Let us pass to a specific context. We can analyze this text of Heidegger and you would have the opportunity to explain that Heidegger doesn't say that Western metaphysics is wrong ant that we shouldn't "destroy" it to regain the true way of Being. — David Mo
Exactly. Philosophers of the last 2,500 are right within the scope of "presencing."
— Xtrix
I don't know what scope that is. What do you mean by "presence"?
— David Mo
That's a great question. There's plenty to talk about there. He has a lot to say in Being and Time about the "present-at-hand" relations to things in the world. This is the "mode" in which he believes nearly all philosophy has dwelled -- by seeing things as present before us, as substances or objects. This is the connection to the "time" part of the title -- that Being gets "interpreted" from the perspective of time. (Namely, the present.) — Xtrix
Being isn't a being, and it isn't in some mysterious "realm." It's any being whatsoever. It's the "is-ness" of any thing.
— Xtrix
You yourself are saying that the term being applies to all things. Therefore it is universal and we cannot find a "scope" that is restrictive.
— David Mo
Substance. Or God. Or nature. All interpretations of Being, and all restrictive in their interpretations.
Being itself isn't restricted to any class of entities.
Heidegger has an entire chapter on this, titled "The Restriction of Being." He goes through four of them: being and becoming, being and seeming, being and thinking, being and the ought. This is how being has been historically interpreted and "set apart" from something else. Being "and not", etc. — Xtrix
I don't know why you say this translation is "correct". From what I've read it's pretty controversial. Not to mention the fact that in the index of Stambaugh’s translation you can see that he keeps the term "destruction". Anyway…In that paragraph Heidegger doesn't use the verb "destroy" but noun "Destruktion". Stambaugh translates this correctly "destructuring". — waarala
When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn.
(…)
The destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation.
(…)
Here Kant shrinks back, as it were, in the face of something which must be brought to light as a theme and a principle if the expression "Being" is to have any demonstrable meaning.
(…)
In taking over Descartes' ontological position Kant made an essential omission : he failed to provide an ontology of Dasein. This omission was a decisive one in the Spririt [im Sinne] of Descartes' ownmost Tendencies.
(…)
The seemingly new beginning which Descartes proposed for philosophizing has revealed
itself as the implantatiop of a baleful prejudice…
(…)
But with this 'discovery' nothing is achieved philosophically as long as it remains obscure to what a profound extent the medieval ontology has influenced the way in which posterity has determined or failed to determine the ontological character of the res cogitans.
The phrase you quote does not cause any confusion. It simply points out that there is a philosophical tradition which describes the specificity of the human being in Heidegger-like terms. They all raise the universal issue of freedom.elicits the trouble in understanding him/referenced passages because — Kevin
That's fine with me. Neologisms can awaken stale concepts when they are sufficiently provocative.The neologisms might also "perform" the modes of being of the coming-to-be of beings as objective presence - without themselves quite 'congealing' into ready-made concepts. — Kevin
Georg Lukács: El asalto a la razón, Madrid 1976; p. 406.[The descriptions of common life] are the most vigorous and suggestive part of Being and Time and in them lies, very probably, the reason for the extensive and profound influence achieved in this work. Heidegger traces here, with the resources of phenomenology, a series of interesting pictures of the inner life, of the conception of the world in which the process of the disintegration of the bourgeois intellectuality of the years of the postwar period is reflected. These pictures are undoubtedly suggestive, because they are - on a descriptive level - authentic and faithful images.
You can praise yourself, but I don't think what you say is very "interesting" because it doesn't go to the heart of the matter.
The mistake that Heidegger blames on the metaphysical tradition is to err on the key question: Being. That's why he says it has to be "destroyed". Please read my previous comments. — David Mo
According to Heidegger, God, substance or nature are not understood without a previous theory of Being. Western metaphysics was perverted because it hid Being under Substantialism.
On the other hand, the law of gravity can be understood without the general theory of relativity. Therefore, Newton could not degrade, nor err, nor hide a superior reality, as Thomas Aquinas or Descartes did. He worked correctly in the field of objects within his grasp. No one is going to destroy Newtonian physics. Scholasticism, on the other hand, must be destroyed as a system. — David Mo
The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being, — Xtrix
Not to be rude or egotistical or anything like that, but you don't understand Heidegger as well as I do. — Xtrix
The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being,
— Xtrix
This is rigorously disproved by the quotes I have placed above. Your interpretation of Heidegger seems a little "autistic", if I may say so. I mean, you don't listen to the words of Heidegger himself. — David Mo
Not to be rude or egotistical or anything like that, but you don't understand Heidegger as well as I do.
— Xtrix
That's funny. — David Mo
There is no mystical "hidden". But we do hide from ourselves, and with good reason. Any claim of understanding Heidegger should be suspect. — Gary M Washburn
It's the question of the meaning of Being that's been hidden and forgotten. The interpretation that's taken for granted, ousia (substance), isn't itself "hidden" — Xtrix
According to Heidegger, God, substance or nature are not understood without a previous theory of Being. — David Mo
"Misses its sense entirely"; “Falsified from the bottom up”. Is it not clear for you? What context can change the meaning of phrases expressed so strongly?The usual thoughtlessness translates ousia as "substance" and thereby misses its sense entirely (ItM: 46/64)
Greek philosophy is then interpreted retroactively—that is, falsified from the bottom up—on the basis of the dominant concept of substance (ItM: 148/207)
It's the question of the meaning of Being that's been hidden and forgotten. The interpretation that's taken for granted, ousia (substance), isn't itself "hidden"
— Xtrix
I don't understand anything. The text above is by Heidegger? If so, it's misquoted. Quotes and reference are missing. — David Mo
I don't understand either who talks about "the interpretation of ousia as substance is hidden". Is the interpretation hidden? That doesn't make much sense. Can you explain it better? — David Mo
The interpretation of Being as "substance," or ousia, is not "hiding" Being,
— Xtrix
This is rigorously disproved by the quotes I have placed above. — David Mo
I think this whole mess you're making is because you didn't understand my opening remark. I can explain it better, if you like. — David Mo
According to Heidegger, God, substance or nature are not understood without a previous theory of Being.
— David Mo
What I was trying to explain is that Newton's theory is still valid in the terms that the theory is limited. That is, it is valid for concepts defined in the terms of Newtonian physics. Absolute space -independent of time and perspective- perfectly works in phenomenal objects. In this sense, it is still applied with constant success.
You pretended that it was the same case with the theories that are limited to talk about God, substance or other partial aspects of metaphysics, which according to you are valid "interpretations" of Being or partial aspects of it. I explained that for Heidegger this was not true. Theories about God, for example, are not different or partially valid interpretations, but wrong approaches without a correct comprehension of Being. Heidegger says textually that only a previous understanding of Being can lead to understanding of the sacred. Therefore, everything that is said about God outside a Heideggerian phenomenological perspective is invalid (inapplicable, if you want to say so). — David Mo
Of course, this is not compatible with your theory that all interpretation is valid. Heidegger never said such a thing. — David Mo
The usual thoughtlessness translates ousia as "substance" and thereby misses its sense entirely (ItM: 46/64)
Greek philosophy is then interpreted retroactively—that is, falsified from the bottom up—on the basis of the dominant concept of substance (ItM: 148/207)
"Misses its sense entirely"; “Falsified from the bottom up”. Is it not clear for you? What context can change the meaning of phrases expressed so strongly? — David Mo
He considered that Western philosophy had overlooked, deformed, degenerated, etc. this question since the time of the Greeks. — David Mo
Heidegger repeatedly accuses Western philosophy with negative concepts that imply falsity in many ways, — David Mo
According to Heidegger, Western metaphysics perverted the correct questioning of the Greeks. Therefore, the Greeks were right and western metaphysics was wrong. So much so that philosophy needs to start again, which does not happen until Heidegger arrives. Of course. — David Mo
"Firstly I have to correct the question with regard to the way in which you talked about the 'downfall of Being'. For that is not meant in a negative manner. I do not speak about a 'downfall' of Being, but rather about the fate of Being insofar as it hides itself more and more in comparison to the Openness of Being with the Greeks." — Xtrix
Here again, as I've said before, Heidegger is talking about translations. When talking about translations, of course he believes that many are simply inaccurate. This is a matter of scholarship.
You claimed, however, that Heidegger thought that Western philosophy (including the Greeks) was wrong. — Xtrix
The meaning of words in Greek philosophy is not an academic issue for him. Inaccurate translations are a reflection of inaccurate metaphysics: the concealment of Being. To reveal means truth in Heidegger, concealment is wrong. — David Mo
How do you can dissimulate the absolutely obvious expression "falsified from the bottom up"? — David Mo
No. He never once says anything about "inaccurate metaphysics" or that concealment is "wrong." — Xtrix
.Referring to translations of the Greeks. He's claiming their original way of seeing the world -- as phusis -- gets mistranslated and thus the original meaning gets falsified. So what? — Xtrix
Does any of this sound like "all philosophers and metaphysics since the Greeks are wrong"? If so, you're wrong. Heidegger is uninterested in making claims about the truth or falsity of metaphysics since the Greeks. — Xtrix
When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn.(BT: 22/43)
Being-true as Being-uncovering* , is a way of Being for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called 'true' in a still more primordial sense. (BT: 220/263)
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