?

As I said, my model for memory is very expansive and could roughly described as a holographic model of information. Probably no reason to go totally off topic with this idea. However, insofar as my past is concerned, it is for all intents and purposes what I remember. Where all other memory of events are stored and how they are experienced and and evolve is a much larger question.

I believe I understand what you’re expressing. And, at least as pertains to my current understanding, I'm in agreement with you.

Yet there is the issue of other(s)’ memories-embedded-with-the-present as well. Here, a simple argument of taking two people as example will be overly simplistic. Each cell within one’s body—to the extent it too is in some way sentient—will hold its own memories within the present. (This, I grant, will be contentious with many). Still, sentience is not limited to one individual. Every person I’ve ever interacted with will hold some memories of each and every interaction. Memories of what was said, seen, etc. These memories of (at least) sapient beings will, furthermore, themselves need to be noncontradictory in order to be intelligible: one can’t remember there having been a house at place and time X and there not being the same house at the same time and in the same way.

If we are to use a holomovement view, then there’s a complex interplay of memory between all individuals that in any way have ever interacted (for clarity, individuals which nevertheless presently coexist) which would then create a stable global memory of what was.

Hopefully I’m not being too abstract about all this. My basic point being that the past would be a complex web of causal interactions between a multiplicity of beings which, as such, would stabilize into what would for all intended purposes result in a changeless past.

For example, were I (knock on wood) to gain Alzheimer’s in later life, my past would still remain stable in space and time—this despite me no longer having a personal memory of when I was birthed, for example.

So, I’m still inclined to argue that—nitty-gritty metaphysical analysis of a non-B-series time aside—the past would still be a permanently fixed set of events that have already passed by … this from the vantage of all coexistent sentience (by which I myself include microscopic life as well, even that of somatic cells).

I understand everything you wrote. It is the concept of space-time where we diverge. Memory is not situated in space-time as view it. Memory, as I view it, is holographic that is constantly in flux. (There is no present, since that would require a freezing in the movement of memory). It is this evolving memory that creates the psychological feeling of time - real time. For example, how do I know that I exist and am evolving? It is the memory of myself juxtaposed on a prior memory of myself. The two memories create time. The time of scientists, or clock time, is different. Clock time is a spatial movement used to measure (with inaccuracies) the simultaneity of events. This is not the time that we feel as time. The time we live - real time - is evolving memory.

For example, how do I know that I exist and am evolving? It is the memory of myself juxtaposed on a prior memory of myself. The two memories create time. The time of scientists, or click time, is different. — Rich

I’ve expressed this in other places: I’m by comparison anything but erudite when it comes to the in-depth physics of time. Not to say that I’m utterly ignorant either. However, a quick glance at Wikipedia didn’t reveal any information on what click time might be—and I haven't previously come across this term.

The view I’ve been holding onto is that time—both physical and experiential—is a hybrid between cyclical and linear: spiralar (but I’ve so far found no term that sounds good to the ear). From grandfather clocks to atomic clocks, time holds periods demarcated by repetition that nevertheless is always different with each new cycle. Like a more poetic dictum that every sunrise is the same, though no two sunrises in the history of Earth have ever been identical. This can be argued for digital time as well: the same quantities repeat as they accumulate into cycles.

I can in my own way then understand the sense of time being memory—for it is via memory, as you've addressed it, that this linear-cycle of information occurs (maybe better said, holds presence).

Not to contradict, but out of good natured curiosity: I associate forethought (prediction of what is to come) to the future, much in the same manner I’ve (maybe all too poorly) described the past as memory. I’m wondering if you currently hold an interpretation of memory as time that also incorporates this experiential property of forethought?

First, I must apologize. I corrected my post, but too late. I was referring to clock time.

Clock time is really a measurement instrument for trying to establish simultaneity. It is not lived time, and making it lived time and elevating it to some ontological theory creates all kinds of paradoxes which simply are not real.

But to answer your question. Bergson views the future as virtual action. It is what is intended but has not been. At this time, not having pondered this too much, it seems reasonable.

But to answer your question. Bergson views the future as virtual action. It is what is intended but has not been. At this time, not having pondered this too much, it seems reasonable. — Rich

thanks. Only read Bohm so far. Might give Bergson a read.

Sounds interesting; why not start a thread to address it?

I am not sure where Bohm was directly influenced by Bergson but he must have been indirectly influenced.

Also, this may be interesting once you have some background on Bergson.

http://www.stephenerobbins.com

His papers are difficult to follow but had lots of depth. He has some Youtube videos that are bit easier to follow. Some interesting ideas to compare with Bohm's Implicate Universe. But definitely start with the source of it all, Bergson.

Hi John. I'll give it some thought. Thanks.

No, it's a matter of knowing you are having it when you do! That is the actual point at issue. — John

Are you talking about propositional knowledge that's independent of the phenomenal experience as such? Or would knowledge by acquaintance count? You have the latter simply by having the experience. I wouldn't say that the former is identical to the experience necessarily--although in the case where the phenomenal experience is of propositional knowledge it is.

In any event, my comment isn't necessarily about propositional knowledge of course. That's only pertinent when that's the phenomenal experience in question.

There's only (a) logical identity, and (b) whether we call something "the same x" by virtue of the necessary and sufficient conditions we construct via our concepts. There is no other sort of identity on my view. Re (a) it's not the same chair. Re (b) it can be, depending on your conceptual abstractions relative to the chair. — Terrapin Station

OK, so you deny that the chair which I sit in this morning is the same chair that I sat in last night. Of course that is contrary to the way we speak, and if it were true, or at least believed to be true by the majority of people, and held as true by the legal system, it would make ownership of objects impossible. The car that you bought yesterday is not the same car that is in the parking lot right now, so who exactly owns that car?

But let's put that issue aside, and assume that what you state is true. I believe that it could be the case, what you say, and our common affirmation that the object is "the same" object, is just done for convenience, and not a proper representation of what is real. But here's the problem I have with this position.

Let's say that every moment tiny parts of the chair change, but the majority of the chair appears to remain the same, unchanged. We are denying that it is the same chair from one moment to the next, because of those changes. Changes have occurred, therefore it cannot be the same chair. Why is it then, that the majority of the chair stays the same? We are claiming that the old chair is taken right out of existence, and replaced with a new chair at each moment of change. How is it that the new chair appears to be identical to the old chair? There are just minute, imperceptible changes.

Of course, some process has to manufacture a new chair at each moment, to replace each old chair which goes out of existence at each moment. So that process which is constantly manufacturing new chairs to replace the old chairs must be following some kind of design, in order that each new chair comes out looking like the old chair. Don't you think? How can we account for the existence of this design, which the manufacturing process must be following every time that it produces a new chair to replace the old chair? Where does that design exist, and what kind of machine is following that design in manufacturing a new chair at each moment?

My own argument would be that, as with the Ship of Theseus problem, the parts of the chair can change but as long as the whole, the gestalt, remains unchanged in form and/or functionality, it remains the same chair. Darn it though, this gets into issues of identity and change. ... But I too am an curious to see what Terrapin has to say. — javra

The Ship of Theseus problem takes the two distinct forms of identity, logical identity as claimed by Terrapin, and material identity as stated by Aristotle, and creates ambiguity between them. The appearance of a paradox is the result of this ambiguity. We have a named item, The Ship of Theseus, which is pointed to, and the temporal continuity of that item provides identity. This is identity according to the Aristotelian notion, material identity, it allows that parts can change, and the temporal continuity of the item is the identity of that item. If we maintain this identity, it doesn't matter how many parts are exchanged, or how many times they are changed, the named object is always pointed to, through time, it is always that named object, and there is no problem.

But if we allow formal identity, logical identity to enter the picture, then the named item, The Ship of Theseus, has a specific description, a definition, of what that item is. Then if the pointed to item ever ceases to fulfill the conditions of that definition, it is no longer the named item. In the so-called paradox, it is implied that the named item has a formal definition, but none is provided. If one were provided then we'd have a standard by which we could say whether or not the named item fulfills the conditions of the definition. Since none is provided, we must assume that the named item really has no formal definition, and it will always continue to be that named item no matter what changes occur. So the appearance of a paradox is created by implying that the named item has a formal definition when it really does not.

OK, so you deny that the chair which I sit in this morning is the same chair that I sat in last night. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say that. I'd personally call it the same chair under (b), where philosophically, we need to be clear that it's not literally the same chair with respect to logical identity, and that it's only the same chair per my bestowal (to me, not to everyone) because it meets the necessary and sufficient conceptual criteria for me to call it the same chair.

The car that you bought yesterday is not the same car that is in the parking lot right now, so who exactly owns that car? — Metaphysician Undercover

What matters for that, aside from it meeting the necessary and sufficient subjective conceptual criteria to call it the same car, is that it's developmentally, causally, contiguously connected to the previous existents (that we're calling "the same car").

Why is it then, that the majority of the chair stays the same? — Metaphysician Undercover

Ontologically it's not. I already specified a reason for this--all of the molecules that make up the chair (and all of the atoms that make up all of those molecules, and all of the electrons in those atoms, and so on) are constantly in motion, constantly changing relations with respect to each other, and so on.

You mentioned appearance right before you asked the question above. We can't see things on a molecular level with our unaided eyes, we've evolved to ignore a lot of minor (differences of) details, etc.

We are claiming that the old chair is taken right out of existence, and replaced with a new chair at each moment of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

No one is claiming anything like that. And you're being led to that ridiculous idea by the equally ridiculous idea of there being an objective essence. What makes x a "chair" and what makes that particular one "that chair" in the first place is simply how we think about it conceptually, including that we conceptually separate it from the rug its on, the air around it, etc.

Nevertheless, when we address past, we all use the notion of changelessness as it pertains to events gone by. — javra

The past consists of the changes/motion that occurred, but that are no longer occurring (and it no longer exists, of course--it rather existed). Talking about changing the past, then, is talking about changing changes that no longer exist. Obviously that isn't possible.

The Ship of Theseus problem takes the two distinct forms of identity, logical identity as claimed by Terrapin, and material identity as stated by Aristotle, and creates ambiguity between them. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your conclusions regarding logical identity, but disagree that the Ship of Theseus is an issue of material identity.

Suppose Theseus takes his ship (ship A) and uses its material to build himself a cabin. It’s the same material but no longer a ship, so the identity of that addressed has changed. A week following, Theseus changes his mind and uses the same material, now a cabin, to rebuild the same ship he had before (ship B). It becomes Theseus’s ship again. Complexities could ensue as regards identity, but to the extent ship A and ship B are the same ship (as would uphold someone off for the month in which it was rebuilt in to a cabin and back), it would be the same ship for what reason? Neither due to logical nor material identity—the latter, on its own, would make the cabin identical to the ship.

It at least in part would be the same ship due to its functionality as form: e.g. were it to now have two masts instead of one its functionality would be different, even though the total material would be the same and even though it would still be a ship. Functionality, in turn, is entwined with purpose; and purpose, in an Aristotelian view, is a product of telos.

Using functionality as a means of arriving at identity, Theseus’s ship could then have half of its wooden planks replaced with plastic planks (different material) and, as long as its functionality would be unchanged, it would remain the same ship. However, were all its material to change, its is very unlikely that it would retain the same functionality, and would thereby be a different ship.

I’m not affirming that there isn’t more to identity. A crushed aluminum can is the same can it previously was when uncrushed, for example. But I do believe there’s more to identity than that of material form.

The past consists of the changes/motion that occurred, but that are no longer occurring (and it no longer exists, of course--it rather existed). Talking about changing the past, then, it talking about changing changes that no longer exist. — Terrapin Station

I keep on coming back in my thoughts to a Tom Waits lyric: “time is just memory mixed with desire”

To argue the past no longer exists in some ontological way is not necessarily contradictory; but one cannot claim that the past holds no presence whatsoever. Yesterday was there for me and it was there for you too. Yesterday, then, is more than an intra-personal memory. It holds presence within all sentience … even if only as an intersubjectively shared memory of what was (not barring personal deviations from this intersubjectively shared memory). In this sense, the past exists independently of us as individual beings.

In other words--thought I think I get what you’re saying--the past is yet there for all of us and it is yet remembered (usually) in a third-person, “t1, t2, t3” manner … such that we are no longer present within the events of the past but, instead, look upon these events from the outside. This “outside” being the duration of the current moment.

I keep on coming back in my thoughts to a Tom Waits lyric: “time is just memory mixed with desire” — javra

Pretty much straight out of Bergson.

Time is memory with intent to action (desire).

Very nice indeed. I wonder if Wait arrived at this via his own intuition?

Yesterday, then, is more than an intra-personal memory. It holds presence within all sentience … even if only as an intersubjectively shared memory of what was (not barring personal deviations from this intersubjectively shared memory). In this sense, the past exists independently of us as individual beings. — javra

On my view sentience isn't independent of individual persons, and "intersubjectivity" doesn't amount to anything more than the fact that we can utter things to each other including agreements. It's nothing like literally sharing subjectivity.

Re the present, I defined that a couple times above, see especially this post: http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/45749#Post_45749

I wonder if Wait arrived at this via his own intuition? — Rich

I've no way of knowing. But a lot of his lyrics indicate that he's well read.

and "intersubjectivity" doesn't amount to anything more than the fact that we can utter things to each other including agreements. It's nothing like literally sharing subjectivity. — Terrapin Station

Different topic but: we can and do share unspoken understandings. You disagree?

Still, what I was trying to get at is that the past yet holds presence--exists in one way or another.

Different topic but: we can and do share unspoken understandings. You disagree? — javra

We don't literally share understandings on my view, no. Understanding is an individual subjective (dynamic) state that can't be shared with others. We can achieve that (dynamic) state in response to other things than natural language utterances, though, sure. I didn't mean to suggest that I thought that it was limited to natural language utterances and not body gestures, artworks, etc.

(By the way, I'm just putting "dynamic" in parentheses because there are a number of people around here who read "state" as static/not-changing)

Right, you’re not one for universals. I was instead thinking in terms of all of us sharing a common understanding of basic aspects of reality, such as what up and down is, for example—this due to a fundamental universality of our individual experiences, even when unexpressed. And it of course then can become more complex via culture (in the anthropological sense) ... which includes a commonality of memories regarding the same events as referents.

We might need to do the old agreement to disagree on this one.

We might need to do the old agreement to disagree on this one. — javra

Haha--yeah. Remember that I'm a physicalist and kind of an extreme reductionist and "naturalist," in addition to being a nominalist who rejects that there are any real abstracts whatsoever. So anything that suggests a real abstract in any manner isn't going to be something I'd accept.

Talking about changing the past, then, is talking about changing changes that no longer exist. — Terrapin Station

But hey, no cheating: what about your claim that the past doesn't exist? Care to embellish this some.

I'm not sure what you want me to embellish. It seems very straightforward to me. Obviously I'm not saying that we don't have present memories, but that doesn't amount to the past existing.

I'm not sure what you want me to embellish. It seems very straightforward to me. Obviously I'm not saying that we don't have present memories, but that doesn't amount to the past existing. — Terrapin Station

I’m not sure how to do this without dreary examples, so I’ll use forth-person: One is fine up until the day one gains amnesia. When one is fine there is a (nonexistent?) past. When one gains amnesia, this (nonexistent?) past is no longer existent within one’s duration of the present moment.

(a) Correct this wordage so that when one is fine there is a past relative to oneself.

(b) Then, using this corrected wordage regarding the past, how is the past which applies to one and all not existent (i.e., devoid of being; aka. “is” not)?

Before we get lost in what (b) intends, resolve (a).

Amnesia is a memory problem. You might not remember things like your name, your family, where you live, what you do for work, etc. So it's an issue with present brain states. Remembering those things is a matter of presently accessing information stored in your brain (via dynamic structures of particular neurons, synapses, etc.). When you have amensia, you can't access that information any longer.

Amnesia is a memory problem. — Terrapin Station

Yes, I’m aware of what it is and its mechanisms as much as any other.

The issue is in expressing the different between there being a past for the person prior to amnesia, after which the person’s past no longer is.

Again, all this is in reference to your remark that the past does not exist.

there being a past — javra

"There being things they remember" is all that is.

"There being things they remember" is all that is. — Terrapin Station

So the things that the doctors remember isn't?

And if those things also are, then isn't there a commonly shared past independent of the individual's memory?

So the things that the doctors remember isn't? — javra

What? The things that the doctors remember aren't what? My "is all that is" is another way of saying "All that you're describing there is that people remember things (when they don't have amesia)."