At the beginning of our discussion you tried to give me lessons because, according to you, I did not read Heidegger directly but through second-hand sources. Now you are going to Wikipedia, which is not a second-hand font. It's fourth or fifth hand. It's fun. But where have you put your principles?

Also, I'll thank you to give the name or the article when quoting an encyclopedia. It's the right way to do it and it helps to locate the exact citation. Also, this helps to find the original text.

Because, for further confusion, the Wikipedia quote does not even mention Parmenides and you do not explain anything about him on your own.

I have done the homework for you --you're welcome:

That is why Aristotle no longer ‘has any understanding’ of it [dialectics], for he has put it on a more radical footing and raised it to a new level [aufhob]. Légein itself--or rather noéin –, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being-has the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. Those entities which show themselves i n this and for it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence ( ousía ) . (B&T: 26/48)

Now, you can explain this imbroglio between presence-at-hand, time and Parmenides and I will explain you where Heidegger conceals the very thought of Parmenides. In two points, at least.

At the beginning of our discussion you tried to give me lessons because, according to you, I did not read Heidegger directly but through second-hand sources. Now you are going to Wikipedia, which is not a second-hand font. It's fourth or fifth hand. It's fun. But where have you put your principles? — David Mo

I said it was due to time constraints. You asked what "presence-at-hand" means, which I've talked about before and which, had you read Heidegger, you'd know. Rather than go through and type out relevant paragraphs, I thought the Wikipedia article was accurate and approved of it as at least an introduction to the term (if indeed you're not familiar with it).

Also, I'll thank you to give the name or the article when quoting an encyclopedia. It's the right way to do it and it helps to locate the exact citation. Also, this helps to find the original text. — David Mo

You're right. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_of_presence

I have done the homework for you --you're welcome:

That is why Aristotle no longer ‘has any understanding’ of it [dialectics], for he has put it on a more radical footing and raised it to a new level [aufhob]. Légein itself--or rather noéin –, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being-has the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. Those entities which show themselves i n this and for it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence ( ousía ) . (B&T: 26/48) — David Mo

Funny you say that -- I quoted this text twice before in reference to Parmenides.

Now, you can explain this imbroglio between presence-at-hand, time and Parmenides and I will explain you where Heidegger conceals the very thought of Parmenides. In two points, at least. — David Mo

No imbroglio. The above says most of it. With regard to "time" (in terms of the common notion since Aristotle's essay), Heidegger will talk at length about. As the Wiki article mentions, correctly, he has a different analysis, which he calls "temporality."

In the beginning, phusis and logos meant something very different than what they meant later on in the inception. They both had to do with unconcealment, as an emerging and a gathering, respectively. This is where Parmenides began, with aletheia. As you know from reading Intro to Metaphysics, phusis became "idea" and logos became assertion/category, which Heidegger claims sets the stage for Being to be interpreted as "substance" and later "object," apart from the thinking subject. He will claim that the distinction (or "restriction") between "being and thinking" has dominated Western thought since (IM p. 208).

Specifically regarding Parmenides, pages 101-103 is a good start. From Parmenides (and the "inception") onwards, the question of being becomes concealed. A relevant passage below:

"Now the collapse of unconcealment, as we briefly call this happening, does not originate from a mere deficiency, from an inability to sustain any longer that which, with this essence, was given to historical humanity to preserve. The ground of the collapse lies first in the greatness of the inception and in the essence of the inception itself. ["Fall" and "collapse" create an illusion of negativity only in a superficial exposition.]" (IM p. 204)

Notice the part in brackets -- it's as if he's specifically talking to someone like yourself.

In any case, Parmenides is still "presencing," and this is why the "ground of the collapse" was embedded in the inception. It's not meant as a criticism, but as a description (interpretation) of history. It's also much different from later interpretations and questioning, and one in which we should return. Why? Because Parmenides "indicates Being itself in view of Being and from within Being" (IM p. 102). Still, the seeds of concealment were there from the beginning: "...in the inception of Western philosophy, the perspective that guides the opening up of Being is time, but in such a way that this perspective as such still remained and had to remain concealed." (IM p. 220) The underline is mine.

This is why "time" becomes relevant. An interesting thesis, worth mulling over. None of this can be understood fully if taken in isolation. You have to first take up Heidegger's terminology, which his difficult. You're simply not at that stage yet.

Now, you can explain this imbroglio between presence-at-hand, time and Parmenides — David Mo

I asked you for a clarification that you have not given. You limit yourself to talk about the valuation that Heidegger makes of the "inception" (origin) of philosophy in Greece. You mention the concept of "presencing" in Parmenides but do not explain it, much less in relation to time and his concept of Being. As for my question, you limit yourself to repeat in the same words what I asked you to explain: "the perspective that guides the opening up of Being is time". I will not ask you again to explain it because it seems to me that it will be useless. It seems that you are in another "stage" (that of the clouds). Instead, I am going to explain it in a less "nebulous" way than yours.

Prior warning: No one should look up the definition of "present-at-hand" in Heidegger. It is not given, at least in the texts I have consulted. This is very significant because the term "present-at-hand" has an important place, at least in B&T. By not giving a precise definition, any interpretation becomes possible and Heidegger reserves the right to disqualify the one he does not like. This is very typical of him.

Heidegger's arbitrary interpretation of Parmenides is based on this indetermination of language. In the paragraph we are commenting on he does so in the following terms.

1. Present-at-hand: ambiguity of meanings: a) pure theoretical "contemplation" - as opposed to "ready-to-hand" which includes the interaction of the subject (Dasein) with the world; b) the placing of the subject in front of the objects of the world (the "objective" point of view).

2. Presence: quality of being present to human understanding. Ambiguity: a) the subject is placed in front of the object of knowledge; b) the object of knowledge is placed now (present time as different from past and future).

Applied to Parmenides this is resolved in an affirmation that mixes all these different senses within the same meaning: "Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being-has the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something".

Heidegger's argument synthesized: Truth is presented to Parmenides > It is something that is presented as pure presence independent of the practical relationship that one may have > It is the truth about something (Being) > Being is now (present)> It is contemplated in the mode of Time.

Critical analysis:

Heidegger's first omission: Parmenides does not “contemplate” Being. Parmenides is taught by the Goddess. (Suppose the Goddess is a metaphor. Instead, we could suppose that Parmenides is giving a theological content to his poem and the presence of the Goddess is literal. This is not the general interpretation nor Heidegger's - I think - so I overlook it).

In the non/theological context of the poem, what the figure of the Goddess means is an illumination. Moreover, the Goddess specifies where that illumination comes from: from the way of Reason.

The Goddess does not induce Parmenides to the contemplation/presence of any object of knowledge, as Heidegger claims. The Goddess leads Parmenides to the truth not by the presence of something, but by the force of a logical reasoning: Only Being is and non-being is not (variant of the identity principle).
Therefore, Heidegger's identification of Parmenides' vision in the literal sense is out of place. There is no presence, no temporality. Parmenides’ thought is produced outside of time and the narration of the poem is a mytho-poetic artifice.

Second omission: This is riveted by the Goddess when she states that if the non-being is not there can be no change or time since it is impossible to move from something that is to what is not, or vice versa. Time is expressly refuted in Parmenides' poem. Being is one and immobile.

The (verbal) game is over.

Now, you can explain this imbroglio between presence-at-hand, time and Parmenides
— David Mo

I asked you for a clarification that you have not given. — David Mo

I did; you haven't understood it.

It seems that you are in another "stage" (that of the clouds). Instead, I am going to explain it in a less "nebulous" way than yours. — David Mo

You accuse me and Heidegger of being "in the clouds," then go on to offer an analysis of these "clouds" which you admittedly don't understand. Rather you make several utterly false statements and then try to "clean up" Heidegger to essentially be more Cartesian. Much like Sartre. To demonstrate:

No one should look up the definition of "present-at-hand" in Heidegger. It is not given, at least in the texts I have consulted. — David Mo

Have you consulted Being and Time?

That which is present-at-hand is a theoretical object, something that is "extant" or, as Heidegger says, is tied up with what is traditionally meant by "existentia" (basically "substance") [p. 42/67]. Presence-at-hand is a related term, the mode (or attitude) we're in when looking at the world in such a way -- apart from being involved in it with equipment (the "ready-to-hand").

1. Present-at-hand: ambiguity of meanings: a) pure theoretical "contemplation" - as opposed to "ready-to-hand" which includes the interaction of the subject (Dasein) with the world; b) the placing of the subject in front of the objects of the world (the "objective" point of view). — David Mo

No ambiguity -- (a) and (b) are the same thing. Your injecting "subject/object" into this is one example of making Heidegger Cartesian. There's a reason he uses "dasein."

2. Presence: quality of being present to human understanding. Ambiguity: a) the subject is placed in front of the object of knowledge; b) the object of knowledge is placed now (present time as different from past and future). — David Mo

Again, both say the same thing.

Side note: the entire subject/object dichotomy (or mind/body) is likewise conceived within this mode (i.e., within the theoretical, present-at-hand). Only when one is taking away from everyday "coping," and looks out "objectively" at the world does the world become "substance" or "object," and thus the entity "looking out" becomes a "subject." When you're trying to catch the bus, this is not one's experience.

Heidegger's argument synthesized: Truth is presented to Parmenides > It is something that is presented as pure presence independent of the practical relationship that one may have > It is the truth about something (Being) > Being is now (present)> It is contemplated in the mode of Time. — David Mo

No. Truth is "there," it opens, it is "disclosed." Aletheia is the truth. The goddess is the truth. It's not "contemplated" -- I don't know where you came up with this one, because it's not in Heidegger. The truth is aletheia -- unconcealment, disclosure. Indeed it must occur in the "present" -- because Parmenides is a human being. Unless he "stepped outside" of life itself, whatever he "saw" happened in the present. Unless he's an angel. Everything happens in the "present" -- the rest is separated by thinking, and has a long history which, as you know, has largely been determined by the Physics of Aristotle, which interprets "time" as a sequence of "nows." Which is a perfectly fine conception, and a very powerful one -- just as the mind/body, subject/object distinction is. Just as "substance" and "nature" is. Just as modern science is.

So yes, if Parmenides was a human being -- and not a magical angel -- he lived and breathed as a human being, and whatever he experienced was experienced "in time" (not the time of physics, but experienced time, which in Heidegger is "temporality"). So of course it's in the "present."

Critical analysis:

Heidegger's first omission: Parmenides does not “contemplate” Being. — David Mo

Nice job knocking down the pins you yourself set up. But since it's not what Heidegger is saying, completely irrelevant. Might as well be playing chess with yourself and congratulating yourself on the win.

Parmenides is taught by the Goddess. (Suppose the Goddess is a metaphor. Instead, we could suppose that Parmenides is giving a theological content to his poem and the presence of the Goddess is literal. This is not the general interpretation nor Heidegger's - I think - so I overlook it). — David Mo

You "think"? Heidegger is emphatically against the interpretation of the goddess as "literal." (Parmenides, p. 8-11; 14-16). "To make of 'the truth' a goddess amounts to turning the mere not on of something, namely the concept of the essence of truth, in a 'personality.'" (p.10)

In the non/theological context of the poem, what the figure of the Goddess means is an illumination. — David Mo

Yes. It is illumination (or un-concealedness) itself.

The Goddess does not induce Parmenides to the contemplation/presence of any object of knowledge, as Heidegger claims. — David Mo

Where is Heidegger claiming this? I'll save you the trouble: he doesn't. Another straw man. You're confusing the fact that what is revealed is revealed in the "present" must mean that "being" becomes a present-at-hand "object" -- this is not the case. As I said before, everything happens in the present, whether we're aware of it or not (off thinking about the future or the past). Just introspect or meditate for a while and see for yourself. What "time" is it? It's now -- the present. Not "now" as an object-point, not "now" as a second hand on a clock.

This is why I say you're not on the level to understand Heidegger -- there's too much more reading you have to do.

The Goddess leads Parmenides to the truth not by the presence of something, but by the force of a logical reasoning: Only Being is and non-being is not (variant of the identity principle). — David Mo

Logical reasoning? This is your interpretation?

Therefore, Heidegger's identification of Parmenides' vision in the literal sense is out of place. There is no presence, no temporality. Parmenides’ thought is produced outside of time and the narration of the poem is a mytho-poetic artifice. — David Mo

Almost laughable. "Outside of time," eh? So Parmenides was an angel. "No presence, no temporality" -- so no human being, either. Where exactly did this "logical reasoning" take place, then? In heaven? Clearly not in the 6th century BC, as it was "outside of time" (both temporality and world-time, apparently). Come on.

It's fairly obvious you must be equating "time" with "motion" and "becoming," but even this view of time is contradictory in this context.

Second omission: This is riveted by the Goddess when she states that if the non-being is not there can be no change or time since it is impossible to move from something that is to what is not, or vice versa. Time is expressly refuted in Parmenides' poem. Being is one and immobile. — David Mo

The old "being and becoming" interpretation. :yawn:

Heidegger has a lot to say about this -- if you read him.

I did; you haven't understood it. — Xtrix

To explain the relationship between three terms you must be able to link them together (Parménides, presence and time) in a sequence or proposition. You did not.
An explanation must be made in terms other than the explanandum. You did not. You simply repeated what you had to explain.

Interestingly enough, it is in this commentary that you attempt an explanation. And it is remarkably... naive? insufficient? I will explain it to you.

That which is present-at-hand is a theoretical object, something that is "extant" or, as Heidegger says, is tied up with what is traditionally meant by "existentia" (basically "substance") [p. 42/67]. Presence-at-hand is a related term, the mode (or attitude) we're in when looking at the world in such a way -- apart from being involved in it with equipment (the "ready-to-hand"). — Xtrix

On the page you mention Heidegger does not give any definition. He simply relates (tantamount) present-at-hand to the classical term existentia. He gives no further explanation and the comparison is not too clarifying, since that term was used in different ways from Aristotle to Ockham.
If you want a definition you'll have to go elsewhere.

No. Truth is "there," it opens, it is "disclosed." Aletheia is the truth. The goddess is the truth. It's not "contemplated" — Xtrix

Logical reasoning? This is your interpretation? — Xtrix

Of course, that is my interpretation of Parmenides. An interpretation in which I follow the immense majority of experts. I don't risk anything. For the separation between the world of truth and the world of opinion in Parmenides you can read

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183487?seq=1
https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/apeiron/32/3/article-p153.xml

If you do not have access to these I suggest an open article that will show you how to make a serious study of a Greek author, instead of Heidegger's inventions. The identification of the goddess of Parmenides with the goddess Truth is a typical case. Heidegger goes from linking words by their similarity until getting convinced himself of the conclusion: The first link matches the last one. It seems a typically childish game: "What does a cheesecake look like at speed?" Heidegger in its pure state.

Heidegger’s jump in this case consists of saying that the goddess speaks the truth is the same as saying that she is the Truth. If Parmenides had wanted to give her a name, he would have given it to her. He probably did not because the name of the goddess is irrelevant. It is simply a mytho-poetic image of the way of truth, of the philosopher's reason.

https://www.persee.fr/doc/reg_0035-2039_1969_num_82_389_1027

On the other hand, Heidegger may not use the term contemplation. But since he uses metaphors such as illumination or unveiling which involve contemplation, I think I am authorized to use that term. I don't think Heidegger or you have the only visa to play poetically with language. At least I have the decency to put quotation marks around it.

Almost laughable. "Outside of time," eh? So Parmenides was an angel. "No presence, no temporality" -- so no human being, either. Where exactly did this "logical reasoning" take place, then? In heaven? — Xtrix

Well, finally the clarification I asked for appears.
Totally laughable: you (or Heidegger) confuse two things:
Analysis of the psychological or social origin of the ideas.
Internal analysis of the meaning of the ideas.

In the first case, to say that Parmenides' ideas come from the world in which he lives is probably true, but it is something that few philosophers would deny. In different ways it is admitted by empiricists, historicists, Hegelians, Marxists, phenomenologists and many others. It is a statement that is not limited to Parmenides, but to all of us who have ideas. If you or Heidegger say nothing else, your explanation is a banality.

If you pretend to say it is an idea of Parmenides, you are saying an outrage. As the articles I have quoted and many others I could quote to you show, the distinction between the world of truth and the world of appearances, between truth and doxa, is proper to Parmenides. The Goddess clearly excludes that truth comes from the world of things or from the world of appearances. The basic argument of the Goddess is an early formulation of the principle of non-contradiction. That is, logic, incipient state, but logic and rationality, not experience of anything existing. Moreover, the conclusion is that the world of things is not true.

Therefore, in the first sense we can say that Parmenides' ideas come from his world (this gives rise to a religious interpretation of his poem that a minority of phylosophers have attempted), but it is a banal statement. If we say in the second sense that Parmenides affirms that truth comes from existing things (present-at-hand) according to the category of temporality, we are saying an atrocity. To maintain this barbarity we would have to justify it with a careful analysis of the text. Something that Heidegger does not bother to do. Of course.

Finally I will add an explanatory bonus for your understanding of something that is obvious:
In traditional logic there are no time variables. If a truth is logical, or rationally pure, it is supposed to be the same now as at the end of time. That is because it does not depend on experience, but on the inner connection of the terms themselves.

That which is present-at-hand is a theoretical object, something that is "extant" or, as Heidegger says, is tied up with what is traditionally meant by "existentia" (basically "substance") [p. 42/67]. Presence-at-hand is a related term, the mode (or attitude) we're in when looking at the world in such a way -- apart from being involved in it with equipment (the "ready-to-hand").
— Xtrix

On the page you mention Heidegger does not give any definition. He simply relates (tantamount) present-at-hand to the classical term existentia. He gives no further explanation and the comparison is not too clarifying, since that term was used in different ways from Aristotle to Ockham.
If you want a definition you'll have to go elsewhere. — David Mo

Heidegger talks about the present-at-hand all over Being and Time. You have to read it to understand it. If you're looking for a place where he "defines" it the a format that's suitable to you, then you probably won't find it, as "x = y." But it's obvious from anyone who's read him what it means, as I explained above (which is uncontroversial in secondary scholarship, even among those who are critical).

The above explanation stands.

I did; you haven't understood it.
— Xtrix

To explain the relationship between three terms you must be able to link them together (Parménides, presence and time) in a sequence or proposition. You did not. — David Mo

Yes, I did. Again, your failure to understand what is being said is not my problem. The cause is that you showed up to this thread (and to Heidegger) not to understand but to defend a position you've already settled upon, that of Carnap, Russell, etc.

Interestingly enough, it is in this commentary that you attempt an explanation. And it is remarkably... naive? insufficient? I will explain it to you. — David Mo

:lol:

Yes, because you've definitely earned the right to give lectures about Heidegger so far. :roll:

Before accusing others of being naive, try to make sure you're not making a complete fool of yourself first. Which you've done over and over again, particularly with your childish reading of Heidegger's views on the history of Western thought.

Logical reasoning? This is your interpretation?
— Xtrix

Of course, that is my interpretation of Parmenides. An interpretation in which I follow the immense majority of experts. I don't risk anything. — David Mo

Yes, you risk nothing indeed by parroting the common reading of Parmenides.

The identification of the goddess of Parmenides with the goddess Truth is a typical case. — David Mo

It also has the benefit of being accurate. But you wouldn't know one way or another, having read so little. Set up more straw men -- I'm not interested. You haven't demonstrated you've understood Heidegger.

It seems a typically childish game: "What does a cheesecake look like at speed?" Heidegger in its pure state. — David Mo

Yes, you've really nailed it. Run along back to the others. Come back when you're serious about learning something -- the way most adults approach a topic.

On the other hand, Heidegger may not use the term contemplation. But since he uses metaphors such as illumination or unveiling which involve contemplation, — David Mo

It doesn't involve contemplation any more than vision involves "contemplation."

You don't understand Heidegger.

In the first case, to say that Parmenides' ideas come from the world in which he lives is probably true, — David Mo

I didn't mention "the world," I mentioned time, in response to your ridiculous claim that Parmenides was "outside time."


Parmenides was "presencing," and what was disclosed to him was being. Ditto Heraclitus. Both men, as human beings, thought/wrote/interpreted being from the perspective of time -- namely, the present, that which is present before us, that which appears, that which is uncovered and unconcealed. All of the Greeks took "time" as the perspective in which they interpreted themselves and the world, without knowing it. "Time", as pointed out by Kant, is a form of our sensibility, along with space -- in Heidegger's hands it becomes something much different than this Aristotelian "time" which Kant presupposed -- it becomes temporality, which is what Being and Time is about -- namely, interpreting the human being (Dasein) in its average everydayness, which brings out the ontological structures of this entity, as care. Care (Sorge) is reinterpreted as temporality.

If you don't see any of this and consistently keeping it in mind, you're avoiding Heidegger. You're just focusing on isolated features. And it's boring.

Come back when you've shown you understood a word of what you've read. Before that, however, it's important to approach a thinker with an open mind. That's what this thread was supposed to be about -- not a defense of a position long ago decided from secondary sources.

The above explanation stands. — Xtrix

Yes, I did. — Xtrix

To say that Heidegger talks a lot about it and that to understand it you have to read everything Heidegger is not to explain anything.
It is not true that you have established the relationship between Parmenides, presence and time. It is true that you have tried but with a monumental confusion that I dismantled in my previous commentary. It is certain that you have not understood what I explained to you and you fall back into the same hole:

I didn't mention "the world," I mentioned time, in response to your ridiculous claim that Parmenides was "outside time." — Xtrix

You confuse two different things again:
Parmenides was a man of (his) time (or world, which is the same in common language). "He was not an angel," you said.
Parmenides thought that Being is timeless (eternal and immobile). What I said.

Please make an effort. Perhaps you will see the difference.

It doesn't involve contemplation any more than vision involves "contemplation." — Xtrix

It is normal, you can see something without contemplating it. By turning your back, I guess. You do it almost always in this thread.

You don't understand Heidegger. — Xtrix

Surely not. But neither do you. You are not able to answer a single one of my questions and objections.
And you know that the one who knows that he does not know is much wiser than the one who pretends to know without knowing.

Parmenides was "presencing," and what was disclosed to him was being. Ditto Heraclitus. Both men, as human beings, thought/wrote/interpreted being from the perspective of time -- namely, the present, that which is present before us, that which appears, that which is uncovered and unconcealed. All of the Greeks took "time" as the perspective in which they interpreted themselves and the world, without knowing it. "Time", as pointed out by Kant, is a form of our sensibility, along with space -- in Heidegger's hands it becomes something much different than this Aristotelian "time" which Kant presupposed -- it becomes temporality, which is what Being and Time is about -- namely, interpreting the human being (Dasein) in its average everydayness, which brings out the ontological structures of this entity, as care. Care (Sorge) is reinterpreted as temporality. — Xtrix

Why are you telling this? What are Kant and Aristotle doing here when we are talking about Parmenides? It has nothing to do with the objections I made to you. If you want to prove that you know how to repeat Heidegger's words, you have already done it several times. But to repeat does not mean to understand. Answer my questions and stop tracing texts that you do not understand.

Have you learned anything interesting about Heidegger here? I have read Sein und seit, knows a bit of his mentors and pupils and some about his Nazi years.

Sein und zeit was really complex to read but I got a rather agreeable picture of his view on what meaning of life is. The base in everyday life and then thoughts on the timeliness of the existence, the importance of death, the augenblick and the historicism. All good and well and not a trace of a guy that wants to stand in a flock and yell heil a few years later(ok, thats seemingly more his cup of tea than socialising with upper class gossiping but anyways)

So what to look for next?

To say that Heidegger talks a lot about it and that to understand it you have to read everything Heidegger is not to explain anything. — David Mo

That's not what was said.

I didn't mention "the world," I mentioned time, in response to your ridiculous claim that Parmenides was "outside time."
— Xtrix
You confuse two different things again:
Parmenides was a man of (his) time (or world, which is the same in common language). "He was not an angel," you said.
Parmenides thought that Being is timeless (eternal and immobile). What I said. — David Mo

What you said:

There is no presence, no temporality. Parmenides’ thought is produced outside of time and the narration of the poem is a mytho-poetic artifice. — David Mo

Parmenides thought that being is timeless. He "produced" this thought "outside of time." That's what you said. And it's ridiculous. Next time try harder to be clear if this isn't what you meant.

You don't understand Heidegger.
— Xtrix
Surely not. — David Mo

As you've demonstrated very well. The reasons are obvious, too. Not from a lack of intelligence, but from a lack of openness to learning (from him and from me). Pity.

But neither do you. You are not able to answer a single one of my questions and objections. — David Mo

:yawn: Ok bud, whatever you say. There's no such thing as "expertise," I guess. You're like arguing against climate change deniers -- do a little perusing of data, then use it to justify what you already wanted to believe to begin with. What a shocker that the notion of Heidegger you began with hasn't changed. And of course, the person who has studied much longer and more carefully (and open-mindedly) than you "doesn't understand." Standard fare. :yawn:

Regardless, if I don't understand Heidegger, it's surely not been you who have shown that. Nor are you in any position to judge it.

Parmenides was "presencing," and what was disclosed to him was being. Ditto Heraclitus. Both men, as human beings, thought/wrote/interpreted being from the perspective of time -- namely, the present, that which is present before us, that which appears, that which is uncovered and unconcealed. All of the Greeks took "time" as the perspective in which they interpreted themselves and the world, without knowing it. "Time", as pointed out by Kant, is a form of our sensibility, along with space -- in Heidegger's hands it becomes something much different than this Aristotelian "time" which Kant presupposed -- it becomes temporality, which is what Being and Time is about -- namely, interpreting the human being (Dasein) in its average everydayness, which brings out the ontological structures of this entity, as care. Care (Sorge) is reinterpreted as temporality.
— Xtrix

Why are you telling this? — David Mo

Because if you don't understand it, it's no wonder you don't understand his views on Parmenides, phusis, aletheia, the history of Western thought, etc. But you can do on believing you do -- not my business.

Answer my questions and stop tracing texts that you do not understand. — David Mo

I repeat:

If you don't see any of this and consistently keeping it in mind, you're avoiding Heidegger. You're just focusing on isolated features. And it's boring. — Xtrix

Your "questions" have been answered. Multiple times. As I said, if you don't understand them, that's not a surprise...

It is not true that you have established the relationship between Parmenides, presence and time. — David Mo

First you have to understand what "presence" and "time" mean in Heidegger. When you can explain that to me, you'll see understand the already given answer:

No imbroglio. The above says most of it. With regard to "time" (in terms of the common notion since Aristotle's essay), Heidegger will talk at length about. As the Wiki article mentions, correctly, he has a different analysis, which he calls "temporality." — Xtrix

In any case, Parmenides is still "presencing," and this is why the "ground of the collapse" was embedded in the inception. It's not meant as a criticism, but as a description (interpretation) of history. It's also much different from later interpretations and questioning, and one in which we should return. Why? Because Parmenides "indicates Being itself in view of Being and from within Being" (IM p. 102). Still, the seeds of concealment were there from the beginning: "...in the inception of Western philosophy, the perspective that guides the opening up of Being is time, but in such a way that this perspective as such still remained and had to remain concealed." (IM p. 220) The underline is mine. — Xtrix

If you fail to see the connection between "presence" and (common) "time," and how this relates to Parmenides (when you yourself quoted a relevant passage), and furthermore why it's important to understand Heidegger's thesis about Western thought and temporality -- then that's your business. If I thought for a second that further elaborate explanation would actually get through to you, I'd do so. But it won't -- you've already taken a position on Heidegger, and that position has become dogma. Feigning a desire to learn by asking questions you don't understand simply because it's a topic you think you're well versed in (Parmenides) is not of interest to me. You've already taken up enough of my time with digressions about how "wrong" Heidegger thinks Western thought was -- again because you can't keep up with the conversation otherwise. I won't be sucked in again. If you want truly want to learn about what Heidegger thinks of Parmenides, since you refuse to learn from me (after all, I "don't understand" any of it) then here are the relevant texts: Parmenides, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The History of the Concept of Time, Basic Questions of Philosophy, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and even Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. This of course assumes you've truly and carefully read Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics, which I highly doubt. There are also free UC Berkley courses available by Hubert Dreyfus et al., which go through the text carefully and which is a good introduction to Heidegger. Good luck.

So what to look for next? — Ansiktsburk

In terms of?

Parmenides thought that being is timeless. He "produced" this thought "outside of time." That's what you said. And it's ridiculous. — Xtrix

What is ridiculous is that you focus on a phrase that is not well expressed to avoid the question. What I thought I said clearly and in detail in two comments:

Well, finally the clarification I asked for appears.
you (or Heidegger) confuse two things:
Analysis of the psychological or social origin of the ideas.
Internal analysis of the meaning of the ideas.

In the first case, to say that Parmenides' ideas come from the world in which he lives is probably true, but it is something that few philosophers would deny. In different ways it is admitted by empiricists, historicists, Hegelians, Marxists, phenomenologists and many others. It is a statement that is not limited to Parmenides, but to all of us who have ideas. If you or Heidegger say nothing else, your explanation is a banality.

If you pretend to say it is an idea of Parmenides, you are saying an outrage. As the articles I have quoted and many others I could quote to you show, the distinction between the world of truth and the world of appearances, between truth and doxa, is proper to Parmenides. The Goddess clearly excludes that truth comes from the world of things or from the world of appearances. The basic argument of the Goddess is an early formulation of the principle of non-contradiction. That is, logic, incipient state, but logic and rationality, not experience of anything existing. Moreover, the conclusion is that the world of things is not true.

Therefore, in the first sense we can say that Parmenides' ideas come from his world (this gives rise to a religious interpretation of his poem that a minority of phylosophers have attempted), but it is a banal statement. If we say in the second sense that Parmenides affirms that truth comes from existing things (present-at-hand) according to the category of temporality, we are saying an atrocity. To maintain this barbarity we would have to justify it with a careful analysis of the text. Something that Heidegger does not bother to do. Of course. — David Mo

You confuse two different things again:
Parmenides was a man of (his) time (or world, which is the same in common language). "He was not an angel," you said.
Parmenides thought that Being is timeless (eternal and immobile). What I said.

Please make an effort. Perhaps you will see the difference. — David Mo

So don't try to evade the question with little tricks and answer the question, please.

Do you see the difference?

Question:
What does Parmenides have to do with presence and time?
Answer:

In any case, Parmenides is still "presencing", — Xtrix

Is that what you call a response? To repeat the question?

Question:
If we are talking about Parmenides' Being, why do you talk about Aristotle instead?

Because if you don't understand it, it's no wonder you don't understand his views on Parmenides, — Xtrix

Is that what you call an answer? To boast of being very wise and look the other way?

First you have to understand what "presence" and "time" mean in Heidegger. When you can explain that to me, you'll see understand the already given answer — Xtrix

The reasons are obvious, too. Not from a lack of intelligence, but from a lack of openness to learning (from him and from me). — Xtrix

Stop strutting around. Your Youtube Heidegger doesn't interest me. If you want to discuss answer the specific questions you are asked and ask in turn. I'm not going to talk of a different thing that asked.. It's not my style.

Question:
What does Parmenides have to do with presence and time?
Answer:
In any case, Parmenides is still "presencing",
— Xtrix
Is that what you call a response? To repeat the question? — David Mo

I'm sure it appears that way. The reason it appears this way is that you don't understand what "presencing" means, in Heideggerian terminology. Presencing is related to aletheia, to phusis -- that which is unconcealed, that which emerges and endures. The connection to "time"? Fairly obvious: "presence" is something present. The present is a dimension of time. Again, "time" has to be explained further -- hence Being and Time. Heidegger differentiates between "time" and "temporality," which has to be understood. You don't seem interested in understanding this distinction. Fine -- in that case, you get your answer in one step.

So where's the connection between presencing (in the present) and Parmenides? You quoted a relevant passage from Being and Time. Heidegger is claiming that Parmenides was likewise in this "mode" when philosophizing. I think the point is a truism -- or a "banality" if you like, until we find out why pointing this out is relevant. Heidegger spends hundreds of pages elaborating on it, especially regarding time (yet you go on to question why I continually bring this up, as if it were irrelevant) and how on its basis Being gets interpreted. The "seeds" of the meaning of Being as "ousia" (and hence substance, nature, object, etc) were already there with Parmenides, as the beginning of the great tradition (which he claims is now in its end, or has peaked with Hegel and came to an end with Nietzsche). Its important to understand this tradition and what it's come to if we're interested in understanding our modern situation and the possibilities of the future. This is Heidegger in a nutshell. This is why there's so much time spent on the Greeks and on history (of ontology and of the concept of time).

Stop strutting around. Your Youtube Heidegger doesn't interest me. — David Mo

Hmm...

If you want truly want to learn about what Heidegger thinks of Parmenides, since you refuse to learn from me (after all, I "don't understand" any of it) then here are the relevant texts: Parmenides, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The History of the Concept of Time, Basic Questions of Philosophy, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and even Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. This of course assumes you've truly and carefully read Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics, which I highly doubt. — Xtrix

"YouTube" Heidegger?

Question:
What does Parmenides have to do with presence and time? — David Mo

Presencing is related to aletheia, to phusis -- that which is unconcealed, that which emerges and endures. The connection to "time"? Fairly obvious: "presence" is something present. The present is a dimension of time. — Xtrix

The "seeds" of the meaning of Being as "ousia" (and hence substance, nature, object, etc) were already there with Parmenides, as the beginning of the great tradition — Xtrix

1. Time is not only present. A present without past or future does not pass and therefore is the lack of time: eternal immobility.
2. Parmenides defended that Being is eternal in this sense.
3. It cannot be said, as Heidegger (you) claims, that Parmenides' concept of Being is temporal. Unless Heidegger (you) twist the word time to make it say something else and then say that others do not know what the word means. I wouldn't be surprised. It is the quintessential Heideggerian method.

---------
4. In the same sense, Parmenides represents a tradition that worries his followers, especially Plato and Aristotle who try to correct him. They cannot be expected to be mere continuators of his concept of Being. But this is another issue.

You don't seem interested in understanding this distinction. — Xtrix

I am interested in any distinction you would like to make that would shed light on the problem of Parmenides and time.

"YouTube" Heidegger? — Xtrix

Apart from the Introduction to Metaphysics and some loose lines, your recommendations are excerpts from an interview and a Dreyfuss course on Heidegger. Both on Youtube. Draw your own conclusions.

Addendum: By the way, the term substance (ousía), whose origin Heidegger attributes to Parmenides, does not even appear in his poem. Of course, according to Heidegger's peculiar etymological method one can say that the author has said it even though he has not said it and without giving any proof that he has said it.

George Steiner: Heidegger, p. 153

The fatal deception of metaphysical-philosophical thought has been to consider Being as a kind of eternal "being before the eyes" (Vorhandesein). Already Saint Augustine had called attention against the obsessive concupiscentia oculorum of the philosophers, their Platonic insistence on the "vision" of the essence of things instead of living them with patience and with an existential commitment that implied the temporarily limited nature of being.

I think this brief fragment says much more than your twists and turns in the void.
Since the nature of being is temporary, the philosophers who defended the eternal character of nature were misleading their readers. They say that substances are eternal, but they are unable to give a coherent view of time and eternity.

So far I find this criticism acceptable and debatable. But Heidegger begins to run aground when he pretends that Plato's ideas or Parmenides' being are of a fictitious timelessness because they rest on a concept of "vision" that is nothing but the present turned into unlimited. It would be a false eternity.

But it is not. This is where Heidegger skates.
Parmenides' concept of being is not based on any "vision" or "presence" as he says. It is the fruit of a rational analysis -by the Goddess- of the discourse of men. This analysis does not focus on any contemplation or vision, but on a Truth of proto-logical order: it is not possible that the non-being is. Where is the vision here?
Secondly, St. Augustine and Heidegger are wrong. Platonic idealism is not only based on the illumination/vision of the world of ideas in the present. Two aspects of time are internal to its development: the past in the form of oblivion and the future in the form of reincarnation. Forms are not known because they are seen, but because they are remembered on the occasion of intellectual illumination. And life is projected to the future because it doesn't ends in worldly death, but in a continuous journey of the soul rising or falling

So, it is not true that Greek metaphysics has a concept of eternity based on the hypostasis of the present. Especially it is not true in the case of Parmenides.

1. Time is not only present. A present without past or future does not pass and therefore is the lack of time: eternal immobility. — David Mo

There's two claims here.

1) I agree time is not only present -- but I never claimed that.

2) I noticed you mentioned "does not pass" and "eternal immobility." That's interesting. In this case your conception of time is equivalent to (or closely associated with) change (becoming, happening, or the Buddhist "impermanence" [arising and passing]) and/or motion (mobile vs. immobile). Am I misinterpreting? I think the latter is the basic formulation of time in physics, and an important one.

2. Parmenides defended that Being is eternal in this sense. — David Mo

That change is impossible, because nothing truly arises or passes -- or put another way, that there is only being, and no such thing as non-being (and thus no arising and passing, since for something to arise it has to arise from non-being into being, or pass out of being into non-being, which is impossible). Hence, as Zeno later points out (as you mentioned), no such thing as motion either.

This is my understanding of the standard interpretation of Parmenides from most scholars, or at least from the (limited) secondary sources I've read. You subscribe to this view, in my understanding- perhaps put in slightly different terms, but nonetheless essentially accurate?

I want to at least get all this correct, otherwise going on further is fruitless.

3. It cannot be said, as Heidegger (you) claims, that Parmenides' concept of Being is temporal. Unless Heidegger (you) twist the word time to make it say something else and then say that others do not know what the word means. I wouldn't be surprised. It is the quintessential Heideggerian method. — David Mo

Well I would lose the term "twist," and I would also reject that me or Heidegger would have deride someone for "not knowing what the word means." I have indeed mentioned that you don't fully understand (yet) what Heidegger is meaning with "time" and "temporality," yes. For good reason: it's not an easy topic. It's still very difficult for me in many ways, and there's no doubt I don't have it all 100% accurate.

4. In the same sense, Parmenides represents a tradition that worries his followers, especially Plato and Aristotle who try to correct him. They cannot be expected to be mere continuators of his concept of Being. But this is another issue. — David Mo

I don't think they're continuators of his concept of Being at all. I think you're right when you say both Plato and Aristotle tried to "correct" him, or at least synthesize or appropriate his thought. The "being of beings" in Plato and Aristotle are very different from Parmenides, without a doubt.

"YouTube" Heidegger?
— Xtrix
Apart from the Introduction to Metaphysics and some loose lines, your recommendations are excerpts from an interview and a Dreyfuss course on Heidegger. Both on Youtube. Draw your own conclusions. — David Mo

I don't understand -- I have now twice given you several relevant books. Why ignore this? And yes, I really have read these. Here's a third attempt:

"Parmenides, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The History of the Concept of Time, Basic Questions of Philosophy, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and even Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. This of course assumes you've truly and carefully read Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics"

Obviously that's a lot of reading, but you'll find very quickly in each of these from the outline and indexes what you're looking for regarding Parmenides, time, and the history of philosophy.

Heidegger might have said that Parmenides was doing phenomenology when he wrote his poem. Parmenides found the Being/One behind the world, the noumena. Heraclitus found the same in the form of fire instead of as a marble. Parmenides rejected senses for reason. Heraclitus rejected reason for senses you might say in a way. Hegel and Heidegger saw these two paths to the source and made new systems. I think we can all agree Heideggers system was unique and will take time to see in the context of history

George Steiner: Heidegger, p. 153

The fatal deception of metaphysical-philosophical thought has been to consider Being as a kind of eternal "being before the eyes" (Vorhandesein). Already Saint Augustine had called attention against the obsessive concupiscentia oculorum of the philosophers, their Platonic insistence on the "vision" of the essence of things instead of living them with patience and with an existential commitment that implied the temporarily limited nature of being.

I think this brief fragment says much more than your twists and turns in the void. — David Mo

Well what can I say? I'm glad you find this person a better communicator. I agree with the above wholeheartedly.

Parmenides' concept of being is not based on any "vision" or "presence" as he says. It is the fruit of a rational analysis -by the Goddess- of the discourse of men. This analysis does not focus on any contemplation or vision, but on a Truth of proto-logical order: it is not possible that the non-being is. Where is the vision here? — David Mo

No "vision" perhaps, but certainly thought, perception and interpretation. As you say, "rational analysis." Well Heidegger would say "Where is this rational analysis/thinking/interpreting coming from, if not the human being?" So if (1) this is an interpretation of Being, (2) we assume Parmenides is a human being (Dasein), (3) the Heideggerian interpretation of the "essence" of Dasein is its "existence" (it's "there-ness," its "being-in-the-world"), (4) that this "existence" manifests itself in the ready-to-hand, involved engagement with the world and with others (as its common and typical everyday "average" mode), and lastly that (5) this involved engagement is connected to plans and goals ("for the sake of which...", "in order to," "towards which"), which can be re-interpreted as "projecting" (i.e., towards a future), then (6) we see that the essence of the being (Dasein) asking the question of Being is essentially a caring-temporal one.

Very long winded, I know. But each step is in this layered analysis is very important. All Heidegger is really doing is focusing more on the practical, everyday stuff -- in a reaction to logic and analysis, like many others have done (the Pragmatists, other "existentialist" thinkers, etc) -- and doing so with a phenomenological method that focuses on absence and withdrawal, the "transparent" stuff that gets overlooked, the "hidden," the "concealed." In his hands, Kant's thesis still stands but in his phenomenological/hermeneutic anlaysis "time" becomes something very different, all with the incorporation of Nietzsche's "perspectivism."

Briefer: According to Heidegger, since Parmenides is a human being, and ontologically "human being" means "temporality" (again, in his formulation), then he cannot escape interpreting "Being" in terms of ("on the basis of") this temporality. I think B&T page 46-47/25 says it clearly, but especially Intro to Metaphysics page 157, as I think I quoted elsewhere, with reference to page 127 (concerning what is meant by "perspective").

From 157:

But why time, precisely? Because in the inception of Western philosophy, the perspective that guides the opening up of Being is time, but in such a way that this perspective as such still remained and had to remain concealed. [...] But this "time" still has not been unfolded in its essence, nor can it be unfolded (on the basis and within the purview of "physics"). For as soon as meditation on the essence of time begins, at the end of Greek philosophy with Aristotle, time itself must be taken as something that is somehow coming to presence, ousia tis. This is expressed in the fact that time is conceived on the basis of the "now," that which is in each case uniquely present. The past is the "no-longer-now," the future is the "not-yet-now." Being in the sense of presence at hand (presence) becomes the perspective for the determination of time. But time does not become the perspective that is especially selected for the interpretation of being. —

(Italics all Heidegger's)

Again, long winded but maybe helpful.

Well Heidegger would say — Xtrix

I assume this is what you think Heidegger would think. Interpretation in second phase.
If the above explanation is true, it would be applicable to Parmenides, according you. No direct quote of Heidegger to explain the link between Parmenides and time. Only a curt assertion.

Then, about your opinion:
Let us accept that every human being live in the experience of time (temporality). This is not the same than saying that every human proposition implies time because it is based on existence of things (presence).
"A is A" is not a temporal assertion. It is assumed to refer to objects without circumstances of present, past and future. Very different to say "The corpse was on the table". This is temporal because I can ask "When?" and I understand that it is different to "The corpse is on the table" or "We will put the corpse on the table". But asking "When A is A?" has no sense. You are badly asking. The answer is: "Under any circumstance of time and space" This is to say, without any circumstance of time and space.

Another thing is that the timeless statements that human beings are capable of making contain some empirical content. "A =A", for instance, is a formal statement. It says nothing about reality, but rather about the way thought is organized. Probably "Being is One", by Parmenides, has no empirical content. It does not describe anything, so to speak. It is a formal statement used as if it were existential. That is the error of all metaphysics and Parmenides is its father.

But this is very different from saying that we cannot formulate propositions that escape the a priori conditions of temporality. We can and do so constantly. In fact, Heidegger claims that it must be done, since he accuses Parmenides of defining being in terms of temporality, in terms of the present. But what I doubt is that both Parmenides' and Heidegger's metaphysical statements are referential, that they refer to something real. They are simple escapes from reality. Very typical of myth, religion and poetry.

1) are you a positivist?

2) have you read Heidegger on the metaphysical foundations of math and logic?

Before continuing, I have to same I'm a little disappointed -- you seem to have avoided a large part of my post, which was aiming at understanding your position. I'll assume I have described your position (fairly) accurately.

Let us accept that every human being live in the experience of time (temporality). This is not the same than saying that every human proposition implies time because it is based on existence of things (presence).
"A is A" is not a temporal assertion. It is assumed to refer to objects without circumstances of present, past and future. Very different to say "The corpse was on the table". This is temporal because I can ask "When?" and I understand that it is different to "The corpse is on the table" or "We will put the corpse on the table". But asking "When A is A?" has no sense. You are badly asking. The answer is: "Under any circumstance of time and space" This is to say, without any circumstance of time and space. — David Mo

Seems to me that you are taking the propositions of logic to be timeless, in a sense. In that case, the same applies to arithmetic, which is also not temporal assertions. But these formal propositions and assertions are still coming out of the human mind -- I think we both agree with that. If the human mind is essentially temporal, and if the symbols of logic and mathematics are themselves beings which occur in the mind (in thought, reason, etc.), it's difficult to see how they're somehow beyond or outside time -- unless of course by "time" we mean the time of physics, in which case we mean essentially change/motion, and of course A = A doesn't change or move. So again it really all depends on what we mean by "time." Which is why I bring it up so much.

But this is very different from saying that we cannot formulate propositions that escape the a priori conditions of temporality. We can and do so constantly. In fact, Heidegger claims that it must be done, since he accuses Parmenides of defining being in terms of temporality, in terms of the present. But what I doubt is that both Parmenides' and Heidegger's metaphysical statements are referential, that they refer to something real. They are simple escapes from reality. Very typical of myth, religion and poetry. — David Mo

"Real" is problematic for me. Is discussing Being any less "real" than laws of logic? I also think ideas of referentiality are questionable.

Logic, math, language, etc., are all involved in thought. Thinking is a human activity (maybe exclusively, maybe not), along with feeling, willing, etc. Thoughts occur at some point in time -- so even the "objects" or "representations" of thought arise in a present. If I visualize a triangle, it's not that the triangle is somewhere "outside" myself that can decay, but neither is anything in thought. So yes, in that case almost anything we think or imagine is "timeless" -- they never change, they never move, they never decay. In that case the moon illusion is also timeless, in a sense -- it's in our heads as perception, and always has been, even though it is indeed an illusion.

But this opens up many questions as well, particularly about what we mean by "thinking," which is also an important one. Heidegger, in Intro to Metaphysics, talks at length about thought as traditionally associated with what you're talking about -- namely, with logic -- and goes on to claim that the distinction between being and thinking is the dominant one in the West.

"Real" is problematic for me. Is discussing Being any less "real" than laws of logic? I also think ideas of referentiality are questionable. — Xtrix

And for me it's problematic that the concept of reality is problematic for you, especially because you don't give any reason for it. If you want to discuss it, and if you don't want to, I don't know why you say it.

If I visualize a triangle, it's not that the triangle is somewhere "outside" myself that can decay, but neither is anything in tho — Xtrix

Math is not based on what we visualize or imagine. Mathematical proofs are based on formal criteria, independent of empirical intuition. That's why there are totally counterintuitive mathematics. The same for logic.

Of course. The life of human being is subject to temporality. But he can formulate propositions that refer to non-temporal objects. I repeat, you see sense in saying: "Tomorrow at 10 p.m. A will be equal to A"? Do you see no difference between "A=A" and "The postman will ring twice"?

Summarizing: I think Parmenides was trying to do an a-temporal and counterintuitive theory of Being and Heidegger misunderstood him because he had a preconceived idea. He thought that all the metaphysical tradition was infected by the ontical. He was the only one that was able to lead humanity on the path of true ontological thinking. I think he had a high concept of himself. A philosophical vice.

What he did not perceive is that metaphysics is contaminated by the ontic because a thought detached from sensitive experience becomes empty and irrelevant to practice. Perhaps he realized this in his final stage and therefore preferred to take refuge in poetry and abjure philosophy. Because poetry has no commitment to truth and does not need to justify what it claims.

You just made we want to read his last philosophical works

You just made we want to read his last philosophical works — Gregory

Great! You'll tell us about it.

I have Discourse on Thinking somewhere. Does anyone know when that was written?

1959, looks like.

If you copy/paste the following:

University of Sussex › blogs › ...PDF
Martin Heidegger - Sussex Blogs

into google, you'll find a downloadable pdf version of On Time and Being (1969) with an intro/commentary by Joan Stambaugh. It also includes The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.

Also seen Letter on Humanism available in pdf format as well in searches.

If I visualize a triangle, it's not that the triangle is somewhere "outside" myself that can decay, but neither is anything in tho
— Xtrix
Math is not based on what we visualize or imagine. Mathematical proofs are based on formal criteria, independent of empirical intuition. That's why there are totally counterintuitive mathematics. The same for logic. — David Mo

I didn't say mathematics is based on visualization or imagination. On the other hand, there are formal principles involved in vision as well -- yet without the triggering effect of experience we wouldn't know what they are. Regardless, assuming arithmetic is a completely formal system, it's still a part of the human mind. As is logic. As is language.

The life of human being is subject to temporality. But he can formulate propositions that refer to non-temporal objects. — David Mo

Again, "non-temporal object" is meaningless until we explain what "temporal" means. If we define "temporal" as something that moves/changes, then no -- abstractions aren't, in that sense, temporal objects. Quite true. But this is why I said "It comes down to how we're defining time."

Summarizing: I think Parmenides was trying to do an a-temporal and counterintuitive theory of Being and Heidegger misunderstood him because he had a preconceived idea. He thought that all the metaphysical tradition was infected by the ontical. — David Mo

"Ontical," in Heidegger, refers to beings (plural). That metaphysics has lost the question of Being itself, according to Heidegger, is quite true -- in the sense that "Being" gets interpreted as *a* being -- as permanence, as becoming, as Idea (enduring prototype), as ousia (substance). Whether Heidegger considers Parmenides as part of this I'm not sure. It seems Parmenides was truly doing ontology and raising the question of Being, but leaving unquestioned (phenomenologically) the perspective which guided his questioning. According to Heidegger, that concealed perspective was temporality.

But this is why I said "It comes down to how we're defining time." — Xtrix

I don't know how time can be defined without reference to change, evolution or whatever you want to call it. I would like to know how you do it. Seriously.

Whether Heidegger considers Parmenides as part of this I'm not sure — Xtrix

What do you mean, we don't know? The text we are discussing accuses Parmenides of having directly raised the problem of Being in temporal (present) mode. And Heidegger assimilated it to Aristotle. I don't have time to look at it now, but I think I remember it quite well.

Whether Heidegger considers Parmenides as part of this I'm not sure
— Xtrix
What do you mean, we don't know? The text we are discussing accuses Parmenides of having directly raised the problem of Being in temporal (present) mode. — David Mo

Very true, but I was referring to:

He [Heidegger] thought that all the metaphysical tradition was infected by the ontical. — David Mo

Whether Parmenides is part of the tradition of mistaking being for a being, or focusing entirely on "beings" (the ontical) is not clear to me, I'd have to go back and check a number of books, but my sense is that Heidegger considers Parmenides to be a true "thinker," a primordial one, one who raises the question of Being.

"Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding. This thesis has remained the foundation of western philosophy ever since [Parmenides]." (B&T, p. 215/171 -- context is important here, the brackets are mine but if you read the previous part he's referring to Parmenides' famous 'For thinking and being are the same' sentence, although 'thinking' here is interpreted by Heidegger as 'to perceive with the eyes" as the footnote explains.)

But this is why I said "It comes down to how we're defining time."
— Xtrix

I don't know how time can be defined without reference to change, evolution or whatever you want to call it. I would like to know how you do it. Seriously. — David Mo

Well not me, really, but Heidegger -- or at least my take on him. He sees Aristotle as treating "time" as something already present-at-hand, as something measurable, as change in the sense of a sequence of "nows" -- I think of a moving point on a number line, for example. One of the basis units of physics, as you know, is the unit fo time: the second, as measured by a repetitive, consistent change (something to do with caesium, but I won't pretend to understand it).

What Heidegger will say, however, is that this understanding of time is itself grounded in our "temporality," which in B&T is tied to Sorge, care. We're projecting, anticipating, expecting -- that's the "future." He'll call the past/present/future different "ecstases," but that temporality is really a unity and happening all at once, so that there is no "before" and "after," really. So in a weird way, there is no "time" without humans:

"Strictly speaking we cannot say: There was a time when man was not. At all times man was and is and will be, because time temporalities itself only insofar as man is." (Intro to Metaphysics, p. 71)

"There is no nature-time, since all time belongs essential to Dasein." (Basic Problems, p. 262)

All of this is admittedly very strange, but I wonder: what do you think he's driving at in Being and Time? He says from the beginning that "time" will have to be re-interpreted, that a new understanding of it needs to be "explicated," etc. His thesis stands or falls on whether he's adequately describing things, and so this is why "time" is particularly relevant here -- if he's wrong about "time," then he's completely useless (in my view).

I agree with what you've written on this thread. I think for Heidegger, time is meditation on being by the Kantian self

Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception — Xtrix

What is pure perception? An intellectual vision, since it is pure. But there is nothing in Parmenides that suggests contemplation in the sense of intuitive grasping (I use intuition in the Kantian sense), but reasoning. Of course, if we equate every thought with "pure perception" everything is "vision". But it is an unjustifiable assimilation that only serves to create confusion of language.

All of this is admittedly very strange, what do you think he's driving at in Being and Time? — Xtrix

George Steiner is my main guide to (not) understanding Heidegger. In his own words, the subject of time "is watertight even by Heideggerian standards". Indeed, Heidegger creates around the concept of temporality a tangle of metaphors, neologisms and undefined concepts that make what he says unintelligible. A labyrinth only suitable for lovers of the cabala and masochists. :yum:

What I am clear about is that Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic temporality. What I am clear about is that the authentic one is the one that corresponds to his ideas. What I am also clear about is that either of the two temporalities includes past, present and future as becoming. And it is clear that Parmenides denies becoming, since Being is one and immobile.
Therefore there is no reason why Heidegger accuses Parmenides of thinking Being in the mode of time. It does not make sense.