"Exempt from doubt" has a different meaning to "cannot be doubted." — RussellA

What is the illocutionary difference between the two expressions?

What is the illocutionary difference between the two expressions? — Corvus

Cannot doubt vs exempt from doubt

My previous example was:

i) That Paris is in France cannot be doubted means that we started with a doubt and then concluded that our doubt was baseless.
ii) That Paris is in France is exempt from doubt means that we are not even allowed to doubt at all.

But in addition - cannot could mean:
i) not allowed - as in you cannot speak in an exam
ii) not able - as in you cannot climb Mount Everest because you are unfit

Exempt could mean
i) not applied - as in food is exempt from vat
ii) not present - as in summer nights are exempt from frost

:ok: Seems to be delicate nuance in the uses, but the gist of the claim seems it is impossible to doubt?

FYI, USA has 23 towns and cities called Paris, and the French government folks could decide to change Paris to "Sartre" or some other names they feel more suitable one day. :)

Seems to be delicate nuance in the uses, but the gist of the claim seems it is impossible to doubt? — Corvus

Not really. "Impossible to doubt" has a different meaning to "exempt from doubt" OC 341

For example, "food is exempt from vat".

How would you replace "exempt" by "impossible" in the above sentence?

@RussellA @Josh

How Are Hinges True?

Hinge propositions, like the earth has existed for more than ten minutes or "I have two hands” —aren’t true in the way we typically think of propositions being true (i.e., through evidence, justification, or correspondence to reality). Wittgenstein’s point in OC is that hinges are the bedrock of our epistemic practices—they’re what we don’t doubt to even start asking questions or justifying anything else (OC 341-343). So, their truth isn’t about being proven; it’s about their role in our forms of life.

Hinges are true in a practical, functional sense—they’re the scaffolding we rely on to play our language games. In OC 94, Wittgenstein says, “I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates.” They’re true because they’re embedded in how we act and think, not because we’ve epistemologically validated them. For example,things don’t vanish randomly (OC 342) isn’t something we test - it’s what lets us test other things.

Their truth comes from being immune to doubt within our system. In OC 115, he writes, “If you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.” Hinges are true in the sense that they’re the ground we stand on—doubting them unravels the whole game, like pulling the tablecloth out from under a dinner party.

Traditional truth often means a proposition matches reality (e.g., “snow is white” is true if snow is, in fact, white). Hinges don’t work that way. “The earth exists” (OC 99) isn’t true because we checked; it’s true because our entire way of living—building houses, farming, launching rockets - assumes it. Their truth is more like a lived certainty, not a verified fact. This is very similar to the rules of chess that allow the game to be played.

Justification, as an epistemological practice, stops at hinges. Wittgenstein says in OC 204, “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.” So, if hinges aren’t epistemologically justified, what kind of truth do they have?

If justification is epistemological, hinges live in a pre-epistemic space. Their truth is a kind of certainty that’s more basic—almost instinctual or animal, as Wittgenstein hints in OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination.” The truth of “I have hands” (OC 153) isn’t argued for—it’s a certainty I live with, like breathing. It’s true because it’s part of the scaffolding of my existence, not because I epistemologically proved or justified it.

How can you have a conviction (OC 102) that's not an expression of something you believe is true? Hinges are true is a matter of pragmatics or a way of acting, it's a different language game. Again, like the rules of chess. Someone might ask you "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" and you reply, "Yes," but does this mean that it's true in an epistemological sense? No,

OC isn't a finished work, so we don't know which passages would have been left in or eliminated.

Hinge propositions, like the earth has existed for more than ten minutes or "I have two hands” —aren’t true in the way we typically think of propositions being true (i.e., through evidence, justification, or correspondence to reality). — Sam26

"It is raining" is true1 IFF it is raining

You say that hinge propositions are true2, where true1 and true2 are different.

But how have true1 and true2 been defined? A proposition that corresponds with a fact is true1. A proposition that is exempt from doubt is true2 (OC 341)

The definition of true1 is well established, and there are many references in the literature. However, the definition of true2 does not seem to be established at all, and I haven't found any references to it in the literature.

It seems that true2 is your personal definition. There is nothing wrong with inventing definitions, in fact I invented the definition "peffel". However, no-one other than me uses it.
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Someone might ask you "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" and you reply, "Yes," but does this mean that it's true in an epistemological sense? No, — Sam26

In other words, "bishops move diagonally" is true IFF bishops move diagonally.

Truth is the relation between the proposition and the fact.

Truth is neither the proposition nor the fact.

For example:
i) That Paris is in France cannot be doubted means that we started with a doubt and then concluded that our doubt was baseless.
ii) That Paris is in France is exempt from doubt means that we are not even allowed to doubt at — RussellA

One way of understanding ‘exempt from doubt’ is the way I suggested here:

In the second way of thinking, only the epistemological ‘I know’ represents my conviction (justifiable or not) that what I believe to be the case corresponds to what is actually the case. The hinge ‘ I know’ is not a conviction that what I believe corresponds with the way things actually are. It functions prior to correspondence, and the split between hypothesis and experience. Both what makes hypothesis and any possible experience that could validate or falsify it intelligible are already framed by the hinge conviction. — Joshs

How would you replace "exempt" by "impossible" in the above sentence? — RussellA

You don't. It was a suggestion for W if he used the word "impossible" rather than "exempt", it would have been clearer in the point.

"Exempt" is normally used for the situation where an object is free from liability, duty or restriction. Hence it seems not a proper word to use for doubt.

My idea is that you can doubt on anything and everything if you choose to do so. Even the fact "Paris in France." could be doubted under the simple syllogism.

Names of cities could be changed into some other name through time.
Paris is a name of the city.
Paris could be changed into some other name through time..

which implies Paris might not be in France sometime in the future. (weak doubt for the possibility in the future = still a doubt).

The use of "true" with the lowest common denominator is that given by a T-sentence.

Being a hinge proposition is a role in a language game. Doubting is a language game or a part of a language game. Being a hinge proposition is being unavailable for doubt in the language games being played. Language games are not discrete - does that need saying?

Some hinge propositions are of the form "...counts as...", and as such their role is in setting up the language game. "The piece that only moves diagonally counts as a bishop"; "This counts as a hand"; "'P' counts as true if and only if P". These sentences set up being a bishop in Chess, being a hand in ontology, and being a true sentence in epistemology.

Are all hinges of this form? I'm not sure. You decide. Have a look at propositions you think are hinges and see if they fit, and if they do not, ask if it is because they are not analysable as "...counts as..." or becasue they are not hinges.

Notice that one can form a T-sentence for any proposition, hinge or otherwise. There is no special nature of truth peculiar to hinge propositions. Again, being a hinge proposition is something we do with a proposition when we use it to set up a language game.

This is how truth and hinge propositions work.

My idea is that you can doubt on anything and everything if you choose to do so. Even the fact "Paris in France." could be doubted under the simple syllogism. — Corvus

"Exempt" is normally used for the situation where an object is free from liability, duty or restriction. Hence it seems not a proper word to use for doubt. — Corvus

In a language game are ordinary propositions such as "it is raining" and hinge propositions such as "here is one hand".

All ordinary propositions can be doubted. I say "it is raining". You say "are you sure?"

The whole point of a hinge proposition is that it is exempt from being doubted. Doubting a hinge proposition cannot even be considered.

Both what makes hypothesis and any possible experience that could validate or falsify it intelligible are already framed by the hinge conviction. — Joshs

:up: Continuing:

For example, in a language game, "here is one hand and the hand is holding a mug of coffee", "here is one hand" is the hinge proposition and "the hand is holding a mug of coffee" is the ordinary (non-hinge) proposition.

Being an ordinary proposition, "the hand is holding a mug of coffee " can be true or false, depending on whether or not it corresponds with what is actually the case in the world.

But the truth-aptness of this ordinary proposition is only intelligible if the language game has been founded on a hinge proposition.

Because, if a language game was not founded on a hinge proposition, and there were no hinge propositions, then the meaning of each expression would depend on its context within the language game.

IE, the meaning of "the hand" would depend on its context "the hand is holding a mug of coffee", and the meaning of "holding a mug of coffee" would depend on its context "the hand is holding a mug of coffee". Although this language game might be perfectly coherent, it would be ultimately be nonsensical.

For a language game to make sense, within the language game there must be something extra-linguistic that founds the language game within the world, and these things are the hinge propositions.

Hinge propositions are extra-linguistic, even they they are part of the language game.

:ok: :up:

The T-sentence assumes a proposition’s truth is about whether the content matches reality, but hinges aren’t evaluated like that. In OC 205, Wittgenstein says the ground (hinges) isn’t true or false—it’s just the ground. “The earth has existed for a long time” (OC 85) isn’t true because we’ve checked it against reality—it’s true because it’s a hinge, a certainty we don’t doubt. The T-sentence (“‘The earth has existed for a long time’ is true if and only if the earth has existed for a long time”) doesn’t capture this. It’s a formal equivalence, but it misses the lived role of the hinge as a conviction we act on. Hinges don't play this formal game.

The truth for hinges is pragmatic, not formal. Wittgenstein ties truth to our forms of life, not to logical definitions. In OC 241, he says truth and falsity depend on our shared language, our forms of life, not on a formal standard like the T-sentence. Thetruth of “I have hands” isn’t in a T-sentence; it’s how I live: I use my hands every day, and I don’t doubt them. In OC 204, he says our acting is what matters. The T-sentence is too abstract, it doesn’t get at the pragmatic, action-based nature of hinges’ truth.

The language game of hinges is different. The game of truth for empirical propositions (“It’s raining,” check the window) is different from the game of truth for hinges. In OC 243, he says, “One says ‘I know’ when one is ready to give compelling ground - but with hinges, there is no such possibility.” Hinges don’t play the game of justification or demonstration. They’re certainties we live by. The T-sentence assumes a single game of truth, but Wittgenstein’s approach is more pluralistic. The truth of hinges is a different game—one of lived certainty, not formal equivalence.

Not all hinges fit the "counts as" mold (if that's your point @Banno): "The Earth has existed for more than 10 minutes" or "Objects don't vanish randomly" are background certainties (convictions), not rule-setting propositions. I think Wittgenstein's pragmatism captures the truth of these certainties and fits our life forms much better.

We treat hinges as true for practical reasons. And the fact that they're not doubted demonstrates they don't play the true/false game. We accept them as true, period.

I suspect that hinges refer to what Frege called "taking as true".

For example, I often "take it as true" that my colour judgements are synonymous with the optical colours, due to learning the colors by ostensive definition; in spite of the fact that the definition of the optical colours makes no mention of my color judgements.

If this is the case, then hinges represent an extension of thought from Wittgenstein's earlier remarks in relation to private language, and possible represent a footnote to, or even an attack on, Frege's anti-psychologism that sought to clearly delineate truth from "taking as true".

I'm not sure I haven't read Frege's account. I suspect that it might be similar in some respects but dissimilar in others. I'm guessing.

We treat hinges as true for practical reasons. And the fact that they're not doubted demonstrates they don't play the true/false game. We accept them as true, period. — Sam26

There are many different definitions of "truth" (SEP - Truth)

Wittgenstein did not consider the hinge proposition as being true.

OC 204 Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.
OC 205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false.

What definition of truth are you using when you say that hinge propositions are "true"?

The whole point of a hinge proposition is that it is exempt from being doubted. Doubting a hinge proposition cannot even be considered. — RussellA

What are the philosophical / epistemological / logical grounds for hinge propositions being exempt from doubt?

What are the philosophical / epistemological / logical grounds for hinge propositions being exempt from doubt? — Corvus

What does "hapa kuna mkono mmoja na katika mkono huu kuna kikombe" mean?

I can tell you that this is a coherent language, where each part is fully in context with all the other parts of the sentence.

The question is, where is the key that unlocks the meaning of the whole?

Can the key be found inside the text, or can it only be found outside the text?

Only if the meaning of each part was exempt from doubt in your mind could you understand the meaning of the whole.

Any part whose meaning is exempt from doubt in your mind can be called a hinge proposition.

Wittgenstein is not referring to traditional theories of truth - like the correspondence (matches reality) or coherence theories (fits within a system of beliefs). These may work for empirical propositions like "It is raining." Hinges are about lived truths, i.e., how we act without doubting. If you're stuck with traditional ideas, then you'll never see this. Wittgenstein is thinking outside the box of traditional ideas of epistemology. These truths are outside epistemology, they give life to epistemology, which means they give life to our ideas of justification and truth. Without these truths/convictions, there would be no talk of propositional truth. So, it's very pragmatic, and they lie at the very bottom of our forms of life. If you doubt what's bedrock, everything collapses. If you're looking for a definition, especially a traditional one, you won't find one.

They're a pragmatic lived foundational/bedrock truths, but without the possibility of being false, i.e., doubted. Remember, if you doubt the truth or falsity of a traditional proposition, you're challenging one of the true/false paradigms. Hinges are beliefs accepted without question. If you doubt them, nothing follows, even the questions fall apart.

What are the philosophical / epistemological / logical grounds for hinge propositions being exempt from doubt? — Corvus

I guess you could doubt them, you just exit the language game when you do.

Only if the meaning of each part was exempt from doubt in your mind could you understand the meaning of the whole.

Any part whose meaning is exempt from doubt in your mind can be called a hinge proposition.

Maybe I am misunderstanding the point here. It seems to me that we misunderstand and misuse words all the time. Someone might confuse an uncommon word like "dearth" with "surfeit," when it means the opposite. They might even use the word in this way (hell, I've done this lol). Yet eventually we might come to doubt the meaning of the part if it is behaving strangely (e.g. if the context implies an alternative meaning).

But to 's point, which perhaps you will disagree with, it hardly seem that this should mean exiting the "language game" unless "language game" is rather carefully defined (and I fear this would have to be done in an ad hoc manner).

When Descartes starts doubting away in the Meditations, he doesn't stop writing in French. We live in the aftermath of massive efforts to standardize dialects and spelling, where universal compulsory education has ironed out a lot of divergence, but from what I understand it was quite possible to have doubts about understanding text or speech in some close dialect, to be unsure if one had grasped the meaning quite right, particularly if one knew the broader language (as opposed to dialect) as a second language. Italy for instance is rather famous for this and there are some jokes about it in old literature.

You can still sort of get this experience in Scotland or Jamaica, or even moreso in pidgin dialects. Or, for a less expensive experience, go read the BBC Pidgin page. You will understand some, not understand other parts, and be unsure about others: https://www.bbc.com/pidgin

Donald Trump tok say im "no dey joke" wen e say im wan do third term as US president.

Di US Constitution say "no body... go dey elected more dan twice", but some Trump supporters don suggest say ways fit dey around am.

Wen dem ask am for one interview wit NBC about di possibility of seeking a third term for di White House, Trump say "methods dey on how to run am".

"I no dey joke... plenty pipo want make I do am," e add. "But, I just dey tell dem say, we still get long way to go, you know, e still dey very early for di administration."

Dem ask Trump, wey go be 82 at di end of im second term, e go wan continue dey serve for "di toughest job for di kontri".

Written pidgin is probably not the best example though. I feel like it's pretty intelligible to English-speakers. Spoken is an entirely different story, and very much in a grey zone (for me at least).

What are the philosophical / epistemological / logical grounds for hinge propositions being exempt from doubt?
— Corvus

I guess you could doubt them, you just exit the language game when you do — frank

In order to doubt anything, one must rely on that which is beyond doubt. In other words, one cannot exit all language games and still be capable of doubting.

, I often "take it as true" that my colour judgements are synonymous with the optical colours, due to learning the colors by ostensive definition; in spite of the fact that the definition of the optical colours makes no mention of my color judgements. — sime

Doesn’t this kind of truth depend on a comparison or correspondence, even if only ‘taken as’ correct, between color judgement and optical colors?

Some hinge propositions are of the form "...counts as...", and as such their role is in setting up the language game. "The piece that only moves diagonally counts as a bishop"; "This counts as a hand"; "'P' counts as true if and only if P". — Banno

Is this what’s called anaphoric or prosentential logic? I’m
thinking of Brandom here.

In order to doubt anything, one must rely on that which is beyond doubt. In other words, one cannot exit all language games and still be capable of doubting. — Joshs

Apparently you can't doubt that you exist (in some sense).

Apparently you can't doubt that you exist (in some sense). — frank

It's logically impossible to doubt that you exist. Doubting your existence shows your existence. :grin:

Can other animals or babies doubt?

I would think not, although it would depend on how we define doubt. I do think they can confused and usure, have misapprehensions, or "second guess themselves" though. Doubt, to me, would require some distinction between reality and appearances, but also the knowledge of beliefs as true or false, making it properly intellectual.

However, a sort of sensuous misapprehension/confusion seems analogous to proper, intellectual doubt. And there the same seems true. You cannot experience this towards everything at once. Some background of sensuous intelligibility would be needed, else it would be sheer confusion, something like the results of a concussion or stroke.

No. Quite distinct.

Might be interesting to do a thread on Davidson's approach to meaning. I'll think about it.

The T-sentence assumes a proposition’s truth is about whether the content matches reality, but hinges aren’t evaluated like that. — Sam26

Well, no, T-sentences are not just a reinvention of correspondence. The sentence on the left might not have any correspondence at all, and yet the T-sentence would be true:

"The goat is a democracy" is true IFF the goat is a democracy

Usually a T- sentence is treated extensionally. That's probably enough for here. There are however, intensional treatments that use them. in Montague semantics this is fairly straight forward, but in constructivist treatment it would be more interesting - something like "S" is true ↔∃p(p is a proof of S), perhaps
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The trick is to avoid saying that hinge propositions are not truth apt while at the same time saying that they are true... as here:

Wittgenstein says the ground (hinges) isn’t true or false—it’s just the ground. — Sam26

then

it’s true because it’s a hinge — Sam26

See the problem? And the answer is the role take on by the hinge...

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

It's what we do.

Notice the difference in direction, the change from word-to-world to world-to-word. The world is changes so that "hand" refers to this, so that bishops only move diagonally, and so that "P" is true only if P.

Notice also that what we say is amongst the things that we do. Saying, and hence propositional knowledge, is a sub-class of doing, and hence know-that is a sub class of (parasitic on...) know-how.

Notice also that what we do can be put into a propositional form - usually first-order. Hinges can be put into propositional form, and also have a realisation in what we do. Hence, again PI§201 - there is both a way of saying that this is a hand and a way of doing with hands.

The language game of hinges is different. — Sam26

There is no "language game of hinges". Being a hinge is a role in a language game, it's what we do in order to be able to "play".

"The Earth has existed for more than 10 minutes" — Sam26

This is a hinge becasue we assume it in order to continue on with the game - to deal with the Earth in our usual way, "the Earth" counts as something that has been around for a very long time. So the car you recall parking in the garage will be found in the garage. "Objects don't vanish randomly" might render as "to count as an object is to have relative permanency" - and the role here is to rule out some things as objects...

We treat hinges as true for practical reasons. — Sam26

Yes; and moreover, we only get to do stuff becasue we take certain things as indubitable. The alternative is solipsistic catatonia.

Hinge propositions are extra-linguistic, even they they are part of the language game. — RussellA

But all language games are embedded in the world; the counting of apples involves apples and charts, the building involves blocks and slabs. It is not peculiar to hinge propositions to be about how things are - all propositions do that.

But all language games are embedded in the world; the counting of apples involves apples and charts, the building involves blocks and slabs. It is not peculiar to hinge propositions to be about how things are - all propositions do that. — Banno

The language game that includes the sentence "Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street" is embedded in a world of literature rather than a world outside literature.

It seems that Wittgenstein agrees that there is a world but never specifies exactly where this world exists.

My understanding is that in a sentence such as "here is one hand and in the hand is a mug and in the mug is an elephant", not only is every part a hinge proposition but also every part can form a T-sentence.

Each part, i) "Here is one hand", ii) "in the hand is a mug" and iii) "in the mug is an elephant" has to be a hinge proposition in order to allow the rest of the language game to take place.

That a language game is embedded in the world means that there is a correspondence between the language game and the world. If the language game was not embedded in the world, then there could be no correspondence between the language game and the world.

That there is a correspondence means that the T-sentence can be formed from each part, i) "here is one hand" is true IFF here is one hand. ii) "in the hand is a mug" is true IFF in the hand is a mug, iii) "in the mug is an elephant" is true IFF in the mug is an elephant.

In a T-sentence, what does "true" mean? It seems to mean that in the event that something is the case in the world, something does obtain in the world or something is a fact in the world, then that fact can be described by language.