You have some interesting ideas there, but until science finds out something, we won't be able to confirm or deny any of it. — Punshhh

We're going to need a lot of badass brainscan technology to save the star-crossed mice. Anyone know what glial cells do? Could probably be lots of intricate quantum entanglement effects as their chemistry isn't limited to functionality for synapsing.

Modern formal logic doesn’t contradict him any more than Einstein didn’t contradict Newton......you know that story. — Mww

Not only because of phrases like that but because the whole Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason is mounted on syllogistic logic. Of course it can be reformulated, but it was not Kant's idea.
It is not a question of contradicting, but of saying things that cannot be said within one logical system or another. So Newton's physics cannot express the theory of relativity and Aristotelian logic cannot say what contemporary formal logics say.

The inconceivable is not the impossible. — David Mo

Under what conditions would this not be true? — Mww

It's not about conditions. It's an analytical statement.

Could probably be lots of intricate quantum entanglement effects as their chemistry isn't limited to functionality for synapsing. — Enrique

There may also be an angel and a devil pulling each to one side of the synapse. Why not?

Modern formal logic contradicts him. — David Mo

It is not a question of contradicting — David Mo

Make up your mind.
—————-

The inconceivable is not the impossible. — David Mo

Under what conditions would this not be true?
— Mww

It's not about conditions. It's an analytical statement. — David Mo

An analytic judgement can be false. Because “the inconceivable is not the impossible” is false, it is not true under any condition.

Make up your mind. — Mww

Honi soit qui mal y pense.

What is contradicted in the first sentence is the assumption that Aristotelian logic is the only one possible. Not that formal logic contradicts Aristotelian logic, which is what the second sentence refers to. They are two different things.

I'm not saying I can't contradict myself, but not on this occasion.

An analytic judgement can be false. Because “the inconceivable is not the impossible” is false, it is not true under any condition. — Mww

An analytical statement is supposed to be tautological and cannot be false. If what I said is false, it's because it's not analytical. In my opinion, impossible and inconceivable are two words with different meanings and therefore have different meanings. Do not tell me that this "deduction" can be false. It would be chaos.

Do not tell me that this "deduction" can be false. It would be chaos. — David Mo

Momentary lapse of reason (thanks, David!! Not you...the other David) on my part. That which is inconceivable is unknowable, not necessarily impossible.

My bad.

Very sorry for the (about a month) late reply; but I haven’t had the leisure-time, for some while now, to sit down at my computer &, so, be able to trade thoughtful responses over it (being preoccupied with work, the family & all). So I’ll understand if you don’t (want to) reply; though everything which I’m going to respond to, from your posts, I’ll directly quote, so that you won’t have to go back & review any of your older comments (focusing only on what’s quoted from your most recent posts).

Sure, but Kant here has introduced a Copernican twist, as he says. Classical metaphysics has sought to find synthetic principles a priori about things. Kantian metaphysics dispenses with things and explains synthetic a priori principles as conditions of a priori knowledge. — David Mo

The point that metaphysical knowledge is based on form, & not the particular materials or matter of any empirical intuition, taking Kant’s “Copernican revolution” into account, still stands, precisely because everything which is contingently given to us in empirical intuition is conditioned by the form of our subject; so that any synthesis apriori holds good for all possible experiences &, therefore, isn’t limited to either a single subject or instance of empirical intuition. In other words, any synthetic apriori determination stands over & above every particular instance or state & holds good throughout all possible experiences. Hence, “meta”-physics... such sythetic apriori knowledge is “beyond” any particular empirical or physical state, & so its validity is independent of any one altogether.

"The cat was advancing with feline steps." The argument is rational. “All cats' footsteps are feline“ — David Mo

To take your example... the truth of this judgement is independent of any particular instance or state of an actual cat, as it holds good for all possible cats. Such that, even if there were no actual “cats,” it would still hold good because it’s applicable to all possible cats altogether; & so it would pertain to the judgement with hypothetical logical necessity — i.e., “If there’s a cat advancing with footsteps, then they would be feline.”

The only thing that Kant did not justify is that mathematics or logic are absolutely a priori. — David Mo

How so? Are you saying that mathematics can be something which is valid only aposteriori, such that it’s possible for its determinations to be valid in one instance of intuition & then change, & not be so, in another? If not, I fail to see, how is it not apriori, i.e., not independent of any one instance of intuition?

The inconceivable is not the impossible. Kant demonstrated that the principles of logic are indissolubly associated with the forms of our intellect. — David Mo

On the basis of Kant’s claim that our knowledge is limited to the form of our subject, how can you know that the inconceivable isn’t the impossible? For you can’t transcend the form of your subject in order to determine that there are possibilities which violate what’s (logically) inconceivable to us. Thus you can’t know the truth of it; & your claim that the inconceivable isn’t the impossible simply takes the point for granted & begs the question. Either way, even if one is to grant this claim of yours, under Kantian principles, it would be wholly irrelevant; because we could never know of them, i.e., possibilities that are inconceivable, & they wouldn’t apply to us or our knowledge; as we’re limited to what we can know only under the form of our subject, which can never violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction.

Any day an artificial superintelligence can give us a hard time. — David Mo

Yet never so hard a time as to violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction; & if otherwise were to be the case with an “artificial superintelligence,” in order to for us to know of this, it would have to enter through the form of our subject, which would then make it conform to the form of our subject, such that it couldn’t then violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction.

Modern formal logic contradicts him. There are other possible logics. — David Mo

Let it be so... yet & still none of them violate the principle of non-contradiction. The self-referential “barber paradox” is no instance of this; for it obfuscates the modality of possibility. A barber who shaves all those who can’t shave themselves, misses that a barber can shave all those who’re capable of shaving themselves (which logically includes himself), even if he hasn’t or doesn’t.

Sorry for the very late reply; I really haven’t had the time to sit down & log into my account lately. So if you don’t reply, I’ll understand.

What era does your realidealism come from? — Mww

Is this relevant? Either you accept (the premise of) the argument, my friend, or you don’t — i.e., what’s created by us can be altered or changed by us, if it can’t then it’s not.

The form of the argument is certainly valid (so it’s left for you to grant the premises or not)...

-If X, then Y
-Not Y
-Therefore not X

-If A created B, i.e., “if X,” then A can alter or change B, i.e., “then Y”
-A can’t alter or change B, i.e, “Not Y”
-Therefore A didn’t create B, i.e., “therefore not X”

-If human conception created the law non-contradiction, then human conception can alter or change the law of non-contradiction
-Human conception can’t alter or change the law of non-contradiction
-Therefore human conception didn’t create the law of non-contradiction

If you grant the premises, & also acknowledge the validity of the argument’s form, then I don’t see how you can claim that the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction, is a product of human conception?

If there's no thoughts there's no way of knowing if you're conscious or not. The only way to know is if your thinking print out "yeah, I'm conscious".
Consciousness as some kind of mishmash of thinking/infinite pure backdrop/awareness etc is just a myth.

If human conception created the law non-contradiction, then human conception can alter or change the law of non-contradiction — aRealidealist

So what happens when empirical conditions occur, in which the proof of such logical transformations goes against experience? Shall we then find that this animal, being truly a dog, is also truly not a dog? If so, we can absolutely never know what the animal is, for no matter what its appearance, it can simultaneously appear as not that. Which prevents us ever even conceptualizing said animal as dog in the first place, which contradicts (?) the fact that we do.

Now I understand merely saying human conception can change the LNC,,,,..conceptions are the representations but not the source of change, but ok..... doesn’t imply the actual doing of it. Nevertheless, there can’t be much point in the saying of it, other than.....

“...there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this...that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has been employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly misapplied....”