I'd participate. I was hoping we'd do more "let's read a book together" threads.

Do you mean the following paper, if yes, then yes.

http://selfpace.uconn.edu/class/percep/SellarsEmpPhilMind.pdf

I am interested and game.

Cool, I'm glad there's interest. I've read about half of the paper and it's pretty dense, so I think reading maybe 2 sections a week would be a good pace.There's a lot to digest. I'd say three sections a week, but, in the first half of the paper at least, the sections are kind of organized into couplets. Reading three a week would throw off the rhythm of the paper.. I'd also prefer to do this as a free-form reading group without any leader (I'm also too lazy/busy to commit to holding that position.) So what do you all think, read the first two sections (An ambiguity in Sense Datum Theories & Another Language?) by next sunday?

Yeah, that's the paper! Thanks for the link. It can also be found here, handily formatted section by section: http://www.ditext.com/sellars/epm.html

So what do you all think, read the first two sections (An ambiguity in Sense Datum Theories & Another Language?) by next sunday? — csalisbury

Yeah, no problem.

I don't know if AaronR comes by at all, he put me straight about Sellars a couple of years ago.

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is the most famous article written by Wilfrid Sellars. Harvard Edition includes Robert Brandom's study guide. Robert Brandom's Articulating Reasons will help you understand Sellars' thoughts.

Hey everyone, fairly new to philosophy.

I have been reading through quite a few of the empiricists over the past few weeks: Russel, Hanson, Maxwell and van Fraassen. So I'm pretty interested in reading some Sellers, I got a few points down.

Can someone tell me what the heck a "carrier of slabs" is???????? (VII. in the beginning)

Can someone tell me what the heck a "carrier of slabs" is????????

It's a reference to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. If you're not familiar with the Big Themes of that work, one central idea is that 'the meaning of a word is its use' and that 'to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.' To illustrate this idea, Wittgenstein imagines a very simple form of life - builders using 'slabs' to construct something - and a correspondingly simple language - 'slab' is used to request a slab from another worker etc.
Here's the text. Sections 1 & 2 are the relevant ones.

Re the beginning of Sellars paper, the first big problem I have with it is his distinction between particulars and facts.

Facts are particulars. Re his examples of facts: (i) something's being thus-and-so, and (ii) something's standing in a certain relation to something else, those are both examples of particulars on my view.

So sensing particulars isn't mutually exclusive with knowing facts. Not that I buy sense data theory, but this is a major problem with his analysis of a putative dilemma with sense data theory.

Huh, how would you define 'particular' (noun)?

Facts are particulars. Re his examples of facts: (i) something's being thus-and-so, and (ii) something's standing in a certain relation to something else, those are both examples of particulars on my view.

Not sure I understand what you are referring to in regard to what he says. Seller's thinks that particulars are sensed. The problem he has, as I understand it, is that in that the sensation of sense datum can't act as epistemic knowledge of what is being sensed, sense datum itself is non-cognitive.

How do you conceive of sense datum?


My concern has to do with what is Given. Suppose I'm walking though a park and I say "that tree is green" did what I experienced (the green tree) demonstrate its presence to me as part of my experience of the park or does the statement "that tree is green" represent my experience, which in itself has no content.

The difference is that on the representational approach, I am to some extent responsible for what I experience and on the presentational approach I am somewhat passive in regards to the tree I experience.

Huh, how would you define 'particular' (noun)? — csalisbury

In the standard way, or at least per the core of the standard way. For example, per Wikipedia: "In metaphysics, particulars are defined as concrete, spatiotemporal entities as opposed to abstract entities."

However, I do not agree that properties--or anything, for that matter, aren't particulars.

Yeah, that's more or less how I take Sellars to understand the term too.

But so you consider facts to be concrete, spatiotemporal entities?

Not sure I understand what you are referring to in regard to what he says. — Cavacava

He says the following:

. . . according to sense-datum theorists, it is particulars that are sensed. For what is known even in non-inferential knowledge, is facts rather than particulars, items of the form something's being thus-and-so or something's standing in a certain relation to something else . . . The sense-datum theorist, it would seem, must choose between saying . . . Sensing is a form of knowing. It is facts rather than particulars which are sensed. — Wilfrid Sellars

How do you conceive of sense datum? — Cavacava

As with "particulars," I just use "sense data" in the usual way. Per SEP for example:

Sense data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have. For instance, sense data theorists say that, upon viewing a tomato in normal conditions, one forms an image of the tomato in one's mind. This image is red and round. The mental image is an example of a 'sense datum.' Many philosophers have rejected the notion of sense data, either because they believe that perception gives us direct awareness of physical phenomena, rather than mere mental images . . . — SEP

That last sentence describes me.

But so you consider facts to be spatiotemporal entities? — csalisbury

Yes, and on my view, nothing exists that isn't a spatiotemporal entity. In fact, the idea of a non-spatiotemporal existent is incoherent on my view.

Oh, ok, you probably won't get much from this paper then

Oh, ok, you probably won't get much from this paper then — csalisbury

Well, I'll get the opportunity to note some of the many ways Sellars goes wrong, for one. :-)

Do you have a sense of why others might think that facts aren't particulars?

Sure, I understand what they believe that's wrong.

Ok, but what I asked was do you have a sense why they might believe that?

What's the difference in your view?

Are you asking what the difference is between understanding that someone is wrong and understanding why they believe that wrong thing?

No, I'm not asking that. What I said above was not that I understand that they're wrong. I said that I understand what they believe, and that what they believe is wrong. So I'm asking you what the difference is on your view between understanding what they believe and understanding why they believe it.

Ok, sure, if you want to split absolutely inconsequential semantic hairs, I'll grant you that. This kind of thing doesn't further conversation whatsoever, but it seems important to you, and I want you to feel comfortable.

Not believing that facts are particulars doesn't entail believing any other one thing. All it means is believing 'facts are not particulars.' I'm sure you do understand 'facts are not particulars.' What I'm asking is: Do you understand why people would think that? [let me be entirely forthright: I don't you think you actually do understand the thought behind it. I think you're stalling. I think you have a very simple idea: 'All that there is is material things' & instead of engaging philosophically with anything, you just see how a sentence stands up against this pre-established idea. Basically, terrapin, I think you're very bad at philosophy and I think you're paticipating in this group in bad faith. But I'm willing to be proven wrong. Show me!)

What I'm asking is: Do you understand why people would think that? — csalisbury

And that's what I answered. Yes, I understand what they believe, meaning the same thing as I understand why they believe this.

I don't you think you actually do understand the thought behind it. — csalisbury

Yeah, no shit, as if there was some doubt about you being unjustifiably arrogant and patronizing. You'd probably find conversations furthered better without that attitude.

Sorry man. Understanding what someone believes is not understanding why they believe it. If you don't already understand this, no one can explain it to you. I've had lots of good conversations with people on this board. If you don't like the patronizing, arrogant responses*, then step up your game, and I'll gladly meet you.

* is there anything more patronizing and arrogant then saying something like 'well in my view,this is false, so I disagree'? Without arguing for that view? You do this constantly.

Here's another problem with the Sellars paper: he says, "It would seem, then, that the sensing of sense contents cannot constitute knowledge, inferential or non-inferential; and if so, we may well ask, what light does the concept of a sense datum throw on the 'foundations of empirical knowledge?'"

He's assuming that for the concept of sense data to throw light on the foundations of empirical knowledge, sense data must itself be knowledge. But that assumption is completely unsupported in Sellars' paper. He just proceeds as if it goes without saying.

So do you have anything to say about the first couple sections of Sellars' paper, or are you just never going to get around to that?