I hope Xtrix responds, but in would like a try at a little response.

Heidegger 's thoughts were always in projection. Once he found a truth he projected it.. Being the first existential philosopher, this was only natural and it was natural for him to tear through the continuity of his thoughts in search of One thought that would hold forever

Heidegger 's thoughts were always in projection. Once he found a truth he projected it.. — Gregory

What does "projection" mean?

Projection was to always put the truth in the future; it's like having a friesby that you keep tossing away once it returns to you. Hegel and Heidegger were the greatest products, or should I say projects, of Germany. Husserl was a genuine man, fish he even looks like a civil war General without the stress

So my argument on Parmenides and Heidegger is that both went through every contingent truth until the necessary truth was found. Only that Parmenides was an ancient, more akin to our distant ancestors

Projection was to always put the truth in the future; it's like having a friesby that you keep tossing away once it returns to you. — Gregory

Hey, what language do you speak? I'm just saying that because of the accent. I hadn't thought of comparing Hegel to a potato chip, but sometimes Heidegger seems more like a sweet potato promoted to the generalate. I hope that doesn't lead to a third world war. With the civil war I have enough.

I'm from Italy actually, but my residency is in the US. Thank you for asking

I didn't realize this was noticible lol. I was born in Rome and have been an American citizen since I was a teenager. Life in the USA is fast but for me it has moved slowly, and I am now almost 35. English was my study since a young age so, now, it's my primary language by far. If anyone is interested, I wanted to research the philosophical sides of Giovanni Gentiles and compare them to Heidegger

I agree with what you've written on this thread. I think for Heidegger, time is meditation on being by the Kantian self — Gregory

I'm not sure what this means exactly, but perhaps it's true.

Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception
— Xtrix

What is pure perception? An intellectual vision, since it is pure. But there is nothing in Parmenides that suggests contemplation in the sense of intuitive grasping (I use intuition in the Kantian sense), but reasoning. Of course, if we equate every thought with "pure perception" everything is "vision". But it is an unjustifiable assimilation that only serves to create confusion of language. — David Mo

"Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. — Xtrix

This "beholding" and "discovering" is related to aletheia, to unconcealedness, to "disclosure" or "open-ness" of the world. Remember this is what Heidegger asserts that the tradition has always believed, but with the emphasis on what's present before us. What he will constantly emphasize, however, is absence -- that which withdraws, conceals, and hides.

George Steiner is my main guide to (not) understanding Heidegger. In his own words, the subject of time "is watertight even by Heideggerian standards". Indeed, Heidegger creates around the concept of temporality a tangle of metaphors, neologisms and undefined concepts that make what he says unintelligible. A labyrinth only suitable for lovers of the cabala and masochists. :yum: — David Mo

Not easy, but I wouldn't say unintelligible. That "projection" and "anticipation" are the basis for ordinary concepts about the "future" as a "not-yet-now" isn't all that hard to understand: our experience and involvement in the world ("being-in-the-world") is where we always start from when we begin to philosophize -- but like when a hammer breaks down, it's a different mode of being than when simply acting.

What I am clear about is that Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic temporality. — David Mo

Maybe you could explain it to me then, because this is something I'm certainly not clear on. I'm not even sure if "authentic temporality" really makes sense. Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic, but I don't see how these ideas apply to temporality as Dasein's being.

Not easy, but I wouldn't say unintelligible. That "projection" and "anticipation" are the basis for ordinary concepts about the "future" as a "not-yet-now" isn't all that hard to understand: — Xtrix

Maybe you could explain it to me then, because this is something I'm certainly not clear on. I'm not even sure if "authentic temporality" really makes sense. — Xtrix

Ley us see:

His letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein's Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural [[i]als zukünftiges[/i]], in the sense which we have now indicated, and which we have still to define more closely. (B&T: 326/372-3)

Two things are clear here: There is an authentic and an inauthentic temporality and both are based on "futural”. But what temporality means is gibberish.

The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" (or better, which "is in the process of having been") releases from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality" (B&T: 326/374)

This is a mess because Heidegger identifies past, present and future in a "unity". To build that unity he equates the future with "having been", that is, what is normally understood as the past. And the present is "liberated" from itself we don't quite know how nor from what. In other words, the construction of that unity destroys the common meaning of the word "time", without proposing an intelligible alternative.

In my opinion.

Once again I insist that all this has nothing to do with the Being of Parmenides, who is one and immobile.

NOTE: one of the traits that define authentic temporality is that of finitude. Inauthentic temporality is conceived as infinite. The authentic one as finite, that is to say, being for death.
One would be tempted to say that what happens is that the common man thinks time in objective terms, while Heidegger is thinking in subjective terms, beyond his particular life. But this is not the case. Heidegger prevents us from considering time in objective vs. subjective terms. Phenomenology is supposed to overcome that alternative of vulgar thinking. How? Another mystery.

Inauthentic temporality is a spurious infinity, one that goes nowhere and has no point

Ley us see:
His letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein's Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural [[i]als zukünftiges[/i]], in the sense which we have now indicated, and which we have still to define more closely. (B&T: 326/372-3)

Two things are clear here: There is an authentic and an inauthentic temporality and both are based on "futural”. But what temporality means is gibberish. — David Mo

Not really. Notice he doesn't mention temporality here. Being-towards-death is a separate, but related, issue. It's true that it deals with the future, but that doesn't mean it's synonymous with "temporality," which he'll later talk about in terms of "ecstases," etc.

The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" (or better, which "is in the process of having been") releases from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality" (B&T: 326/374)

This is a mess because Heidegger identifies past, present and future in a "unity". — David Mo

I don't see it as a mess really. What I gather here is his claiming that, in ordinary experience, all three are happening essentially at once, and only in detached, abstract thinking do they become separate "things" on a number line which happen in a sequence. It always has struck me as quasi-Buddhist, but I think they emphasize more that the "past" and "future" are indeed separate but illusory and that only the present matters.

In any case, again and again it's always helpful to keep in mind the separation of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand" modes of being, ordinary everyday (average) experience, and contrasting with what the "tradition" (which has always privileged abstract, theoretical thinking and "logic") claims "time" and "being" are (i.e., how they get interpreted). By using phenomenology as a method, and as something that essentially studies the "hidden" or "concealedness" of things, Heidegger is trying to throw out all traditional concepts and describe "being-in-the-world" anew -- hence "Dasein" and "temporality" and "unconcealedness," etc.

To take Being and Time in reverse order: we essentially are temporality (as beings), which manifests are "care," which shows up in average everyday experiences as the "ready-to-hand" activities we're mostly engaged in and which are transparent to us because they're so "close," and have thus been ignored by the tradition. He layers these analyses, I think rather poorly, in the first two Divisions, but this (in my view) remains the thesis, apart from his "deconstruction" of the history of time and Being.

Notice he doesn't mention temporality here. — Xtrix

I suggest that you read the context of the texts I have provided. In any case, in the two texts I have provided, temporality is impied by means of future. In the first and second texts Heidegger is talking about temporality.

I don't see it as a mess really. — Xtrix

Because you don't pay attention to what I say and you respond to something else that comes to mind. The problem is not that they form a unity (at least not the one I was aiming at) but that in that unity the future is defined in terms of having been (past).

In any case, again and again it's always helpful to keep in mind the separation of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand" modes of being, — Xtrix

This is exactly what you do from here. Nothing you say refers to my objection. You recite what you more or less know and forget the terms of our debate.

This is exactly what you do from here. Nothing you say refers to my objection. You recite what you more or less know and forget the terms of our debate. — David Mo

Because the "terms" are based on no understanding of Heidegger's concepts, hence why I have to go back over and over to them. If you understood them, you'd quickly see how the "terms" melt away. Regardless:

Notice he doesn't mention temporality here.
— Xtrix
I suggest that you read the context of the texts I have provided. — David Mo

As far as I see, he never once mentions "authentic temporality." That doesn't make sense. What you're referring to is being-towards-death, which is a different topic.

I don't see it as a mess really.
— Xtrix
Because you don't pay attention to what I say and you respond to something else that comes to mind. The problem is not that they form a unity (at least not the one I was aiming at) but that in that unity the future is defined in terms of having been (past). — David Mo

All three ecstases are defined in terms of the others. The past, therefore, is just as much defined by the future as the future is in terms of the past. Take a look at the quote you provided again, then the following:

"Thus we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded ithe totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling -- that is, the unity o the care-structure." (B&T p. 350/401 -- emphasis Heidegger's)

The entire paragraph is helpful, but I don't feel like typing it all out.

"Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a 'succession'. The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been." (ibid. p 350/401)

This is a mess because Heidegger identifies past, present and future in a "unity". To build that unity he equates the future with "having been", that is, what is normally understood as the past. And the present is "liberated" from itself we don't quite know how nor from what. In other words, the construction of that unity destroys the common meaning of the word "time", without proposing an intelligible alternative. — David Mo

He does not "equate" it, he's saying it's all happening at once and so should not be thought of as "later" or "not-yet." Likewise, the past is very much dependent on the future -- and if you look at how we live, or even how we think about our history or world history, our current values and goals plays a huge role in how we interpret the past. It's not a construction, it's a description. And it is indeed an intelligible alternative -- it makes good sense, in fact -- at least to me. Does it "destroy" the common meaning of the word "time"? Sure it does, of time as a sequence of "nows" that we measure, quantitatively, with clocks and calendars, etc. That "ordinary conception of time" has been destroyed isn't a criticism.

Heidegger specifically spoke of relativity. Being Kantian, time does not have parts. SO would inauthentic time be Newton's and authentic be Kant's? I suppose. Heidegger says in B&T that death is a possibility FOR being. I guess this implies an afterlife where we experience time truly instead.of in an illusion. Any comments?

Heidegger specifically spoke of relativity. Being Kantian, time does not have parts. SO would inauthentic time be Newton's and authentic be Kant's? I suppose. — Gregory

No, because "inauthentic/authentic time" is meaningless. Heidegger rarely spoke about relativity.

Heidegger says in B&T that death is a possibility FOR being. I guess this implies an afterlife where we experience time truly instead.of in an illusion. Any comments? — Gregory

You'll have to provide some quotations, because I see nothing about an afterlife in Heidegger -- ever.

No, because "inauthentic/authentic time" is meaningless. — Xtrix

For Heidegger it's meaningingless? He says "the facticity of Being is essentially distinguished from the factuality of something objectively present. Existing Being does not encounter itself as something objectively present within the world." This might be a starting point to seeing a difference in time-structure.

"The problem of possible wholeness of the being, who we ourselves actually are, exists justifiably IF care, as the fundamental constitution of Being, 'is connected' with DEATH as the most extreme possibility OF this Being."

So there is possibility of Being in death. Heidegger doesn't say we then go from Being to infinite nothingness. He doesn't speak of ETERNAL life at all. But Being does not leave us in death

"..death is the ownmost nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and not to be bypssed possibility OF Being".

All these quotes are from B&T

No, because "inauthentic/authentic time" is meaningless.
— Xtrix

For Heidegger it's meaningingless? He says "the facticity of Being is essentially distinguished from the factuality of something objectively present. Existing Being does not encounter itself as something objectively present within the world." This might be a starting point to seeing a difference in time-structure. — Gregory

He's making a distinction between the present-at-hand, "objectively present" mode of being, the being of "objects" in our environment, and ourselves (Dasein). He's not talking about temporality here, and certainly not about authentic or inauthentic temporality -- which is meaningless.

"The problem of possible wholeness of the being, who we ourselves actually are, exists justifiably IF care, as the fundamental constitution of Being, 'is connected' with DEATH as the most extreme possibility OF this Being."

So there is possibility of Being in death. Heidegger doesn't say we then go from Being to infinite nothingness. He doesn't speak of ETERNAL life at all. But Being does not leave us in death — Gregory

Page number?

This passage in itself says nothing about what you're thinking. Death is connected to "this being," meaning Dasein. Yes, dasein lives with the knowledge that it will eventually die. Death is the end of possibilities in Heidegger. There's nothing about an afterlife anywhere.

"..death is the ownmost nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and not to be bypssed possibility OF Being".

All these quotes are from B&T — Gregory

Where? Pages are helpful.

"Possibility of being" is in relation to dasein -- and yes, in that case death is, as I mentioned above, the most extreme possibility -- the possibility which cancels all possibilities.

You're just misreading it, I'm afraid.

All the quotes are from the middle of the book when he starts talking about conscience and death; I simply wrote them down on my computer awhile ago so I could use them on this for this forum . You are supremely correct that I should've page numbers attached. I picked the book up today for the first time in months.

I thought death as a "possibility of being" meant we could find some kind of being in death. It's clear that language works such that the equivocal is predominate

1) doesnt post modernism say that most language is inherently ambiguous?

2) Heidegger wrote "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics" during an age when everyone was talking about relativity. I'm sure it's covered in the book. I see a lot of B-time in "Being and Time"

3) what would a conversation between Heisenberg and Heidegger have been like?? Energy was being discovered as the principle of everything, and the conclusion seemed to be that energy could create its own forces out of nothing. So much for a need for supernatural intervention! Heidegger must have found this interesting

1) doesnt post modernism say that most language is inherently ambiguous? — Gregory

I'm not sure what postmodernism says, to be honest. I suspect, from my little reading, that it says very little.

2) Heidegger wrote "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics" during an age when everyone was talking about relativity. I'm sure it's covered in the book. — Gregory

Well if he covers relativity somewhere I'm happy to take a look.

3) what would a conversation between Heisenberg and Heidegger have been like?? Energy was being discovered as the principle of everything, and the conclusion seemed to be that energy could create its own forces out of nothing. So much for a need for supernatural intervention! Heidegger must have found this interesting — Gregory

Heisenberg was a physicist, and Heidegger has a lot to say about physics (in the sense of its origins and ontological underpinnings). Whether or not he was interested in (or fully understood) all of Heisenberg's ideas, I have no idea.

That "ordinary conception of time" has been destroyed isn't a criticism. — Xtrix

He does not destroy anything. He changes the common sense of a word without giving a valid reason. When he speaks of temporality he is speaking of something else that is not temporary. According to you what reason do you have to "destroy" the common concept of time? Any sensible person understands that the football match to be played tomorrow is not now and that the car I bought yesterday is not in the future. For him everything is part of the same amalgam. That is, a play on words that serves only to mislead.
I understand that mystics and Buddhists like this verbal entanglement. I do not.

As far as I see, he never once mentions "authentic temporality." That doesn't make sense. — Xtrix

Tell Heidegger.

It arises from inauthentic temporality, which has a source of its own. The
conceptions of 'future', 'past' and 'Present' have first arisen in terms of
the inauthentic way of understanding time. (B&T: 326/374)

This way of Being-alongside is the Present-the "waiting-towards" ; this
ecstatical mode reveals itself if we adduce for comparison this very same
ecstasis, but in the mode of authentic temporality. To the anticipation
which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a Present in accordance with
which a resolution discloses the Situation. In resoluteness, the Present is
not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest
concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That Present
which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we
call the "moment of vision". (B&T: 338/387)

I found a dozen references to authentic or inauthentic temporality in 10''. Advantages of computer science.

Let me paraphrase that paragraph. "Existing in the world is being in the present, waiting for the future. To be authentically in the present is to resolutely anticipate, through which we see the future. Temporality and the present are the same, and it is a moment of vision. When the vision is timeless, it is in the ecstatic mood. Usually we are only a few seconds ahead of us. A broader vision is to see your whole destiny."

Let me paraphrase that paragraph. — Gregory

Is this Heidegger or St. Teresa of Jesus levitating?

Is this Heidegger or St. Teresa of Jesus levitating? — David Mo

I don't think you appreciate philosophy are it's deepest levels

Heidegger was very influenced by B-time, and might have interpreted it in Kantian terms. (remember, Kant thought time was in our minds) Heidegger said for example that when we're crossing a bridge we are already on the other side. His idea were not poetry

Gregory:
"I don't think you appreciate philosophy are it's deepest levels"
Wells are not good for philosophy.

That "ordinary conception of time" has been destroyed isn't a criticism.
— Xtrix

He does not destroy anything. — David Mo

In other words, the construction of that unity destroys the common meaning of the word "time", — David Mo

He changes the common sense of a word without giving a valid reason. — David Mo

Most of division II of Being and Time is dedicated to giving multiple "valid reasons," in fact.

When he speaks of temporality he is speaking of something else that is not temporary. According to you what reason do you have to "destroy" the common concept of time? Any sensible person understands that the football match to be played tomorrow is not now and that the car I bought yesterday is not in the future. For him everything is part of the same amalgam. That is, a play on words that serves only to mislead.
I understand that mystics and Buddhists like this verbal entanglement. I do not. — David Mo

So you stick with Aristotle. Nothing wrong with that. I myself use it, of course -- we all do. Heidegger goes beneath this "common" conception, however. The use of a "time line," a sequence of "nows," an equating time with "motion" or space, and the measuring/quantifying of repeatable changes in clocks, etc., is not necessarily how we experience "time." The experiential component, when analyzed phenomenologically, has little to do with "seconds" and "minutes," "befores" and "afters." Thus why he dubs it "temporality" rather than "time."

I found a dozen references to authentic or inauthentic temporality in 10''. Advantages of computer science. — David Mo

Still doesn't make sense to me, but thanks for pointing them out.

There was some truth Heidegger was trying to communicate.

If you don't quote any valid reason you are blocking the discussion.

"So you stick with Aristotle"
I do not adhere to anyone.
I am affirming the common perception of time that Heidegger violates without valid reason.
You don't need clocks to have a different perception of the past, present and future as different elements of a lived process. My objection is that Heidegger makes an aberrant mix as we saw with Parmenides.

In my opinion.