My first reaction is that of course there need be nothing in common between the various language games. — Banno

If there are variable language games, are there also variable human forms of life that play those games, or is there but one?

If there are many, then we cannot know who shares our form, and so we cannot know that we are playing a language game at all. My conversation with a parrot isn't public use.

If you say there is only one human form of life, then that belief must itself be a hinge, because we cannot derive it from language use (which presupposes it), and we cannot claim to know it empirically without violating Wittgenstein’s broader rejection of a metaphysical correspondence theory.

If there are variable language games, are there also variable human forms of life that play those games, or is there but one? — Hanover

I’ve always thought that language games and forms of life were synonymous.

If there are many, then we cannot know who shares our form, and so we cannot know that we are playing a language game at all. My conversation with a parrot isn't public use. — Hanover

I beleive there are many. But if so, how did Wittgenstein come to know that there are language games? Perhaps from the experience of initially finding a set of discursive practices within a foreign community to be incoherent, and then later learning how to engage with that form of life. This may have led him to surmise that if the sense of meaning of word use is only contingently grounded within a particular language game, then even within that game, reference to pre-existing rules and criteria of meaning of words do not guarantee how they will be understood.

With regard to my conversation with a parrot (or with an A.I.), to the extent that I claim that I understand the parrot and the parrot understands me, I must be drawing from some already available normative discursive structure of meaning, which is likely to come from the language games I share with my human discursive community. Isnt this what we do when we interpret our pet’s behaviors in anthropomorphic terms? Which is not to say that we can’t enter into a language game directly with our pet dog.

What I would like to do is develop an epistemology based on JTB, but with a Wittgensteinian twist - for example, demonstrating how our methods of justification apply across various language games within our form of life. — Sam26

What’s you think is the difference between a language game and a form of life?

, I picture language games as more or less discreet, seperate enterprises. The examples are things like the builders calling for a block, buying an apple, and so on. A form of life is an aggregation of these.

So, not synonymous.

And calling for a block or buying an apple would look more or less the same, in various different cultures.

Consider Quine's Gavagai as a language game. Identifying the referent of "Gavagai" perhaps doesn't much matter, provided you participate int he hunt and get your share of the stew.

If there are variable language games, are there also variable human forms of life that play those games, or is there but one? — Hanover

Wittgenstein’s form of life refers to shared practices, behaviors, and instinctive foundations that make meaning possible, and this is true whether cultural (like rituals) or universal (like pain reactions). These forms of life give rise to distinct language games, viz., rule-governed and flexible ways of speaking within these activities (e.g., science, chess, or humor). Forms of life vary across cultures and domains; it’s crucial to stress that not all are rigidly rule-bound; some are organic (e.g., grieving), and boundaries often blur. There is no single, overarching form of life for Wittgenstein. I believe he rejects the idea of a universal logic or framework underpinning all language and meaning. Instead, meaning emerges from multiple and diverse forms of life, each with its own internal rules or norms. For instance, the language games of religious belief and scientific proof operate differently, with no master form to reconcile them. While overlaps exist (e.g., counting in math and carpentry), these practices resist being flattened into one system. I guess you could say the key takeaway is pluralism: meaning is always local, grounded in the practical and contextual ways we live and speak.

↪Hanover, ↪Joshs I picture language games as more or less discreet, seperate enterprises. The examples are things like the builders calling for a block, buying an apple, and so on. A form of life is an aggregation of these.

So, not synonymous.

And calling for a block or buying an apple would look more or less the same, in various different cultures. — Banno

Perhaps a form of life can be understood via Witt’s description of a family of resemblances, which ties together discrete games on the basis of commonalities that are intertwined but not reducible to a single shared thread:

66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' "—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!—Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball­games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they all 'amusing'?

Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.— And I shall say: 'games' form a family.

Perhaps a form of life can be understood via Witt’s description of a family of resemblances, which ties together discrete games on the basis of commonalities that are intertwined but not reducible to a single shared thread: — Joshs

Yep. Quite agree.

Here are all the mentions on PI:

19. It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and
reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions and
expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others.——
And to imagine a language means to imaginea form of life.


241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is
true and what is false?"—It is what human beings say that is true and
false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in
opinions but in form of life.

i
One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy,
startled. But hopeful? And why not?
A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his
master will come the day after to-morrow?—And what can he not do
here?—How do I do it?—How am I supposed to answer this?
Can only those hope who can talk? (only those who have mastered
the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes
of this complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of
human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write.)

And from OC:

357. One might say: " 'I know' expresses comfortable certainty, not the certainty that is still struggling."

358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.)

So not synonymous with "language game", but more the ground on which they take place.

for example, demonstrating how our methods of justification apply across various language games within our form of life. — Sam26

My OP on two ways to do philosophy is along these lines.

Explanation - or justification - requires a contrast between what is explained and the explanation. For an explanation to function it must take what is being explained as granted - an explanation as to why the wasabi plants are thriving grants that the wasabi plants are thriving. The explanation explains and accepts something external to itself.

What our explanations - justifications - have in common is that there is something to justify. What our language games have in common is that they are embedded in the world, and together they make a form of life.

This strikes me as backdooring the beetle back in. The lion's language is meaningless not because it's gibberish, but it's because he doesn't share our form of life. This means it's not langauge misuse that identifies his seperate life form, but it's his thought processes brought about by some metaphysical difference in the lion.

If we're going to rely upon metaphysical similarity to create meaningful language, why not leave it at the beetle?

If there are many, then we cannot know who shares our form, and so we cannot know that we are playing a language game at all. — Hanover

Yes, and we certainly cannot know that we are playing the same language game as someone else.

Could dolphins have a form of life so different to our own that we could not understand it?

If so, how would we recognise it as a 'form of life"?

Explanation - or justification - requires a contrast between what is explained and the explanation. For an explanation to function it must take what is being explained as granted - an explanation as to why the wasabi plants are thriving grants that the wasabi plants are thriving. The explanation explains and accepts something external to itself.

What our explanations - justifications - have in common is that there is something to justify. What our language games have in common is that they are embedded in the world, and together they make a form of life — Banno

Are language games explanations-justifications or are they structures of intelligibility providing the criteria for justification?

Could dolphins have a form of life so different to our own that we could not understand it? — Banno

Yes.

If so, how would we recognise it as a 'form of life"? — Banno

We couldn't. We'd assume it, but it could be a robot. You and I could be differing forms of life. It's assumed many humans don't share forms of life. You also could be a bot.

We assume we are similar forms of life. It's a hinge belief. This is a metaphysical assumption. It's the Cartesian solution. God would not so deceive us.

My point is I'd rather not play the Wittgenstein game and just assume my beetle is yours. Metaphysically the same.

Seems to be pretty much the question I asked here:

that not all language games involve justification. — Banno

However, language games are embedded and make use of stuff in the world - apples and blocks and so on. Hence they presume the world is a certain way - that it contains blocks and apples.

So I think the general point remains, even if not all langauge games are explanations-justifications.

What do you think?

We assume we are similar forms of life. — Hanover

I don't think that quite right. We might participate in a form of life or a language game, without sucha n assumption.

Hence my reference to the Gavagai example. We don;t have to assume that Gavagai means "un-detached rabbit part" in order to participate in the hunt and the feast.

Hence my reference to the Gavagai example. We don;t have to assume that Gavagai means "un-detached rabbit part" in order to participate in the hunt and the feast. — Banno

But how do you link this to form of life? Differing languages don't exclude similar life forms. The French and the English can have differing forms of life.

If social interaction dictated form of life, then a loyal dog that returns with prey shares a form of life.

Form of life is feeling like a deus ex machina.

The Gavagai thought experiment is of a linguist attempting an interpretation of a language. The point is that the linguist doesn't need to decide the referent of "Gavagai" in order to participate in the form of life consisting partially of the hunt and the feast.

We don't need determinate meaning to get on with the language games nor with the forms of life.

It's possible someone else asked, and some answer was given, but i'm personally interested in how you get from "stuff" to "blocks" without already playing the game? I say that because this seems to divorce objects from the language about them while using language about them.
That doesn't seem quite available here?

but i'm personally interested in how you get from "stuff" to "blocks" without already playing the game? — AmadeusD

To play the game is to move blocks and apples around. What counts as a block or an apple is constituted by the game, as much as prior to the game.

Thanks. So, I see two points here:

1. Manipulating the world is playing the game; and
2. Naming objects one manipulates is part of the game (this can be read in two directions. I've arbitrary chosen one as a possible reading).

The former point, yes 100% get you there. More or less agree too.
The second point I can't quite grok. Is this to say that the operation of non-language to language (i.e pointing and slapping the X, to "Slab!") is also part of the game?

I don't think I get that from Witt or other concepts of language use/games.

Pointing already is a language game.

It's only a block so far as it participated in the game of building.

This is of course quite contrary to the view that there are already blocks outside of the language game.

However, language games are embedded and make use of stuff in the world - apples and blocks and so on. Hence they presume the world is a certain way - that it contains blocks and apples — Banno

I don’t know that Witt would want to separate the perception of things from the things themselves. He discusses this in relation to the duck-rabbit drawing in his analysis of what it means to ‘see something as’. Rather than our perception being an interpretation or perception of something external to it (a pre-existing something), the ‘seeing as’ is fundamental.

I think I agree.

But I walk away from "perception" because it is seen as private. Seems to me that form a Wittgensteinian perspective, perception as a private experience drops out of the language game.

That is, roughly, that if what counts as a block is constituted by the language game, then so is what is perceived as a block.

Neither the block nor the perception of block are outside of the game.

Not as clear as I'd like. This is not to say that there is nothing more than language. There certainly are blocks.

Ahh I see. Ok, that's quite clear for me now. I don't quite think i'd agree, but yeah very clear. Thanks

Edit:

perception as a private experience drops out of the language game — Banno

Even clearer .

Wow.

Cheers.

Think that made my day.

If not sarcasm, you're very welcome :)

No, just pleased to get a bit of harmony.

It's a rare thing.

Pointing already is a language game.

It's only a block so far as it participated in the game of building.

This is of course quite contrary to the view that there are already blocks outside of the language game. — Banno

This is not to say that there is nothing more than language. There certainly are blocks. — Banno

These two come off as contradictory:
1. There are only blocks within the game of building.
2. There is more than language; there certainly are blocks.

Does it clarify to say instead “there certainly are things outside of language games, it’s just that they are not ‘blocks’ until we bring them into a game such as building.”

The Gavagai thought experiment is of a linguist attempting an interpretation of a language. The point is that the linguist doesn't need to decide the referent of "Gavagai" in order to participate in the form of life consisting partially of the hunt and the feast.

We don't need determinate meaning to get on with the language games nor with the forms of life. — Banno

But this doesn't address the meta element of the form of life, which is critical to holding the system together. The Wittgensteinian enterprise is to dispense with the relevance of the metaphysical as the foundation of meaning, but if it creeps back in, then it has failed.

To address the form of life in your Gavagai example would require a linguist who is attempting to interpret the language not of a foreign people but of a lion. The lion represents the being with a differing form of life, who, per Wittgenstein's clear statement, we would not understand. The Gavagai example is no different from French to English to German. That is, all those folks share a form of life. We're looking for those who don't.

Consider AI. You can speak back and forth with AI, with full understanding, but I submit you are not playing a language game with ChatGPT. It is a lion. It lacks your form of life. What this means is that there is a metaphysical anchor to meaning. It is use by something like you. What is like you isn't decipherable by simply looking at the person, the lion, or the dolphin. It is something inherent within that being that processes like or not like you. If not, you are left with a convincing parrot, lion, AI program, or Searle's Chinese speakers as playing language games, which they are not.

So my problem here is that if we're going to say that we're taking as a hinge belief the uniformity of thought processes among various people, why not just make it a hinge belief that we truly have the same beetle metaphysically. If we're going to reduce this down to an object of foundation/hinge/faith, why choose one method over the other?

That works for me!