of experience to reach a Platonic understanding of reality.

Plato called the highest form of knowing "noesis". In modern terms, insight. Noesis is the highest form of human thought, and allows the mind direct apprehension of universal truths. Noesis is in opposition to dianoia, discursive thinking and analytical explanations. For example, explaining how a car engine works.

Many modern philosophers from Kant onwards, including the Logical Positivists and AJ Ayer, reject Transcendental Apriorism. However, Burgess argues that such rejection has been too cursory, and the theory should begin to be taken more seriously.

Defenders of Transcendental Apriorism will have a difficult task in justifying how a solitary thinker only having access to their sensations and just using pure reason will be able to unlock the mysteries of the reality of an external world. As WH Walsh wrote in Reason and Experience "There seems to be little difficulty in showing that metaphysics in this sense is an impossible undertaking".

(to be continued)

Not only Wittgenstein, but many modern philosophers don't accept the concept of Transcendental Aprioris, of which noesis is a part. — RussellA

I don't think he would accept or reject it. He would say we have no way of definitively answering the question.

"Noesis (a non-discursive, non-linguistic, reflexive grasp of truth) is impossible." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is that line actually in the TLP?

I don't think he would accept or reject it. He would say we have no way of definitively answering the question. — frank

A believer in Transcendental Apriosis is a Rationalist who proposes that a solitary thinker using pure reason can understand reality.

Wittgenstein's hinge propositions are part of the language game. The language game is part of a form of life. A form of life is what society does in the world.

The Rationalist using pure reason could never know a form of life where someone asks of another "bring me a slab"

Surely, for this reason, Wittgenstein would reject Transcendental Apriorism?

A believer in Transcendental Apriosis is a Rationalist who proposes that a solitary thinker using pure reason can understand reality. — RussellA

I think the point of the TLP is to show that when we talk about "understanding reality" in some rarified sense, we're doing something with language that it's not designed for. What sorts of things go on beyond the realm of language? There's nothing to say about that.

In other words, Witt wasn't trying to say that consciousness excludes anything beyond the word circus. He was just pointing out that going on and on about things that are beyond language is foolish.

But what language an archeological text is written in is an empirical question, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure. My point is not about archeology, but about the sentence you are reading now. To doubt that this sentence is in English is to doubt that you understand what this sentence says.

Point being that in order to engage with the text one must first accept certain propositions, even if not explicitly. That this post is in English being one such proposition. Such propositions are good candidates for hinge propositions.

That might not be a prerequisite for thinking but it is probably a prerequisite for replying coherently to this post - for continuing this discussion.

It's perhaps not an axiom, nor self-evident, maybe not even assumed, but it is what we do.

I think the point of the TLP is to show that when we talk about "understanding reality" in some rarified sense, we're doing something with language that it's not designed for. — frank

I think that you are partly right and partly wrong.

Partly wrong in that a Wittgenstein sentence, such as "snow is white", does correspond with the reality of the world. The Tractatus is basically setting out a correspondence theory.

There are two aspects to a Wittgenstein sentence. Simple sentences such as "snow is white" are true when they correspond with facts in the world. Complex sentences, such as "snow is white and trees are green" are true by virtue of the Truth Table.

Partly right in that Wittgenstein is vague in justifying whether a Wittgenstein proposition, such as "Jack believes that Mars is green", do correspond with the reality of the world.

When you talk about consciousness, it depends whether you mean from the point of view of the Rationalist, which includes Transcendental Apriorism, or from the point of view of the Empiricist.

Wittgenstein did not agree with the Rationalists, who believe that concepts and knowledge can come from a solitary thinker using pure reason isolated from contaminated empirical experiences.

Partly wrong in that a Wittgenstein sentence, such as "snow is white", does correspond with the reality of the world. The Tractatus is basically setting out a correspondence theory. — RussellA

There are a lot of interpretations of the TLP, changing in character over time. I don't think any of the various interpreters can claim to have more sway than the others. Witt is so in the category of food for thought.

I came to the TLP from having been immersed in Schopenhauer. It's really obvious that he's responding to Schopenhauer, especially chastening him about getting transcendent in the speculation department.

So I see what you're talking about, but I don't think he's talking in terms of a correspondence that a realist would approve of.

more in a bit

So I see what you're talking about, but I don't think he's talking in terms of a correspondence that a realist would approve of. — frank

I agree, more or less.

It seems to me that there are three main theories of perception: Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism

In the Tractatus, truth is basically a correspondence between language and the world. "Snow is white" is true if snow is white.

In Philosophical Investigations, truth is basically a correspondence between language and its own conditions for being true. "Theft is wrong" is true if theft is wrong.

I agree that Wittgenstein includes references in Tractatus to a "gramophone record" and in Philosophical Investigations to "bring me a slab". These objects exist in our world, which makes one assume his approach is that of Realism.

However, this is not necessarily the case, in that although gramophone records and slabs exist in a world, the question is, where does this world exist. This is something that Wittgenstein is very vague about.

For the Idealist, the world exists in the mind. For the Direct Realist we directly perceive the world and for the Indirect Realist we directly perceive representations of the world.

Wittgenstein in general should not be read from the viewpoints of either Idealism or Realism

Thinking of the "world" as either mind-dependent or mind-independent may not be how to approach Wittgenstein.

Hinges, hinge beliefs and hinge propositions... — Banno

It's the world of hinges.

By the way, I might submit a paper as part of the Philosophy Forum's paper challenge. I'm not sure yet, but I'm working on it. It depends on how lazy I am. :grin:

Here's my abstract for my upcoming paper.

Wittgenstein's Hinges Reimagined

Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) final notes were published posthumously as On Certainty (1969). In these notes, he introduced the concept of hinge propositions (OC 341) as a response to G.E. Moore’s arguments (“Proof of an External World,” 1939) against the radical skeptic. Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification. They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function. This paper reimagines hinges as foundational convictions, namely, as arational certainties that act as a foundational platform that grounds our epistemological language and systems of proof.

Building on this foundation, the paper extends Wittgenstein’s hinges to Kurt Godel’s incompleteness theorems (1931), which demonstrate that any consistent formal system of arithmetic will necessarily contain unprovable statements. Godel’s mathematical discovery parallels Wittgenstein’s hinge insights, revealing the need for system-enabling certainties that ground both frameworks. The problem of infinite regression further illustrates the need for foundational convictions.

This bridges the gap between mathematical formalism and epistemological foundationalism and challenges the notion that any comprehensive proof is possible in either domain. The paper offers a novel approach to understanding the limits and foundations of human knowledge.

If it's helpful, Wittgenstein actually commented on Gödel's work (and Gödel commented very briefly on Wittgenstein's commentary). We've discussed it here before a few times. You might already be aware, but IIRC it was in some ancillary papers, so it is easy to miss.

Ya, but not in the way I'm presenting this issue. I can't find anywhere where someone makes this connection, but I could be wrong.

1) Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification.
2) They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function. — Sam26

These are contradictory statements.

A hinge proposition cannot be both outside the domain of epistemological justification, including justifications such as truth and falsity, and be inside the domain of epistemology justification that enables truth operations.

1) Wittgenstein’s hinges function as indubitable certainties outside the domain of epistemological justification.
2) They differ from traditional propositions by enabling traditional truth operations to function.
— Sam26

These are contradictory statements.

A hinge proposition cannot be both outside the domain of epistemological justification, including justifications such as truth and falsity, and be inside the domain of epistemology justification that enables truth operations. — RussellA

I can see how you might think they're contradictory, but I'm making a subtle distinction about truth, which I believe Wittgenstein is also making. Hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are, i.e., they're beyond the truth-testing game. Their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices. Wittgenstein points out, “It belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted” (On Certainty 342). They’re not conclusions; they’re the ground.

The truth of traditional propositions is tied to evidence or falsifiability. “It’s raining” is true if I look out and see rain; it’s false if I don’t. Hinges can't be meaningfully doubted without collapsing the system. Doubting “The earth exists” isn’t false, it’s nonsensical, as no test could apply outside the framework of everyday epistemological language. Doubt is essential to how we use traditional propositions. “The keys are on the table” invites checking; it’s true or false based on what I find. However, again, the truth of a hinge, which is like a foundational conviction, is indubitable (impossible to doubt, unquestionable).

Hinges are indubitable not because they’re proven beyond doubt but because they’re the foundation of doubting, outside the game of justification. Ordinary propositions play inside that game, subject to the rules hinges silently uphold. Wittgenstein’s move is to say: what Moore calls indubitable truths aren’t truths in the propositional sense. they’re the very backdrop that lets propositional truths get their life.

Think of a conviction, one could hold that it's true without appealing to justification, it's bedrock to a system of beliefs that are justified and true. These truths are essential to how I act in the world, but their function is much different.

If I repeat myself, it's for effect.

The truth of traditional propositions is tied to evidence or falsifiability. “It’s raining” is true if I look out and see rain; it’s false if I don’t. — Sam26

I agree that ordinary propositions are truth apt. For example, "it is raining" is true IFF it is raining

Hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are, i.e., they're beyond the truth-testing game. Their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices. — Sam26

It is not that "hinges aren’t true in the same way that ordinary propositions are", but rather that hinge propositions are not truth-apt at all.

It is not that "their truth is their unshakeable role in our practices", as hinge propositions have no truth.

It is true that in Philosophical Investigations there is a role for hinge propositions in the language game, but here the word "true" refers to the role that the hinge proposition is playing, not to the hinge proposition itself.

The word true shouldn't be applied to a hinge proposition. For example, as in "hinges aren't true in the same way" and "their truth".

Well, we disagree. I think this position is clear and a common misinterpretation of OC.

Well, we disagree. I think this position is clear and a common misinterpretation of OC. — Sam26

Do you have any support in the literature?

There is support, but there is also seeing where his notes are leading us. I've said this before, but let me repeat it. There are two language games of truth in OC. One is the language game of traditional propositions, which can be true or false and require justification. The other language game of truth is one of foundational convictions. The latter convictions are accepted as true and cannot be sensibly doubted. If they can't be doubted, it means they can't be false. Whereas traditional propositions have true/false built into their meaning. These convictions are lived truths built into our actions. They reflect subjective certainties that we all have. If they could be doubted and thus false, knowledge would collapse

The two language games I'm referring to are seen in one use of 'I know.." as an epistemological use, the other use as an expression of a conviction. Something I believe to be an indubitable truth, which doesn't have a justification like normal propositions. There is no justification; it's a lived conviction shown in our actions.

It's ok if people disagree that's just the nature of philosophy.

The two language games I'm referring to are seen in one use of 'I know.." as an epistemological use, the other use as an expression of a conviction. Something I believe to be an indubitable truth, which doesn't have a justification like normal propositions. There is no justification; it's a lived conviction shown in our actions — Sam26

Let me offer two ways of thinking about this distinction between ‘I know’ as epistemological and ‘I know’ as hinge conviction, and you tell me which one you prefer. According to the first way, in both the epistemological and the hinge ‘I know’, truth is a correspondence between what I believe to be the case and what is actually the case. But the hinge ‘I know’ doesn’t have a justification or proof for its conviction that the way things really are corresponds to the way I believe them to be.

In the second way of thinking, only the epistemological ‘I know’ represents my conviction (justifiable or not) that what I believe to be the case corresponds to what is actually the case. The hinge ‘ I know’ is not a conviction that what I believe corresponds with the way things actually are. It functions prior to correspondence, and the split between hypothesis and experience. Both what makes hypothesis and any possible experience that could
validate or falsify it intelligible are already framed by the hinge conviction.

this distinction between ‘I know’ as epistemological and ‘I know’ as hinge conviction, — Joshs

There are different types of "I know". I think I know, I feel I know, I believe I know, I am sure I know. I know I know. IOW, "I know" always comes with the hidden label in the front.

The other language game of truth is one of foundational convictions. The latter convictions are accepted as true and cannot be sensibly doubted. — Sam26

There is a difference in meaning between i) hinge propositions cannot be doubted and ii) hinge propositions are exempt from doubt

Wittgenstein says "exempt from doubt"

OC 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

For example:
i) That Paris is in France cannot be doubted means that we started with a doubt and then concluded that our doubt was baseless.
ii) That Paris is in France is exempt from doubt means that we are not even allowed to doubt at all.

Wittgenstein says "exempt from doubt" — RussellA

There are different types of doubts too i.e. rational doubts based on reasoning, and psychological doubts based on feelings, emotions and beliefs.

When a doubter is psychologically motivated by such as the groundless beliefs or Machiavellianism & Hyper-Competitiveness syndrome, he will not notice or understand the rational side of arguments or knowledge on the facts even with the clear evidence and rational explanations on the matter.

There would be no way to stop him from the doubting unless the causes for the psychological motivations for the doubts are resolved.

There are different types of doubts too i.e. rational doubts based on reasoning, and psychological doubts based on feelings, emotions and beliefs. — Corvus

True, but on a thread about Wittgenstein's On Certainty, the question is, how did Wittgenstein describe doubt?

True, but on a thread about Wittgenstein's On Certainty, the question is, how did Wittgenstein describe doubt? — RussellA

I understand W said that hinge propositions / certainties cannot be doubted or are not allowed doubting. I don't agree with that. Anything and everything can be doubted by the psychologically motivated minds.

If someone decided to doubt whether if the earth exists, or Paris is in France, then there is no way stop him from the doubting. Psychology overrides and takes precedence to reasoning.

I understand W said that hinge propositions / certainties cannot be doubted or not allowed doubting — Corvus

In OC 341 Wittgenstein writes "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn."

"Exempt from doubt" has a different meaning to "cannot be doubted."

Is there anywhere in On Certainty where Wittgenstein writes that hinge propositions cannot be doubted?