Rather they would take the contrapositive of the argument, and reason that since the foundation of empirical knowledge is the non-inferential knowledge of such facts, it does consist of members of a class which contains non-veridical members.
though for it to strike them as it does, they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experience as veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it as unveridical.
He's assuming that for the concept of sense data to throw light on the foundations of empirical knowledge, sense data must itself be knowledge — Terrapin Station
Yet it would be hasty to conclude that this alternative precludes any logical connection between the sensing of sense contents and the possession of non-inferential knowledge. For even if the sensing of sense contents did not logically imply the existence of non-inferential knowledge, the converse might well be true. Thus, the non-inferential knowledge of particular matter of fact might logically imply the existence of sense data (for example, seeing that a certain physical object is red might logically imply sensing a red sense content) even though the sensing of a red sense content were not itself a cognitive fact and did not imply the possession of non-inferential knowledge.
Hmm. Why does Sellars think this? — The Great Whatever
Now it is, of course, possible to delimit subclasses of ostensible seeings, hearings, etc., which are progressively less precarious, i.e. more reliable, by specifying the circumstances in which they occur, and the vigilance of the perceiver. But the possibility that any given ostensible seeing, hearing, etc., is non-veridical can never be entirely eliminated. Therefore, given that the foundation of empirical knowledge cannot consist of the veridical members of a class not all the members of which are veridical, and from which the non-veridical members cannot be weeded out by 'inspection,' this foundation cannot consist of such items as seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular. — Wilfrid Sellars
The whole point of non-veridicality, if you like, is that there was a seeming that led you to believe something that wasn't so. But if what 'was so' was merely the seeming, this possibility seems to become incoherent. Sellars seems to want to say that this makes veridicality incoherent too, but I'm not sure what leads him to think this. — The Great Whatever
Again, in that section he's speaking in the voice of the sense datum theorist, — The Great Whatever
That is, I think you're misreading the paper on a very surface level. — The Great Whatever
He's assuming that for the concept of sense data to throw light on the foundations of empirical knowledge, sense data must itself be knowledge
Yet it would be hasty to conclude that this alternative [that is, alternative (a), that sensing is not itself knowing] precludes any logical connection between the sensing of sense contents and the possession of non-inferential knowledge. For even if the sensing of sense contents did not logically imply the existence of non-inferential knowledge, the converse might well be true. Thus, the non-inferential knowledge of particular matter of fact might logically imply the existence of sense data (for example, seeing that a certain physical object is red might logically imply sensing a red sense content) even though the sensing of a red sense content were not itself a cognitive fact and did not imply the possession of non-inferential knowledge.
He can abandon A, in which case the sensing of sense contents becomes a noncognitive fact -- a noncognitive fact, to be sure which may be a necessary condition, even a logically necessary condition, of non-inferential knowledge, but a fact, nevertheless, which cannot constitute this knowledge.
This unfortunate, but familiar, line of thought runs as follows:
He can abandon A, in which case the sensing of sense contents becomes a noncognitive fact -- a noncognitive fact, to be sure which may be a necessary condition, even a logically necessary condition, of non-inferential knowledge, but a fact, nevertheless, which cannot constitute this knowledge. — Wilfrid Sellars
you seem to be implying that Sellars is critiquing the sense datum theorist for allowing uncertainty in their empirical foundations, — The Great Whatever
Regarding the second disagreement,
Unfortunately, the idea that there are such things as sensations of red triangles . . . seems to fit the requirements of another . . . line of thought so well that it has almost invariably been distorted to give the latter a reinforcement without which it would long ago have collapsed. — Wilfrid Sellars
Thus baldly put, scarcely anyone would accept this conclusion. — Wilfried Sellars
though for it to strike them as it does, they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experience as veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it as unveridical.
Hmm. Why does Sellars think this?
"I had experience x."
"I had experience x, and it was veridical."
So your argument that Sellars counts non-inferential knowledge of particular matters of fact might logically imply the existence of sense data is sufficient for noncognitive sense data throwing light on the foundations of empirical knowledge is ________? — Terrapin Station
Again, that reason that makes it sufficient to throw a light on the foundations of empirical knowledge in Sellars opinion, in your view, is _______? — Terrapin Station
So who is he supposedly paraphrasing "baldly" anyway? — Terrapin Station
Sellars outright admits that even if sensation of sense data doesn't constitute knowledge, it might nonetheless shed light on the foundations of empirical knowledge (i.e. by being a logically necessary condition for empirical knowledge), — The Great Whatever
Also, reading comprehension is interpretation. — Terrapin Station
Thus, when I say "X looks green to me now" I am reporting the fact that my experience is, so to speak, intrinsically, as an experience, indistinguishable from a veridical one of seeing that x is green. — Wilfrid Sellars
Interpretation can't happen until reading comprehension is complete. — The Great Whatever
As our friend John becomes more and more sophisticated about his own and other people's visual experiences, he learns under what conditions it is as though one were seeing a necktie to be of one color when in fact it is of another. Suppose someone asks him "Why does this tie look green to me?" John may very well reply "Because it is blue, and blue objects look green in this kind of light." And if someone asks this question when looking at the necktie in plain daylight, John may very well reply "Because the tie is green" -- to which he may add "We are in plain daylight, and in daylight things look what they are." — Wilfrid Sellars
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