You have some interesting ideas there, but until science finds out something, we won't be able to confirm or deny any of it. — Punshhh
Not only because of phrases like that but because the whole Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason is mounted on syllogistic logic. Of course it can be reformulated, but it was not Kant's idea.Modern formal logic doesn’t contradict him any more than Einstein didn’t contradict Newton......you know that story. — Mww
The inconceivable is not the impossible. — David Mo
Under what conditions would this not be true? — Mww
Modern formal logic contradicts him. — David Mo
It is not a question of contradicting — David Mo
The inconceivable is not the impossible. — David Mo
Under what conditions would this not be true?
— Mww
It's not about conditions. It's an analytical statement. — David Mo
Make up your mind. — Mww
An analytical statement is supposed to be tautological and cannot be false. If what I said is false, it's because it's not analytical. In my opinion, impossible and inconceivable are two words with different meanings and therefore have different meanings. Do not tell me that this "deduction" can be false. It would be chaos.An analytic judgement can be false. Because “the inconceivable is not the impossible” is false, it is not true under any condition. — Mww
The point that metaphysical knowledge is based on form, & not the particular materials or matter of any empirical intuition, taking Kant’s “Copernican revolution” into account, still stands, precisely because everything which is contingently given to us in empirical intuition is conditioned by the form of our subject; so that any synthesis apriori holds good for all possible experiences &, therefore, isn’t limited to either a single subject or instance of empirical intuition. In other words, any synthetic apriori determination stands over & above every particular instance or state & holds good throughout all possible experiences. Hence, “meta”-physics... such sythetic apriori knowledge is “beyond” any particular empirical or physical state, & so its validity is independent of any one altogether.Sure, but Kant here has introduced a Copernican twist, as he says. Classical metaphysics has sought to find synthetic principles a priori about things. Kantian metaphysics dispenses with things and explains synthetic a priori principles as conditions of a priori knowledge. — David Mo
To take your example... the truth of this judgement is independent of any particular instance or state of an actual cat, as it holds good for all possible cats. Such that, even if there were no actual “cats,” it would still hold good because it’s applicable to all possible cats altogether; & so it would pertain to the judgement with hypothetical logical necessity — i.e., “If there’s a cat advancing with footsteps, then they would be feline.”"The cat was advancing with feline steps." The argument is rational. “All cats' footsteps are feline“ — David Mo
How so? Are you saying that mathematics can be something which is valid only aposteriori, such that it’s possible for its determinations to be valid in one instance of intuition & then change, & not be so, in another? If not, I fail to see, how is it not apriori, i.e., not independent of any one instance of intuition?The only thing that Kant did not justify is that mathematics or logic are absolutely a priori. — David Mo
On the basis of Kant’s claim that our knowledge is limited to the form of our subject, how can you know that the inconceivable isn’t the impossible? For you can’t transcend the form of your subject in order to determine that there are possibilities which violate what’s (logically) inconceivable to us. Thus you can’t know the truth of it; & your claim that the inconceivable isn’t the impossible simply takes the point for granted & begs the question. Either way, even if one is to grant this claim of yours, under Kantian principles, it would be wholly irrelevant; because we could never know of them, i.e., possibilities that are inconceivable, & they wouldn’t apply to us or our knowledge; as we’re limited to what we can know only under the form of our subject, which can never violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction.The inconceivable is not the impossible. Kant demonstrated that the principles of logic are indissolubly associated with the forms of our intellect. — David Mo
Yet never so hard a time as to violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction; & if otherwise were to be the case with an “artificial superintelligence,” in order to for us to know of this, it would have to enter through the form of our subject, which would then make it conform to the form of our subject, such that it couldn’t then violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction.Any day an artificial superintelligence can give us a hard time. — David Mo
Let it be so... yet & still none of them violate the principle of non-contradiction. The self-referential “barber paradox” is no instance of this; for it obfuscates the modality of possibility. A barber who shaves all those who can’t shave themselves, misses that a barber can shave all those who’re capable of shaving themselves (which logically includes himself), even if he hasn’t or doesn’t.Modern formal logic contradicts him. There are other possible logics. — David Mo
Is this relevant? Either you accept (the premise of) the argument, my friend, or you don’t — i.e., what’s created by us can be altered or changed by us, if it can’t then it’s not.What era does your realidealism come from? — Mww
If human conception created the law non-contradiction, then human conception can alter or change the law of non-contradiction — aRealidealist
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