In either case, could you point me in the direction of where either or both were said/where I can find these? And/or other referenced denials? — Kevin
At the very beginning of B&T, Sartre famously quotes him in the intro to his Being and Nothingness. I don't remember where he denied it, but it was commonly discussed among students of his. I clearly remember the matter coming up in class, over fifty years ago. The response from the instructor was "he made a mistake." — Gary M Washburn
We do not fear being dead. [...] "Idle talk" is far more genuinely what language really is. — Gary M Washburn
I seem to recall a note in BT in which he says Sartre misunderstood him in "existentia precedes essentia" or "existence precedes essence" — Kevin
Where's the difference? — David Mo
In my opinion Heidegger realized that Sartre was drawing his own conclusions from existentialism, which he found unbearable. Sartre was probably using the concepts in his own way. I don't see anything wrong with that. Rather, I find Sartre far more digestible than Heidegger (Leaving Critique of Dialectical Reason aside). — David Mo
At the beginning of section #9 of Being and Time, Heidegger makes a nice word game between essentia, existenze, existentia, being, being-present-hand and others that may end your patience. If you resist — David Mo
Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. — waarala
I had mentioned the problem of the various verbal games with the concept of "existence" and "essence" and you don't even mention them. Where are we going? — David Mo
But Heidegger doesn't think of it as "perverted" or "wrong."
— Xtrix
What kind of question is this? — David Mo
Heidegger repeatedly accuses Western philosophy with negative concepts that imply falsity in many ways, — David Mo
The term "misinterpretation" applied to Western philosophy appears from the first pages (7/10) and throughout the work. — David Mo
Heidegger understands truth as aletheia. He describes it with various words that refer to a revelation or unveiling of the concealed. (Very poetic). Cf. Being and Time (223/265). That's what I'm talking about. I don't know what other sense you're talking about. — David Mo
Exactly. Philosophers of the last 2,500 are right within the scope of "presencing."
— Xtrix
I don't know what scope that is. What do you mean by "presence"? — David Mo
Heidegger is explicitly referring to the realm of that mysterious stuff called Being. At least it can be said that this Being is universal. He says so. He does not mention a restricted scope, — David Mo
Heidegger is explicitly referring to the realm of that mysterious stuff called Being. — David Mo
I see no difference - just can't recall the exact wording of the quote/note. — Kevin
By way of contrast, Sartre expresses the basic tenet of existentialism in this way: Existence precedes essence. In this statement he is taking existentia and essentia according to their metaphysical meaning, which from Plato's time on has said that essenria precedes existentia. Sartre reverses this statement. But the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement — Heideger, Ibid, p. 250
Commenting Heidegger's "verbal games" (p. 42): In the traditional metaphysics there is an important basic distinction between essence (what) and existence ("that"). This distinction can't be applied to Dasein (living subject). Dasein's "essence" is its "to be"* i.e. its essence seems to be its existence. But here existence can't be understood traditionally as present-at-hand because this type of being doesn't apply to Dasein's (living subject) being. So, Dasein's existence is Existence and non-Dasein's existence is present-at-hand. — waarala
And all the examples I gave you? Have you read them?"Falsity" in the sense of being concealed, covering-over, and forgetting. — Xtrix
You yourself are saying that the term being applies to all things. Therefore it is universal and we cannot find a "scope" that is restrictive. It is not the same as Newtonian and Einsteinian physics, which apply to different fields of reality. The metaphysical error will always be an error about the totality and we cannot say that it is an error for a certain field of objects, but not for another one. Metaphysics is the science of being as being. At least in its ontological sense, which is the one followed by Heidegger.Being isn't a being, and it isn't in some mysterious "realm." It's any being whatsoever. It's the "is-ness" of any thing. — Xtrix
I'm afraid you still haven't explained what the terms existence and essence in Heidegger mean. You vaguely allude to the meanings in traditional metaphysics such as what and that. That can mean anything — David Mo
Deteriorated, dogmatic, concealment, misinterpretation, deformation, to destroy our genuine relation to things.
These are Heidegger's words. — David Mo
Being isn't a being, and it isn't in some mysterious "realm." It's any being whatsoever. It's the "is-ness" of any thing.
— Xtrix
You yourself are saying that the term being applies to all things. Therefore it is universal and we cannot find a "scope" that is restrictive. — David Mo
Plato was not a metaphysician or an ontologist. He was a dramatist. Scholars universally miss this. — Gary M Washburn
I think Heidegger is suggesting that we cannot think of essence and existence in the same way when applied to humans as when thinking about things/objects/concepts. — Kevin
Metaphysics can't think Being because the distinction essence-existence and all constructions based on it "hides" Being (through/in these constructions). Being remains evasive for metaphysics. — waarala
And without context, just that -- words. As I mentioned, from my reading these statements are almost always made in reference to translations of words and how the question of "Being" has been lost. — Xtrix
And without context, just that -- words. — Xtrix
We have shown at the outset (Section 1) not only that the question of the meaning of Being is one that has not been attended to and one that has been inadequately formulated, but that it has become quite forgotten in spite of all our interest in 'metaphysics'. Greek ontology and its history which, in their numerous filiations and distortions, determine the conceptual character of philosophy even today-prove that when Dasein understands either itself or Being in general, it does so in terms of the 'world', and that the ontology which has thus arisen has deteriorated [ verfallt] to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident -merely material for reworking, as it was for Hegel. In the Middle Ages this uprooted Greek ontology became a fixed body of doctrine. Its systematics, however, is by no means a mere joining together of traditional pieces into a single edifice. Though its basic conceptions of Being have been taken over dogmatically from the Greeks, a great deal of unpretentious work has been carried on further within these limits. With the peculiar character which the Scholastics gave it, Greek ontology has, in its essentials, travelled the path that leads through the Disputationes metaphysicae of Suarez to the 'metaphysics' and transcendental philosophy of modern times, determining even the foundations and the aims of Hegel's 'logic'. In the course of this history certain distinctive domains of Being have come into view and have served as the primary guides for subsequent problematics : the ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, the "I", reason, spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their Being and its structure, in accordance with the thoroughgoing way in which the question of Being has been neglected. It is rather the case that the categorial content of the traditional ontology has been carried over to these entities with corresponding formalizations and purely negative restrictions, or else dialectic has been called in for the purpose of interpreting the substantiality of the subject ontologically.
If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being-the ways which have guided us ever since. — Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 22/43-44
In the traditional metaphysics there is an important basic distinction between essence (what) and existence ("that"). This distinction can't be applied to Dasein (living subject). Dasein's "essence" is its "to be"*
[...]
"The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein] . Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia) .
[...]
The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand ; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that." — waarala
I'm afraid waraala's attempt is not very helpful. — David No
I think Heidegger is suggesting that we cannot think of essence and existence in the same way when applied to humans as when thinking about things/objects/concepts.
When he says the essence of a person lies in his/her "to be," he is referring to possibilities for being, possibilities which are already determined and possibilities that, as some are realized, others are closed off - new possibilities are re-determined.
It's become clear I will never be a basketball player, but that was sort of clear when I was a kid. — Kevin
Almost all philosophy, except for the most dogmatic positivist, distinguishes between the mode of existence of beings in general and that of the human being. — David Mo
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