For example, how do I know that I exist and am evolving? It is the memory of myself juxtaposed on a prior memory of myself. The two memories create time. The time of scientists, or click time, is different. — Rich
No, it's a matter of knowing you are having it when you do! That is the actual point at issue. — John
There's only (a) logical identity, and (b) whether we call something "the same x" by virtue of the necessary and sufficient conditions we construct via our concepts. There is no other sort of identity on my view. Re (a) it's not the same chair. Re (b) it can be, depending on your conceptual abstractions relative to the chair. — Terrapin Station
My own argument would be that, as with the Ship of Theseus problem, the parts of the chair can change but as long as the whole, the gestalt, remains unchanged in form and/or functionality, it remains the same chair. Darn it though, this gets into issues of identity and change. ... But I too am an curious to see what Terrapin has to say. — javra
OK, so you deny that the chair which I sit in this morning is the same chair that I sat in last night. — Metaphysician Undercover
The car that you bought yesterday is not the same car that is in the parking lot right now, so who exactly owns that car? — Metaphysician Undercover
Why is it then, that the majority of the chair stays the same? — Metaphysician Undercover
We are claiming that the old chair is taken right out of existence, and replaced with a new chair at each moment of change. — Metaphysician Undercover
Nevertheless, when we address past, we all use the notion of changelessness as it pertains to events gone by. — javra
The Ship of Theseus problem takes the two distinct forms of identity, logical identity as claimed by Terrapin, and material identity as stated by Aristotle, and creates ambiguity between them. — Metaphysician Undercover
The past consists of the changes/motion that occurred, but that are no longer occurring (and it no longer exists, of course--it rather existed). Talking about changing the past, then, it talking about changing changes that no longer exist. — Terrapin Station
Yesterday, then, is more than an intra-personal memory. It holds presence within all sentience … even if only as an intersubjectively shared memory of what was (not barring personal deviations from this intersubjectively shared memory). In this sense, the past exists independently of us as individual beings. — javra
and "intersubjectivity" doesn't amount to anything more than the fact that we can utter things to each other including agreements. It's nothing like literally sharing subjectivity. — Terrapin Station
Different topic but: we can and do share unspoken understandings. You disagree? — javra
We might need to do the old agreement to disagree on this one. — javra
Talking about changing the past, then, is talking about changing changes that no longer exist. — Terrapin Station
I'm not sure what you want me to embellish. It seems very straightforward to me. Obviously I'm not saying that we don't have present memories, but that doesn't amount to the past existing. — Terrapin Station
Amnesia is a memory problem. — Terrapin Station
there being a past — javra
"There being things they remember" is all that is. — Terrapin Station
So the things that the doctors remember isn't? — javra
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